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 Abstract 
 
After decades of international activism by Indigenous peoples, the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration) was endorsed by the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly in 2007. The Declaration affirms the Indigenous right to self-determination 
and promotes development as a primary tool to implement this right peacefully and sustainably. 
My research explores the extent to which the current development system in Timor-Leste can 
support the implementation of Indigenous self-determination. 
 
Timor-Leste is a conflict-affected Indigenous society with a long history of colonialism and 
violence. Since 1999, when the East Timorese people exercised their right to self-determination 
in a UN-sponsored ballot, the country has been impacted by numerous international 
development and peacebuilding interventions with mixed outcomes.  
 
I specifically appraise perceptions of international development and peacebuilding interventions 
that have taken place in Timor-Leste since 1999, and undertake a comprehensive complex 
systems analysis of the root causes of violence and Indigenous peacebuilding practices in 
Timor-Leste. I argue that the current development system, rather than building peace, creates 
further structural and cultural violence because it overlooks or does not value or empower 
Indigenous knowledge systems or peacebuilding practices. I find that international practitioners 
have structural and cultural barriers that prevent them from engaging with Indigenous 
knowledge systems.  
 
My research demonstrates that East Timorese people have strong Indigenous knowledge 
systems, deeply linked to land, place and kinship networks. Indigenous East Timorese people 
seek to find balance within their complex and plural knowledge systems, which are envisioned 
as ukun rasik a’an or self-determination and peace.  
 
I used an ethnographic ‘listening’ methodology to undertake field research between 2009 and 
2013 with around ninety East Timorese and international development and peacebuilding 
practitioners, and used abductive methods to analyse this data. Using primary and secondary 
sources I identify three main themes embedded in Indigenous East Timorese knowledge 
systems: 
 
i 
• Culture / lulik: a plural system of cosmological and secular unity expressed through 
cultural practices and rituals;  
• Power / lisan: a governance system grounded in the balancing of power dynamics 
through cultural practices; and  
• Relationships / slulu: the primacy of localised relationship-based land, place and kinship 
systems. 
 
Drawing on the experiences of East Timorese and international practitioners I provide guiding 
principles or practical recommendations for practitioners to use to transform the identified root 
causes of violence in Timor-Leste and implement Indigenous self-determined development, 
grounded in free, prior and informed consent. My research contributes to the ongoing critique of 
development and liberal peacebuilding through the use of complex systems theory and the 
prioritisation of Indigenous peacebuilding approaches and Indigenous knowledge systems. 
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hakawak (Tetum: working collectively or together) 
hakmatek (Tetum: stability or quiet, a situation where violence and disorder are absent) 
halerik (Tetum: the singing or chanting of the suffering) 
heda (Tetum: pandanus leaves) 
hun (Tetum: the roots of the tree or source, meaning their ancestors, origins and history) 
indigenas (Portuguese - people who are Indigenous, local or natives) 
Ita Nia Rai (Tetum: our land) 
juramentu (Tetum: binding oath, blood oath or oath of loyalty) 
jus cogens (Latin: compelling law) 
katuas (Tetum: customary elder) 
Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute (KSI) (Tetum: Streams meet to become one river) 
Keluarga Berencana (Indonesian: Indonesian National Family Planning Programme) 
Klibur Oan Timor Assua’in (KOTA) (Portuguese: Association of Timorese Warrior Sons) knua 
(Tetum: larger group or clan) 
La’o Hamutuk (Tetum: walking together) 
lia-nain (Tetum: owner of words, a customary law expert, spokesperson, responsible for ritual 
authority and moral behaviour) 
lian inan (Tetum: mother tongue) 
x 
lisan (Tetum: customary governance) 
liurai (Tetum: hereditary leaders or ‘lords of the land’)  
liurai (Tetum: local hereditary leaders or ‘lords of the land’ responsible for political authority, 
justice and resource management)  
Loromonu (Tetum: West/sunset  
Lorosa’e (Tetum: East/sunrise) 
lulik (Tetum: sacred knowledge) 
malae (Tetum: foreigner) 
malisan husi matebian sira (Tetum: curse of the martyrs) 
mambai (East Timorese mother tongue or local language) 
mane (Tetum: male) 
Maromak (Tetum: one who gives light or enlightens) 
Maromak Oan (Tetum: Great Lord) 
matak inan malirin inan (Tetum: mother of greenness and coolness) 
matak-malirin (Tetum-terik: newly green or sprouting - cool) 
matan-do’ok (Tetum: soothsayers, people who diagnose illness and use traditional plant 
medicines) 
maubere or mau bere (Mambai: people of the countryside) 
maun-alin (Tetum: elder-younger siblings)  
mestiços (Portuguese: a person with mixed Indigenous and European parentage) 
moradores or arraias  (Portuguese: Indigenous militias) 
moris (Tetum: life and the future one seeks) 
nacionalismo (Tetum: East Timorese nationalism) 
nahe biti (Tetum: stretching or laying down the mat as a means to facilitate consensus, truth-
telling or reconciliation). 
nobles (Tetum: dato) 
Organização Popular da Mulher Timor (OPMT) (Portuguese: Popular Organisation of 
Timorese Women) 
Pakote Dezenvolvimentu Desentrilizadu (PDD) (Tetum: Decentralised Development Package)  
Pakote Referendum (Tetum: Referendum Package) 
Partido Trabalhista (Portuguese: Labour Party) 
Planu Nasional Dezenvolvimentu Suku (PNDS) (Tetum: National Suku Development Plan) 
Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) (Portuguese: East Timorese national police force) 
posto – now sub distritu (Tetum: sub-district) 
Programa Dezenvolvimentu Lokal (PDL) (Tetum: Local Development Program)  
rai (Tetum: the land one stands on)  
rai lulik timor (Tetum: The land is sacred) 
rate (Tetum: the graveyard of your kin) 
Rede Feto (Tetum: NGO network of Women’s Groups) 
República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL) (Portuguese: Democratic Republic of East 
Timor) 
rohan (Tetum: tips of the tree branches, meaning the present or the future) 
Rotinohshonni (model of Indigenous self-governance from the knowledge system of the 
Kahnawake-Mohawk peoples) 
sasan lulik (Tetum: ancient relics) 
slulu (Mambai: cooperation or working collectively) 
suku (Tetum: local level government areas / princedom)  
tabula rasa (Latin: blank slate) 
tais (Tetum: woven cloth) 
tam kalsa (Mambai: put on trousers) 
tara (Tetum: to hang up or suspend, often a piece of cloth) 
tarabandu (Tetum/Portuguese: set rules and prohibitions) 
Tat Felis (Mambai: a Christ-like character whose persecution and suffering has been linked to 
the struggles to attain East Timorese self-determination) 
tempu beiala (Tetum: time of the ancestors) 
tempu rai-diak (Tetum: a time of tranquility) 
Tentara Nacional Indonesia (TNI) (Indonesian: Indonesian military) 
xi 
terra nullius (Latin: land that belongs to no one) 
Tetum – a hybrid language, the common vernacular across Timor-Leste 
Tupassi or Topasses (Portuguese: Black Portuguese) 
ukun (Tetum: rule or regulate) 
ukun rasik a’an (Tetum: self-determination: sovereignty, self-sufficiency and independence) 
uma (Tetum: house) 
uma fukun (Tetum: sacred house for extended family or clan)  
uma kain (Tetum: immediate household) 
uma lulik (Tetum: sacred houses) 
umamane (Tetum: wife givers) 
União Democratica Timorense (UDT) (Portuguese: East Timorese Democratic Union) 
Xefe de Aldeia (Tetum: sub-chief) 
Xefe de Suku (Tetum: elected chief of the village) 
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 The research problem 
 
Worldwide, it is estimated that there are approximately 370 million Indigenous people (IWGIA, 
2013). Indigenous peoples experience direct, structural and cultural violence at inter-state, 
national, community or individual levels. Not all conflict that takes place in Indigenous 
communities is negative: intra-group conflict is often constructive and necessary to enable 
change and transformation (Lederach, 2003; 2005a; 2015). However, significant levels of direct, 
structural and cultural violence exist in Indigenous communities as a result of prior and ongoing 
forms of colonialism. This violence manifests broadly as forced resettlement; practices of rape, 
murder and incarceration; the removal of rights; and restricted access to land and resources.  
 
Due to the impacts of colonialism, Indigenous peacebuilding systems are often not able to 
transform the root causes of violence, so preventing Indigenous communities from meaningfully 
engaging or actively participating in their own self-determination. This problem is compounded 
because many Indigenous peoples are governed by non-Indigenous systems and institutions, are 
often unable to access service delivery and are dislocated from customary structures of law, 
leadership and decision-making. In this thesis I explore whether space can be found within the 
current development system to engage in a partnership with Indigenous peoples towards their 
goal of self-determination. I do this through a case study of Timor-Leste. 
 
Indigenous self-determination is most clearly articulated as a theoretical concept and a legal 
framework in the 2007 United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(the Declaration). In the Declaration development is promoted as a primary tool to implement 
Indigenous self-determination. This is critical because states, the private sector and non-
government organisations (NGOs) world-wide are funding development interventions in 
Indigenous communities worth millions of dollars per annum. These interventions heavily 
impact on the lives and futures of Indigenous peoples but have not yet achieved the outcomes 
promised (Rihani, 2002).  
 
Not all conflict or violence that exists in Indigenous communities is caused by development 
interventions. However, evidence (Easterley, 2006; 2014; Kothari & Minogue, 2002; Moyo, 
2009; Rihani, 2002; Ramalingam, 2013) indicates that ineffective international development 
interventions have negatively affected Indigenous communities by causing and exacerbating 
existing conflict dynamics. I term this development-related violence, arguing that development, 
when practiced poorly, can exacerbate the root causes of violence and make development 
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interventions and their associated impacts both a cause and an effect of violence and instability 
in Indigenous communities. Evidence also shows that development-related violence has local 
and global economic, environmental, social, cultural, governance, gender and security impacts 
for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples (Anderson, 1999; Chand & Coffman, 2008; 
Collier, 2007; Richmond, 2010; 2015; Westoby & Dowling, 2009).  
 
I argue that the use of the current development system to achieve Indigenous self-determination 
poses a significant dilemma because the current development system is fundamentally flawed 
for two main reasons: it does not legitimise or empower Indigenous knowledge systems and it 
exacerbates violence in Indigenous communities. 
 
Timor-Leste is a conflict-affected society with a long history of colonialism and violence, which 
has been impacted by many development interventions, with mixed evidence of positive 
impacts. Since 1999, intra-state violence has continued to affect East Timorese communities. 
These ongoing high levels of violence underscore the need to examine whether violence is 
being exacerbated by development interventions. Despite the scope and scale of research about 
development and peacebuilding effectiveness in Timor-Leste, there is minimal research 
explicitly linking Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems to violence and development. 
By exploring how the current development system causes or exacerbates violence in Timor-
Leste and the systemic change needed to transform development practice, my research aims to: 
 
• map East Timorese development and peacebuilding goals, and reflect East Timorese 
and international practitioner views on the current development system and processes 
that could better achieve these goals;  
• assess the extent to which the current development system exacerbates violence or 
contributes to peacebuilding in Timor-Leste; and 
• construct a theoretical framework to better understand Indigenous East Timorese 
knowledge systems and apply this framework to support East Timorese development 
and peacebuilding goals. 
 
This introductory chapter outlines the current research in development, peacebuilding and 
Indigenous studies and establishes the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the research 
problem. I examine a number of theoretical approaches and discuss how they are incompatible 
with this interdisciplinary approach. I discuss the current development system and propose that 
Indigenous knowledge systems, critical peace studies and complex systems theory can be used 
to can build a theoretical framework to understand, explore and transform the current 
development system. This theoretical framework aims to better understand how Indigenous 
peoples can transform violence, and create self-determined development in their communities. 
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As each chapter develops, definitions and concepts are examined and explained and the 
historical context will be provided to locate and frame the issues.  
 
1.2 Peacebuilding, conflict and violence  
 
Peace and conflict studies are the ontological and epistemological foundation of this research. In 
this section I differentiate conflict from violence and discuss how I engage with the concepts of 
peacebuilding and human security. I position my research as a contribution to critical peace 
theory and peacebuilding practice in Timor-Leste. 
 
There are multiple, contested definitions of conflict. I use Lederach’s transformational 
perspective, where conflict is seen as: “a natural part of human experience and relationships… 
conflict [is] a valuable opportunity to grow and increases our understanding of ourselves and 
others” (Lederach, 2003). I agree that conflict can be positive and constructive, enabling 
societies and individuals to evolve to achieve necessary change and renewal. However, if 
conflict is not managed appropriately, it may become violent, as has been the primary historical 
experience of Indigenous peoples (Lederach, 1997; 2005a; 2006).  
 
Using Galtung’s work I differentiate the term ‘conflict’ from ‘violence’. Galtung (1969; 1990; 
1996; 2004) sought to understand peace by identifying, differentiating and connecting three 
fundamental forms of violence – personal or direct violence, cultural and structural violence 
(see Figure 1). Galtung (2004) explains that personal or direct violence is an event that can 
manifest visibly as physical, psychological and/or verbal behaviour. Structural violence is an 
indirect process caused by inequality. It: “comes from the social structure itself – between 
humans, between sets of humans (societies), between sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the 
world” (Galtung, 1996, p.2). Cultural violence is defined as: “those aspects of culture, the 
symbolic sphere of our existence–exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, 
empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or 
legitimise direct or structural violence” (Galtung, 1990, p.291). Galtung goes on to argue that 
direct violence reinforces structural and cultural violence and that cultural violence provides 
legitimising frameworks for direct and structural violence. This triangle of violence is useful 
because it helps portray the complexity of violence and emphasises the need for conflict 
transformation that targets violence in all its forms. 
 
3 
Figure 1: ‘Triangle of Violence’ showing the inter-relationship of direct, structural and cultural 
violence (Galtung, 2004). 
 
 
In his nuanced definition of violence Galtung (1969, p.190) explains that peace is not merely 
“the absence of violence”, which he terms negative peace, but that positive peace also includes 
the absence of structural and cultural violence, which he describes as “the presence of harmony” 
or the “integration of human society” (1964, p.2). Galtung (1969) describes positive peace as a 
sustainable situation where inequality, systematic societal disadvantage and the root causes of 
violence are eliminated. Lederach’s (2006, p.27) focus on conflict transformation positions 
positive peace as “centered and rooted in the quality of relationships”, where positive peace is 
not a static end-goal but a continuously dynamic and evolving quality of relationship. I argue 
that violence is multi-dimensional. It can be structural, political, economic, social, cultural, 
ethnic, religious, resource-based, gender-based. It is also a multi-tiered concept: violence is 
inter-woven and can take place simultaneously or separately at macro-, meso- and micro-levels. 
Violence involves multiple actors with multiple agendas.  
 
In 1992, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992, p.11) introduced the concept of 
peacebuilding, which he defined as “action to identify and support structures, which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Since then there has been 
much debate about the scope and definition of peacebuilding. I use the term ‘peacebuilding’ 
throughout my research to describe the meta-processes used to gain positive peace. I assert that 
peacebuilding is holistic; it incorporates all stages of conflict at all levels of intervention and it 
has a long-term focus on sustainably transforming the root causes of violence, particularly 
structural and cultural violence (Clements, 2004; Lederach, 2005b; 2015; Schirch, 2008). I 
support Boulding’s (1996, p.39) emphasis that peacebuilders should nurture “cultures of peace” 
which she defines as “a mosaic of identities, attitudes, values and beliefs, and institutional 
patterns that lead people to live nurturantly [sic] with one another, deal with difference, share 
their resources, solve their problems, and give each other space, so no one is harmed and 
everyone’s basic needs are met”. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation are therefore 
ongoing and holistic processes that change the socio-economic and cultural conditions that 
trigger violence; rebuild relationships, institutions and structures that support peace; and aim to 
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heal past traumas through broad, inclusive and long-term community participation and 
ownership of these processes (Hunt, 2008a; Lederach, 2015; Spence, 1999).  
 
The concept of human security, which is articulated in the 1994 United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) Human Development Report, broadened the concept of violence and 
insecurity beyond its narrow focus on state or political violence to integrate the comprehensive 
security needs of individuals and communities (Newman, 2011). The UNDP (1994, pp.23-25) 
and the international NGO (INGO) Human Security Centre (2005) define human security as 
economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, 
community security and political security. They place collective responsibility for human 
security on all states, international organisations, NGOs, individuals, communities, families and 
other groups within civil society. I acknowledge the usefulness of the term human security in 
expanding the current definition of violence, although I acknowledge Suhrke’s (1999) assertion 
that while human security is progressive, it ultimately perpetuates state-centric understandings 
of security. In Chapters Five and Six I analyse violence by including threats to human security 
in Timor-Leste. Unless otherwise stated I will use the term ‘violence’ throughout this thesis to 
denote both human insecurity and direct, cultural and structural violence. 
 
I agree with my East Timorese colleague Antero da Silva (2012, p.18) who underlines that post-
conflict peacebuilding or a process of “re-conscientisation” must occur to prevent further 
instability. He suggests providing communities with safe spaces to share their stories and to 
enable true healing, to recreate societal links, and to bear witness to the suffering and bravery of 
East Timorese women and men during Indonesian occupation. The isolation caused by the 
Indonesian occupation and the ensuing collective trauma means that very few East Timorese 
have been able to develop their own understandings of positive peace in Timor-Leste. Jabri 
(1996, p.154) agrees, noting that communities emerging from protracted conflict and violence 
require the development of “a conception of peace that challenges war as a social continuity”. 
Candio and Bleiker (2001, p.71), Lederach (1996, p.20), Spence (1999) and Westoby and 
Dowling (2009) concur claiming that it is in the personal and community-level domains where 
peacebuilding transformation emerges to deal with grief, trauma, loss, fear and anger resulting 
from violence. 
 
A peacebuilding focus is important because ongoing intra-state violence continues to affect 
Timor-Leste. Chapters Four to Eight will detail the broad scope of direct, structural and cultural 
violence currently occurring across all communities in Timor-Leste. Collier (et.al., 2003) asserts 
that around half of all states emerging from conflict have reoccurring violence within the ten 
years after the initial conflict ceases. The World Bank (2011a, p.10) found that on average states 
take between fifteen and thirty years, a full generation, to transition out of conflict and to build 
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resilience, and the World Bank (2004) reports that countries coming out of conflict face a forty 
per cent chance of relapsing within the first five years of peace. Chand and Coffman (2008) 
indicate that given the levels of violence experienced and other factors, development 
practitioners may be engaged in Timor-Leste until 2026. Considering Timor-Leste’s violent 
history, the social and economic development achieved so far in Timor-Leste is remarkably 
positive, however, I will argue that the ongoing intra-state violence is a major barrier to further 
development and peace. 
 
At the heart of the challenge of achieving positive peace is the need to understand and transform 
the complex root causes of violence (Lederach, 1996; 2015). While there have been some useful 
contributions from East Timorese researchers and practitioners (Babo-Soares, 2003; 2004; da 
Silva, 2012; Trindade, 2006; 2008; 2014) and others (Belun, International Crisis Group (ICG) 
and The Asia Foundation) to building understanding, there are no comprehensive studies that 
investigate the root causes of direct, cultural and structural violence in Timor-Leste. Nor is there 
existing research that uses Indigenous critical theory to examine peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. 
My research aims to fill this gap by investigating the ways in which social institutions are built, 
sustained and changed by conflict; how conflict changes relationships between Indigenous 
peoples and international development practitioners; and how these patterns affect the way 
people understand and respond to conflict. I do this by analysing violence in Timor-Leste 
through an Indigenous critical theory lens and by providing a space for East Timorese to discuss 
and analyse their experiences of violence and to suggest practical solutions for conflict 
transformation.  
 
1.3 Indigenous critical theory and complex systems theory 
 
This section positions my research within two different but, I argue, connected theoretical 
approaches: Indigenous critical theory – which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Three –  
and complex systems theory, which I engage with throughout this thesis. I discuss the current 
development system and differentiate it from my concept of Indigenous self-determined 
development. 
 
In this thesis, ‘Western’ is identified as the positivist, ahistorical liberal-democratic, market-
economy doctrine, dominant to most states, that has extended its influence throughout the 
world. I refer to this as the current or modern system that dominates international development. 
This tradition is dominant, in loose geographic terms, in North America, Europe/Scandinavia 
and Australia/New Zealand. Non-Western states, including states from the Arab Gulf, Africa, 
North and East Asia and Central and South America, are included as actors in this current 
development system. 
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 1.3.1 Indigenous critical theory  
 
My research is a contribution to Indigenous critical theory, or what Alfred (2010) calls “radical 
imagination” and what Garroutte (2003, p.101) calls “radical Indigenism”. These involve a 
process that “illuminates differences in assumptions about knowledge that are at the root of the 
dominant culture’s misunderstanding and subordination of indigenous knowledge. It argues for 
the reassertion and rebuilding of [Indigenous] knowledge from its roots, its fundamental 
principles” (Garroutte, 2003, p.101). I draw on the work of Indigenous critical theorists Alfred 
(1999; 2004; 2009; 2015), Corntassel (2008; 2009; 2012), Graham (1999; 2013a; 2013b), 
Moreton-Robinson (2004), Moreton-Robinson and Walter (2009), Nakata (1997; 2004; 2007), 
Nakata et.al, (2012), Rigney (1999; 2001; 2006), Smith (1999; 2007a; 2007b) and Walker 
(2001; 2003) who assert the primacy of Indigenous knowledge systems and the need for the 
rigorous decolonisation of Western knowledge to emancipate Indigenous peoples. By placing 
Indigenous knowledge alongside the modern ‘Western’ academy, I work to avoid 
disempowering Indigenous systems and eschew modern versus Indigenous dichotomies. 
 
Critical theory is a trans-disciplinary project used within Indigenous studies to emancipate and 
liberate Indigenous knowledge systems, to overcome dominant power structures, and to achieve 
societal transformation and Indigenous self-determination (Horkheimer, 1972; 1993; Nakata 
et.al., 2012). I believe that applying critical theory to Indigenous studies can expose hidden 
power relationships and the hierarchy of knowledge systems in the current development 
systems. Indigenous critical theory opens up the existing dialogues to better understand and 
articulate Indigenous differences; exposing new ways of seeing old challenges and providing a 
deeper understanding of the power dynamics with the systems Indigenous peoples engage with. 
I use Indigenous critical theory as a tool to envision pluralist alternatives to transform complex 
violence in Indigenous communities. 
 
Smith (1999, p.95) seeks to decolonise the current hierarchies of knowledge systems which 
problematise Indigenous peoples, invalidating their knowledge so that they have “no solutions 
to their own problems”. By “decolonising the academy” and aligning Indigenous research with 
Indigenous activism Smith (1999, pp.218,226) creates spaces for knowledge regeneration and 
radical resistance where Indigenous peoples can “talk back to or talk up to power”. Nakata et.al. 
(2012, p.124) also proposes that Indigenous scholars should engage in “de-colonial knowledge-
making”. Nakata et.al., (2012, p.127) explain that Western knowledge seeks to reinstate 
Indigenous worldviews in a way that is simplistic and counter-productive, and can lead to 
binary dichotomies that do not acknowledge “dynamically adapting cultural practices”. This 
simplistic form of Indigenous studies is risky, as it reduces Indigenous knowledge to versions of 
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authenticity, and fails to recognise the pluralism of modern Indigenous ontologies that are 
actively engaged with, not separate from, modernism and colonialism. I agree with Smith and 
Nakata that Indigenous scholars must do more than contest Western knowledge frameworks, 
they should also create new complex analytical frameworks and nuanced language to help frame 
new paths for Indigenous knowledge.  
 
The pluralism of Indigenous knowledge systems results in distinctly different approaches to 
self-determination for each Indigenous nation and individual. As Graham (2013a; 2013b) states, 
Indigenous peoples are located in multiple places throughout the world. These locations give 
rise to multiple dreamings and laws and therefore, multiple truths and perspectives. Indigenous 
scholars such as Alfred (1999; 2015), Corntassel (2008; 2009; 2012), Graham (1999; 2013a; 
2013b), Nakata (1997; 2007; 2012) Rigney (1999; 2001; 2006) and Smith (1999; 2007a; 2007b) 
provide examples of unique governance and decision-making frameworks based on their own 
Indigenous knowledge systems. This research aims to value these multiple ontologies, and by 
practically applying them to their related contexts will continue to transform knowledge 
generation and decision-making in Indigenous communities. I note that it is impossible to 
translate one Indigenous knowledge system into another context. Theoretically that would 
equate all Indigenous ontologies as homogenous, which is not the case. In my research I apply 
Indigenous critical theory to the Timor-Leste context but do not seek to take Indigenous East 
Timorese knowledge out of context. 
 
1.3.2 Complex systems theory  
 
Complex systems theory is a way of understanding relationships between structures and 
behaviours. Complex systems are everywhere: they are integrated, interconnected, and self-
organising, and understanding their intrinsic problems is at the root of restructuring or 
transforming the system itself (Meadows, 2008). Understanding and applying systems theory to 
real world problems allows us to “restructure the systems we live within…[and] leverage points 
for change” (Meadows, 2008, p.6). Systems theory is also a tool increasingly being used by 
peacebuilding practitioners in international organisations such as CDA Collaborative Learning 
Projects (CDA) and the Innovation Lab on Dynamical Systems Theory, Peace and Conflict1, 
who are applying dynamic systems theory to transform violence (Chigas & Woodrow, 2013; 
Körppen et.al., 2011; Ricigliano & Chigas, 2011). These practitioners explore how systems 
1 The Advanced Consortium on Cooperation Conflict and Complexity (AC4), the International Center for 
Cooperation and Conflict Resolution at Columbia University, The Institute of World Affairs at the 
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, and the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George 
Mason University are participating in the Innovation Lab on Dynamical Systems Theory, Peace and 
Conflict. See: http://conflictinnovationlab.org 
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theory can help to identify patterns of behavior, decision, and interaction in multiple complex 
conflict scenarios.  
 
I draw on Chigas and Woodrow (2013), Meadows (2008), Ramalingam (2013), Rihani (2002), 
Woodrow and Chigas (2011) and the work of Körppen et.al. (2011) to apply dynamic systems 
theory to understand poly-centric and non-linear Indigenous knowledge systems. Systems 
theory is a tool for examining how multiple decisions, behaviours and complex institutions 
change over time to affect outcomes. This tool provides ways of mapping power and 
relationships in a way that is non-hierarchical, non-linear and dynamic. My research aims to 
demonstrate that systems theory is useful for researchers and practitioners who are engaging 
with information that is both complex and plural, and form synergies with – rather than 
dominate – Indigenous knowledge systems.  
 
Using complex systems theory allows me to compare Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
knowledge systems and experiences in the same context. This is why my research participants 
include both international development practitioners who have worked in Timor-Leste and 
many other development contexts over many years and East Timorese development 
practitioners. This broad cross-section of individual stories and experiences contributes to 
building patterns across multiple contexts using qualitative evidence. The current development 
system is analysed in Chapter Four; East Timorese knowledge systems in Chapter Six; and in 
Chapter Seven and Eight I use this complex systems approach to seek broader patterns of 
violence and peacebuilding across Timor-Leste. 
 
One of the aims of Indigenous research methodologies is to transform knowledge generation. 
My research is only a small contribution to the building wave of Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
academics pursuing Indigenous cross-disciplinary studies and applying Indigenous critical 
methodologies to achieve knowledge pluralism in the (Western-dominated) academy and the 
wider community. My Indigenous critical theory and complex systems theory approach aims to 
analyse data to provide tools to rethink how Indigenous knowledge systems are generated, 
shared and applied. While there are limitations to the methodology used, I hope that my 
contribution expands the reader’s appreciation of the range and breadth of Indigenous critical 
theory. 
 
1.4 Current development system 
 
My research applies complex systems theory to the current development system. The current 
development system is grounded in modernisation and is characterised by liberal 
democratisation, property rights, market externalities, state territoriality and ethnocentric 
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individualism. This system seeks to resolve fundamental queries concerning justice, equality 
and power and uses linear, mechanistic models to find solutions to these complex challenges. 
Rihani (2002) and Ramalingam (2013) contend that applying complex systems theory helps us 
understand that the current development system is non-linear, interconnected, multi-
dimensional and adaptive. They highlight that linear, mechanistic models cannot adequately 
encompass the scope of the challenges provided. Lennie and Tacchi (2013, p.58) use Rihani 
(2002, pp.80-81) to demonstrate that development is a global system with the following 
behaviours: 
 
• “Active internal elements that have enough requisite variety that they can adapt to 
unforseen circumstances; 
• System elements are lightly, but not sparsely connected; 
• Simple rules maintain global patterns, as opposed to rigid order and chaos; and  
• Variations result in minor changes, but it is impossible to predict future outcomes”. 
 
Many Indigenous communities and civil society, bilateral, multilateral and private sector 
organisations are trying to use the current development system to implement Indigenous self-
determination. I argue that this is a fraught process based on an incorrect assumption that the 
current development system has the capacity to understand or integrate Indigenous knowledge 
systems. Rihani (2002, p.xv) asserts that new worldviews or theories will be required to engage 
in a necessary paradigm shift where development practitioners must “discard an inbuilt structure 
of beliefs and assumptions”. In Chapter Three I assert that an Indigenous critical theory 
approach could provide a radical alternative worldview, with context-specific models, to 
challenge the beliefs and assumptions implict within the current development system. I examine 
the current development system further in Chapter Four.  
 
1.4.1 Indigenous self-determined development  
 
I posit that the ultimate goal of Indigenous peoples is Indigenous self-determination. While 
Indigenous self-determination is not easily defined, and the goals are different for different 
Indigenous peoples, I use the Declaration as a tool to frame and analyse Indigenous self-
determination throughout this thesis: 
 
Article 3: Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development”.  
 
At some key points, the Declaration cites development as a primary tool to implement 
Indigenous self-determination. The Declaration guides the practical steps necessary to realise 
this goal in different contexts, much of which relies on working within the current development 
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system. In this thesis I argue that current development system is not effectively achieving 
Indigenous self-determination, and propose that if development is to be used to achieve 
Indigenous self-determination it needs to be a new form of development, grounded in 
Indigenous knowledge. I draw on Dodson and Smith (2003), Hemming and Rigney (2012), 
Hemming et.al. (2011), Hunt et.al. (2008) and Nuttall (2008) to propose that the term 
‘Indigenous self-determined development’ should be used to describe this form of development 
that is owned and enacted by empowered Indigenous peoples. Indigenous self-determined 
development promotes the primacy of Indigenous peoples as responsible custodians of their 
land, resources, culture, spirituality and governance.  
 
The right to Indigenous self-detemination and development is a complex theoretical issue, 
discussed at length by Anaya (1994), Behrendt (2003), Corntassel (2008), Davis (2008a), 
Dodson (1994; 1999), Engel (2010), Venne (2011) and Watson (2011a; 2011b; 2014). These 
rights are often viewed as problematic and polarising; Indigenous knowledge systems are seen 
as hostile to modernisation, liberal democracy and economic growth, ideas that underpin the 
current development system (U-1800-031010)2. For example, Indigenous peoples 
simultaneously hold multiple communal and individual rights. I posit that the current 
development system is often unable to manage the complexity of incorporating these multiple 
layers of rights or prioritising Indigenous communal rights.  
 
At the heart of Indigenous self-determined development is the right to free, prior and informed 
consent (FPIC) (UN General Assembly, 2007; Ward, 2011, p.55). Nuttall (2008, p.70) 
contends: “Self-determination is also about the right to development and, based on the rights of 
people to govern themselves, it is about the right to make decisions and choices that determine 
the path development should take”. Development, Indigenous self-determined development and 
FPIC are discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
 
Using critical peace theory I also link the goal of Indigenous self-determination and self-
determined development with positive peace, which is a process and an end goal with no direct, 
structural or cultural violence (Galtung, 1964; Lederach, 2006). I argue that Indigenous self-
determination cannot be achieved due to the pervasive existence of violence in Indigenous 
communities. I posit that any version of self-determination that does not directly address threats 
and triggers to violence can produce violent outcomes. My research therefore examines the 
rationale and processes of transforming violence using Indigenous knowledge systems and 
Indigenous self-determined development. 
2 My system of referencing interviews is discussed in Chapter Two. To maintain anonymity, 
each interviewee is coded. For example, U-1800-031010 indicates a participant whose interview 
took place at 18:00 hours on 3 October 2010. 
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 1.5 Other theoretical approaches 
 
This section highlights the hierarchy of Indigenous and modern knowledge systems that result 
in continued structural violence toward Indigenous peoples. I examine some non-Indigenous 
theoretical approaches, particularly post-colonialism, post-structuralism, liberal rights, critical 
cultural studies, liberal peacebuilding and hybridity theories that have been used to describe 
aspects of the Indigenous experience. I show that these theories are challenged by Indigenous 
knowledge systems that more usefully enable and empower Indigenous peoples’ to prioritise 
their worldviews and experiences. 
 
1.5.1 Post-colonial theory  
 
Indigenous knowledge systems are different from post-colonial theory that, as Seth (2000, 
p.218) explains is an intellectual discipline that “arose in the West, and which takes its bearings 
from landmarks in the Western intellectual tradition”. Post-colonialism does have some 
common ground with Indigenous knowledge systems by explaining some of the historical 
power and identity dynamics; however, as a theoretical approach used to understand 
Indigeneity, post-colonialism is limited. As Hart (cited in Murphy, 2000, p. 31) argues: “Post-
colonialism merely represents another calibration of politics that nomadically hunts and gathers 
inside the discursive landscape established by colonialism and the dispossession of the invaded” 
[my emphasis].  
 
History has shown that colonialism took place through widespread and sanctioned practices of 
homicide, sexual abuse, disease and starvation, combined with an influx of external migration 
and exclusion from essential services. Through these practices, the Indigenous space is usurped 
by a brand of colonialism that promotes Western hegemony and epistemic violence (Wolfe, 
1999). Wolfe (1999) argues that post-colonialism is pervasively Eurocentric; a narcissistic 
projection of the Western will to power. He differentiates between post-colonialism that arises 
from majority Indigenous populations asserting change in the context of forced labour and 
minority coloniser dependency, and settler colonialism, where Indigenous peoples are displaced 
or replaced to gain value from natural resources and land (Wolfe, 1999). Settler colonialism was 
supported by the doctrine of terra nullius (Latin: land that belongs to no-one), which asserted 
that the lands, waters and territories were not privately or collectively owned, and settlers who 
could cultivate land had the right to own it (Watson, 2014). 
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Since the middle of the twentieth century, states have (mostly) halted their colonialist 
expansion. However, scholars argue that through new institutions and structures, forms of neo-
colonialism continue to evolve across the world, most prominently in settler colonial contexts 
(Fanon, 1967, 1963; Nkrumah, 1965). In these contexts, neo-colonialism has been and is 
categorised by systemic direct, structural and cultural violence against Indigenous peoples. 
Post-colonialism only explains part of the East Timorese experience as a result of Portuguese 
and Indonesian occupation. I categorise Timor-Leste as a neo-colonial state and I will draw on 
useful post-colonial concepts of welfare colonialism and co-option, described further in Chapter 
Three, to expand on the experience of Indigenous East Timorese. 
 
1.5.2 Post-structuralism  
 
Post-structuralism proposes that deconstruction can assist with a re-reading of colonial history. 
De Saussure (1993 [1917]), Derrida (1978; 2004) and Foucault (1970) indicate that a binary 
opposition exists within all cultures. This series of oppositions is the basis of all thought, text 
and language where, by indicating good/evil or violence/peace, one term is favoured over the 
other and a preference or hierarchy is set. Oppositions within society create the illusion of truths 
and structures and this limits the capacity for cultures to change and transform (Devetak, 2013). 
The process of deconstruction examines this hierarchy and undertakes “a critical operation by 
which such oppositions can be partially undermined” (Sarup, 1989, p.40).  
 
Deconstruction highlights the binary oppositions within culture to emancipate the repressed, 
“the other”, and to form a politics of difference (Young, 1995; 1999). Derrida (1978) subverted 
hierarchies of privilege and marginalisation by interpreting terms in a non-hierarchical manner 
and without any stable central meaning. Post-structuralists believe that deconstruction shows 
there are no ultimate or correct paths for cultural evolution. Indeed truth is “nothing but a set of 
congealed or frozen metaphors whose metaphorical status has been mistaken for the literal” 
(Nietzsche in Deleuze, 1995, p.58). Anything is possible and all discourse is relative (Nietzsche, 
1968).  
 
Foucault (1970) scrutinised power and proposed that we deconstruct ourselves from the 
dominant discourse within our culture to see the alternative possibilities of human behaviour. 
Using this method researchers can explore the hierarchical “binary opposition” that is 
constructed between dominant modern Western and Indigenous notions of power, legitimacy 
and authority (Brigg, 2008; Derrida, 1978; Doxtater, 2004; Nietschmann, 1994, p.228). Post-
structuralism also shows us that in Western political spaces, relationships are defined either by 
assimilation or by eradication of the Other by the Self (Day, 2001; O’Hagan, 2004). These 
destructive relationships have been illustrated in the violent historical experience of Indigenous 
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peoples, including forced resettlement, practices of cultural genocide, rape, murder, 
incarceration, and removal of rights and access to land and resources. 
 
Indigenous critical theory can certainly draw on post-structuralism to break down the binary 
hierarchies inherent in neo- and post-colonialism. Post-structuralism also supports Indigenous 
emancipation and endorses a politics of difference. Where Indigenous critical theory differs 
from post-structuralism is in the pluralism of Indigenous knowledge systems, which create a 
layering of lived truths and identities. Indigenous peoples can draw on post-structuralism, but 
ultimately Indigenous knowledge systems provide more holistic structures to understand 
themselves and their communities.  
 
1.5.3 Critical cultural studies  
 
In the past twenty years, peace research and practice has increasingly acknowledged the 
importance of Indigenous approaches to peacebuilding and the role of culture in conflict 
transformation (Avruch and Black, 1991; Brigg, 2008; 2010; Brigg and Muller, 2009; Lederach, 
1996). Lorenz (1966) and Weber (1946) argue that violence is inherent in the discourse of 
Western culture and that humans instinctively assume this aggressive behavioural pattern, and 
support and propagate it through institutions and norms that have been set in place. They 
believe that violence is not necessarily a ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’ discourse, it is merely an outcome of 
cultural evolution, and change will not necessarily mean that non-violent behaviour would 
become the dominant discourse. This pessimistic view of human nature is supported by Freud 
(1961), Hobbes (1651), Lorenz (1966) and Wilson (1975). I disagree with Lorenz and Weber’s 
assessments that violence is inherent in Western or any other culture because it does not take 
into account evidence from Barash (1991), Bonta (1993), Galtung (1990), Giorgi (1999), 
Kropotkin (1914) and Lederach (1997) that many cultures are inherently non-violent and 
cooperative. Lederach (1997; 2005a) and Spence and McLeod (2002) also assert the importance 
of working toward long-term peacebuilding processes that support non-violent cultures. 
 
I posit that alterity of behaviour is possible through an understanding of culture, and culture 
holds the key to changing conflict behaviour and building peace (Avruch & Black, 1991). 
Devetak (2013), Brigg (2008), Etzioni (1993; 2010) and Young (1995) state that culture 
originates in the discourse between power and knowledge and they suggest that using the 
philosophical tool of deconstruction and the politics of difference, humans can emancipate the 
limits of possible discourse and enact more inclusive, less structurally homogenising patterns of 
behaviour. Brigg (2008, p.14) specifies that Indigenous knowledge can provide “ways of 
knowing and relating to others across difference” and that scholars and practitioners can take a 
relational approach to culture that connects across difference. These theorists position culture, 
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power and relationships as fundamental to understanding and transforming violence and these 
three key concepts continue as primary themes throughout my thesis. 
 
Within my research I view culture as publicly constructed; fluid and flexible; connecting 
individuals and communities to their histories, present and futures; and central to ontological 
and epistemological frameworks. Geertz (1973, pp.5,52) explains culture as “webs of 
significance” with “systems of meaning” that are created by and are the collective property of a 
group of peoples. Culture is mostly implicit and unexamined, yet Morphy (2014, p.3) underlines 
that culture also conditions and constrains possibilities for action. Culture includes the 
knowledge systems that produce art, music and artefacts and the beliefs and values that create 
patterns for behaviour. Drawing on Geertz (1973; 1994) I use Morphy’s (2014, p.2) definition 
that frames culture as a complex, adaptive system: 
 
“Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and 
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, 
including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached 
values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and 
on the other as conditioning elements of further action” [Morphy’s emphasis]. 
 
1.5.4 Liberal rights theory  
 
Indigenous knowledge systems challenge liberal minority rights theorists Cairns (2000), 
Kymlicka (1989; 1995), Taylor (1993) and Tully (1995), who assert that political space can be 
found within Western liberalism to accommodate Indigenous self-determination. Tully (1995) 
reframes the Indigenous struggle for recognition within a new liberal multicultural discourse 
that answers the settler colonial “problem of diversity” through a coordination of differentiated 
citizenship rights. 
 
Corntassel (2007; 2008), Davis (2008a; 2008b; 2012), Engel (2010), Venne (2011) and Watson 
(2011a; 2014) and others underline that the liberal rights and the Declaration are state-centric 
tools, only legitimising Indigenous self-determination within the limiting power of the state. 
Day (2001, p.173) sees Tully’s approach as possible “only at the expense of excluding 
dissenting voices from the intercultural dialogue”. Day argues that Western liberal 
multiculturalism is flawed because it does not seek to engage in dialogical interaction, but only 
in finite goals of a coherent identity (Day, 2001; Fleras & Kunz, 2001). Multiculturalism 
indicates that each state’s power and legitimacy lies within the recognition of the superiority of 
Western, non-Indigenous structures of governance and concepts of self-determination and self-
governance; and the accommodation within the Western top-down organisational model of 
governance (Minh-ha, 1995; Murphy, 2000; Wilmer, 1993). 
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 Turner (2006, p.42) emphasises this inequality of political power in his critique of Cairns and 
Kymlicka’s liberal rights theories noting that they consider the sovereignty of the state as non-
negotiable and that “many if not most Aboriginal people see themselves as…citizens of an 
indigenous nation in addition to (and often prior to) being citizens of Canada”. Turner (2006, 
pp.73,9) agrees that liberal rights theorists constrain Indigenous peoples to explain their 
knowledge systems within modern political cultures, but that this effort is doomed to failure 
unless Indigenous knowledge systems are “viewed as legitimate” because “the normative source 
of indigenous difference lies in indigenous philosophy”. The modern state’s legitimacy over 
Indigeneity is also maintained by liberal rights theory and Minh-ha’s “logocentric naming and 
objectivising”, which classifies Indigenous peoples as marginal under the guise of 
multiculturalism (Minh-ha, 1995, p.216). 
 
1.5.5 Liberal peacebuilding  
 
Since the early 1990s international peacebuilding efforts have largely been attempts to impose 
liberal peacebuilding, which is grounded in liberal rights theory. Liberal peacebuilding is 
characterised by liberal democracy, cosmopolitan individualism, the rule of law, human rights, 
civil society, market-based economic growth, development and elite governance. It is usually 
associated with peacebuilding models that are top-down, state-centric, conditional, and that 
prioritise elite agreements, peacekeeping, mediation, and negotiation (Chandler, 2004; Paris, 
2010; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007; Newman et.al. 2009; Richmond & Franks, 2007, 2008). 
Liberal peacebuilding prioritises immediate peace dividends, rapid reconstruction, 
demobilisation and reemployment of combatants (Suhrke et.al., 2005). 
 
The record of liberal peacebuilding has been disappointing (Campbell et.al., 2011; Mac Ginty 
2008; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2010; 2005). The failure of these models to create positive peace 
in so many different contexts from Kosovo to South Sudan has led to a broad range of 
criticisms. Richmond and Franks (2007, pp.30,46) and Richmond (2005) explain that liberal 
peacebuilding has resulted in a “virtual peace”, a situation where liberal hubris, local co-option 
and elite power politics are created by the wholesale transplanting of dominant Western ideals, 
without the necessary Indigenous ownership. There is heavy criticism of the international 
institutions and actors engaged in liberal peacebuilding. 
 
Paris (2010, p.338) points out that elements of liberal peacebuilding remain important, 
including the obligations of international actors to support peacebuilding and the need to 
support non-elite actors’ involvement in peacebuilding. I agree that these are significant issues, 
and I believe there remains an vital role and a mandate for international actors to support 
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peacebuilding in complex contexts, particularly in post-colonial contexts where these 
international actors have actively perpetrated violence. Paris (2010, p.340), however, also 
argues that liberal critiques that call for increases in local-level capacities for peace are merely 
variations of liberal peace, and that there is “no realistic alternative to some form of liberal 
peacebuilding strategy”. I disagree with Paris, and aim to demonstrate throughout my research 
the legitimacy and power of Indigenous peacebuilding practices.  
 
Mac Ginty (2008) argues that while liberal peace theorists are interested in using Indigenous 
conflict transformation practices, the structural power of ‘Western’ peacebuilding limits the 
space for these ‘alternative’ approaches. He explains that Indigenous conflict transformation 
approaches are being co-opted into liberal peacebuilding instead of being viewed as separate 
legitimate approaches. I agree with Mitchell (2009, p.667) who observes that liberal 
peacebuilding could: “replace ‘traditional’ forms of conflict not only with peaceful activity, but 
also with forms of structural conflict embedded in transformative processes and the ethics that 
drive them”. I agree with Grenfell (2012), MacGinty (2008), Mitchell (2009) and Richmond 
(2010; 2005) and seek to demonstrate that liberal peacebuilding in Timor-Leste has either co-
opted or rejected Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding practices, resulting in “violent peace” 
where ongoing direct, structural and cultural violence continue to occur (Dewhurst, 2008). 
 
1.5.6 Hybridity  
 
Hybridity emerged as a critique of liberal peacebuilding, which sought to value local 
peacebuilding approaches but, as I will argue, has not managed to overcome its own limitations. 
Internationally, Indigenous peoples are currently engaging in a mix of two or more unclear and 
unstructured governance systems. This is often described as hybridity (Bhabha, 1994; Clements 
et.al., 2007; Pieterse, 2000; 2015; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011). Pieterse (2000) articulates 
hybridity as a form of social evolution that could frame development beyond a Western or 
Eurocentric narrative in favour of transnationalism. Wulf (2007, p.8) notes that in hybrid 
political systems both “traditional” non-state and “modern” state actors are integrated into the 
governance system in an attempt at inclusivity. These actors each play key roles both in 
perpetrating violence and in conflict transformation and governance. Boege (2007, pp.1-5) 
describes “hybrid political orders”, where the post-colonial state is opened up to Indigenous 
permeation, with potentially disintegrative outcomes. In hybrid political orders, non-Indigenous 
structures dominate the hierarchy, distorting and disintegrating already fractured Indigenous 
structures (Boege et.al., 2008; Brown et.al., 2010; Richmond, 2009).  
 
Mac Ginty (2010, p.403) refers to “hybrid peace” as a distorted form of liberal peace that is 
influenced by Indigenous knowledge and constituencies. He explains that hybrid peace is in “a 
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constant state of flux”, as local actors cooperate, resist, ignore or subvert liberal peacebuilding. 
Richmond (2015) further explains that hybrid peace, by failing to resolve the contradictions 
between local and international norms reiterates colonial epistemologies and results in a 
negative peace that perpetuates cultural and structural violence. Dinnen and Kent (2015, p.2) 
explain that hybridity, when used prescriptively, can “romanticise the local” and “hollow out 
already weak states”. They assert that even though the concept of hybridity is meant to 
overcome binaries, it can create a problematic binary between global and local, or modern and 
Indigenous, without acknowledging their interconnectedness.  
 
Boege et.al. (2009), Brown and Gusmão (2009), Cummins (2014), Cummins and Leach (2012), 
Grenfell (2012), Grenfell and Winch (2014), Laakso (2007), Richmond (2011), Richmond and 
Franks (2008) and Wallis (2012) discuss liberal peacebuilding and hybridity in Timor-Leste. In 
Timor-Leste this is seen as dominant Western liberal state-centric institutions sitting uneasily 
over Indigenous systems, structures and processes. Wallis (2012) asserts that Timor-Leste is 
good example of liberal and hybrid peacebuilding in practice. She explains that the failures of 
the post-1999 institutionalisation of liberal peacebuilding by the UN and other international 
organisations meant that the state sought to increasingly engage in liberal-local hybrid 
peacebuilding practices. I seek to evaluate these practices of liberal peacebuilding throughout 
this research. 
 
I follow Bhabha (1994), Brigg and Bleiker (2011), Dinnen and Kent (2015), Grenfell (2012), 
Mac Ginty (2008), Mitchell (2011) and Richmond (2009; 2010; 2011; 2015) in their criticisms 
of liberal and hybrid peace theory. I argue that liberal peacebuilding and hybridity, because they 
are grounded in modernity and liberalism, do not go far enough in opening space to legitimise 
and empower Indigenous conflict transformation. Efforts toward hybridity have often been too 
simplistic or prescriptive to challenge liberal peacebuilding. Perhaps hybridity can usefully 
assess the peacebuilding challenges of Indigenous peoples existing within modern state 
structures, but liberal and hybrid peacebuilding processes tend to focus on theoretical 
frameworks and tools that are inadequate in transforming complex conflicts in Indigenous 
communities. Indigenous critical theorists (Alfred, 1999; Alfred & Wilmer, 1997; Turner, 2006) 
acknowledge that hybridity often idealises and essentialises Indigenous knowledge systems. At 
the same time, Indigenous conflict transformation practices are under extreme pressure by 
liberal peacebuilding to modernise (Boege et al., 2008; Brigg, 2008; Richmond, 2015, p.52). I 
would add that neither liberal or hybrid peacebuilding has truly engaged with or prioritised 
Indigenous knowledge systems. 
 
I have summarised above some important theoretical approaches used by scholars to engage 
with and explain Indigenous peoples experiences of development and violence. While I 
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acknowledge that elements of these approaches are useful, they do not encompass the pluralism 
or the complexity of Indigenous knowledge systems. In Chapter Three I will discuss further my 
use of Indigenous critical theory in my research. 
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
 
In Chapter Two I detail the research methods used and the theories underpinning them. I explain 
the data collection ‘listening’ methodology used during the field study to target discussions with 
East Timorese and international development practitioners. I also report on the Feedback 
Workshops I conducted in Timor-Leste to discuss my research findings. I describe my use of 
grounded theory and abduction analysis to analyse the qualitative data and build my theoretical 
framework. I describe the ethical processes necessary to undertake field research with 
Indigenous peoples and outline some of the difficulties encountered in the field and the 
limitations of the method and dataset.  
  
In Chapter Three I identify East Timorese as Indigenous people with distinct lands and 
territories, shared cultural, ethno-linguistic and historical experiences. I argue that, in line with 
Indigenous theorists including Alfred (1999; 2015), Corntassel (2007; 2008; 2012), Garroutte 
(2003), Graham (1999; 2013a; 2013b), Nakata (1997; 2004; 2007) and Smith (1999), 
Indigenous critical theory and Indigenous knowledge systems should be prioritised when 
seeking solutions to the complex challenges facing Indigenous peoples. This chapter will 
provide a detailed examination of Indigenous critical theory, locating this as a broad, 
interdisciplinary body of knowledge that allows for flexibility to discuss Indigenous self-
determination. I position Indigenous critical theory as both a practical and theoretical response 
to the challenge of achieving Indigenous self-determined development. I survey the history of 
Indigenous internationalism and the importance of this political movement in articulating 
Indigenous rights within the Declaration. I argue that the Declaration has limitations because it 
is created within, and defined through, modern state-centric processes. These constraints aside, I 
maintain that the Declaration is a valuable international legal tool as it contains the most current 
and comprehensive description of Indigenous self-determination.  
 
The Declaration asserts that development can facilitate Indigenous self-determination. Chapter 
Four investigates the historical and current approaches of international practitioners and 
organisations to determine how, and to what extent these mechanisms engage Indigenous 
peoples and facilitate Indigenous self-determined development. This includes an investigation 
of the policy and programming interventions within the current development system. I also 
explore the potential within the current development system to exacerbate structural violence, 
which I term “development-related violence”. Through an examination of these relationships I 
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map how current development systems processes, structures and institutions act to cause or 
exacerbate violence. I argue that the current potential for development interventions to cause 
and contribute to violence can result in negative or negligible development outcomes and thus 
reduce the ability for Indigenous peoples to achieve self-determination. To do this I scrutinise 
the relationships between the the República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL) (Portuguese: 
Democratic Republic of East Timor) (the Government) and its citizens, and external 
development stakeholders, such as bilateral donors, multilateral organisations, development 
financial institutions (DFIs), private sector, and civil society organisations (CSOs). 
 
Chapter Five begins with an overarching history of Timor-Leste, with a focus on pre-
colonialism, Portuguese colonialism, civil war and invasion, Indonesian occupation and the UN 
administration until independence in 2002. It focuses on building an understanding of 
Indigenous East Timorese knowledge and governance systems and how they have changed over 
time. I then review the broader conflict and security environment, with a particular focus on 
challenges to the security sector, the 2006–2008 crisis and ongoing intra-state violence. By 
focusing on the complex history of Timor-Leste I identify the root causes of intra-state and 
intra-community violence. This evidence shows that Timor-Leste is experiencing high levels of 
existing intra-state violence linked to a complex web of unresolved historical violence and 
violence that has arisen post-1999. 
 
Chapter Six presents a comprehensive examination of Indigenous knowledge systems in Timor-
Leste. I begin with an analysis of Indigenous peacebuilding practices in Timor-Leste. These 
practices emphasise that Timor-Leste has a long history of effective conflict transformation 
based on their Indigenous knowledge systems and these practices continue to be actively used 
across Timor-Leste. I assert that there are multiple ethno-linguistic peoples and different 
historical experiences across Timor-Leste resulting in a pluralism of Indigenous knowledge 
systems with differing identities and cultural practices. I then scrutinise Indigenous East 
Timorese knowledge systems through a comprehensive framework that examines culture, power 
and relationships to better understand what this knowledge looks like and how it is connected to 
violence and peacebuilding. In the section on culture or lulik (Tetum: sacred knowledge) I 
expand on sacred houses and localised identities, languages and land and belonging. Under 
power, or lisan (Tetum: customary governance) I review decentralised governance, leadership 
and elitism, gender equality, education and choice and consent. Finally, I investigate how 
relationships or slulu (Mambai: cooperation or working collectively) are formed and sustained 
in Timor-Leste. 
 
Chapter Seven reports the results of field research conducted in Timor-Leste between 2009 and 
2015. I evaluate, from the perspective of the East Timorese participants, whether, and how, East 
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Timorese knowledge systems and goals of self-determination are incorporated into the current 
development system in Timor-Leste. I use the Indigenous systems framework (culture, power, 
relationships) to analyse the data from my fieldwork in Timor-Leste. I provide suggestions, 
from East Timorese who participated in my field research, about how the current development 
system could more effectively incorporate, legitimise and empower Indigenous East Timorese 
knowledge systems to achieve self-determined development. Within this chapter I use three case 
studies to expand on the failures and successes of development interventions in Timor-Leste. 
The case studies provide examples from East Timorese participants of how international 
development practitioners can engage with Indigenous East Timorese knowledge in their 
development practice. 
 
In Chapter Eight I analyse the findings of my field research with international development 
practitioner participants working in Timor-Leste and other development contexts. I use the 
framework to access whether and how these practices exacerbate existing violence in Timor-
Leste. I use this information to document and assess the range of systemic failures that 
exacerbate violence and prevent international practitioners from prioritising Indigenous East 
Timorese knowledge in their work.  
 
In my final chapter I analyse the fieldwork findings of both the East Timorese and international 
development practitioners and frame these findings as guiding principles to explain how the 
current development system can work to transform violence and achieve Indigenous self-
determined development in Timor-Leste. I discuss how these recommendations could be 
implemented effectively across different Indigenous contexts and suggest future research 
possibilities.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
Indigenous critical theorists assert that differentiated citizenship rights and multiculturalism 
(citizenship theory), diverse liberalism (liberal minority rights and citizenship theory), state 
power and authenticity notions (post-colonial and post-structural theory), or forms of 
democratic liberal states (liberal peacebuilding and hybridity) do not construct political spaces 
that give equality, power, authority and legitimacy to Indigenous knowledge systems or 
Indigenous self-determination (Alfred, 1999; 2015; Corntassel, 2007; 2008; Day, 2001; 
Garroutte, 2003; Minh-ha, 1995; Murphy, 2000; 2002; Smith, 1999; Turner, 2006). 
 
I suggest that Indigenous knowledge systems are a useful tool to differentiate and map the 
power relationships between structures, institutions and agents in the modern development 
system. I conclude that using non-Indigenous frameworks to understand and empower 
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Indigenous peoples perpetuates structural violence and does not provide Indigenous peoples 
with relevant tools and frameworks to help achieve their goals. 
 
I argue that each of the theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter – while sometimes 
useful – persistently fail to understand the practical and ideological complexities necessary to 
assert Indigenous power and authority and gain Indigenous self-determination. Only Indigenous 
knowledge systems encapsulate the lived and historical experience of Indigenous peoples and 
enable a holistic understanding of the complex interconnections of culture, power, identity, and 
land at the heart of Indigeneity. Indigenous critical theory therefore remains the most important 
epistemological framework within my research. 
 
As a non-Indigenous person, I take the Mohawk academic Professor Taiaiake Alfred’s advice as 
my goal for this thesis. He suggested that “non-Indigenous people should work to transform the 
[Western] culture from within and to focus their energies on undermining the power of colonial 
myths and attitudes to shape public perceptions” (Alfred, 2002, pers. comm., 7 August). In line 
with Alfred’s advice, my research is primarily aimed to guide international practitioners toward 
radical ways of thinking and acting; to provide practical recommendations and guidance for 
international peacebuilding and development practitioners to support Indigenous self-
determination.  
 
The current development system has not yet successfully integrated peacebuilding practice. I 
hope that by grounding this thesis within critical peace theory and practice the reader will be 
provided with new tools to transform the current development system. I also aim to facilitate a 
conversation between international practitioners and Indigenous communities about how 
practitioners can shift to engage more deeply with Indigenous peoples and seek to balance the 
current ‘disequilibrium’ of power. This is not a thesis that aims to tell Indigenous peoples what 
to do when confronted by development or peacebuilding interventions and the associated 
violence that concerns them. I do however hope that Indigenous peoples may be able to draw 
useful lessons and conclusions from this research to assist and empower them to understand the 
current development system and to use this information to transform their own relationships 
with international practitioners. 
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2 Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This section focuses on the qualitative multi-disciplinary research methodology used during my 
research. To begin, I identify myself reflexively explaining my relationship to the world I seek 
to explore. I explain how I have used ethnographic methods to collect qualitative data and I 
expand on how my two primary methods of data analysis, grounded theory and abductive 
analysis, are used to promote the discovery of theory constructed from Indigenous critical 
theory and methodological data analysis. 
 
I detail the ethical processes undertaken prior to conducting the field research with both 
Indigenous East Timorese development practitioners and international development 
practitioners. I discuss the process of transcribing the data, and how I used qualitative software 
to code, map and analyse complex data. This chapter also outlines the feedback loops conducted 
to seek views and insights into the findings of this research in Timor-Leste. In conclusion, I 
outline some of the difficulties encountered in the field and the limitations of the method and 
dataset. 
 
2.2 Reflexivity: locating the researcher 
 
I am a non-Indigenous Anglo-Australian woman. Since 2003 I have lived and worked in a 
number of conflict-affected developing-states in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe and the Gulf 
States for the Australian Government, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Studies (AIATSIS), the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) and 
UNDP on Indigenous, peace, conflict and development issues. From 2006 to 2014 I was 
employed as a Peace, Conflict and Development Specialist at the then Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID) (now Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – DFAT). 
This period included a two-year diplomatic posting to Papua New Guinea (PNG) managing 
AusAID’s AUD 170 million Democratic Governance program.  
 
Throughout my work, my local and international development and peacebuilding colleagues 
have shared stories about their challenging personal and professional experiences. Before I 
worked in PNG, my conversations with these practitioners had an air of unreality. My 
experience in PNG gave me deeper insight and experience into the challenges of the current 
development system. For example, in PNG sometimes I would attend eight meetings a day on 
eight different topics. I had goals I needed to achieve in each meeting, and rarely were they to 
build and strengthen the relationships between myself and my organisation and the people I was 
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sitting across from. I was contributing to the lack of inclusive participation and undermining the 
conditions that enable FPIC, exacerbating what I saw as forms of structural violence inherent in 
the current development system. These experiences have motivated me to focus my PhD 
research on contributing to improving international practitioners’ understanding as to why our 
efforts fail to reach the development and peacebuilding goals we aspire to reach.  
 
I am a participant observer, where insights require connections, at least in part, to the research. 
This process recognises the presence of the researcher in the study, and acknowledges the 
critical importance of reflexivity for each researcher (Davies, 1999, p.3). Davies (1999, p.9) 
argues that: “The research process is more clearly perceived as an encounter in which 
knowledge is constituted in ways which reflect and maintain various power relations, a process 
with ethical implication”. I acknowledge I am deeply connected to this research, grounded in 
my experience of attempting to change institutions, policies and processes within the current 
development system.  
 
In my research I am positioned as an insider / outsider. My aim is to be critically reflexive, 
allowing me to review my role of research–practitioner, my connection to the research context 
and relationships with the participants, and how my actions affect the research outcomes. I must 
examine my own practice and the practice of my fellow international practitioner colleagues 
working globally in developing and conflict-affected contexts. To do this successfully I must 
balance my dual role of connection and separation from the research. 
 
2.3 Fieldwork methodology and processes used 
 
This next section explores the methodologies used to undertake the fieldwork data collection 
and analysis. I also describe the processes used to obtain informed consent from participants, 
the confidentiality of this research, and how participants were chosen. Throughout this research 
I adhere to the ANU human ethics protocol clearance.  
 
2.3.1 Data collection: ‘listening’ methodology 
 
From 2006 to 2010 I managed AusAID’s program funding for CDA (Centre for Development 
Action) Collaborative Learning Projects. CDA is a US peacebuilding organisation that promotes 
the use of the Do No Harm principles and framework – a tool to analyse the effect of 
development and peacebuilding interventions on conflict and peacebuilding (Anderson, 1999; 
Woodrow & Chigas, 2009). Since 1999, CDA have progressed their Reflecting on Peace 
Practice and Listening Projects, which are systematic explorations of the ideas and insights of 
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people who are recipients of international development assistance. Their findings indicate 
minimal development outcomes, and a range of harmful impacts from these development 
interventions (Anderson et.al., 2003). In October 2008, I participated in the Listening Project 
field exercise in Timor-Leste and found that the ethnographic ‘listening’ methodology worked 
effectively, collating rich context-specific data from a wide range of stakeholder groups (CDA, 
2008). As a result of this experience, I used a modified version of the ‘listening’ methodology 
during my field research. 
 
‘Listening’ uses ethnographic techniques to undertake semi-structured one-on-one qualitative 
interviews that gather qualitative evidence. These series of conversations between researcher 
and participants aim to map the scope and effectiveness of development and peacebuilding 
interventions in Timor-Leste. It is a flexible, rigorous and systematic evaluative mapping 
process allowing me to explore “a reality that is neither accessible directly though native texts 
nor simply a reflection of the individual anthropologist’s psyche” (Davies, 1999, p.6). 
 
Ethnography is core to this research methodology. This is the study of social interactions, 
behaviours and perceptions between groups, through observation and interviews, to provide 
rich, holistic insights (Reeves et.al., 2008, p.512). To do this I gathered participant observations 
and was directly engaged with and involved in the world I studied: the current development 
system in Timor-Leste. 
 
Ethnographers use casual, conversational interviews to elicit highly candid data (Reeves et.al., 
2008, p.513). Conversations start with open-ended questions so participants bring up the issues 
that matter most to them, and allow the researcher to pace and sequence questions according to 
the context and explore critical areas of inquiry in line with the grounded theory approach 
(which I discuss further below). As conversations proceed, I ensure that certain themes and 
issues are explored and I use the methodology to further identify each participant’s needs, 
interests and positions in terms of peacebuilding and development. Data is collected on similar 
themes each time, allowing me to compare across multiple experiences of development 
interventions. This approach is challenging to analyse, and labour intensive to collect. It 
requires curiosity and facilitation, and is not a combative or intrusive process. This 
methodology has resulted in a broad, inductive set of evidence mapping Indigenous East 
Timorese and non-Indigenous peoples’ cumulative experiences of development, peacebuilding 
and violence. 
 
‘Listening’, or ethnographic research, is not an Indigenous evaluation methodology. However, 
because it is grounded in narrative inquiry and empowers the interviewee to direct the 
conversation, it provides a radical space for Indigenous peoples to articulate their perspectives 
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as they choose, and places the researcher (or development practitioner) in a secondary and 
receptive position as a listener and a facilitator of dialogue. Powerful story and conversation 
methods can be used to authentically empower the different perspectives and knowledge 
systems particular to Indigenous peoples. Visenor (cited in Turner, 2006, p.71) emphasises the 
role of story and narrative as critical to Indigenous activism:  
 
“We are more than a curious medicine bundle on a museum rack…We are trickster in 
the blood, natural mixedblood tricksters, word warriors in that silence between bodies, 
and we bear our best medicine on our voices”. 
 
Between September 2009 and January 2010 I conducted field interviews with senior peace, 
conflict, development and Indigenous theorists and practitioners in Australia, the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. My field research in Timor-Leste 
took place during August–October 2010, July 2013 and July 2015. Field research took place in 
Dili, excepting interviews that took place in Ermera District. Prior to conducting fieldwork in 
Timor-Leste, I established ongoing partnerships with the National Ministry of Culture that 
manages all in-country research and the Peace and Conflict Studies Centre at the National 
University of Timor-Leste (UNTL) led by Dr Antero Benedito da Silva. All interviews took 
place face to face in public locations or using Skype. 
 
Table 1 below highlights the six key themes raised with each participant. While the sequencing 
varied, I always first asked each participant to define development in their own words. I used 
obtrusive interviewing research methods, where observations are made of behaviour and 
opinions with the participant's knowledge to minimise any perceived risks of conflict of interest. 
 
Table 1: Six key themes raised during interviews. 
DEFINE DEVELOPMENT:  
What does the term development mean to you?  
In your view, has development been successful, what have been some of the challenges to 
success?  
EXPERIENCES OF DEVELOPMENT-RELATED VIOLENCE:  
What are your experiences of, and views on violence and peacebuilding in relation to 
development? 
For example, as a result of development activities have you experienced or witnessed 
community or personal violence or peacebuilding? Please expand. 
IDEAS ON HOW TO ACHIEVE CHANGE:  
How could development practitioners or organisations better direct development 
/peacebuilding work to create more effective outcomes in communities?  
What tools or processes might be used? 
DEFINE INDIGENOUS:  
What does the term ‘Indigenous’ mean to you?  
In Timor-Leste how would you describe the current state of the relationship between 
Indigenous/local peoples and development actors?  
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HUMAN RIGHTS:  
What are your views or experiences of ‘human rights’ in development?  
Do you believe that these are ‘rights’ that Indigenous peoples are entitled to? 
SELF-DETERMINATION:  
What are your experiences of Indigenous ‘self-determination’ or ‘self-governance’?   
Do you know of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(the Declaration)? 
How could development assist in implementing the Declaration? 
 
Other sources of data were reports and other relevant materials from a wide range of East 
Timorese and international development organisations, think tanks and research institutions. 
This included data from reference books, research articles in professional journals, novels, 
blogs, and newspaper and magazine articles. I also drew on notes from conferences and 
seminars I attended, and my research journal, in which I documented my reflections throughout 
the research process.  
 
2.3.2 Data analysis 
 
This section details the process of qualitatively analysing the data collected during field research 
and how I used systems theory and applied it with Indigenous critical methodologies. I used 
abductive analysis to construct a new theoretical model to apply to current development 
practice. Abduction uses grounded theory to systematically code qualitative data, which I did 
using qualitative research software. 
 
I focus on one major country case study, Timor-Leste, which I purposefully selected because of 
its unique, information-rich context. The case study approach allows me to demonstrate the 
complex, holistic and interconnected nature of the current development system. By reducing my 
data set to one major case study I can more precisely investigate how structures, institutions and 
behaviours interact in a specific time and context (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Johansson, 2003). I also 
use six smaller case studies in Chapters Seven and Eight to illuminate detailed examples of my 
research findings. 
 
2.3.2.1 Abductive analysis  
 
The three primary themes I developed are significant areas of inquiry within Indigenous critical 
theory as I highlight in Chapter Three. This signalled to me that even though I was seeking to 
construct theory grounded in the data, I continued to draw on my existing theoretical insights 
and personal subjectivity, which led me to appreciate these themes have a resonance beyond 
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Timor-Leste. This led me to explore the use of abductive analysis, first developed by Peirce, as 
a methodology to build new theory (Anderson, 1986; Fann, 1970; Peirce, 1955). While 
grounded theory, with its linear coding schemes and heuristic principles, was very useful to 
analyse large quantities of complex qualitative data I found that the induction method in 
grounded theory did not logically assist me in developing new theoretical insights. Grounded 
theory did not adequately account for or value my existing theoretical knowledge and social and 
intellectual positioning (Johansson, 2003, pp.9-10). 
 
Instead, as I analysed the data I drew on my own experiences in peacebuilding and 
development, positioning me as a participant-observer. Davies (1999, p.5) describes this process 
as “the relationships between ethnographer and informant in the field, which form the basis for 
subsequent theorising and conclusion, are expressed through social interaction in which the 
ethnographer participates; thus ethnographers help to construct the observations that become 
their data”. Powdermaker (1966, p.19) defines this as a process of systematically “stepping in 
and out of society”, where it is essential for the researcher to continually involve and detach 
from the contexts they are studying. Luttrell (2000) also emphasises the importance of 
reflexivity in naming the tensions, contradictions and power imbalances a researcher encounters 
and naming these, rather than eliminating or ignoring them. This auto-ethnographic and 
reflexive research process underlines the presence of existing theoretical positions or bias in the 
researcher (Reeves et.al., 2008, p.512). It also fits with Timmermans and Tavory’s (2012) 
assertion that abductive analysis should be used to construct empirically based theory. 
 
Timmermans and Tavory (2012, p.180) describe abductive analysis as “a qualitative data 
analysis approach aimed at generating creative and novel theoretical insights through a dialectic 
of cultivated theoretical sensitivity and methodological heuristics…rather than setting all 
preconceived theoretical ideas aside during the research project, researchers should enter the 
field with the deepest and broadest theoretical base possible and develop their theoretical 
repertoires throughout the research process…instead of theories emerging from the data, new 
concepts are developed to account for puzzling empirical materials”. Timmermans and Tavory 
(2012, p.176) highlight the importance of using careful methodological data analysis and 
explain that grounded theory methods in induction help abductive analysis by deepening our 
perceptions, allowing us to “see the phenomenon in socially interesting ways”. 
 
I used abductive analysis to develop a new theoretical framework. This approach values the 
production of theory based on surprising research evidence which is generated by investigating 
non-linear interconnection, and the plurality and complexity of the data, which can be mapped 
and connected in different ways.  My interview transcripts held multiple layers of codes (or 
meanings) and often this coding was repeated across multiple sources. As I re-read the 
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transcripts I became deeply familiar with the evidence, connecting codes in a myriad of possible 
themes. I used my whiteboard and visual systems maps from HyperRESEARCH to visualise the 
systemic patterns raised by the grounded theory data analysis process.  
 
The primary themes within my research findings were used to develop theories about violence 
and self-determined development. In Chapters Seven and Eight I detail my research findings 
and explore the theoretical insights developed from this abductive research process. The 
ethnographic method used in Chapters Seven and Eight prioritises the Indigenous voice. Direct 
quotes are analysed contextually, and they are sequenced to build the theoretical framework. 
 
2.3.2.2 Grounded theory 
 
Abduction uses the grounded theory approach developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) to code 
qualitative data using systematic procedures of coding schemes and heuristic principles. My 
eighty-six field interviews ranged between thirty minutes to three hours, covering a wide range 
of topics, and to manage the large and diverse data set I required qualitative research software. I 
used HyperRESEARCH, a computer-assisted qualitative software tool. HyperRESEARCH 
differs from other qualitative software in that the primary unit of analysis and comparison is the 
case. In line with a grounded theory model, I built each case according to the key themes 
emerging from the data. In HyperRESEARCH, each case is linked to any number of empirical 
sources e.g. transcripts, and each source is linked to different cases via codes (a word or two 
that describes the significance of the text).  
 
In line with a grounded theory approach I built the key themes and coded them before I 
analysed the data. Grounded theory uses three types of coding: open, axial and selective coding 
(Emerson, 1983, p.50). I used all three during my data analysis. Open coding is the “process of 
breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data” (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990, p.61). To do this I examined each source document (interview transcript) for key 
concepts or ideas that were related to the six key research questions. I gave these initial ideas 
‘codes’ and highlighted them in the relevant text. This process is time-consuming and 
necessitated detailed textual analysis. 
 
The open coding process identified a large number of codes (ninety two), and it was necessary 
to break down these codes. As I proceeded through iterations of reading and coding the 
transcribed interviews, I used a process of axial coding to reduce the initial codes and where 
repetition occurred, clustered them into primary and secondary code groups. Axial coding is a 
“set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding by making 
connections between categories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.96). For example, links between 
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self-determination and independence also connected themes of power, ownership and decision-
making. 
 
Throughout the data analysis process I used selective coding to link primary and secondary 
categories, which is “the process of selecting the core category, systematically relating it to 
other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further 
refinement and development” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.116). From this process emerged three 
primary themes or cases: culture, power and relationships (see in CAPITALS in Table 2). Under 
the three themes are the primary code groups (see in bold in Table 2) and the secondary code 
groups (in italics in Table 2). The process of selective coding highlighted that the three primary 
themes are interconnected in multiple and overlapping ways.  
 
Table 2: Cases and primary and secondary code groups used  
CULTURE POWER RELATIONSHIPS 
Identity 
Definitions of Indigenous 
Maubere 
Kinship/family/clan 
Land/place 
Belonging 
Gender 
Youth 
 
Indigenous conflict 
transformation 
Umu-lulik 
Law – justice 
Matrilineal / patrilineal 
Peace 
Peacebuilding 
Conflict analysis/sensitivity 
Na he biti bo’ot  
Conflict – conflict trigger 
Fragility – fragile state 
Security – stability 
Systems – failure 
 
Sacred knowledge/ 
information 
Decision-making 
Understanding culture 
Tradition 
Working with context - 
targeting  
History – historical 
experience  
Leadership 
Co-option 
Elites 
Corruption 
Expectations – entitled  
Hierarchy 
Political parties – politicians 
Responsibility 
Informing – socialising 
 
Aid effectiveness 
Duplication 
Accountability 
Coordination/planning / 
prioritising 
Misaligned development 
Monitoring and evaluation 
Sustainability 
 
Governance 
Decentralisation 
Economy 
Education 
Health 
Funding / budget / money 
Recruitment – employment 
Unemployment 
Institutional strengthening 
 
Participation 
Rural – urban divide 
Building relationships 
Cooperate – collective – 
together 
Dependency 
Insider / outsider 
Indonesian occupation 
Portuguese colonialism 
UN administration 
NGO – non-state actor 
Australia 
Churches – faith  
 
Self-determination 
Independence 
Indigenous internationalism 
The Declaration 
Nation-building 
State building 
Shared vision 
Unity 
Respect 
 
Trust 
Staff turnover 
Timing 
Flexible 
Listening 
Language issues / Tetum 
Ethics – morals – attitudes 
 
Choice 
Consent 
Consultation 
Confidence / self-esteem 
Assumptions 
Human rights 
Incentives 
Capacity building 
Human resources – capital 
Ownership 
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 2.3.3 Informed consent and the human ethics protocol clearance 
 
Enabling participants’ FPIC in research is both a requirement of my ANU Full Human Ethics 
Protocol and a key standard for any Indigenous research grounded in meaningful engagement 
and reciprocity with Indigenous peoples. I have demonstrated my respect for Indigenous 
peoples inherent right to control and maintain their knowledge systems by forming long-term 
research partnerships with East Timorese organisations and undertaking feedback workshops 
and production of accessible research materials in Tetum.  
 
I received my ethics clearance in 9 June 2009 and I was granted a variation approving field 
research in Timor-Leste in 14 May 2010. My Research Information Sheet (see Appendices A 
[English] and B [Tetum]) provides an overview of my research and the Informed Consent Form 
(see Appendix C) details the consent required. These were developed in line with the AIATSIS 
Guidelines for Ethical Research in Indigenous Studies (2001).  
 
During my fieldwork, I began each interview by clarifying the informed consent process in 
English or Tetum and consent was negotiated via email, Skype and face to face. The ‘listening’ 
methodology provides a risk management strategy by providing space to clarify mistakes or 
misunderstandings during the interview and reorientate the focus of questions for subsequent 
interviews. This obtrusive interview method allowed participants to share their views with 
minimal risk. Only one interviewee did not permit me to record our interview citing institutional 
security reasons. 
 
2.3.4 Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality is a critical element of the FPIC process and research that supports the rights of 
Indigenous peoples. Anonymity is fundamental in conflict-affected contexts when public 
criticism of the state, key individuals or organisations could result in physical harm, threats or 
targeted structural violence. In line with the informed consent process I assured each participant 
that any published data would be anonymous. In accordance with the ANU Ethics Protocol at 
no time did I engage in discussion of classified issues or criminal acts. 
 
To maintain anonymity, each interviewee (or source) is coded. For example, TL-1300-170910 
indicates a Timor-based participant whose interview took place at 13:00 hours on 17 September 
2010. Sources have additional identifiers by sex (female or male), whether they are East 
Timorese and whether they work for a government or donor agency, NGO, International NGO 
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(INGO), multilateral organisation or university. I am the only person who has access to the 
coding key. Readers who would like to build on my research should contact me for referrals and 
advice. 
 
I maintained accurate records by recording and transcribing all interviews myself. Digital 
recordings were used for transcription and are retained for the duration of the PhD. All 
recordings are stored on my private computer and backup drives both online, using Dropbox, 
and on external hard drives. If participants request they can access a recording or transcript of 
their interview. No other researcher will have access to the recording or transcript without the 
written or oral permission of the participant as per the Informed Consent Form (see Appendix 
C).  
 
2.3.5 How were research participants’ chosen? 
 
I used theoretical sampling to choose my field research participants. This is “the process of data 
collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his [sic] 
data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his [sic] 
theory as it emerges…controlled by the emergent theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.45). I used 
purposive sampling to identify interviewees. This process is not random, and people are 
selected because of their ability to comment on the research topic, illuminate key theories or 
help resolve challenges within the research.  
 
Katz (1982, p.127) highlights the importance of representativeness of qualitative data to justify 
making generalisations. Emerson (1983, p.46) notes that most researchers commonly undertake 
twenty to thirty interviews to “saturate the categories, meaning to begin to find the same thing”. 
My supervisory committee determined that at least forty interviews, with at least twenty 
Timorese people and at least twenty development or peacebuilding practitioners, would create a 
representative sample and justify a convincing argument, without the need for quantitative 
testing of significance. Noting considerations of cost and time, I was able to interview more 
participants than anticipated: a total of eighty-six. Thirty-eight international development and 
peacebuilding practitioners during my initial field work in 2009–2010, and during my 2010–
2013 fieldwork in Timor-Leste I interviewed forty-eight practitioners, twenty-three of whom 
were East Timorese (see Table 3). During feedback workshops in 2015 I discussed my research 
findings with twenty-two practitioners, six were East Timorese. 
 
I have been privileged to have so many people share their stories with me. I listened to deep 
soul searching and frank admissions of error that triggered tears in some participants. Most 
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international practitioners live and work in isolated and challenging contexts and a number of 
participants described our discussion as cathartic.  
 
Table 3: Research participants by gender and background 
 East Timorese Non-East 
Timorese in 
Timor-Leste 
International Total 
Female 7 10 17 34 
Male 16 15 21 52 
Total 23 25 38 86 
 
Throughout my research I use the term ‘international practitioners’ to describe people who work 
in the international humanitarian, peacebuilding and development sectors. I acknowledge that 
these are different professional sectors, where individuals are at different times engaged within 
conflict-affected developing contexts. I note that humanitarian assistance is one part of the 
development system and tends to be shorter-term and is focused on responding with protection, 
assistance and relief to a disaster (human or natural) or complex emergency situation beyond the 
capacity of national agencies (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
cited in Relief Web, 2008). In Timor-Leste my research participants were primarily 
development and peacebuilding practitioners. The international practitioners I interviewed in 
2009 worked in the humanitarian, peacebuilding and development sectors.  
 
My target participants were East Timorese and international practitioners who work in the 
current development and peacebuilding system, this included people working for bilateral and 
donor agencies, multilateral agencies, NGOs, CSOs, faith based organisations, private sector 
organisations and the media. They were academics and community members, government 
officials, public servants, youth, clan leaders, landowners, and ex-combatants. I sought a broad 
mix of participants to get diverse perspectives on the effectiveness of development and 
peacebuilding and in doing so I have covered all major actors within the system and added their 
voices. I aimed for a balance in gender, and between East Timorese and non-East Timorese 
people.  
 
I note the potential contradiction that many of the East Timorese I interviewed during my field 
research were themselves elite. The majority were educated overseas, spoke English fluently, 
and were paid comparatively high wages to work as development practitioners in large INGOs 
or bilateral or multilateral organisations. These individuals were often critical of other elites and 
internationals, highlighting the complexity of East Timorese identity and politics. The use of 
‘we’ is sometimes unclear, highlighting that many East Timorese participants recognise they are 
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elites and/or do not consider themselves a representative or spokesperson of the rural 
communities they are referring to. In citations I clarify attribution using [brackets]. 
 
I interviewed East Timorese practitioners and their international counterparts separately to 
compare experiences and views. Participants were recruited using word of mouth, email and 
telephone. There was no material benefit for participating and no incentives were offered. 
During field research in Timor-Leste nominal and symbolic gift giving was expected and was 
carried out according to custom by bringing food, or buying coffee during interviews. 
 
2.3.6 Feedback workshops 
 
To explore how my findings apply to development and peacebuilding practice I conducted 
feedback workshops with key stakeholders in Timor-Leste in July 2015. To facilitate these 
meetings I summarised my research findings from Chapters Seven and Eight into English (see 
Appendix D) and Tetum (see Appendix E).  
 
International practitioners currently interact with East Timorese peoples through shared 
English-language reports or via summarised power point presentations, email and the Internet, 
using jargon and acronyms. In this way, practitioners generate and share knowledge through 
processes that are reductive, exclusive and available only to a minority of East Timorese, 
therefore excluding the communities they purport to work with and for. I will demonstrate that 
these restrictive forms of communication create limited feedback loops that shrink the 
possibility of generating new knowledge or resolving problems with empowered communities.  
 
I worked with the Peace and Conflict Centre at UNTL and Belun and La’o Hamutuk, two East 
Timorese NGOs, and met separately with East Timorese and international practitioners to 
conduct feedback discussions. I sought partners’ views on whether my findings are useful and 
how my research fits in with ongoing analysis that contributes to their broader development and 
peacebuilding praxis. The findings of this feedback are described in Chapter Nine. 
 
2.4 Limitation of process and dataset 
 
There are three main limitations to the research methodologies I have used and the way I have 
collected and analysed my data. The ‘listening’ methodology works optimally when both the 
interviewer and participants have a shared language. I do not speak Tetum or other East 
Timorese languages, so most interviews were in English. This limited my ability to directly 
interview a wider group of East Timorese who participated in development and peacebuilding 
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programs, particularly those living in rural and remote areas. To overcome this language barrier, 
I worked with student translators from UNTL, particularly when undertaking interviews in 
Ermera. Tetum is a developing language so I have edited this text using Hull’s (2001) Standard 
Tetum–English Dictionary for consistency of spelling. 
 
As a self-funded PhD student I was limited by my ability to take study leave from my full-time 
work. As a result, I had limited time in the field and usually only had one opportunity to 
interview participants. Therefore discussions were limited by what experiences each individual 
was comfortable to share at the time of the interview. Despite this limitation, discussions were 
wide ranging and I have a large data set for future research.  
 
I have been trying to straddle the demands of two very different perspectives, the modern 
western academy of the university and Indigenous knowledge systems. The former seeks linear 
patterns and the latter prioritises non-linear, visual and verbal information. This thesis provides 
linear, easily applicable results, but also seeks to consistently prioritise Indigenous knowledge 
systems. I do not have answers that will be applicable to every development or peacebuilding 
context. My research is not a ‘how to manual’ for international practitioners struggling with 
their practice, unable to see through the apathy, grinding poverty, corruption and frustrating 
bureaucracy to find solutions. It is a contribution, which provides hope for positive systems 
transformation. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This is qualitative research, which uses a grounded theory approach combined with abductive 
analysis that draws on Indigenous critical theory to analyse complex data and build theory. 
From this fieldwork process I have developed a new theoretical framework to assist 
practitioners to support Indigenous communities to better achieve self-determined development. 
Use of this framework and the resulting guiding principles will be explored in detail in Chapters 
Seven to Nine. The findings of my research have implications for other Indigenous peoples 
seeking to fulfill their Indigenous right to self-determination. My focus on only one case study 
means that there are opportunities for further research in other contexts.  
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3 Indigenous Knowledge Systems 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this Chapter I locate this thesis within the broad spectrum of Indigenous critical theory and 
explore Indigenous epistemologies or Indigenous knowledge systems. I begin by defining 
Indigeneity and address some of the concerns expressed by researchers about classifying East 
Timorese peoples as Indigenous, and explain why an Indigenous identifier works for the 
purposes of this research.  
 
I examine Indigenous knowledge systems to better identify the structures and institutions that 
maintain or legitimise power and decision-making in Indigenous communities. Indigenous 
critical theory provides a theoretical framework to explain the structural and cultural violence 
experienced by Indigenous peoples, nations vs. states conflict, welfare colonialism and co-
option, intra-state power dynamics, and Indigenous relationships to land and resources.  
 
I detail how the dominant non-Indigenous system affects violence in Indigenous communities. 
It links this ongoing violence and the failure to achieve the Indigenous goals of self-
determination and self-determined development with the need for conflict transformation or 
positive peace. I argue that empowering the radically different worldviews within Indigenous 
knowledge systems might better support the attainment of Indigenous self-determination.  
 
I also summarise the history of Indigenous internationalism. I track the growth of political 
awareness and connectivity of Indigenous peoples, that has resulted in a proliferation of 
international law, norms and practice focused on Indigenous rights. This chapter focuses on the 
creation of the Declaration, the primary international legal document articulating the right to 
Indigenous self-determination. I highlight the potential solidarity and support for self-
determination for East Timorese if they engage with other Indigenous peoples worldwide. In the 
Declaration, development is identified as a primary tool to implement Indigenous self-
determination. I explore the right to development, introduce my concept of Indigenous self-
determined development and emphasise the importance of FPIC. 
 
3.2 Who are Indigenous peoples? 
 
Defining who are ‘Indigenous’ has historically been problematic. Many definitions are viewed 
by Indigenous peoples as marginalising, disempowering and exclusionary. The lack of a 
definition may be considered problematic to this research, so in the section below I propose a 
working definition. 
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 3.2.1 Identification of Indigenous peoples 
 
Indigenous peoples are the most diverse and complex grouping of humanity. Worldwide, at 
least 370 million people are considered to be Indigenous (IWGIA, 2013). Represented across 
approximately 5,000 different nation groups, speaking at least 4–5,000 of the approximately 
6,000 languages existing today, they are geographically located across all states and territories 
(Posey, 2002, p.26). 
 
To be Indigenous is to exist within a multiplicity of global and collective identities. Through 
their geographic spread across nation-state borders, different faith communities, gender and 
ethnic boundaries Indigenous peoples embody identity pluralism (Barth, 1969; Berger, 1990). 
Identity pluralism is clearly articulated by Khan (cited in Talbot, 1998, p.1), who declared he 
had been a Pushtun for 4,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years and a Pakistani for forty years. 
Indigeneity is not delineated by natural boundaries and state borders but by the social landscape 
where, “some of the strongest claims of difference are made by the marginalized and 
deracinated, by those who would otherwise be absorbed, eliminated and forgotten by dominant 
societies” (Niezen, 2003, p.6). 
 
Due to the complexity and potential for exclusion in defining Indigeneity, the UN and many 
other international bodies have not adopted a formal definition of Indigeneity. Instead, the UN, 
led by the UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), identifies but does not define 
Indigenous peoples according to the following criteria – not all of which need to be fulfilled to 
claim Indigeneity (UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues, 2008): 
 
• “Self-identification as Indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by their 
community as their member.  
• Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies. 
• Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources. 
• Distinct social, economic or political systems.  
• Distinct language, culture and beliefs. 
• Form non-dominant groups of society.  
• Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as 
distinctive peoples and communities”. 
 
The primary importance of self-identification was outlined initially in Convention 169 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO c.169) (International 
Labour Organization, 1989). The principle of self-identification is also clearly defined in Article 
33 of the Declaration (UN General Assembly, 2007): 
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“1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in 
accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of 
Indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live”. 
 
Erica-Irene Daes, the former Chairperson of the UN' Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, points out that a shared history and distinct cultural characteristics can help to 
identify some peoples as Indigenous (IWGIA, 2013). Jose R. Martinez Cobo (1983, pp.50-51), 
the former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, provided the current working criterion of Indigeneity in his eminent 
Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations: 
 
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal system. 
 
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period 
reaching into the present of one or more of the following factors: 
 
a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; 
b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; 
c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a 
tribal system, membership of an Indigenous community, dress, means of 
livelihood, lifestyle, etc.); 
d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother tongue, as the habitual 
means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, 
habitual, general or normal language); 
e) Residence on certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world; 
f) Other relevant factors. 
 
On an individual basis, an Indigenous person is one who belongs to these Indigenous 
populations through self-identification as Indigenous (group consciousness) and is 
recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the 
group).This preserves for these communities the sovereign right and power to decide 
who belongs to them, without external interference”. 
 
I agree that both Daes and Cobo’s criterion are relevant and applicable but for one phrase of 
Cobo’s that I have emphasised: “They form at present non-dominant sectors of society”. 
Dodson notes that these criterion are contextual, written at a time when most Indigenous 
activists were from settler-colonial contexts in Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Dodson, 
2015, pers. comm., 16 October). I argue that this definition is not accurate for all Indigenous 
contexts, particularly in the Pacific Region where in most states, including Timor-Leste, 
Indigenous peoples are the majority population (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005, p.607). In these 
states, Indigenous peoples lead government, control the economy and resource use, use 
traditional languages and teach Indigenous culture in schools. These peoples, meet all the other 
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criterion or identifiers of Indigenous, including self-identification, and are also the dominant 
sector in their societies.  
 
With this important difference in mind, I expand Cobo’s (1983) criterion of Indigeneity to 
reflect the experience of settler-colonial and non-settler colonial Indigenous peoples. The 
following definition is more inclusive and is used throughout my research: 
 
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. Depending on context, they form both 
non-dominant and dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop 
and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as 
the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural 
patterns, social institutions and legal system” [my emphasis]. 
 
3.2.2 Indigeneity in Timor-Leste  
 
A number of East Timorese people and experienced researchers have questioned my use of an 
Indigenous critical theory lens in Timor-Leste. These people note correctly that few East 
Timorese people identify as being Indigenous, which underlines a dilemma with the issue of 
self-identification outlined above. Therefore, it is critical that I explain why I am talking about 
Indigenous peoples in Timor-Leste.  
 
I argue that East Timorese peoples fit each of the categories of my earlier definition of 
Indigeneity. Most important is the evidence of strong, vibrant Indigenous knowledge systems 
practiced by East Timorese throughout the country. Research in anthropology, archaeology and 
ethno-botany also show that East Timorese people can trace ancestry to the island of Timor-
Leste back thousands of years and their historical connection to the land prior to Portuguese 
colonialism and Indonesian invasion (McClean, 2014; Oliveira, 2008; Traube, 2007). East 
Timorese people consider themselves to be distinct from the peoples living in nearby islands, 
and they are the dominant nation grouping within the borders of Timor-Leste. East Timorese 
people are preserving and strengthening their independence and exploring how to integrate 
Indigenous culture into governance and legal systems, leadership and decision-making.  
 
East Timorese scholars such as Babo-Soares (2004) and Trindade and Castro (2007) and 
international researchers including Loch and Prueller (2011) and Ospina and Hohe (2002) 
emphasise the important links between the struggles and experiences of East Timorese and 
Indigenous peoples globally. Nevertheless, I was informed that East Timorese mostly self-
identify as Indigenous only when it suits them (Durnam & Boughton, 2010, pers. comm., 14 
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September; da Silva, 2010, pers. comm., 29 September). For example, identifying as 
‘Indigenous’ might take place in a human rights debate in New York or Geneva, but rarely does 
a East Timorese person publicly identify as Indigenous. The term Indigenous is used in Timor-
Leste, as an East Timorese peace researcher explained: 
 
“Indigenous people means for me they are the people who live in that place, they have a 
long history from their grandfathers until now. They have strong, deep feelings about 
their land around them. They know the history of the land and the people there. They 
still believe in traditional ways to run their lives” (TTG-1500-300910). 
 
She went on to warn that in a conflict-affected context the label ‘Indigenous’ can exacerbate 
violence by differentiating and separating East Timorese: 
 
“I have heard that people say that the Indigenous people of Timor are all the people that 
have the black skin. If you are mixed, then you are not Indigenous anymore. They call it 
mestiços. I don’t want to make a difference between me and other people. Sometimes 
difference can create conflict” (TTG-1500-300910). 
 
While it is rare to have a conversation about Indigeneity, if you were to raise ‘culture’ with East 
Timorese, you would have a lively and engaged discussion. When East Timorese people talk 
about culture they talk about a deep reverence, responsibility and relationship to place, clan, and 
family and reference the importance of language, resource exchange, law and spirituality. Many 
researchers including Grenfell (2013, pers.comm., 16 July) and Hunt (2013, pers.comm., 16 
July) have proposed that the discussion about East Timorese development has shifted in the past 
five years from one of technical issues and governance, to a much more open discussion 
involving culture.  
 
During Portuguese colonialism, and certainly for Portuguese-speaking East Timorese, it would 
have been highly improbable to label oneself ‘Indigenous’. The Portuguese used the term 
indigenas to describe people who are Indigenous, local or natives, and the term has connotations 
of savagery, and is associated with Hobbes’ social contract, which states that without modern 
political community the lives of people are “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 
1651). Cabral (2002, p.65) cites the 1954 Native Statute in Portuguese law that defines an 
indigenas as: 
 
“A person ‘of black race, of black descent, born in the province or habitually resident in 
it, who has not yet the knowledge and the individual and social habits which are 
considered prerequisite to the complete application of the public and private law by 
which Portuguese citizens are governed”. 
 
Under Portuguese colonialism, indigenas in Timor-Leste were denied civil rights, access to 
property and were geographically and socially separated from Europeans, assimilados 
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(Portuguese: assimilated colonial subjects) and mestiços (Portuguese: a person with mixed 
Indigenous and European parentage) (Cabral, 2002, pp.65-66). In a community striving for 
modernity, using the term Indigenous can be divisive. An East Timorese development analyst 
explains:  
 
“The term Indigenous becomes part of a very racist speech. Here you have to be very 
careful with so much oppression. We are all East Timorese and we all started the idea 
that we should be independent” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
The potential for structural and cultural violence must be considered when identifying 
Indigenous peoples and it is necessary to use a conflict-sensitive approach (Anderson, 1999). 
Taking this approach means considering how the identification and prioritisation of certain 
Indigenous nations over other groups can act to exacerbate violence or nurture peace.  
Internationally, there are examples where claiming Indigeneity has led to the marginalisation of 
other individuals and groups and Indigeneity has been used to threaten and practice large-scale 
violence. Claims to Indigeneity can be deeply divisive; however, such identification can also be 
empowering and lead to cultural, social and political transformation. A senior development 
practitioner proposed that the challenge of identifying Indigeneity has the potential to initiate 
violence between groups:  
 
“The issue of Indigeneity it is a very conflictual issue. Examples in Rwanda and Nigeria 
show that we are not dealing with a romanticised view of Indigenous people, crushed by 
an oppressive national elite. There are many situations where these identities are used 
and exploited by political elite for their own gain, which leads to violence” (DD-2100-
250110). 
 
Claims to and definitions of Indigeneity in Timor-Leste are inconstant, fluid and politicised – 
but not irrelevant. I posit that, in Timor-Leste, East Timorese people’s understanding of custom, 
culture, power and identity are akin to Indigeneity. The issue of Indigeneity, and its questions of 
nationalism, identity, land, culture and power are at the heart of development, violence and 
peacebuilding issues in Timor-Leste. Indigenous critical theory is an important tool to better 
understand issues of structural and cultural violence in Timor-Leste. I argue, that while 
Indigeneity is complex, an Indigenous critical theory approach is highly relevant in Timor-
Leste.  
 
3.3 Indigenous knowledge systems 
 
Indigenous knowledge systems are both a theoretical framework and political movement that 
assert the rights, cultural and political sovereignty of Indigenous peoples as distinct from non-
Indigenous peoples. These knowledge systems have not arisen from Western tradition. By 
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identifying Indigenous peoples in international law, they are both a legal category and a 
theoretical and political construct. 
 
My research prioritises the term ‘Indigenous knowledge systems’ over the use of ‘Fourth World 
theory’. The term ‘Fourth World’ was first widely used in 1974 by Shuswap Grand Chief 
George Manuel to differentiate Indigenous peoples from the Third, Second and First Worlds 
(common groupings in the then Cold War environment); and to indicate the marginalised 
position of many Indigenous peoples in relation to other political power structures (Bodley, 
1999, pp.77-85; Churchill, 1992; Dyck, 1985; Griggs, 1992; Manuel & Posluns, 1974). Manuel 
and Posluns (1974, p.40) defined the Fourth World as “Indigenous peoples descended from a 
country’s aboriginal population and who today are completely or partly deprived of the right to 
their own territories and its riches”. Dyck (1985, p.1) emphasised the shared experiences of 
Indigenous peoples to form the collective Fourth World: 
 
“[Indigenous peoples] in all parts of the world are struggling to retain traditional land, 
cope with government administration of their lives and to survive as culturally distinct 
peoples within nation states. They are the Fourth World - they are not ethnic minorities 
but the original inhabitants of lands that are now separated into nation-states”. 
 
While there is a form of power in differentiating Indigenous peoples as Fourth World and 
Indigenous epistemologies as Fourth World theory, I argue this neo-colonial terminology is 
potentially disempowering in the post-Cold War context, locating Indigenous peoples as 
victims. I therefore use the term Indigenous critical theory, which provides a theoretical 
framework for Indigenous self-determination that promotes the primacy of Indigenous peoples 
as responsible custodians of their land, resources, culture and governance. Indigenous critical 
theories are logic systems located in Indigenous epistemology or Indigenous knowledge 
systems. I do not use the term ‘traditional’ as this can also be a limiting term, with connotations 
of an inflexible past (Alfred, 2015; Posey, 2002, p.28).  
 
The epistemology and ontology of Indigenous knowledge systems are radically different from 
other theoretical or qualitative inquiries. Indigenous knowledge systems ontology is based on 
historical, collective experience of Indigenous peoples; reality is lived, multifaceted, 
interconnected and continuous throughout time (LaDuke, 1999; 2005). Indigenous knowledge 
systems offer a holistic, multilayered, plural vantage point from which to observe and critique 
non-Indigenous perspectives (Close, 2002).  
 
This epistemology is extended through experiential and concrete findings; it is a practical form 
of knowing that is learnt, shared and practiced through dance, song, ceremony and relationships 
(Grenier, 1998; Langton & Palmer, 2003). It is the product of an interconnected spiritual and 
metaphysical link between Indigenous peoples’ land, ancestors, kin and personal identity - 
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located simultaneously in the past, present and future (Lynge, 1992; Peat, 1995). The 
Indigenous knowledge system takes its intellectual landmarks from Indigenous ways of 
knowing (developed over thousands of years) and articulates the power, rights, authority, 
ownership, responsibilities and aspirations of Indigenous peoples (Shiva, 2000). It locates 
power both individually and collectively. 
 
Empowering Indigenous knowledge systems accords Indigenous peoples the collective power 
and tools to assert their politics of difference from the dominant modern system. It provides 
Indigenous peoples with an intellectual platform to make their fundamental claims to self-
determination and social and ecological justice separate from current discriminatory and 
marginalising power systems. It offers a new mechanism for envisioning Indigenous 
alternatives to the often violent structures and processes currently in place (Bates, 1995; 
Beckett, 1987; Doxtater, 2004; Ortiz, 1984).  
 
Posey (2002, pp.28-30), Suzuki (1999) and Swiderska (2009) emphasise that modern science 
does not have the capacity to adequately engage with the holistic and spiritual nature of 
Indigenous knowledge. Often science reduces nature to ‘objects’ or ‘components’ of knowledge 
for human use and exploitation; it does not always engage with Indigenous knowledge and the 
ensuing custodianship, which encompasses environmental management, responsibility and 
reciprocation. Indigenous knowledge systems are radically different from non-Indigenous 
worldviews: 
 
“Indigenous Knowledge is stored in peoples’ memories and activities and is expressed 
in stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, dances, myths, cultural values, beliefs, rituals, 
community laws, local language and taxonomy, agricultural practise, equipment, 
materials, plant species and animal breeds. Indigenous Knowledge is shared and 
communicated orally, by specific example, and through culture. Indigenous forms of 
communication and organization are vital to local-level decision-making processes and 
to the preservation, development, and spread of Indigenous Knowledge” (Grenier, 
1998, p.6). 
 
Indigenous peoples have different relationships to land, resources and the ecosystems around 
them than non-Indigenous peoples. Relationships to land are fundamental to continuing 
Indigenous knowledge and cultures. For Indigenous peoples, land is the visible story that 
explains the meaning of life, law and culture, and of personal and communal spiritual identity. 
Indigenous peoples are morally and spiritually linked to their surrounding ecosystems and their 
custodianship and responsibility is extensive. Within Indigenous knowledge systems it is 
important to celebrate, renew and rejuvenate these physical and metaphysical spaces (Rigsby, 
1999). Aboriginal Australian Patrick Dodson (cited in Stockton, 1995, p.62) elaborates: 
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“The sacred places are not just simply geographically beautiful. They are holy places, 
even more holy than shrines, but not commemorated. They are sacred. The greatest 
respect is shown to them and they are used for the regeneration of history, the 
regeneration of Aboriginal people, the continuation of their life. Because that is where 
they begin and that is where they return”. 
 
Indigenous languages are critical to the transmission of Indigenous knowledge systems and non-
Indigenous language and discourse are a source of Indigenous oppression. As Fanon (1967, 
p.18) suggests, “A man [sic] who has a language, consequently possesses the world expressed 
and implied by that language”. Indigenous human rights specialists Skutnabb-Kangas and 
Dunbar (2010, p.37) agree: “our culture cannot survive without our languages”.  
 
By contrast, Western knowledge is broken into disciplines and specialities; it constructs 
particular faculties as legitimate, eschewing others. Western knowledge systems tend to be 
reductionist, secular and place hierarchical structures and boundaries resulting in Indigenous 
knowledge being defined as inferior and unscientific (Garroutte, 2003; Shiva, 2000, p.vii). 
Western epistemologies have demonstrated their limited scope to differentiate and identify the 
experiences and needs of Indigenous peoples. This limitation creates a power imbalance in 
knowledge systems that have resulted in the assertion of Western intellectual, political, 
economic and cultural dominance over Indigenous knowledge systems (Close, 2002).  
 
Murphy (2002; 2000) argues that Western knowledge has continued to fail Indigenous peoples 
because of the lack of capacity for Indigenous community participation and the impossibility of 
this single static non-Indigenous model to represent the multiple and inter-layered points of 
reference of the Indigenous community. As Minh-ha (1995, p.216) proposes, the central 
problem within Western epistemology is that by displacing Indigenous knowledge systems, it 
prioritises an ethnocentric, bounded and constricted knowledge system. Huggins (1998, p.36) 
agrees describing Western knowledge systems as “yet another alien discourse and institution 
designed by and for Whites without any consultation with Black people”.  
 
Indigenous peoples are using Indigenous knowledge systems to emancipate Indigenous peoples 
from their historicist origins of oppression and colonialism, and to assert their claims toward 
Indigenous self-determination (Doxtater, 2004, p. 625; Murphy, 2000, p.89; Smith, 1999). 
Alfred (1999; 2015) understands that modern Western discourse dismisses the use, applicability 
and status of Indigenous knowledge and governance structures. He advocates a return to a more 
complex understanding of the Indigenous self and community through a process of deep 
ontological questioning and active cultural practice. He calls for Indigenous peoples to re-
imagine and re-orientate the structures of Indigenous self-determination necessary for their 
continuity. Smith (1999) frames Indigenous self-determination at the centre of processes of 
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transformation, decolonisation, healing and mobilisation that are local, regional and global in 
scope. 
 
It is important that the current hierarchy of knowledge systems is debunked and disregarded to 
achieve Indigenous self-determination (Garroutte, 2003; Nakata et.al., 2012; Rigney, 1999; 
Smith, 1999). Indigenous peoples reject this “feeling of [Western] superiority” and argue that 
neither system is superior nor indifferent to the other (Todorov, 1984, p.2). An international 
peacebuilding specialist asserted that: 
 
“Indigenous peoples should not just be the objective of study. They should be active 
agents in structures of knowledge production and South-South learning…Otherwise you 
are just continuing to privilege northern universities and knowledge production as the 
real thing” (X-1100-261109).  
 
Turner, (2006, p.100) points out that there are epistemological problems in systematising, 
classifying, or writing down Indigenous knowledge systems that are sourced from an oral 
cultural tradition – but that this should not deter scholars from engaging with Indigenous 
studies. He promotes the use of a critical indigenous philosophy that Indigenous scholars and 
thinkers – “word warriors” – can use to protect Indigenous knowledge from exploitation and 
assert and defend Indigenous nationhood within the dominant culture.  
 
While there is certainly a role for Indigenous studies to engage the Western academy as Turner 
(2006) and Smith (1999) suggest, I agree with Garrotte (2003), Alfred (1999) and Alfred and 
Corntassel’s (2005) suggestions that Indigenous theorists should recreate or regenerate 
Indigenous institutions and transcend colonial practices of knowledge transmission to cultivate 
self-determination. This is a more powerful intellectual project to achieve Indigenous self-
determination. Their approach asserts that Indigenous peoples possess unique, viable 
philosophies, or worldviews that are tools for the generation and discovery of knowledge, which 
should stand alongside the Western academy as valid knowledge systems. Indigenous peoples 
should resist academic discourses that reject spiritual, sacred and pluralist knowledge and lived 
experience.  
 
3.3.1 The structural violence inherent in states 
 
Indigenous knowledge systems frame states as inherently perpetrating structural violence. 
Indigenous knowledge systems use the term “nation” to describe an Indigenous community, 
cultural group or society, united by common descent and/or language and connected to a 
specific and bounded geographic location (Nietschmann, 1994). There are political and 
geographic differences between nations and states (Nietschmann, 1985; 1994). The inalienable 
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and autonomous territorial borders of states are considered to be a predetermined right 
according to liberal theory (Mill, 1891, p.120; Morgenthau, 1973) but the territorial borders of 
modern states do not easily fit with the many overlapping Indigenous nations’ boundaries.  In 
the statebuilding process however, Indigenous nations are usually deprived of the rights to their 
territories and natural resources, and both these lands and the peoples themselves are usually 
placed under fiduciary obligation (trusteeship) to the state (Anaya et.al., 1995; Anderson, 1991; 
Behrendt, 2002; Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p.9). This process of delineating boundaries between 
nations and states has, and continues to trigger direct, structural and cultural violence that will 
be discussed further in other chapters. 
 
Nietschmann (1994) and Seth (1995) argue that Indigeneity challenges the dual framework of 
nations and states as the basis of modern geo-political power. Nietzen (2003, p.9) clarifies this 
divide by stating that this opposition: “sets social groups and networks apart from others in a 
global ‘we–they’ or ‘North–South’ dichotomy”. Western institutions deny Indigenous nations 
power, authority or legitimacy, exclude Indigenous points of reference, and fail to engage with 
Indigenous languages or cultures (Alfred, 1999; Murphy, 2000). Indigenous knowledge systems 
advocate equality between Indigenous nations and states, not a relationship categorised by this 
power imbalance that triggers violence.  
 
Indigenous peoples pose tremendous potential power and potential threat to the status quo of the 
current system of state-based power. Indigenous peoples worldwide have realised that 
colonisation and assimilation into a state prevents them from controlling their own lives, 
resources and cultures and that the threat to their territorial base and surrounding environment 
may entail their own destruction (Gray, 1995). Indigenous knowledge systems therefore frame 
statebuilding actions as nation-destroying. These actions prevent the attainment of Indigenous 
self-determination and the resulting possible violence, lack of sustainable culturally-appropriate 
development, and the continued reduction in biological and cultural diversity (Gray, 1997; 
Nietschmann, 1994, pp.231-238; Sivertsen, 1999). State building can fracture or destroy 
Indigenous holistic, land-cultural-spiritual-ties, which are distinctly different from Western 
sustainable resource development practices, law, and property ownership (Deloria, 1973; Vel, 
2000). The Indigenous right to self-determination challenges the assumed norms of state 
territoriality and “the legitimacy of political incorporation and cultural assimilation as an 
exercise of state sovereignty” (Wilmer, 1993, p.42). The assertions of Indigenous political status 
and autonomy challenge Anderson’s notion of the “imagined community”, which is 
fundamental to the western model of political community, where autonomous individuals 
participate in defining political community through collective rights and responsibilities 
exercised within the state’s territorial boundaries (Anderson, 1991; Dahl, 2000).  
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Empowered by their continuing existence and strengthened political status, Indigenous peoples 
claim collective rights across and inside state borders. As historical experience indicates, many 
Indigenous people, including Aboriginal Australians, Maori, the Zapatista in Mexico and the 
Mohawk peoples in US and Canada, have violently resisted state suppression. Manuel and 
Posluns (1974) emphasise the experience of Indigenous peoples as one of survival despite 
significant violence. In this way, Indigenous knowledge systems highlight the inherent 
structural violence of Western knowledge systems and their associated system of geo-political 
State territoriality. Indigenous knowledge systems aim to bring an alternative theoretical 
framework to dismantling and transforming state violence. My thesis applies this framework to 
the context in Timor-Leste. 
 
3.3.2 Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems 
 
This section highlights the importance of locating Indigenous East Timorese knowledge 
systems within the broad spectrum of Indigenous knowledge systems. In line with my case 
above that East Timorese people can be identified as Indigenous peoples I argue that Indigenous 
East Timorese knowledge is geographically unique and deeply interconnected to ancestors, 
place and kinship networks and realised through customary practices occurring across multiple 
generations. As an East Timorese peacebuilding practitioner explained to me:  
 
“The local laws are indigenous knowledge. They come from the community itself, from 
our culture, from our tradition. It has not come from abroad, but it has come from 
working together, living in one place, from our ancestors. That is why we call it local 
Indigenous knowledge, because it truly comes from the Timorese people. They have 
already existed for a long time” (TTO-1330-061010). 
 
Indigenous knowledge in Timor-Leste is diverse, with at least 16 language groups, and each 
grounded in specific cultural beliefs, rituals and practices that are unique to a particular 
geographical site (Hull, 1998, p.4). Colonialism, violence and urban migration have changed 
people’s cultural practices, resulting in fewer people accessing Indigenous knowledge. Research 
participants explained that it is difficult to access Indigenous knowledge because within the 
primarily oral culture information had not been written down. Violence in the past has targeted 
customary leaders and knowledge holders, and as power structures changed in communities 
these people held less power and respect. Most of what is now publicly available is via the 
observations of international anthropologists and political scientists. These factors have resulted 
in fewer East Timorese accessing or practicing Indigenous knowledge. Many East Timorese are 
actively seeking to connect with their culture and explore Indigenous solutions to modern 
challenges. As one senior East Timorese UN adviser admitted: 
 
47 
“I do not really know about the real Timorese practice in my own community. So now I 
am trying to understand why they are doing this, to understand why we should have our 
own sacred house, because the sacred house is to bring together the kinship and all the 
relatives, the family” (TA-1100-090910). 
 
In 2009 the Government produced guidelines on customary law. This guideline document 
recognises and records the practice but does not provide it with any formal legal status. Some 
local NGOs are working to record Indigenous knowledge to preserve it for future generations 
and to use it now to transform violence in communities. One East Timorese peacebuilding 
program manager explained the importance of recording this process: 
 
“We have worked with the local community to promote local knowledge on traditional 
laws. We have to preserve it. So the community can use it as a model to resolve conflict 
at different levels” (TTO-1330-061010). 
 
In Chapters Six and Seven I detail Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and explore 
East Timorese self-determination and peacebuilding practices. 
 
3.3.3 Welfare colonialism and co-option  
 
There are two major forms of structural violence that challenge Indigenous peoples striving to 
achieve self-determination: welfare colonialism and co-option. Both are outcomes of state-based 
neo-colonial policies, and both limit the effectiveness of Indigenous activism. Welfare 
colonialism, an internal neo-colonialist practice prevalent within the modern state, is a primary 
form of structural violence currently experienced by Indigenous peoples. Welfare colonialism is 
the deployment and institutionalisation of welfarist policies directed by modern governance 
processes, and this is linked to co-option, as outlined below. As Paine (1977, pp.xi,  3) who first 
used this term illustrated:  
 
“We find a colonialism based on welfare, and a moral ‘double bind’ in the situation of 
those persons who make decisions on behalf of others…this kind of colonialism…is 
based on two illegitimate positions: the colonisers are illegitimately privileged, whereas 
the colonised are illegitimately devalued”.  
 
Beckett (1987, p.14) further explains that welfare colonialism is a state instrument to manage 
Indigenous peoples, and is used when “The expropriation and marginalisation, which are the 
common outcomes of colonisation, have produced a level of poverty and deprivation [in the 
Indigenous group] that is beyond the capacity of the market or the welfare apparatus to 
remedy”. Jull (1986; 1991: p,54) described how welfare colonialism delegates power by co-
opting Indigenous peoples into the modern system: 
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“A group of some type of formal authority carries out tasks with funds and program 
design determined by others outside the group or region. A welfare office on 
Indigenous land may be staffed by local people and may hand out the cheques and carry 
out other welfare functions within the guidelines of a higher authority”. 
 
Co-option is the process by which Indigenous leaders become “tools of the state”, who are 
either “blind or complicit in the political subjugation of legitimate leaders” (Alfred, 1999, 
pp.30-31). Alfred (1999) highlights four methods the state uses to co-opt Indigenous peoples. 
First, the state influences the composition of community leadership by legitimising desirable 
people, relying on non-Native expertise, marginalising certain individuals and labelling 
‘extremist’ views, and diverting attention from addressing structural flaws to managing the 
symptoms of colonialism. Then it amplifies community divisions to prevent unity and solidarity 
effectively challenging state power. Thirdly, the state removes the communities’ economic 
capacity for self-sufficiency in order to form welfare dependency on the state. Finally, it 
incorporates individual leaders and organisations who become agents of state policies and 
administration.  
 
Alfred (1999, pp.75-76) criticises these co-opted Indigenous people for their “pathetic 
compromise of principle” whose actions are “nothing less than a betrayal” and whose “power 
derives from coercion and artifice – in effect, alienation from nature”. Boldt (1993) and Marule 
(1984, p.40) blame: “belief among some of our Indian [Indigenous] people that by replacing the 
white bureaucrats…with brown people, we will remedy all that is wrong with our situation”. 
Murphy (2000, p.67) argues that these policies lead Indigenous peoples to act as “brokers” or 
“Aboriginal experts” which “insulates government from the pressure of conflict”. Corntassel 
(2007, p.140) warns that co-option creates an “illusion of inclusion” incorporating Indigenous 
leaders and communities into the state power structures at the expense of their claims for 
Indigenous self-determination. 
 
Welfare colonialism and co-option highlight the entrenched hierarchical relationships between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, which play out subtly particularly in elite politics and 
dependency narratives. Corntassel (2007), Murphy (2000), Marule (1984) and Boldt (1993) 
argue that these practices demonstrate the structural violence inherent in neo-colonialism where 
Indigenous peoples actively participate in their own downfall. I emphasise that by marginalising 
Indigenous leadership and decision-making, policies of welfare colonialism and co-option 
prevent Indigenous peoples from realising their goals of Indigenous self-determination (Close, 
2002). Welfare colonialism and co-option as structural forms of violence in Timor-Leste will be 
examined in detail in further chapters. 
 
49 
3.4 Indigenous self-determination 
 
Indigenous self-determination is both a concept and a goal within Indigenous knowledge 
systems; it is also a process and a journey that all Indigenous peoples must take to fully realise 
their personal and community aspirations. Indigenous self-determination is the most 
fundamental right for Indigenous peoples, upon which all other rights are based. As Dodson 
(1999, p.44) asserts: 
 
“Time and again Indigenous peoples express the view that the right to self-
determination is the pillar on which all other rights rest. It is of such a profound nature 
that the integrity of all other rights depends on its observance. It is a right that has 
operated since time immemorial amongst our peoples, but it is the right that is at the 
centre of the abuses we have suffered in the face of invasion and colonisation. The 
dominant theme of our lives since colonisation has been that we have been deprived of 
the very basic right to determine our own future, to choose how we would live, to 
follow our own laws. When you understand that, you understand why the right to self-
determination is at the heart of our aspirations”. 
 
In Peace Power Righteousness Alfred (1999) describes the centrality of Indigenous self-
determination and asserts that the current governance of Indigenous peoples is built on Western 
institutions of isolationism, welfare dependency, and co-option resulting in poverty and despair. 
Only when Indigenous communities are grounded in Indigenous values, will they heal these 
divisions. He argues for Indigenous communities to return to their customary political values to 
achieve Indigenous self-determination through the power of Indigenous systems and activism. 
To describe his vision of Indigenous self-determination, Alfred (1995) describes the complex 
Rotinohshonni model of Indigenous self-governance from the knowledge system of the 
Kahnawake-Mohawk peoples. He advocates for a new generation of Indigenous leaders who 
can resist the pressures of neo-colonialism and make Indigenous self-determination a reality.  
 
There is no universal or pan-Indigenous model of self-determination and each Indigenous 
person and community will use their unique and plural Indigenous knowledge systems and 
varying historical, cultural, political, economic and geographic circumstances to understand and 
interpret Indigenous self-determination. There will be as many different types of Indigenous 
self-determination as there are Indigenous nations. Langton (cited in Dodson & Smith, 2003, 
p.3) agrees, noting that in Aboriginal Australia self-determination is “extremely 
localised…elaborated across regions”. For example, Indigenous self-determination in Timor-
Leste is called ukun rasik a’an, a Tetum term that holistically encompasses sovereignty, self-
determination, self-sufficiency and independence (Hunt, 2008a; La’o Hamutuk, 2003). 
 
Therefore, not all Indigenous Nations will recognise, or even agree with, Alfred’s 
Rotinohshonni model of Indigenous self-determination but this model is only an example for 
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how other Indigenous peoples could begin a process of reflection and dialogue about how they 
would envision their own Indigenous self-determination (Garroutte, 2003). Indigenous self-
determination as Alfred (1999) asserts, exists historically and theoretically outside the 
framework of Western theory and practice. Therefore the failure to currently attain Indigenous 
self-determination occurs because the modern governance system limits Indigenous self-
determination to within the system. I argue that unless these issues of structural violence are 
directly addressed and resolved by Indigenous communities, they will not achieve Indigenous 
self-determination or positive peace. 
 
Guidance exists, for example in the Declaration, to assist Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
peoples to understand some of the vital processes, laws, protections, structures and institutions 
that may be necessary to construct to achieve Indigenous self-determination. I note that the 
Declaration frames these rights within the system. This is problematic, but I suggest is an 
important step toward systemic change (Jull, 2010, pers. comm., 30 January). To understand 
how this guidance was formed, the next section will explore how the right to Indigenous self-
determination is articulated in the Declaration. 
 
It is important to note that self-determination is broader than the concept of self-governance. 
Self-governance is defined as having “jurisdiction and a mandated control over the member of a 
group, its land and resources, ‘governance’ is about having the structures, processes and 
institutional capacity in place to be able to exercise that jurisdiction through sound decision-
making, representation and accountability” (Dodson & Smith, 2003, p.2). Self-governance is the 
administration of management and leadership processes and systems necessary to enable 
Indigenous self-determination. 
 
3.4.1 Indigenous internationalism 
 
In the past few decades Indigenous peoples have made prodigious inroads into re-imagining 
their political landscape. The global groundswell toward greater collective political economic, 
social and cultural and legal autonomy is gaining momentum as peoples connect globally to 
discuss common problems and share experience and knowledge (Alfred, 1999; Berger, 1998; 
Corntassel, 2007; Deloria, 1973; Dodson, 1994; Henriksen, 1999; Jull, 1998; 1999; 2005; 
Niezen, 2003; Sanders, 1977; Semali & Kincheloe, 1999; Smith, 1999; Tauli Corpuz, 1999; 
2004).  
 
This section examines how Indigenous peoples have created a unified global political 
movement with common goals through processes of Indigenous internationalism. I examine the 
history of the creation of the Declaration, and the collective Indigenous right to self-
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determination. I highlight the history of Indigenous internationalism because I believe there are 
a range of discussions and practical examples of Indigenous self-determination taking place 
globally that afford opportunities for solidarity and engagement between East Timorese and 
other Indigenous peoples.   
 
The discourse and definition of self-determination is integral to international law and practice 
(Anaya, 1994; 1996; Fletcher, 1994; Lâm, 2000; Pritchard, 1998). The principle of self-
determination has been recognised internationally since the 1919 League of Nations Charter 
and United States’ President Wilson’s 1918 speech to a joint session of Congress. Wilson and 
other liberal thinkers emphasised the right to self-determination for all nation peoples, and 
maintained that groups who attain self-determination are considered less likely to agitate toward 
aggressive territorial expansionism. Lynch (2002, p.419) argues that Wilson’s interpretation of 
self-determination was limited and relevant only when state concerns of security, politics and 
economics had been evaluated.  
 
Chief Levi General Deskaheh led the first Indigenous diplomatic foray in 1923 to the League of 
Nations to request a hearing regarding his peoples’ dispute with the Canadian Government over 
self-government. The Canadian Government reacted dismissively and Deskaheh and his party 
were not heard or recognised formally by the League of Nations (Corntassel, 2008, pp. 109-110; 
Niezen, 2003). In 1924, Maori leader Tahupōtiki Wiremu Rātana travelled with a delegation to 
London and Geneva to protest the breaking of the Treaty of Waitangi but was denied access to 
the League of Nations. Deskaheh and Rātana successfully highlighted the moral and political 
dilemma of a constituent peoples seeking self-determination within an existing State. 
 
Since the 1920s, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) within the UN system, created a 
series of treaties incorporating the rights of Indigenous peoples. The most crucial of which was 
the 1957 Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal 
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (ILO c107) and the updated 1989 ILO 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO c169) 
which were the only international standards that stated that Indigenous peoples had the right to 
decide, control and participate in their own development. These treaties emphasised that states 
have the primary responsibility to develop and implement these rights and neither asserted 
collective rights for self-determination. 
 
While self-determination is a legal tool, it is not a predetermined set of exact rules. The 1945 
UN Charter restricted the term ‘peoples’ to citizens within states, preventing colonised and 
other assimilated peoples who were the victims of foreign occupation and domination from 
claiming self-determination (Pellet, 1998, p.105). Nevertheless the concept of self-
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determination has experienced an evolution through subsequent UN texts, to be affirmed as jus 
cogens, a pre-emptory norm or right to prior acquisition (Panzironi, 2006; Pritchard, 1998). 
Self-determination was initially raised as a right for “all peoples” in the context of 
decolonisation in the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. Panzironi (2006, p.80) explains that the 1966 UN International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN ICCPR) and the UN International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN ICESCR) set out, in legally binding terms, the notion 
of self-determination beyond its widespread understanding as an anti-colonial principle to that 
of a universal doctrine (UN General Assembly, 1966a; 1966b).  
 
The formation of international organisations such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) 
(since 1973), the Indian Treaty Council (since 1974) and the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples (since 1975) provided structures for Indigenous peoples to collectively claim shared 
rights and goals. The Declaration evolved from this international Indigenous advocacy (Tauli 
Corpuz, 1999). Jull (1998) highlights the Indigenous power he witnessed when Inuit from 
Canada and Greenland and Saami from Finland, Norway and Sweden met at the inaugural 1973 
ICC meeting. Dodson (cited in Niezen, 2003, p.47) also recalls the tremendous insight he 
experienced when participating in the 1998 UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN 
WGIP): 
 
“I was sitting in a room, 12,000 miles away from home, but if I’d closed my eyes I 
could just about have been in Maningrida or Doomadgee or Flinders Island…We were 
all part of a world community of Indigenous peoples spanning the planet; experiencing 
the same problems and struggling against the same alienation, marginalisation and 
sense of powerlessness. We had gathered there united by our shared frustration with the 
dominant systems in our own countries and their consistent failure to deliver justice”. 
 
Dodson and Jull’s experiences highlight that while Indigenous peoples have different 
knowledge systems and are geographically separated, they are members of a collective global 
Indigenous movement. This collective is a measure of Indigenous power and while slow 
moving, gives strength and sustainability to Indigenous assertions of their collective rights to 
self-determination (Jull, 1995; 1998).  
 
I suggest that East Timorese activists, particularly those who feel the state and co-opted elites 
are not committed to achieving self-determination could seek to harness the power of this 
Indigenous solidarity and other global allies. I draw on Corntassel (2007), Churchill (2011), 
Venne (2011) and Watson (2011a; 2011b; 2014) to warn that there are risks in seeking authority 
and legitimacy through the same UN’s state-centric system that Indigenous peoples are 
simultaneously challenging. Churchill (2011) describes the Declaration as “a travesty of a 
mockery of a sham” and Corntassel (2007) contends that institutionalising and mainstreaming 
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Indigenous political movements within the UN system has impacted grassroots mobilisation 
toward Indigenous self-determination. Indigenous internationalism continues to be critical, but I 
would posit, should not be restricted to the UN.  
 
3.4.2 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
After decades of debate, the Declaration was adopted by the Human Rights Council on 29 June 
2006. On 13 September 2007 it was adopted by the UN General Assembly, and was endorsed 
by 143 countries (See Appendix F for the full Declaration text) (UN General Assembly, 2007). 
At that time, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand refused to endorse the 
Declaration, citing the unclear definition of Indigeneity, the linking of Indigeneity and self-
determination, and concerns that issues of ownership of land and resources could provoke intra-
state violence. The Declaration clearly incorporates rights within the boundaries of a pre-
existing state and, with changes in political leadership and ongoing pressure from their 
Indigenous constituencies, all four countries have now endorsed the Declaration (Minde, 2008; 
Watson & Venne, 2012; Watson, 2011a; Werther, 1992, p.42)..  
 
The Declaration is the most substantial and authoritative international document detailing a 
broad consensus of Indigenous peoples needs and aspirations (Jull, 2010, pers. comm., 30 
January; Lâm, 2000; Wilmer, 1993). The Declaration is not legally binding but some of the 
rights affirmed form part of customary international law (Adcock, 2014). There are problems of 
definition, universality and legitimacy associated with the Declaration, however, it 
unequivocally states that Indigenous peoples should occupy a privileged political and legal 
position within the UN (Bertrand, 1994; de Varennes, 1996, p.266; López-Reyes, 1995; Ryan, 
2000).  
 
Prior to the Declaration, no international standards specifically addressed Indigenous communal 
rights to self-determination (Anaya, 1996, p.114). The text asserts the full range of rights for 
Indigenous peoples to attain self-determination through five primary concepts divided between 
nine sections: recognition of collective human rights (I, VIII and IX); legal rights protecting 
against violent neo-colonial practices (II); cultural and social rights (III and IV); rights to 
traditional self-government (V) and territorial and/or political autonomy within the state-system 
(VII); and rights to economic sustainability and traditional resource management. The 
Declaration includes the need for Indigenous peoples’ active participation in self-governance 
(Article 4) and decision making that affects them (Article 18), it requires states to seek FPIC 
before adopting measures that will affect Indigenous peoples (Article 19) and highlights the 
right for Indigenous peoples to control land and resources as they choose (Article 26) (See 
Appendix F). 
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 After decades of Indigenous activism externally, and within the UN system the UNPFII was 
established in 2000 as the primary advisory body for Indigenous peoples within the UN system. 
The UNPFII is one of three UN bodies mandated to deal with Indigenous issues alongside the 
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (A-1000-010909; II-0700-230210). The Declaration is a 
significant achievement for all those Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous supporters who 
have fought to enable this text, however the arguably more difficult challenge of 
implementation remains (Adcock, 2014; Davis, 2008b; 2012; Jull, 2010, pers. comm., 30 
January; Tauli Corpuz, 2004). My focus is on the Declaration’s prioritisation of development as 
a tool to achieve Indigenous self-determination. I term this goal Indigenous self-determined 
development and discuss this concept further in the next chapter.  
 
3.5 Indigenous self-determined development 
 
Development – while considered a theory, practice and a system – is also a collective right of all 
peoples and is linked to self-determination as recognised in Article 1 of the 1986 UN 
Declaration on the Right to Development: “The human right to development also implies the 
full realisation of the right of peoples to self-determination” (UN General Assembly, 1986). The 
right to development asserts that fundamental issues of justice, equity, and consent must be at 
the basis of all development decision-making and action (Sengupta, 2000, pp.1-16). ILO c.169 
(International Labour Organization, 1989) urges the importance of Indigenous people deciding 
their own priorities and participating in plans and programs that affect them directly. 
 
As discussed above, both the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development and 1989 ILO 
c.169 are grounded in liberal, citizen and minority rights and locate the right to development 
inside the state (Turner, 2006). Problematically, neither prioritises Indigenous peoples’ FPIC 
(discussed below). These limitations signal the need for a broad definition of the Indigenous 
right to development. I draw on the Declaration to provide a more holistic definition of 
development that I use throughout this research (UN General Assembly, 2007). The Declaration 
explicitly raises the issue of development in Articles 3, 17, 20, 23 and 32, and addresses 
elements of development in Articles 1, 4, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 
37, 39, 41 and 42.  
 
Indigenous knowledge systems highlight the need for a holistic approach to development that 
values collective ownership, small-scale economies, and spiritual/physical ties to land and 
resources (Lynge, 1998; Minh-ha, 1995; Nietschmann, 1985; 1994). My working definition of 
Indigenous self-determined development is: 
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 A holistic economic, social, cultural and ecologically sustainable process of societal 
systems change, that aims to expand human capabilities, reduce vulnerabilities and 
freely determine and develop the individual and communal well-being of the entire 
population, on the basis of their free, prior and informed consent. 
 
The concept of Indigenous self-determined development, and an assessment of how this concept 
applies in practice in the current development system in Timor-Leste is discussed in Chapters 
Seven, Eight and Nine. 
 
3.5.1 Free, prior and informed consent  
 
Indigenous self-determined development is owned and enacted by empowered Indigenous 
peoples, and is grounded in FPIC (Ward, 2011, pp.55-56). FPIC is “a requirement, prerequisite 
and manifestation” of the Indigenous rights to self-determination and development (Indian 
Treaty Council, 2008, p.2). In Articles 10, 11, 19, 28, 29, 30 and 32 the Declaration takes a 
holistic approach to the application of free prior and informed consent and specifies that it must 
occur in relation to reallocation, cultures and cultural property, legislation and administrative 
measures, the conservation and protection of the environment, land and territories, military 
activities, indeed all decision-making that relates to Indigenous lands, territories or other 
resources. The practice of FPIC is most clearly articulated in Article 32.2: 
 
“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilisation or exploitation of 
mineral, water or other resources” [emphasis added] (UN General Assembly, 2007). 
 
FPIC is a decision-making process that does not involve coercion or manipulation, is carried out 
before activities are undertaken and is founded upon decision-makers understanding the full 
range of issues and potential impacts. It involves granting or withholding consent (Weitzner, 
2006). Researchers from Australia’s Desert Knowledge Cooperative Research Centre (2010) 
stress the importance of equal and respectful relationships to negotiate FPIC. The current 
development system is primarily focused on outcomes, and tends not to prioritise or incentivise 
relationship building. Mutual accountability and balanced power dynamics are implicit in the 
creation of consent, without FPIC, Indigenous self-determined development may not be 
achieved. 
 
Although the Declaration is non-binding instrument within international human rights law, 
FPIC is a deeply contentious issue for states, bilateral, multilateral and private sector 
organisations within the current development system (Ward, 2011, p.84). Australia, Canada, 
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New Zealand and the United States which voted against the Declaration, specifically cited FPIC 
and third party rights among their chief concerns (UNGA, 2007). An Indigenous rights 
practitioner clarifies that free prior and informed consent is not technically a veto (O-1600-
230909). If a process or a program does not meet FPIC criteria or negatively affects Indigenous 
peoples, then it may be subject to immediate cessation at the discretion of the Indigenous 
peoples involved (Indian Treaty Council, 2008, p.1).  
 
A number of influential international institutions have specific policies focused on supporting 
the development of Indigenous peoples including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN 
(FAO) (IWGIA, 2015). In 1982, the World Bank became the first multilateral institution to 
create a mandatory safeguards policy on Indigenous Peoples. This policy requires member 
states to undertake free, prior, and informed consultation before deciding on development 
programs affecting Indigenous Peoples (World Bank, 2011b; World Bank, 2013a).  
 
The experiences of the World Bank indicate that operationalising consultation, let alone 
consent, has been challenging. Senior World Bank officials have assessed that this policy has 
been a very powerful incentive to force practical implementation of its recommendations, 
however, practical implementation of ‘consultation’ has been mixed, institutional change has 
been very slow, and Indigenous peoples continue to be harmed by World Bank development 
(Downing & Moles, 2002; O-1600-230909; K-0800-220909). The Indian Treaty Council (2005, 
p.5) argues that the World Bank’s interpretation of ‘consultation’ implies “an exchange of 
views devoid of any decision-making role”. Some participants argue that by using 
‘consultation’, the World Bank has deliberately misinterpreted FPIC (K-0800-220909). A 
senior development practitioner asserted that FPIC should be used as the primary tool to balance 
power relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples:  
 
“To me, the relationship is paramount. Until you have a reasonable relationship, 
then whatever agreement you get, will not be worth the paper it is printed on. 
The main point of the relationship is to recalibrate this huge asymmetry of 
power, which is absolutely inevitable. There are always language [and timing] 
barriers, which are very difficult…so it is open to negotiation. But negotiation 
is not meaningful between an elephant and a flea. Passing information and 
capacity building is all about rectifying this asymmetry of power” (K-0800-
220909). 
 
Strong community capacity to make informed decisions is crucial. Hunt’s (2008a, pp.261-262) 
research shows that capacity development was most effective when it “involved relationships, 
networking and exchanges, accompaniment and mentoring, and reflective learning”. These 
lessons align with UN Inter-Agency Team on National Capacity Development (2013) research 
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that promotes the role of long-term productive and constructive relationships to achieve 
capacity development.  
 
FPIC enabled by strong relationships and capacity strengthening is the basis for self-determined 
development. I discuss issues of operationalising FPIC further in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
I began this chapter by discussing the pluralism of Indigenous identity and defining Indigenous 
peoples as a collective that includes Indigenous peoples who are the majority and minority 
populations within a state. I explored some of the complexities raised when classifying East 
Timorese peoples as Indigenous and made a firm case that East Timorese peoples and their 
knowledge systems are Indigenous.  
 
I located Indigenous knowledge systems as a powerful and authentic theoretical framework for 
Indigenous peoples to realise Indigenous self-determination. I explained how Indigenous critical 
theory can be used to analyse the structural and cultural violence experienced by Indigenous 
peoples. I postulate that welfare colonialism is an important concept to understand in the 
context of a conflict-affected developing country. I signal that co-option is also a useful term to 
critique the behaviours and decisions of Indigenous elite who reject Indigenous knowledge 
systems in favour of modern systems and liberal, democratic state-centred goals. Both of these 
concepts are relevant to my case study in Timor-Leste. 
 
I also summarised the history of Indigenous internationalism and explored how the growth of 
political awareness and connectivity of Indigenous peoples internationally, has resulted in a 
proliferation of international law, norms and practice focused on Indigenous rights. This chapter 
examined the practical implications of these human rights mechanisms with a focus on the 
Declaration and the right to Indigenous self-determination. I suggest that Indigenous East 
Timorese peoples could engage with these international Indigenous fora to seek solidarity and 
learn and share innovative examples of Indigenous self-determination in practice. I finished by 
highlighting that the next challenge is the implementation of the Declaration, particularly 
Indigenous self-determined development.  
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4 The Development System in Timor-Leste 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a concise overview of the current development system. To begin, I define 
the current development system; I summarise key theories and major debates, structures and 
behaviours; and I note that this is a global system with complex, interconnected layers, multiple 
contexts and numerous actors. By establishing the barriers and challenges within this complex 
system at global, institutional and individual actor levels, I indicate the complexity and scope of 
the challenges Timor-Leste is currently contending with and how these challenges impact the 
achievement of self-determined development. 
 
I will also explain the history and framework of the current development system and summarise 
the current development funding, policy and programming cycle. I explain the importance of the 
international institutions and structures including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) and the G7+ (a group of twenty conflict-
affected developing countries) that frame the current development system. I link the role of the 
MDGs, the OECD DAC and the G7+ in shaping and prioritising the East Timorese 
Government’s state-centric approach to development practice.  
 
In this chapter I begin my analysis of Timor-Leste by providing a summary of the actors in the 
current development system. I describe how these dynamic relationships impact on violence and 
peacebuilding by drawing upon my field research and taking into account the policies and 
practices of bilateral and multilateral organisations, civil society and the private sector.  
 
4.2 The current development system 
 
In Chapter One I argued that development is a system constructed upon interconnected, multi-
dimensional sets of relationships and fundamental queries of justice, equality and power 
(Meadows, 2008). Each society must experiment with innovative and context-specific ways to 
achieve these outcomes. I drew on Rihani (2002) and Ramalingam (2013) to argue that the 
current development system is fundamentally flawed due to its attempt to apply linear, 
mechanistic models to a complex, non-linear world. These two authors argue that solutions to 
multi-faceted problems emerge not from simple, predicable solutions but from trial and error 
grounded in interdependent variables, social networks, adaptation of behaviour and dynamic 
change. There are no specific technical solutions to the challenges communities face. Therefore, 
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Rihani (2002) and Ramalingam (2013) call for a paradigm shift in current theory and practice 
that directly acknowledges and engages with the unique development and peacebuilding 
challenges that communities face. My research upholds the argument that a longer term, 
strategic and political process of systemic transformation is necessary; where approaches that 
draw upon culture, power dynamics and relationships can enable development and 
peacebuilding solutions for each context.  
 
The current development system has its roots in modernisation and Western post-World War 
Two discourses of geopolitical power and is global in scope (Desai & Potter, 2002; Kingsbury 
et.al., 2008). Modernisation theorises that less developed countries’ shift away from customary 
cultural, social, political and economic norms as they become developed, prosperous and 
industrialised (Kingsbury et.al., 2008; Kothari & Minogue, 2002; Rostow 1959; 1990). From 
this understanding arises the assumption that neo-liberal state-centric processes of economic 
growth, the rule of law, democratisation and modernisation are inherently beneficial (Emmerij, 
1986; Preston, 1996). Modernisation is ethnocentric in its failure to consider any positive or 
redeeming characteristics in the non-modern. Many scholars argue that the current development 
system excludes Indigenous peoples; invalidating and marginalising their knowledge systems 
and framing them as powerless, problematic, non-scientific, irrational and primitive (Grenier, 
1998; Lear, 2008; Sillitoe et. al., 2002, p.3; Smith, 1999; Young 1999). Subsequently, there is 
an inherent conflict between modern and Indigenous views of development. 
 
Development, modernisation and peace were first linked by the then US President Truman 
(1949) during his Inauguration speech. More recently Huntington (1998) and Fukuyama (1992) 
insinuated that alignment with Western neo-liberal democratisation leads to peace and 
prosperity because they assessed that few stable democratic states fought each other. This 
theory is grounded in Kantian notions of perpetual peace that asserts that democratic states seek 
economic growth through trade as opposed to inter-state violence (Kant, 1983). On the other 
hand, many scholars including Anderson (1999), Chand and Coffman (2008), Collier (2007), 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Richmond (2010; 2015) and Westoby and Dowling (2009) have 
linked the occurance of insecurity and violence to ineffective or unequal development. These 
scholars assert that ineffective development has hindered local and external efforts to strengthen 
peace and security. Insecurity and violence signal the existence of deeper systemic barriers to 
peacebuilding within the current development system. 
 
Aid effectiveness is the degree to which the development system succeeds in meeting its justice, 
equality and power objectives, and is the subject of a number of opposing theoretical discourses 
regarding the extent of this success. Many researchers and organisations (Burnside & Dollar, 
2000; UN General Assembly, 2015; Yunus, 1999) believe that, on a global scale, development 
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has achieved some of its objectives, most notably a reduction of poverty, the prevention of 
diseases, an increase in rates of education and improved access to clean water and basic 
sanitation.  
 
While the evidence shows that global poverty levels have reduced somewhat, this gain has been 
ameliorated by the subsequent increase in inequality – a root cause of structural violence. Many 
researchers and practitioners including Anderson (1999), Bauer (1976; 1986), Donini (2010), 
Easterley (2006; 2014), Escobar (1995), Kothari and Minogue (2002), Moyo (2009), 
Ramalingam (2013), Riddell (2008; 2014), Rihani (2002), Roche (1999), Sachs (1992), Sen 
(1999; 2001), Walker and Pepper (2007) and Walker and Russ (2010) have acknowledged the 
ineffectiveness of the current development system to alleviate poverty and inequality.  
 
These scholars commonly identify structural violence and inequality, as major flaws of the 
current development system, noting that global development interventions, worth millions of 
dollars per annum over the past sixty years, have not yet achieved the outcomes they promised. 
The system is seen to have failed given that its underlying worldview and assumptions do not 
account for the complexity of the challenges it seeks to transform (Escobar, 1995; Pieterse, 
2000; Sachs, 1992; World Bank, 1997). Rihani (2002, p.2) asserts this failure:  
 
“The scale and frequency of development failures and the inability of the experts to 
change course, point to systematic problems associated with the framework within 
which development is conceived and pursued”. 
 
Reacting to development system challenges, practitioners have introduced a range of measures 
to improve effectiveness. Chambers (2014) discusses the importance of participatory research 
that has resulted in widespread use of more inclusive, participant-focused methodologies. 
Results-based management processes are now broadly used to measure and analyse impact, 
although the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action (ALNAP) (2003, p.107) explain that it is extremely difficult to assess results without 
adequate qualitative or quantitative indicators, clear objectives, baseline data and monitoring. 
Sen (1999; 2001) has developed a framework that includes the measurement of an individual’s 
increased capabilities to better understand the effect of development. Researchers including 
Auerbach (2007) Gigler (2005) and Panzironi (2006) claim that Sen’s approach allows local 
participants to define capabilities and priorities for their unique context. Indigenous critical 
theorists claim that these participatory methodologies are still facilitated by outsiders – donors, 
consultants, multinationals, private sector and INGOs – and that the power relationship between 
outsiders and Indigenous peoples is not equal (Novellino, 2003, pp.273-297). In response to the 
challenges of development practice a number of international actors and institutions have been 
working together to develop best-practice guidance to improve development effectiveness. 
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 4.2.1 International guidance on development practice 
 
Given concerns about the effectiveness of the current development system, since 1960 the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) has set and monitored international guidance on development practice. 
Through the OECD DAC the international development community responded to such 
criticisms by expanding the number of targets, goals and policies. International practitioners 
developed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Principles for Good 
International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (the Fragile States Principles) (2007), 
the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and formed the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding 
and Statebuilding (OECD, 2007; 2008; 2010a). These actions elicited further censure. 
 
In 2012 the OECD DAC reported that only one of thirteen Paris Declaration targets on aid 
effectiveness had been met. Furthermore, it reported a considerable variation in the pace of 
development between countries. While the Paris Declaration is seen to increase accountability, 
knowledge and learning, and strengthen good practice norms, overall many targets are 
unrealistic and immeasurable, efficiency gains have been disappointing, and progress has been 
slow, uneven and not integrated into country systems (Chandy, 2011; OECD, 2012b; Wood 
et.al., 2011). For example, the Fragile States Principles have been criticised for perpetuating 
hegemonies of state power and have insufficient contextual analysis leading to pre-packaged 
solutions, inadequate local ownership and insufficient funding (Baranyi & Desrosiers, 2012; 
Naudé et.al., 2011; Nay, 2013; Ware, 2014; Wyeth, 2012).  
 
International actors have also developed the MDGs, and now the SDGs, to identify targets for 
aid: maternal and child health, access to universal primary education and adequate shelter 
required to reduce global poverty are all examples. The MDGs have attracted significant 
criticism primarily because they are seen as unaccountable, donor-driven, not flexible or 
context-specific, overly simplistic and unachievable (Amin, 2006; Fehling et.al., 2013; Fukuda-
Parr, 2010; Hill et.al., 2010; Oya, 2011; Reddy & Heuty, 2008; Sachs, 2012; Waage et.al., 
2010). Minimal community participation in their development has led to limited ownership at a 
country and community level (Fukuda-Parr, 2006; Haines & Cassels, 2004). The MDGs also 
neglect human security, security sector reform and governance. These are all linked to stability, 
a necessary precursor for effective development (Karver et.al., 2012; Melamed & Scott, 2011). 
The recently affirmed SDGs, while identifying more targets and goals than the MDGs, are 
criticised as being too broad, aspirational, unachievable, difficult to measure and weak on 
gender equality. 
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In response to these criticisms many development practitioners reject these internationally 
agreed ‘technocratic’ methods and are instead engaging with local or community-level cultural 
and social systems to achieve development. For example, Westoby and Dowling (2009) argue 
that many development problems require social solutions rather than shallow, technical results. 
By focusing on the latter, they suggest that development loses its capacity for community 
solidarity (the basis for the legitimacy of development) and becomes co-opted by modernity, 
triggering a crisis of legitimisation.  
 
Since the 2010 inaugural meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding, Timor-Leste has played a leading role in the G7+. The G7+, a group of states 
representing 1.5 billion of the world’s poorest people, are critical of the current development 
system (Wyeth, 2012). The G7+ and partner countries developed the New Deal for Engagement 
in Fragile States (the New Deal) (OECD, 2012a). Within the G7+, two of the more influential 
Fragile States Principles have been Principle One: “Take context as the starting point”, and 
Principle Three: “Focus on state-building as the central objective” (OECD, 2007). 
Consequently, the New Deal pushes for decision making and development funding to be 
channelled through developing country government systems and G7+ states tend to focus on 
centralised institutional capacity building to achieve statebuilding (OECD, 2010a; 2011; Pires, 
2012; Wignaraja, 2009).  
 
I caution that the New Deal is risky because it continues to perpetuate state-centric power 
structures that reduce community or citizen-level participation in development decision-making. 
Empowering language masks the continued focus on shallow, technical solutions. In practice 
the G7+ approach skews funding away from NGOs and civil society to formal state systems, 
which risks compounding minimal community participation, creating an unbalanced power 
dynamic that compounds inequality between elites and citizens. Hunt (2008a) asserts that a 
strong and vibrant civil society is critical to keeping the state transparent and accountable to its 
citizens. UNDP (2013a) highlights that sustainable peace is founded in strong community 
capacity and resilient institutions with genuine national ownership. I caution that if international 
practitioners continue to channel funding primarily to the state, in line with the G7+ and other 
institutions’ guidance, these practices may exacerbate structural violence. This issue is 
examined more closely in Chapters Five to Eight.  
 
4.2.2 The planning cycle 
 
To ensure the achievement of internationally determined goals discussed above, an 
overwhelming number of institutions and actors, following both annual and multi-year planning 
cycles, perpetuate the current development system. These planning cycles (shown in Table 4) 
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are mostly linear with six main inputs, which allow organisations and stakeholders to track 
progress and timeframes, and to identify and manage risks (Anderson et.al., 2007). Ongoing 
learning and accountability is an important component but tends to be overly technical and 
relatively inflexible. From personal experience, it is not uncommon for development 
interventions to take several years before reaching the implementation phase, mainly due to the 
lengthy analysis and design processes undertaken. 
 
Table 4: The planning cycle of international development organisations 
Strategy and Program Identification 
The organisation works with stakeholders to define key sectors and areas 
requiring technical or financial assistance. Objectives, imminent risks, 
alternative scenarios and a likely timetable for engagement are identified. 
Analysis is critical to building a comprehensive understanding of the context, 
needs and interests of all stakeholders. If not undertaken correctly, programs 
may target the wrong sectors, inappropriate stakeholders or fail to target root 
causes of violence. 
Program Design  
The organisation and stakeholders are responsible for undertaking a 
scoping/design mission and consulting with all stakeholders to map needs, 
interests and capacities. Systems required for financial management, 
procurement, reporting, monitoring and evaluation are agreed. Overarching 
issues such as environment, gender equality, and anti-corruption would be 
integrated into the design. 
Program Appraisal 
The strategy and programs are usually appraised in a peer review process that 
gives stakeholders an opportunity to review the program design and resolve 
outstanding questions. Stakeholders confirm the expected program objectives, 
intended beneficiaries and evaluation tools for monitoring progress. If incorrect 
or limited stakeholders are involved, any agreement on the design is problematic 
and can lead to future tensions. 
Program Implementation 
The bilateral, multilateral, non-government or private sector organisation 
implements the program under the strategy. The program's progress, outcomes 
and impact are monitored by the implementing agency throughout this phase to 
obtain evaluation data and measure the effectiveness and results of the program. 
Program Completion 
When a program is completed, the organisation and the stakeholders document 
the results; the problems encountered; the lessons learned; and the knowledge 
gained. The report describes and evaluates final program outcomes and 
compares them to expected results. The knowledge gained from this 
measurement of results aims to benefit similar future programs. If feedback does 
not occur, mistakes can become compounded. 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
Monitoring and Evaluation is undertaken throughout the cycle. It begins in the 
program identification phases and acts to support effective change. This process 
aims for ongoing testing of predicated and actual outcomes. In many cases 
M&E is used to make program changes to achieve short-term or political 
outcomes. 
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I include this example of a planning cycle to establish some of the complexities and barriers 
within the development system described by Rihani (2002). The planning cycle compounds the 
inflexibility of the current development system at an institutional level. In Chapters Seven and 
Eight I will detail these systemic barriers and demonstrate that this planning cycle contributes to 
the difficulties for practitioners to engage in systems transformation. 
 
4.2.3 Actors within the current development system 
 
This section emphasises the range and breadth of actors within the current development system. 
The current development system became an industry with the creation of a professionalised 
international civil service within the UN in 1945. International practitioners operate at local, 
district, national, international, regional, and transnational (global) levels.  
 
There are three core groups of practitioners within the current development system: public 
sector (which includes bilateral and multilateral organisations and development financial 
institutions (DFIs)); civil society (for example NGOs, CSOs, faith-based organisations, 
grassroots organisations); and the private (business) sector. Actors within the current 
development system fit loosely into three categories: donors (organisations that provide 
funding), implementers (organisations that manage programs that use these funds) and 
recipients (organisations, groups and individuals who are the beneficiaries of this funding and 
programs). Many actors fit into more than one of these categories.  
 
DFIs aim to support private sector development by making loans, finances and technical 
assistance available at competitive global rates for developing countries, facilitating “a 
particular, capitalist-friendly, neoliberal version of development” (Kothari & Minogue, 2002, 
p.2). More traditional private sector organisations, including from the resource extraction, 
education, financial, and infrastructure industries, are also actively engaging with governments 
and communities to drive development (Ford, 2015). The corporatisation of the development 
system has helped to scale up implementation, but has also resulted in ‘boomerang aid’, where 
high salaries for international consultants can create dual economies and increase inequalities 
between local communities and international practitioners (Anderson, 2012; La’o Hamutuk, 
2009).  
 
International and local NGOs are usually facilitators for civil society and also work with 
governments. They aim to enhance public awareness, build trust, enable dialogue, generate 
political pressure for change and deliver development programs. Due to their relatively small 
scale their effectiveness can be limited and they face constraints from donors (Hulme & 
Goodhand, 2000; Hunt, 2008a, p.52). Indigenous organisations represent and manage the 
65 
interests of their Indigenous members, and are usually community-centred, endogenous and 
culturally constructed (Dodson & Smith, 2003; Hemming et.al., 2011; Hemming & Rigney, 
2012; Hunt, 2008b; Hunt et.al., 2008). Sometimes NGOs can perpetuate authoritarian 
hierarchies and top-down governance and Indigenous organisations can enable co-option and 
welfare colonialism. 
 
International practitioners often have significantly different expectations from those of their 
local counterparts about salaries, accommodation and workplace facilities, and have diverse 
work and communication styles (Currion, 2015). Donini (2007, p.49) says international 
practitioners are “generally far-removed from the realities of the people they purport to help”. 
The World Bank (2015, p.18) states international practitioners “may assume that poor 
individuals may be less autonomous, less responsible, less hopeful, and less knowledgeable than 
they in fact are”. Easterly (2014) is more explicit, arguing that deep racism and a willful neglect 
of history by international practitioners results in the flawed premise that poor people can not be 
trusted to make their own decisions.  
 
I agree with Spence and McLeod (2002, p.63) who affirm the fundamental importance of 
relationships between actors; asserting that peacebuilding practitioners must consistently model 
the values, attitudes and behaviours necessary for positive peace. Grenfell (2012, p.213) 
specifies that international peacebuilding practitioners must be ontologically reflexive, actively 
questioning their own positions of modernity, to engage with different and plural ways of being 
and knowing without subscribing hierarchies of knowledge. Without constant reflexivity and 
modeling positive peace, international practitioners can become the instruments of oppression 
that they seek to alleviate. Unequal power relationships can potentially cause violence. I discuss 
the importance of relationships in detail in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. 
 
4.3 The development system in Timor-Leste 
 
In this next section I provide a broad overview of the current development system in Timor-
Leste. I summarise the current process of development sectoral coordination, and some of the 
ongoing challenges.  
 
During my field research many international and some East Timorese participants framed 
development within the current system, promoting the alleviation of poverty and improvement 
of socio-economic conditions through sustained economic growth and a liberal trade agenda. 
Other East Timorese and international practitioners envisioned development as a positive, 
holistic societal transformation for the benefit of future generations (TL-1300-170910; TK-
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1700-160910). Many participants saw development as inextricably linked to self-determination 
(TTG-1500-300910).  
 
Timor-Leste is one of the highest recipients of ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) per 
capita in the world. Between 1999 and 2013 the OECD estimates that Timor-Leste received 
USD 3.408 billion in ODA funds (OCED, 2015). Overall ODA has been decreasing as a 
percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a result of 
strong economic growth, resource sector wealth and growing private sector investment. For 
example, the net official ODA received in 2012 was 5.69 per cent of GNI, a significant decrease 
from 2000, where net ODA received was 42.02 per cent of GNI (UNDP, 2013b, p.184). 
However: “[The] share of people living under the national poverty line increased from thirty-six 
per cent in 2001 to fifty per cent in 2007” (Government of Timor-Leste & UNDP, 2009). This 
data reveals that despite significant ODA funds, poverty is widespread and persistent (OECD, 
2010b, p.10).  
 
East Timorese NGO La’o Hamutuk (2010, p.10) estimates that between 1999 and 2009 Timor-
Leste received approximately USD 5.2 billion in ODA (a calculation significantly higher than 
the OECD’s own figure). La’o Hamutuk calculates that in that time only one-tenth, or USD 550 
million, reached Timor-Leste’s economy. Nine-tenths of these funds were spent on international 
salaries, foreign soldiers, overseas procurement, foreign supplies, consultant fees and overseas 
administration. Notwithstanding the differences in data between OECD and La’o Hamutuk, if 
La’o Hamutuk’s calculations are even close to the net ODA that reached Timor-Leste, these 
figures highlight serious inequalities and inefficiencies within the current development system 
in Timor-Leste. 
 
4.3.1 Development sectoral coordination in Timor-Leste 
 
Successfully meeting the vast development and peacebuilding challenges across Timor-Leste 
relies on effective coordination between all stakeholders. Coordination is difficult due to the 
complexity and scale of the task; time pressures; centralised decision-making; effectiveness of 
capacity development efforts; the multiplicity and fragmentation of donor-funded programs; and 
the need for assistance to be appropriately sequenced and phased (OECD, 2010a). 
 
Six-monthly donor conferences, coordinated by UNTAET, were held from December 1999 to 
2002. Since 2002 the Government has been working to create a clear strategic direction, 
realistic annual plans, manage donor funds in line with the national budget and planning 
process, and convene quarterly and annual Development Partners Meetings. Coordination is led 
by the National Directorate of Planning and External Assistance Coordination (NDPEAC) and 
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the Aid Effectiveness Directorate within the Ministry of Planning and Finance. Government-led 
coordination has been relatively effective given the constraints caused by shared languages, 
unclear information and mixed participation from development actors (Ashcroft, 2014; TW-
1730-240910; TTC-1230-290910). Many NGOs identify their limited participation in 
consultation processes as problematic. 
 
In 2002, the Government created the 2020 Vision for Development and the 2020 National 
Development Plan (NDP), focused on economic growth and democratisation and aligned 
closely with the MDGs (Rodriguez-García et.al., 2005). In 2007 a National Recovery Strategy 
and an annual National Priorities Process was adopted to respond to the 2006 Crisis (see 
Chapter Five for further analysis). Many donors found this short-term top-down planning 
confusing and difficult to align with, so the Government created a medium-term Strategic 
Development Plan (SDP) 2011–2030 focused on social capital, infrastructure development, 
governance and institutional strengthening and economic development (República Democrática 
de Timor-Leste, 2011a) (see Case Study in Chapter Eight for further discussion on the SDP 
process). These centralised decision-making processes point to limited East Timorese citizens’ 
participation in development. 
 
In line with the New Deal and other OECD DAC guidance, the Government has focused on the 
prioritisation of centralised statebuilding and establishing a comprehensive legislative and 
regulatory framework (OECD, 2010a; República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2011a). I argue 
that by prioritising Fragile States Principle Three (“Focus on statebuilding as the central 
objective”) the Government and international development organisations have failed to equally 
balance the distribution of development funding in Timor-Leste across all areas of need (OECD, 
2007).  
 
Since 1999 the majority of development funding has been on economic infrastructure and other 
social sectors, primarily the security and public sectors. Figure 1 (below) indicates that this 
model has resulted in a huge skewing of funds away from sectors that directly impact the 
majority rural population, including road infrastructure, rural development and agriculture. The 
capacity constraints of the Government, particularly the failure to deliver critical services to 
rural East Timorese, has sparked criticism that challenges the legitimacy of the state and the 
effectiveness of the current development system. 
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Figure 2: Bilateral ODA by sector (2011–2012) (Source: OECD, 2015) 
 
This skewed funding model further unbalances development efforts, leading to tension between 
the Government and organisations delivering sectoral priorities, and communities who seek 
development outcomes, particularly in basic health and education, which were less than twenty 
per cent of bilateral ODA funding in 2011–2012. I would argue that this skewed funding model 
highlights the flawed development priorities of the Government and its international partners. I 
further highlight the implications of limited engagment of Government and international 
decision-makers with communities in Chapters Five to Eight. 
 
4.3.2 Development actors in Timor-Leste 
 
One of the first steps to understanding violence is to first identify key actors. Most actors have 
multiple interests and drivers for their behaviours and incentives. All actors are linked: through 
institutions, structures and behaviours, common language and experiences, or familial and uma 
lulik ties. Some actors are powerful, some are ignored and some are resistant to systems 
transformation. It is critical to understand the power asymmetries, motivations and incentives to 
strategically engage to seek common ground and transform the root causes of violence. In any 
context there are ‘hard to reach’ individuals; groups or communities or challenging sectors that 
are missing out on critical interventions. These actors, nicknamed ‘spoilers’ by Stedman (1997), 
are important to identify when engaged in peacebuilding practice because they often have 
complex capacities to build and sustain peace as ‘unifiers’ and trigger and sustain further 
violence (Chigas, 2003; Chigas & Woodrow, 2009, p.50; Newman & Richmond, 2006). 
 
This will be taken up in detail in further chapters; this section is an overview to introduce key 
actors in post-1999 Timor-Leste. While this section does not capture all the groups engaged in 
the development system in Timor-Leste post-1999, it does indicate the broad range of actors 
working across the country (also see Appendix G). I will summarise key actors, their role in the 
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development system, and their links to other key actors. This information is drawn from the 
Government and bilateral, multilateral and non-government organisations. 
 
4.3.2.1 East Timorese Government 
 
From 2002 the Government has had responsibly to govern across a country that has 
geographically isolated communities, poor infrastructure, and ongoing incidents of violence and 
insecurity. Most of the newly elected politicians, ministers and bureaucrats had limited capacity 
for democratic governance, severely constrained state resources, and were unable to respond 
rapidly to meet development needs (Hunt, 2008a). They had few clear guidelines and a 
massively challenging governing mandate. Many had fought or been active in the resistance and 
the many were part of the newly returned diaspora. Since 2002, the Government has grown 
progressively more confident and effective, although there remain significant institutional, 
legislative, regulatory and administrative challenges. In February 2015 the Sixth Constitutional 
Government was sworn in with a smaller executive, reduced from fifty-five to thirty-eight 
members, to better coordinate and focus on development results. 
 
4.3.2.2 East Timorese Non-Government Organisations and civil society 
 
Since 1976 NGOs have cooperated with the Indonesian authorities to support community 
development. Others were subversive: they both supported development and played a critical 
resistance role by pressuring the international community for human rights and humanitarian 
relief (Hunt, 2004; 2008a). In 1998 fourteen local NGOs formed the East Timor NGO Forum to 
help coordinate their efforts but it could not function until after September 1999 (Hunt, 2015, 
pers. comm., 1 July). By December 2000 approximately two hundred local NGOs were 
operating and by 2004 there were over three hundred (Hunt, 2004; 2008a, pp.311-312). These 
numbers show enormous growth in the number of local NGOs, which included cooperatives, 
trade unions, media, human rights groups, women’s, student, church and youth groups.  
 
A strong civil society is essential to hold government accountable. In Timor-Leste many local 
NGOs and civil society were excluded from development decision-making by the UN, other 
international actors and now government. In the early 2000s, parts of the Government were 
suspicious of NGOs political motives (Hunt, 2008a, pp.253-255,276). Although a few strong 
local NGOs continue to operate effectively, one international program manager explained that: 
“Civil society has been absorbed and co-opted. Some of the leadership is going over into 
government positions. It is complex to know how to engage meaningfully in government 
processes” (TTC-1230-290910).  
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 4.3.2.3 Women 
 
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) highlights that it is critical that women 
are equally included in all peacebuilding and governance processes. Women were active in the 
resistance against Indonesia, and since 1999, have continued to play leadership roles in 
government and civil society, publicly advocating for women’s participation at all levels. 
Today, however, this participation remains shallow and tokenistic, and many rural and less 
educated women are excluded. Gendered and age hierarchies, social status and familial 
relationships continue to dominate a woman’s ability to participate (Morrison, 2015, pp.9-10). 
The UN, the Government, international organisations and NGOs have been instrumental in 
highlighting women’s issues and have been active in designing laws, policies, programs and 
services to support gender equality and the empowerment of women. Rede Feto (Tetum: NGO 
network of Women’s Groups) has coordinated and supported women’s organisations push for 
greater gender equality, including advocating for legislation that supported quotas for women’s 
seats in parliament and in local-level elections and decision-making bodies (Hunt, 2008a, 
p.258). Nevertheless, women remain marginalised and disproportionately affected by violence. 
 
4.3.2.4 Youth 
 
Youth are potentially both instigators and moderators of violence. Here defined as aged between 
eighteen and thirty-five, youth usually do not hold Indigenous leadership or senior government 
positions because political and ritual authority are associated with increasing age (Ospina & 
Hohe, 2002). Wigglesworth (2005, p.125) describes East Timorese youth in the resistance as 
mature, rational, calm and inclusive, and many of the NGO leaders in the early 2000s were 
youth (Hunt, 2015, pers. comm., 9 December). After 1999, many youth felt alienated from 
governance and decision-making processes. An INGO worker said: 
 
“They are, as a group, the prime target for manipulation, the primary catalyst and agent 
and manipulators of violence in the country. [Manipulation] comes from the 
Government, from political parties” (TP-1830-200910).  
 
Youth are often urban economic migrants, living apart from their customary familial systems. 
As a result of poor access to education and high youth unemployment, urban youth are 
particularly vulnerable to armed gangs, criminal activity and political manipulation (Scambary, 
2009; 2013). Scambary (2006) demonstrates that youth are also engaging in positive activities 
aimed at unifying their communities. Wigglesworth (2005, p.127) reports that the participation 
of young women, who have not traditionally participated in decision-making and power-sharing 
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with men, is particularly important, while Crockford (2000, p.226) argues that young women 
should be provided with education and support to take on new roles in society.  
 
4.3.2.5 Catholic Church 
 
The Catholic Church is integral to East Timorese identity and unification and is strongly 
integrated within East Timorese cultural, governance and education systems. 96.9 per cent of 
East Timorese claim to be Catholics, but at the same time 70 per cent also practice forms of 
Indigenous knowledge (National Statistics Directorate, 2011, p.xvi; Rawnsley, 2004, p.6). 
These belief systems are pragmatically viewed as mutually reinforcing, and across Timor-Leste 
many churches are located alongside uma lulik, and share symbolic icons (Ospina & Hohe, 
2002; Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.31-32).  
 
Many of Timor-Leste’s key leaders were educated through the Catholic school system and it 
played an important part in developing the nationalist movement (Cabral, 2002; da Silva, 2012). 
During Indonesian occupation, the Catholic Church was an outspoken critic though its 
transnational social solidarity networks, especially during Pope John Paul’s visit in 1989 
(Cristalis, 2009, p.32; Walsh, 2001, p.31; Wise, 2004, pp.162-166). Some East Timorese are 
critical of the Church in pressing for the abandonment of Indigenous practices, and there is also 
frustration with the Church’s conservatism toward gender equality. Candio and Bleiker (2001, 
p.71) suggest that the Catholic Church, combined with a vibrant civil society, are key actors in 
counter-balancing the potentially authoritarian and undemocratic government and profit-driven 
private sector. 
 
4.3.2.6 East Timorese diaspora 
 
After the 1999 referendum, many of the diaspora returned home from Portugal, Mozambique, 
Macao, Australia, Indonesia and other countries. Many of the diaspora had been active in the 
diplomatic resistance and student solidarity movements supporting East Timorese self-
determination, but mostly they had not experienced the violence and trauma of the majority of 
the population and therefore were professionally and psychologically better able to position 
themselves in the independent Timor-Leste.  
 
The diaspora are not homogenous. Crockford (2000, pp.228-229) describes “hierarchies of 
suffering”, where many East Timorese believe that those who “stayed at home” are more 
authentically East Timorese. Divisions within the diaspora, and between the diaspora and the 
general population were exacerbated by international practitioners who found it easier to 
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employ and engage with the diaspora with whom they had common languages, and who 
dominated leadership and decision-making (Candio & Bleiker, 2001, p.73). These inequalities 
compounded resentments between citizens and the educated elite that had existed since 
Portuguese times (Ingram, 2012, p.7). 
 
4.3.2.7 Bilateral organisations 
 
Prior to 1999 the only bilateral development organisation in Timor-Leste was Australia. By 
2013 Timor-Leste received ODA funding from twenty-one bilateral development partners and 
Australia, the European Union, and Portugal were the three largest bilateral donors (OECD 
DAC, 2015). Since 2002 funding has been aligned to the Government’s strategic plans focusing 
on education, infrastructure, agriculture, security sector reform and institutional capacity-
building (República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2013; 2014). Many bilateral development 
organisations claim their interventions have been well-harmonised, neutral and flexible, and 
there have certainly been some effective programs. Significant criticism has also been levelled 
at bilateral aid effectiveness in Timor-Leste (OECD, 2010b). Bilateral partners are accused of 
working too fast and in short time frames, using confusing delivery modalities, perpetuating 
boomerang aid, and holding implicit political and economic motivations (Anderson, 2003; 
2006; 2012; Fernandes, 2004).  
 
4.3.2.8 The United Nations 
 
On 20 September 1999, INTERFET (International Force in East Timor) was tasked to restore 
security and facilitate humanitarian assistance (Martin, 2001; Smith & Dee, 2003; UN Security 
Council, 1999b). Soon afterwards on the 25 October 1999, the UN Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (UNTAET) was tasked with the most complex and comprehensive transitional 
administrative mandate the UN had undertaken to date. UNTAET was the first time the UN had 
exercised sovereignty over territory. This unprecedented mandate and short deployment 
timeframe created unique challenges and responsibilities (Chesterman, 2002; Rae, 2009; UN 
Security Council, 1999c). An independent review of the UN-sponsored Consolidated Appeals 
Process (CAP) which coordinated all development funding and budgets noted some positive 
achievements but emphased the failure to ensure local participation, consult with local leaders, 
or to value and use the existing governance system (see Bugnion et al., 2000). Chopra (2002, 
p.979), former head of UNTAET’s Office of District Administration, argues that by failing to 
decentralise and enable genuine East Timorese participation “the UN has given birth to a failed 
state”.  
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UNTAET ceded to the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) at independence in 
May 2002 and then to the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) in May 2005. Each subsequent 
administration was smaller and with a reduced mandate (UN Security Council, 2002; 2005). 
Given the 2006–2008 violence, the UN has been widely accused of scaling down too quickly 
(ICG, 2006, pp.21–22). In August 2006 the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 
was created with a new expanded mandate including the command of national policing. 
UNMIT’s mandate was extended until December 2012 (UN Security Council, 2006). A regular 
UN country mission remains.  
 
4.3.2.9 Multilateral Organisations and Development Financial Institutions  
 
By 2013 Timor-Leste had received ODA funding from nineteen multilateral organisations 
(OECD, 2015). The World Bank organised a Joint Assistance Mission with the UN and East 
Timorese counterparts in October–November 1999, co-chaired with UNTAET the first donor 
meeting in December 1999, and managed all sector-based reconstruction financing through the 
multi-donor Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET). Since 2000 the World Bank has managed large 
development programs focused on private sector strengthening, infrastructure and governance 
targeting economic growth (see case study in Chapter Eight for more details on the World 
Bank’s Community Empowerment and Local Governance Program (CEP)). The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has been operating in Timor-Leste since 2004, working with the 
Government and the private sector to promote employment and sustainable livelihoods. They 
provide technical assistance and support government regulation for private sector investment, 
build basic infrastructure and provide microfinance (International Monetary Fund, 2005; 2014).  
 
The neo-liberal World Bank and IMF model of reconstruction and financing promotes free 
market political economy principles which, Candio and Bleiker (2001, p.74) warn, “widens 
already existing social disparities”. A World Bank (2003, pp.23-24) report acknowledges that 
poor coordination between the Bank and UNTAET lead to fragmentation of funding 
mechanisms across all sectors, hampering efforts to strengthen capacity. The report also notes 
that the World Bank avoided working with ‘spoilers’ or key political and development 
challenges, including ex-combatants and addressing property rights.  
 
Since 1999 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has supported economic growth to drive 
poverty reduction and is an implementing agency of the TFET for infrastructure rehabilitation 
and micro financing. The ADB has been criticised for its “poorly conceived and regressive” 
microfinance programs that were controlled by donors, not by East Timorese, and for spending 
TFET funds on extravagant international consultant fees whose performance was 
“unsatisfactory” (Aid/Watch, 2001; La’o Hamutuk, 2005, pp.34-35). World Bank and ADB 
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procurement rules were inflexible which delayed and complicated implementation (World 
Bank, 2003).  
 
4.3.2.10 International Non-Government and Civil Society Organisations 
 
International non-government organisations (INGOs) became involved in Timor-Leste in 1974–
1975 to provide humanitarian assistance. In 1979 the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) were permitted entry, provided they worked closely 
with Indonesian authorities. It was difficult to operate under Indonesian scrutiny (CAVR, 2005, 
pp.49-50,86-87; Hunt, 2008a, pp. 90,102). From September 1999 the access and roles of INGOs 
changed and they became critical intermediaries for aid delivery and a key source of financial 
and capacity support to local NGOs. By 2000, 112 INGOs worked in Timor-Leste and during 
1999–2004 when larger amounts of ODA were provided to Timor-Leste, many INGOs 
expanded to work across a range of sectors (Engel, 2003; Hunt, 2008a, p.311). In 2015 
comparatively few INGOs remain. Many have recruited East Timorese to senior positions and 
there are few expatriates. Hunt (2008, pp.112,116) highlights that, in 1999, INGOs had nil or 
inadequate institutional knowledge about Timor-Leste and had limited shared language skills, 
which led to difficulties working with local NGOs and civil society. Many East Timorese were 
critical of INGO’s focus on ‘service delivery’ to the detriment of seeking communities’ active 
participation and ownership in decisions about their development needs (Brunnstrom, 2000; 
Bugnion et.al., 2000; Hunt, 2008a).  
 
A number of think-tanks including the Asia Foundation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and 
the ICG have provided influential advice and analysis and have worked with local institutions to 
support reform and education. In 1999 Friendship Cities – voluntary networks linking local 
council municipalities in Australia to towns and villages in Timor-Leste – started to direct 
development assistance to rural communities with minimal administration costs (Hill & 
Thomas, 2005; Spence, 2006; Spence & Ninnes, 2007). Friendship Groups are criticised for 
their highly-fragmented way of operating; with no oversight or regular evaluation, these 
programs were said to waste resources, lack coordination and are not needs based (Ninnes, 
2005). Spence and Ninnes (2007) explain that successful Friendship Agreements have a 
common commitment to long-term trust-building, careful prioritisation of needs, and clearly 
articulated intentions and capacity.  
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4.3.2.11 Private sector 
 
The private sector has three major areas in Timor-Leste: the development financial institutions 
(DIFs) that aim to support private sector investment; international and local private sector 
companies that deliver development programs; and private sector companies engaged in 
business and resource extraction. Ford (2015) said that in Timor-Leste the UN and international 
practitioners ignored the private sector as a potential peacebuilding actor. 
 
The World Bank (2013b) ranks Timor-Leste 172 out of 189 in the “Ease of Doing Business” 
survey. It is very difficult to register land or enforce contracts and there are few legal rights for 
borrowers and lenders. International private sector companies have been established to design, 
deliver, and monitor development programs flexibly and with reduced cost (Huysentruyt, 2011). 
Since 2009 local private sector companies have received Government and international 
development funds to implement development programs, particularly for rural infrastructure. 
Elite East Timorese own many of these companies. International resource extraction companies 
are currently playing a key role in the growth of Timor-Leste’s economy. Many of these 
resource extraction companies, and also banks and financial institutions, provide funding for 
development and corporate social responsibility programs to the communities with which they 
engage. 
 
Critics warn that these profit-seeking enterprises reduce accountability for states and distort the 
objective of alleviating poverty. There have subsequently been claims of corruption, nepotism, 
overspending, and minimal community consultation or participation, further exacerbating 
inequality. There remain concerns that private sector investment is benefiting a few elite, while 
the majority of communities continue to lack access to business opportunities, or to scale up 
their current activities (ICG, 2013, pp.5-6). 
 
4.4 Conclusion: Development ineffectiveness in Timor-Leste 
 
I argue that the current development system is highly complex and interconnected and is 
dominated by Western, state-based liberal democratic, modernist underpinnings. It is 
characterised by linear, mechanistic models and inflexible guiding principles. This global 
system has numerous actors with competing agendas and top-down hierarchies. 
 
Current development interventions are not centred on Indigenous knowledge systems but on 
modernism, liberal democracy, the rule of law and economic growth. In Chapter Three I 
explained that Indigenous peoples’ goals of self-determination may challenge the current 
development system’s state-centric goals.  For Indigenous self-determined development to be 
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implemented significant transformation of the current development system must occur. 
International practitioners must be at the forefront of facilitating these changes if they are to 
remain relevant. 
 
Success from some of the MDGs provides evidence that global poverty has been alleviated. In 
2011 Timor-Leste moved into the lower Middle Income Country (MIC) category due to 
increased income from offshore petroleum, however I argue that this gain has been 
accompanied by the subsequent increase in inequality, a root cause of structural violence. The 
focus on institutional capacity building by the UN and INGOs during the transition 
administration from 1999–2002 established the framework for the current top-down, centralised 
development system in Timor-Leste (Chopra, 2000; 2002; Hunt, 2015, pers. comm., 1 July). I 
argue that uneven international technical assistance has undermined East Timorese NGO 
capacity and the focus on centralised state institutions has failed to actively engage citizens in 
governance processes (OECDa, 2010). As a result the majority of East Timorese citizens have 
been excluded from development decision making. In doing so the international community has 
exacerbated structural violence.  
 
Chesterman (2002), Ishizuka (2003) and Shurke (2001) underline that this ineffectiveness has 
contributed to a lack of trust and mounting frustration toward international practitioners. There 
are significant barriers to community participation in development decision-making, including 
ongoing insecurity and violence, unmet expectations, slow progress, and lack of sustainability. 
This imbalance drives structural violence in Timor-Leste. The diversity, lack of coordination 
between, and often differing goals of actors signal the challenges for individuals working within 
institutions to effect systems transformation.  
 
This brief summary of the actors working in Timor-Leste since 1999 should give the reader an 
understanding of the vast array of practitioners working in a relatively small geographic area. 
This diversity leads to difficulties in coordination, communication and timing. These issues are 
expanded on in Chapters Seven and Eight. I highlighted that each actor has complex 
motivations and incentives, and that they can be both ‘spoilers’ and ‘unifiers’ depending on 
context. Whether actors choose to perpetrate violence often depends on their level of inclusion, 
ownership and participation in peace processes. It is my view that any actor in a peacebuilding 
space has the capacity to be a peacebuilding actor.  
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5 Timor-Leste: History of Violence and Development  
 
The focus of this chapter is an analysis of the post-1999 development system in Timor-Leste. 
For background, this Chapter provides an analysis of the history of violence and development in 
Timor-Leste from 1511 to 1999, and then investigates the post-1999 context because this is 
when the greatest accumulation of development interventions took place.  
 
There is an extensive body of literature on the recent history of Timor-Leste, including: Cabral 
(2002), Cristalis (2009), da Silva (2012), Fox and Babo-Soares (2000), Gunn (2001), Gusmão 
and Niner (2000), Hill, (1978; 2002), Hunt (2008a), Kingsbury (2007), McWilliam (2005; 
2008a; 2008b), McWilliam and Traube eds. (2011), Niner (2007; 2011; 2012), Ramos-Horta 
(1987) and Taylor (1991; 1999). Most of these studies do not explicitly discuss the role of 
Indigenous knowledge and culture in Timor-Leste, although there are a number of people 
writing about the governance and culture of Timor-Leste, including: Babo-Soares (2004), 
Brown (2009; 2012), Fitzpatrick et.al (2008; 2013), Ospina and Hohe (2002), Trindade (2006; 
2012; 2014; 2015), and Trindade and Castro (2007). 
 
My research does not attempt to catalogue the pain and trauma of the recent history of Timor-
Leste, but focuses on understanding the history of Indigenous East Timorese governance and 
peacebuilding processes and on building an understanding of the types of violence and human 
insecurity that are present in Timor-Leste. I examine violence that can be categorised as 
development-related: violence or insecurity caused or exacerbated by development 
interventions. In the second half of this chapter I focus on the post-1999 context and aim to 
identify the root causes of violence within the current development system in Timor-Leste.  
 
5.1 History of Timor-Leste 
 
The people of Timor-Leste have experienced a long history of violence, colonialism and foreign 
occupation spanning almost 500 years of Portuguese colonialism and twenty-four years of 
foreign occupation by Indonesia before voting for self-determination in 1999. While parts of 
their colonial experience are similar to that of Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies, and 
their experience of occupation is comparable to that of West Papuans and Acehnese, regarding 
scale, scope and methods of violence, co-option, and resistance Timor-Leste’s history is unique.  
 
This section examines four stages of East Timorese history until independence in 2002. Pre-
colonialism, Portuguese colonialism, Indonesian occupation, and the UN transitional 
administration, with a focus on the two transition periods in 1974–1975 and 1999–2002, both of 
which are important for understanding violence and peacebuilding in current-day Timor-Leste. 
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Map 1: Map of Timor-Leste highlighting the thirteen Districts (Australian National University, 
2012) 
 
5.1.1 Pre-colonialism 
 
Timor-Leste has a rich history of continuous human occupation dating from prehistoric to 
modern times. It is a small territory in the Indonesian archipelago, approximately 265 
kilometres long, 92 kilometres wide, and about 19,000 square kilometres in area. The sea 
surrounding it has significant oil and natural gas deposits. Timor-Leste has evidence of human 
use and active cultural practices in the oldest modern human settlement in South-East Asia, 
occupied more than 42,000 years ago (Lape, 2006; O’Connor, 2007; O’Connor et.al., 2013). 
Research indicates a continuity of resource exploitation over 40,000 years (O’Connor et al., 
2010; Oliveira, 2008).  
 
At least 16 currently spoken languages in Timor-Leste stem from two major language 
groupings, Austronesian and Trans-New Guinea languages (Fox, 2000a, pp.3-6; Hajek, 2013; 
Hull, 1998, p.4; Williams-Van Klinken & Williams, 2015). Eastern Tetum, also known as 
Tetum Terik (True Tetum) or Tetum-Dili is the common vernacular across Timor-Leste (Fox, 
2000a). Tetum is a hybrid language introduced approximately 1,000 years ago, with a 
Portuguese superstratum and additional lexical influences from Indonesian, Malay, Central 
Moluccan and Macassarese languages (Hull, 2001, pp.ix-x). This ethno-linguistic variety, 
compounded with the archaeological data, indicates a long history of inter-island migration 
across the archipelago east of the Malaysian peninsula (McClean, 2014, p.8-9). This evidence of 
transmigration fits with the two main origin stories shared across Timor-Leste: the voyaging of 
a common ancestor to the land and the sea as a birthing place for the East Timorese, and linking 
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the island geography with the myth of a crocodile ancestor (Kehi and Parmer, 2012; Traube, 
2007).  
 
Common to many other Indigenous peoples worldwide, East Timorese people believe Timor-
Leste is anthropomorphised (Fox, 2000a; O’Connor et.al., 2013, p.212). The land is sacred 
(Tetum: rai lulik timor) and sites throughout Timor-Leste highlight the socio-cultural 
significance of cultural practices and landscapes, including a range of ritual and mythological 
sites (McClean, 2014; O’Connor et.al., 2013). Nature and culture interconnect in an indivisible 
relationship and reciprocal responsibilities include ceremonial duties and obligations, such as 
the maintenance of ritual sites. These practices include processes to grant leadership, manage 
land and resource ownership and use, mark boundaries, and to manage violence. Some groups 
were matrilineal, and most balanced a dualism between men/women, insider/outsiders, 
centre/periphery that created functioning highly ritualised societies (Thu et.al., 2007; Therik, 
2004). 
 
Boxer (1947), dos Santos and da Silva (2012), Fox (2002), Ospina and Hohe (2002), Pigafetta 
(1874) and Therik (2004) write that prior to Portuguese colonialism, Timor-Leste had a 
complex governance system. The eastern half of the island (approximately the territory of the 
current Timor-Leste) was divided into forty-six kingdoms each ruled by liurai (Tetum: local 
hereditary leaders or ‘lords of the land’ responsible for political authority, justice and resource 
management) and under the kingdoms were princedoms (Tetum: suku) and governors (Tetum: 
datu). The kingdoms were ruled by the Great Lord (Tetum: Maromak Oan). Within each 
kingdom the suku was located with important ritual, social and cosmic authority related to a 
complex interconnecting system of uma lulik (Tetum: sacred houses) that were controlled by a 
headman and a group of elders (Cabral, 2002, pp.157-158). This complex Indigenous 
knowledge system will be explored in more detail in Chapters Six and Seven, but it is important 
to note that while radically altered, key elements of this pre-colonial system endure in modern 
Timor-Leste. 
 
5.1.2 Portuguese Colonialism: 1511–1974 
 
Fourteenth century Chinese and Javanese texts describe the importance of Timor’s sandalwood 
trade. Portuguese explorers, the first Europeans to visit Timor in 1511, cited the abundance of 
this natural resource and the important trade in beeswax, honey, slaves and silver (Meitzner 
Yoder, 2011). In 1512 Portuguese Dominicans brought the Roman Catholic Church to Timor-
Leste, which remains an enduring link to Portuguese colonialism (Cabral, 2002, pp.155-156; 
Fox, 2000a, p.7).  
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In 1860 the Governor of Dili, Affonso de Castro, described Portuguese colonialism as merely a 
thin veneer: “Our empire on this island is nothing but a fiction” (De Castro cited in Fox, 2000a, 
p.18). Until 1913 when the border between East and West Timor was agreed upon, the 
Portuguese and the Dutch fought over their colonial boundaries and trading rights, and both 
constantly battled against the strong part-Portuguese part-Indigenous population known as the 
Tupassi or Topasses or ‘Black Portuguese’ (Boxer, 1947; Gunn, 2001, p.6). There was a short, 
but brutal period of Japanese interregnum where approximately 60,000 East Timorese died 
supporting the World War II Allies from February 1942 to September 1945, after that Timor-
Leste reverted to Portuguese rule again (Cabral, 2002, p.163; Fox, 2000a, pp.6-21; Taylor, 
1999). Chinese influence over retail and trade continued throughout this period. 
 
In line with this colonial ‘fiction’, by the 1850’s Portugal engaged in the indirect administration 
of Timor-Leste, through a governance system that used the pre-existing system of suku and 
liurai, which were the basis for Indigenous governance. Portugal mobilised Indigenous militias’ 
known as moradores or arraias to provide security and suppress opposition. Militia groups 
continue to play a central role as conflict actors in modern Timor-Leste (Davidson, 1994; 
Robinson, 2001; Roque, 2012a, 2012b).  
 
In the 19th century the Portuguese imposed greater control, establishing coffee and rubber 
plantations, demanding higher taxes and forced labour. They attempted to distort Indigenous 
governance by focusing on the suku and breaking down the customary power of the liurai 
(Ospina & Hohe, 2002). The liurai were co-opted and given wealth-promoting tasks such as tax 
collection, trade and commerce, marking them as the ‘new elite’ or assimilado and mestiço. The 
assimilado had to speak Portuguese, have proof of financial self-sufficiency, behave 
‘appropriately’, and not object to military service (Cabral, 2002, pp.65-66, 157-160). The 
Portuguese administration did not result in broad development outcomes and communities were 
impoverished. Education, health and social welfare were neglected and in early 1970 there were 
no paved roads beyond Dili. Most people survived through subsistence agriculture. 
 
Derogatory language and class hierarchies were used by the Portuguese to incite power 
divisions and to subjugate and separate ethno-linguistic groups. However, the co-option of the 
liurai and some mestiço families did not remove the Indigenous beliefs of ordinary East 
Timorese (dos Santos & da Silva, 2012). Trindade and Castro (2007, p.12) show that the 
Portuguese encouraged stereotyping, exacerbating existing divisions between ethno-linguistic 
groups to divide and rule. Brown (2012, pp.61-62) notes that this colonial experience continues 
in the suspicion cast on leaders and elites by ordinary East Timorese and vice-versa. These 
identity divisions had a significant impact on intra-state violence in 1974–1975 and post-1999 
particularly during community tensions in 2006–2008. 
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 Taylor (1991; 1999), Cabral (2002), Ospina and Hohe (2002) note that while the Indigenous 
system was oppressed and distorted it continued to be firmly in place sanctioned by strong 
political and kinship systems, a self-sustaining subsistence economy, cultural traditions and 
rituals. Therefore under the Portuguese, the Indigenous and colonial systems: “co-existed in a 
rather uneasy truce” (Taylor, 1991, p.12). These asymmetries of power, nurtured by the 
Portuguese colonialists, understanding the root causes of the divisions between urbanised, 
literate elites and their distinctive mestiço culture and the majority of the population, are central 
to understanding modern East Timorese history and leadership. 
 
5.1.3 Civil War and Invasion: 1974–1975 
 
Much of the current internal East Timorese violence and insecurity and the divisive 
relationships between leaders and their supporters has its roots in the brutal civil war that took 
place between Portugal and Indonesia over East Timor (Cabral, 2002; Cristalis, 2009; da Silva, 
2012). Da Silva (2012) describes the period between the 25 April 1974 Carnation Revolution in 
Portugal and August 1975 as divided with incidences of localised violence. During this time, 
three main political parties emerged; each had differing positions on self-determination, and 
different relationships with the colonial powers, which contributed to the internal tensions 
(Cabral, 2002; CAVR, 2005, p.12; Babo-Soares, 2000; Walsh, 2001):  
 
• Frente Revolusionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN - Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor), formally the Timorese Social Democratic Union 
(ASDT): appealed to young intellectual ethnic East Timorese and assimilados 
(including Mari Alkatiri, Jose Ramos-Horta, Nicolau Lobato, and Xanana Gusmão) and 
supported immediate independence from Portugal. 
• União Democratica Timorense (UDT - East Timorese Democratic Union): politically 
conservative, represented elite establishment views (including many liurai and 
assimilados) and was linked to the Portuguese colonial administration. It initially 
rejected integration with Indonesia and saw continued affiliation with Portugal as the 
means to eventual self-determination. 
• Associação Popular Democrática Timorense (APODETI - East Timorese Popular 
Democratic Association): supported an autonomous integration within Indonesia. They 
were supported by two smaller parties - Klibur Oan Timor Assua’in - KOTA 
(Association of Timorese Warrior Sons) and Partido Trabalhista (Labour Party). 
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Indonesia wanted the additional territory and access to Timor-Leste’s considerable resource 
wealth, and was concerned with regional insecurity associated with a potentially independent 
communist Timor-Leste. In August 1975, Indonesia told UDT that if it did not halt the 
‘communist threat’ of FRETILIN then Indonesia would feel obliged to intervene (Way, 2000). 
The UDT attempted a coup, and on 15 August, FRETILIN formed FALINTIL (Forças 
Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste - Armed Forces for the National Liberation of 
East Timor) and launched counter-attacks against UDT (Cabral, 2002). FRETILIN believed 
independence would afford Timor more protection in the international community from an 
Indonesian takeover, and on 28 November 1975, made a unilateral declaration of independence 
(UDI) of the República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL – Democratic Republic of East 
Timor). The next day, under pressure from the Indonesian Government, APODETI, UDT, 
KOTA and the Labor Party signed the Balibó Declaration claiming Portuguese Timor’s 
integration with Indonesia. Timor-Leste’s internal violence enabled Indonesia’s military and 
clandestine forces to justify their invasion. On 7 December 1975 thousands of Indonesian 
paratroopers landed in Dili. Carrascalão (cited in Cristalis, 2009, p.40), a UDT leader, details 
his horror: 
 
“Until that day I believed that the Indonesians meant well…I saw soldiers killing a 
woman who walked on the street with a baby in her arms…[T]hat day I saw they came 
as terrorists, as murderers, as thieves”.  
 
The violence resulted in mass atrocities on both sides. Faced by overwhelming Indonesian 
forces, FRETILIN retreated to the mountainous interior and the resulting violence lasted for 
twenty-four years (Babo-Soares, 2000). It is these internal tensions, born in 1974, and nurtured 
through the Indonesian occupation, and the resulting corrosive relationships between elites, 
their supporters and the broader East Timorese society, that endure today, and are at the root of 
much current violence in Timor-Leste (da Silva, 2012). 
 
5.1.4 Indonesian Occupation: 1975–1999 
 
Between 1975 and 1999, during the Indonesian occupation, anywhere from 100,000 to 180,000 
people, or one-third of the population of Timor-Leste were killed (CAVR, 2005, p.44; 
International Crisis Group, 2006; Rawnsley, 2004, pp.2-3). Cribb (2001, p.82) estimates that 
approximately 50,000 died in the initial bombardments and violence in 1975, and approximately 
50,000 died of famine, disease and malnutrition due to forced resettlement and arbitrary 
detention in concentration camps. Massacres were systematically carried out by the Indonesian 
military (Martin, 2001; Rawnsley, 2004). Women were subjected to forced sterilisation, sex 
slavery and gang rape; and children were removed and reallocated to Indonesian families (de 
Oliveira, 2002; Mason, 2005). 
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 During the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR – 
Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação) hearings, former Governor Carrascalão 
described Indonesia’s isolationist policies: “Timor-Leste was a closed land…it was a place of 
lies and falsities…the people that came here could do anything. It was secret” (CAVR, 2005, 
p.46). Testimonies from CAVR detail the widespread use of violence by UDT, FRETILIN, 
militias and the Indonesian military including, murder, rape and torture (CAVR, 2005, p.13). 
The abuse of women was organised and systematic, aimed at reducing the power of the 
resistance (CAVR, 2005, p.48).  
 
Indonesia sought legitimisation of its annexation of Timor, basing their claim on the Balibó 
Declaration representing a legitimate act of self-determination, and in July 1976 legislated that 
Timor-Leste was the 27th province of Indonesia. FRETILIN appealed to the international 
community to intervene, but no key power acted (Cristalis, 2009; Fernandes, 2004). However, 
emboldened by constant lobbying from the East Timorese diaspora, the UN listed Timor-Leste 
as a non-self governing territory under Portuguese administration until 1999.  
 
The context of international politics during the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste is critical. 
I will not go into detail in this thesis except to state that in the wake of the de-colonialist 
movement and the Cold War, a number of countries (including Australia, New Zealand, United 
States, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand and most of Western Europe) feared Timor-Leste 
was susceptible to communism and was a political and military threat, and therefore they 
supported integration with Indonesia, which was seen as stable (Cabral, 2002, p.176). Other 
issues swayed support including Australia’s negotiation with Indonesia over resource rights in 
the Timor Sea, security concerns and doubts over Timor-Leste’s economic self-sufficiency 
(Anderson, 2003). United States, Japan, United Kingdom and Australia trained, armed and 
provided diplomatic support to Indonesia (Chomsky, 2001, pp.127-129; Fernandes, 2004; 
Ramos-Horta, 2005). This lack of support for Timor-Leste’s self-determination between 1975 
and 1999 by the majority of the international community has had significant implications for 
post-1999 bilateral relationships. 
 
The violence with Indonesia went through a number of phases: direct violence between 
Indonesia and Falantil forces from 1974–1979; and from 1979–1999, a dual strategy of 
“diplomatic war” and an “arduous and protracted guerilla war” supported by clandestine activity 
which had two distinct phases (da Silva, 2012, p.183). The first was from 1979–1987 when the 
Commander-in-Chief Xanana Gusmão formally separated FALINTIL from FRETILIN to form 
a non-partisan national army. This act divided the political party from the military and gave 
political power to the diaspora. The second phase was from 1987–1999 when the focus of 
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resistance activity shifted to Dili and the major towns, and the diaspora-led FRETILIN boosted 
their efforts at international diplomacy with strong involvement of Timorese student activists 
and clandestine groups in Indonesia and Europe (Cabral, 2002; da Silva, 2012, p.205; 
International Crisis Group, 2006; Smith & Dee, 2003, pp.40-41). There was significant 
variation in the geographic areas of violence (Justino et.al., 2011, p.9). No group was 
homogenous; there were internal shifts within FRETILIN and between those who stayed to 
fight and the diaspora (International Crisis Group 2006, p.2). Ideological and personality 
divisions between key individuals during this time caused bitter rifts that are echoed in elite 
political power struggles today, and were instrumental in the 2006–2008 violence. 
 
Some commentators (Cabral, 2002; Aarons & Domm, 1992) assert that Indonesia engaged in 
acts of genocide in Timor-Leste through military and other means. The Indonesian National 
Family Planning Programme Keluarga Berencana clashed with Catholic Church policy, and 
was viewed by East Timorese as a way of terminating population growth (Ingram, 2007). John 
Fernandes, an Indonesian civil servant, described the forced sterilisation under Keluarga 
Berencana as “indirectly aimed at murdering the indigenous people of Timor-Leste” (CAVR, 
2005, p.49). De Oliveria (2002) also argues that Indonesia used systematic rape and sex slavery 
as a weapon of war to suppress, humiliate and terrorise women. The UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2000) reports that there were gross violations of human rights 
and breaches of humanitarian law, but did not explicitly describe these violations as constituting 
acts of genocide. Even if what occurred in Timor-Leste during this period does not meet the 
technical legal definition of genocide set out in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I agree with Saul (2001) that the violence could be 
viewed as ‘cultural genocide’ (UN General Assemby, 1948). Cultural genocide can mean “any 
deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national 
group on grounds of national or racial origin, or religious beliefs” (Morsink, 1999, p.1023). But 
cultural genocide is not explicitly recognised as a form of genocide under international law. I 
note, for example that under the UN Convention the definition of genocide includes ‘forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group’, which appears to have occurred in Timor-
Leste (TTR-0900-061010; Adcock, 2015, pers. comm., 2 December; UN General Assembly, 
1948).  
 
Indonesian governance was different from the Portuguese: based on an authoritarian military 
model of state administration they largely subverted the Indigenous knowledge systems that had 
been mostly ignored under the Portuguese (Candio & Bleiker, 2001, p.67). Hunt (2008a, p.278) 
describes Indonesia as an “all-powerful, repressive, developmentalist state” and Candio and 
Bleiker (2001, pp.66-67) comment that any Indonesian service delivery was aimed at “winning 
hearts and minds” and “countering resistance”. Despite increases in service delivery, continued 
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human rights abuses and atrocities strengthened resentment and Indonesia never won mass East 
Timorese support. 
 
Indonesian occupation militarised the community at every level; women, men and youth were 
actively involved either against the occupation or through martial arts groups, which were a 
response by Indonesia to impose social control and in non-combatant clandestine movements, 
the women particularly through OPMT (Organização Popular da Mulher Timor - Popular 
Organisation of Timorese Women) (da Silva, 2012; dos Santos & da Silva, 2012; Mason, 2005; 
Scambary, 2009, p.1). While the majority of the violence was committed by Indonesian military 
(TNI or Tentara Nacional Indonesia), inter-communal violence was also perpetrated by East 
Timorese on East Timorese through Indonesian-supported militias and East Timorese military 
battalions 744 and 745 (da Silva, 2012; Roque, 2012b). This inter-communal violence was 
intensified under Indonesian occupation but had its roots in hundreds of years of structural 
inequities begun under the Portuguese and continued in the 1974–1975 divisions. 
Understanding these historical layers is crucial to unpacking the root causes of violence in 
Timor-Leste post-1999.  
 
Da Silva (2012), Cabral (2002), Hohe (2002a), McWilliam (2005) and Taylor (1991) emphasise 
that the resistance, structured around Indigenous governance systems, was a crucial factor in 
ending Indonesian occupation. While clandestine, uma lulik systems of kinship at the suku level 
enabled trust, mutual obligation and a commitment to independence (McWilliam, 2005, p.37). 
Indigenous systems were highly resilient under strain, flexible and intuitive to changes in 
personnel (through death or capture). By aligning with Indigenous systems the resistance was 
able to build trust, communicate and engage with the broader population. The Indonesian 
occupation was not just a military failure, it was a failure of governance, due to an inability of 
Indonesia to “win the battle for the hearts and minds” (McWilliam, 2005, p.35).  
 
In 1997 after some previous attempts, the resistance factions, diaspora elite, Catholic Church 
and civil society united under the Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense - CNRT 
(National Council of East Timorese Resistance) to cooperate to achieve independence. Ingram 
(2012, p.7) signals CNRT unity as a future root cause of violence that masked “deep fault lines 
within the political elite”, divisions that were “much deeper, fuelled by ideology and grievance, 
parallel histories and tactical positioning to snatch the prizes of victory”. At this time, greater 
international awareness was crucial in creating a shift in the international political stance on 
Timor-Leste. For example the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, a more engaged international media, 
the awarding of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and Ramos-
Horta, sustained diplomatic lobbying at the UN, combined with the fall of Suharto and 
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broadening support from international solidarity groups (Babo-Soares, 2000; Cabral, 2002, 
pp.348–357; Ramos-Horta, 1987)3 all contributed to a change in international opinion.  
 
5.1.5 End of Indonesian occupation: 1998–1999 
 
“After so many years of oppression, liberation came to East Timor like a whirlwind” 
(Xanana Gusmão cited in Smith & Dee, 2003, p.11).  
 
When Soeharto fell from power in 1998, greater space for political dialogue and change within 
Indonesia occurred under his successor, President Habibie. The UN worked to broker the 5 May 
1999 Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal. This agreement led to the UNAMET (United 
Nations Mission in East Timor) – which administered the referendum on 30 August 1999, 
where ninty-nine per cent of eligible voters in Timor-Leste voted overwhelmingly (78.5 per 
cent) for self-determination (Martin, 2001; UN Security Council, 1999a). Following the vote, 
the Indonesian military in Timor-Leste reacted with widespread organised and systematic 
violence, large-scale destruction and internal displacement. It was nicknamed the ‘scorched 
earth policy’ by the ICG (Babo-Soares, 2000, p.76). The Indonesian military, police and army-
led pro-Indonesian militias in destroying seventy per cent of the country’s buildings and 
infrastructure including 60,000 houses, killing an estimated 1,400 East Timorese people, and 
forcing the evacuation of more than 250,000 East Timorese into West Timor (most of whom 
returned within three months) (Babo-Soares, 2000, pp.57, 71; Burgess, 2012, p.3; CAVR, 2005, 
p.627; Fox, 2000b).  
 
While UNAMET was seen as vital to the referendum, it created expectations of civilian 
protection that could not be met and the international community underestimated Indonesia’s 
capacity for revenge (Martin, 2000, p.148; 2001, p.124). While Habibie assured a peaceful 
withdrawal, the violence arguably demonstrated the power of the Indonesian military leadership 
over its political elites (McWilliam, 2014, pers. comm., 16 November). In response to the vote 
and the extreme violence that followed, in September 1999 INTERFET was deployed and in 
October 1999 UNTAET was established to provide security and assist with the transition to 
independence (UN Security Council, 1999b; 1999c). The violence and destruction in the 
aftermath of the vote meant that the new transitional state started with the almost total 
destruction of the physical infrastructure and state governance institutions, which continues to 
influence structural violence today. 
 
3 See da Silva (2012, pp.231-255) and Cabral (2002, pp.301-357) for detailed discussion from 
an East Timorese perspective about the role of international solidarity, particularly in Portugal 
and Australia, in supporting Timor-Leste’s independence. 
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5.1.6 UNTAET: 1999–2002 
 
During the violence in 1999, only a few journalists and UNAMET mission personnel remained 
in the country. By September 1999, more than sixty international humanitarian and 
development organisations, including twenty-three UN agencies, began to provide assistance to 
Timor-Leste, and by October 1999, access into Timor-Leste from Dili and West-Timor had 
opened (Hunt, 2008a). The primary focus of the international community and East Timorese 
leadership was on the initial humanitarian response, physical reconstruction of infrastructure 
and then on institutional state building through an international liberal democratic model 
(Brown & Gusmão, 2009, p.64). East Timorese were critical of the international focus on 
centralised statebuilding. Many viewed this focus as “another invasion” or a “new form of 
colonialism” accompanied by incorrect assumptions about East Timorese capacity and pre-
determined solutions (Hunt, 2008a, p.113). The international head of a bilateral organisation 
agreed: “Donors and foreigners, the international development organisations, are probably seen 
as the new colonialists” (TI-1400-150910). Many international practitioners assumed a terra 
nullius or tabula rasa (Latin: blank slate) of economic, political and leadership capacity in 
1999. Chesterman (2002, p.63) notes that there was certainly an economic vacuum, but that the 
political and leadership system was highly complex, although divided. Chopra (2002), Hohe 
(2002a; 2003) and Philpott (2006) heavily criticised UNTAET’s tabula rasa approach 
highlighting that the UN failed to appreciate the resilience of Indigenous structures and failed to 
integrate Indigenous systems.  
 
Ingram (2012, p.6) argues that the international community misread the significant East 
Timorese support for independence as an agreement to pursue the statebuilding agenda and 
internationally designed model of the machinery of government. Under pressure to deliver 
outcomes, UNTAET and other development partners did not pursue adequate consultation with 
either the East Timorese leadership or local communities which created early East Timorese 
disillusionment with the UN (Hunt, 2008a, pp.112-115; Suhrke, 2001). Trindade (2008, p.1) 
notes that by 2000, the unity of East Timorese leadership at independence was replaced by 
“competing and divisive narratives” and “a strong sense of exclusion and frustration”. Ingram 
(2012, pp.10,19) agrees, noting that UNTAET ignored the fractured local leadership and the 
complex political dynamics, resulting in misunderstanding and marginalisation of local 
priorities and distortion of particular local interests against others. Hunt (2008a) reports that 
many decisions were made at meetings held in English with no East Timorese present. East 
Timorese participation was also hampered by minimal access to the UN compound, shared 
language difficulties and a lack of transport and office facilities. By marginalising community 
participation, UNTAET further distorted the distribution of power, creating and compounding 
existing tensions. 
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 Freitas (2005) notes that UNTAET and Timor-Leste inherited governance and administrative 
structures from Portugal and Indonesia that were not suitable for participative democratic 
governance. However, Hohe and Nixon (2003, p.7) underline that the minimal Portuguese 
colonial administration and the widely perceived corruption of Indonesia meant that in 1999 
Timor-Leste’s diverse societies were rooted in Indigenous systems. Problematically as Brown 
(2009, p.150) comments, neither the UN staff nor FRETILIN “were sensitive to or broadly 
aware of the value of customary life or local community governance in East Timor”. It is this 
gap in understanding and practice between Indigenous and current development systems that 
will be further explored in my research.  
 
The large international presence, working without effective coordination across multiple sectors 
and competing for finite funding, lead to overlapping programs, high operating costs, 
frustration, and overwhelming workloads. The large-scale and complexity of the international 
response in post-1999 Timor-Leste was similar to that in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Cambodia, and it foreshadowed the international responses in Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti. As a 
result of the influx in international agencies, the housing stock was in crisis, food and fuel prices 
escalated, and the economy was reliant on international salaries and imports of goods and 
services (Carnahan et.al., 2006).  
 
Early humanitarian support was hampered by bad weather, poor UN planning, unsustainable 
budgets and weak procurement and communication mechanisms. This was compounded by a 
volatile and unstable security environment which did not win the trust of local communities 
(Smith & Dee, 2003; Suhrke, 2001). UN personnel had no prior experience of Timor-Leste and 
East Timorese leaders had limited experience of administering modern governance and rule of 
law. East Timorese criticised the UN’s decision-making process, the slow pace, the unmet 
expectations, the high administrative costs, their failure to work with qualified East Timorese, 
or to explore the impact of local culture and politics on decision-making (Rae, 2009, pp.101-
118; Smith & Dee, 2003, pp.62-65; Suhrke, 2001). These structural and institutional constraints 
and community frustrations were triggers for the ongoing unrest and instability and future 
structural violence. 
 
The first national election for the Constituent Assembly, charged with developing the 
Constitution, was held on 30 August 2001 where FRETILIN won the majority. Competition 
during elections exposed repressed grievances between key leaders (International Crisis Group, 
2006; Richmond and Franks, 2008). NGOs strongly protested that the short-time frame to 
develop the Constitution and the NDP did not allow true participation or inclusive discussion 
about the future of Timor-Leste and contributed to the violence that has emerged since 2006 
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(Hunt, 2008a, pp.108-9; Ingram, 2012, p.14). The Constitution has limited recognition of the 
need to respect or preserve East Timorese Indigenous knowledge or cultural practices 
(República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2002). This text is weakly worded and is not enforced 
though additional legislation or governance practices (Leach, 2002; Palmer, 2007).  
 
Despite the inefficiencies and shortcomings of UNTAET, by October 2001, security had been 
restored across the territory, and some 188,646 refugees had returned (Smith & Dee, 2003, 
p.87). On 20 May 2002 the country declared its independence. At this time the international 
community hailed UNTAET a success and under UN Security Council Resolution 1410 (2002) 
a follow-on UN mission was created, UNMISET. This milestone masked a range of potential 
community tensions and weak governance mechanisms that had been overlooked in the rush to 
establish the newest international state. Overall, UN efforts to achieve economic growth, 
community peacebuilding and national unity were viewed as superficial and easily redacted 
(Chopra, 2000, 2002; Gorjão, 2002; Gunn & Huang, 2004; Hohe, 2002a; Rae, 2009; Traub, 
2000). 
 
My summary of East Timorese political history prior to independence in 2002 aims to highlight 
the myriad tensions between outsiders and East Timorese, and within the East Timorese 
community itself. It establishes that over hundreds of years Portuguese colonialism, Indonesian 
occupation and then UN administration created and exacerbated various forms of societal 
inequalities. These outside governance structures distorted and changed Indigenous East 
Timorese knowledge systems, reducing the number of knowledge holders and de-legitimising 
and marginalising these Indigenous systems. This has changed the whole balance of East 
Timorese society, creating new hierarchies and inequalities. These inequalities are deep rooted, 
perpetuated by modern economic and governance systems, structures and institutions that 
compound structural violence in Timor-Leste.  
 
5.2 Violence and insecurity in Timor-Leste post-2002 
 
In the next section I explore the major challenges to peacebuilding in Timor-Leste post-2002, 
particularly the root causes of violence. It is important to understand the context of historical 
and ongoing violence in Timor-Leste to attribute correctly the role of development in causing or 
exacerbating violence. I provide a summary of the security sector in Timor-Leste, highlighting 
particularly the violence from 2006–2008, and then identify other root causes of violence. 
 
I use conflict-sensitive methods, based on principles of Do No Harm, to analyse, measure, map 
and better understand the root causes of violence in post-2002 Timor-Leste. I have integrated 
human security into my analysis. I draw on a number of East Timorese NGOs, academics and 
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local think tanks, including Belun, La’o Hamutuk and NGO Fundasaun Mahein and 
international organisations, such as The Asia Foundation, International Crisis Group and 
Interpeace, which have analysed violence in Timor-Leste since 1999. 
 
5.2.1 Broader violence context 
 
Timor-Leste has a population of approximately 1.16 million peoples across thirteen districts, 
including Oecusse, the former Portuguese enclave on the northern coast of West Timor, and the 
islands of Ataúro and Jaco (Government of Timor-Leste, 2015, p.13). When I first travelled to 
Timor-Leste in 2008 the fear and tension was palpable. Violence in Timor-Leste is not abstract 
or imagined. It is direct, cultural and structural – and it has significant implications for 
development and peacebuilding across all parts of East Timorese life. Every family has 
members who died or experienced physical or psychological harm during the Indonesian 
occupation, during the violent transitions in 1974–1975 and 1999, and during the community 
violence in 2006–2008. This history of trauma, anxiety and grief does not lie quietly on the land 
or its peoples. It is important to acknowledge, record and remember this collective history of 
violence and recognise that East Timorese are undergoing a shared process of healing and 
transformation.  
 
At independence, Timor-Leste emerged as one of the poorest countries in the world, with low 
rates of literacy, high maternal mortality, minimal infrastructure and weak governance 
mechanisms in place. In 1999, the porous border with Indonesia, IDPs, refugees and ex-militia 
threatened ongoing inter-state violence with Indonesia. Intra-community violence, retaliation 
and vengeance killing stemming from the civil war in 1974–1975 and opposing sides under 
occupation to 1999 perpetuated the threat of intra-state violence (International Crisis Group, 
2010; Scambary, 2006, Scambary, 2009; UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for 
Timor-Leste, 2006, p.16). In 2016, fourteen years on from independence, inter-state violence, 
particularly in relation to Indonesia has been largely resolved. I argue it is this latter, protracted 
intra-state violence that threatens the ongoing stability of Timor-Leste.  
 
5.2.1.1 Security sector challenges 
 
INTERFET restored basic security after 1999, but the security sector remained ineffective and 
divided. The depth of national trauma caused by the civil war in 1975, compounded by the 
Indonesian occupation, resulted in numerous East Timorese groups that could turn against their 
people (Cristalis, 2009, p.34). Many FALINTIL ex-combatants were traumatised and there were 
inadequate support structures to enable their reintegration. To manage this potential security 
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challenge, UNTAET created the FALINTIL Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) 
(Portuguese: East Timorese Defence Force) in February 2001. However, UNTAET was 
criticised for focusing on vetting and retraining former Indonesian police rather than 
reintegrating some but not all ex-FALINTIL fighters. This policy left many ex-combatants 
unemployed and frustrated that they were not receiving their ‘just rewards’ for their sacrifices 
(International Crisis Group, 2006; Traube, 2007). 
 
From early 2000 there was a lack of agreement between Timor-Leste political leaders and their 
international partners on the nature of security sector reform. Dahrendorf (2003) suggested 
reforms to create a small professional army, the F-FDTL, and a larger national police force, the 
Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). These recommendations, while supported by the 
international community, did not gain traction with East Timorese leaders, who considered ex-
FALINTIL fighters as critical to their power support base. Then Interior Minister Lobato (and 
former Vice President of FRETILIN), created special well-paid and armed PNTL units 
primarily staffed by ex-FALINTIL fighters. PNTL were placed in charge of law and order, 
border control, riot control and immigration; in comparison, the F-FDTL had no clear mandate 
regarding internal security. F-FDTL soldiers received only three months training, low salaries 
and had minimal regulatory and policy oversight (Scheiner, 2006).  
 
Flawed international assistance also negatively affected the security sector  (da Silva, 2006; de 
Carvalho, 2007; Ingram, 2012; Scambary, 2009). PNTL was provided with the majority of 
international funding and capacity-building support. However, both PNTL and F-FDTL 
remained weak, unaccountable and struggled for legitimacy (Wilson, 2012). Smith and Dee 
(2003, pp.73-75) and Wilson (2012) also argue that the UN civilian police (CIVPOL) was 
staffed with inadequately trained and sub-standard police officers from twenty-two countries, 
many of whom lacked focus and commitment, and failed to establish rapport and trust with the 
East Timorese. International organisations had significantly differing ideological approaches to 
policing and security, resulting in divisions and tensions between these international actors. This 
inadequate, unequal and imbalanced international assistance compounded existing rivalries and 
jealousies within and between the two security forces. Da Silva (2006) maintains that tensions 
between and within these formal security institutions, fuelled by easy access to weapons and 
conflicting leadership from key elites have exacerbated existing community violence in Timor-
Leste, and is one of the root causes of the violence that occurred in 2006–2008. 
 
Armed groups evolved from previously clandestine resistance groups to include disaffected 
veterans and youth in political fronts or political party militias, martial arts groups, crime 
syndicates and non-formal security organisations to form a heterogeneous collective that 
initiated armed violence and threatened state stability (Babo-Soares, 2004, p.19). Some of these 
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gangs were responding to disputes that had historical antecedents from Portuguese and 
Indonesian occupation. These groups primarily used low technology weapons, including 
homemade ‘sling-shots’ and incendiary devices (Scambary, 2009, p.1). I argue below that it is a 
combination of factors, including flawed security sector reform and the prevalence of armed 
groups, that triggered the 2006 Crisis and ongoing tensions. 
 
5.2.1.2 2006 Crisis and ongoing intra-state tensions 
 
Less than a year after UNMISET had scaled down in 2005, redolent with praise from the 
international community, Timor-Leste erupted into violence. The so-called Lorosa’e and 
Loromonu (Tetum: East/sunrise; West/sunset) intra-state violence that occurred in April 2006 
and reoccurred in 2007 and 2008 was not predicted by a complacent international community. 
The violence resulted in the disintegration of PNTL and F-FDTL, thirty-eight people killed and 
more than 1,650 homes destroyed by armed gangs, and 150,000 people or fifteen per cent of the 
population displaced into sixty-five IDP camps (Trindade & Castro, 2007; UN Independent 
Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, 2006, para.101)4. 
 
Lorosa’e are people from districts east of Dili such as Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem 
(associated with the original Papuan–Melanesian population who claim to represent the 
resistance fighters and be the custodians of an independent Timor-Leste). Loromonu are people 
from the western border areas or midlands such as Oecusse, Maliana, Suai, Ermera and Liquiçá 
(who were associated with the Malaysian–Indonesian population, stereotyped as supporters of 
Indonesian integration and anti-independence militias). These pre-colonial terms were recycled 
in 2006 as derogatory and divisive labels for the conflicting parties (Trindade & Castro, 2007, 
p.12). However the root causes of this violence were more complex than a mere geographic 
division.  
 
The International Crisis Group (2006, p.1) contends that: “the entire crisis, its origins and 
solutions, revolve around less than ten people, who have a shared history going back thirty 
years”. I agree that the actions of these leaders were fundamental to the manifestation of direct 
violence, but I assert that the 2006 crisis was triggered by deep societal divisions and grievances 
manifested during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation that remained unresolved 
after independence. These divisions exposed significant weaknesses in the new nation state and 
the liberal peacebuilding model espoused by the international community (Brady & Timberman, 
4 For a more detailed discussion on this matter see: Babo-Soares, 2001; Brown, 2009; Cotton, 
2007; de Carvalho, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2006; eds. Palmer, Niner and Kent, 2007; 
Scambary, 2006 and 2009; Trindade, 2006 and 2008; Trindade and Castro, 2007; UN 
Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, 2006. 
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2006; Richmond & Franks, 2008, p.186). Niner (2007) explains that the 2006 Crisis was 
triggered by a combination of four key issues: elite masculine political divisions, inequities 
within the general community, endemic poverty and disillusionment with independence, and 
underlying pain, trauma and lack of justice. Brady and Timberman (2006) agree and add that 
there were severe inadequacies in the justice system and a widespread absence of reliable 
information.  
 
This violence was also entrenched in issues of national identity. In a conflict-affected 
environment, where communities need unity and stability, creating regional identities through 
Loromonu / Lorosa’e divisions for elite political gain was a potent cause of violence. 
Conflicting ideals of nationalism were aggravated by the personal political interests of elite 
leaders, particularly then President Gusmão and then Prime Minister (and FRETILIN Secretary 
General) Alkatiri, that date back to 1974–1975 (International Crisis Group, 2006; Trindade, 
2008). These leaders opportunistically politicised two major internal conflicts within the 
security sector. The first was the March 2006 dismissal and public protests of a group of 594 F-
FDTL soldiers nicknamed ‘the Petitioners’, who were predominately from western regions 
(Loromono), and were frustrated at perceived discrimination. The second issue was factional 
rivalries between PNTL and F-FDTL over a corruption case involving F-FDTL officials (da 
Silva, 2006, pp.2-3; Ingram, 2012, p.4; Kingsbury, 2007; Loch & Prueller, 2011). Gusmão’s 
“incendiary” speech in March 2006 provided legitimacy to the Petitioners claims, leading to 
mass resignations, dividing elite relationships further and inciting the fear and violence 
perpetrated by hundreds of disenchanted local youth and armed gangs (International Crisis 
Group, 2006, pp.7-8).  
 
Aggrieved individuals and groups used this chaotic environment for personal advantage, taking 
the opportunity to seek revenge for perceived past crimes and unfair treatment (Loch & Prueller, 
2011; Scambary, 2009; Trindade, 2006; Trindade & Castro, 2007). At the request of the 
Government, the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF) deployed in June 2006, 
and UNMIT replaced UNOTIL in August 2006 to restore security. The violence continued until 
2008, when the leader of the Petitioners was killed after attempting to assassinate the then 
President Gusmão and Prime Minister Ramos-Horta. After that the Government made 
significant moves to pardon the remaining Petitioners, return all IDPs and restore security.  
 
It is clear that neither the East Timorese leadership nor its international partners effectively 
addressed the root causes of violence within and between the two security forces before 2006. 
Indeed Government and international policies and programs actively exacerbated an 
environment of fear and mistrust. The 2006 Crisis and ongoing intra-state violence caused 
physical and psychological damage to an already traumatised population. While levels of 
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violence have decreased since 2008 potential triggers for violence remain in the security sector 
and reforms must continue.  
 
5.3 Root triggers for violence in Timor-Leste 
 
While there are no ‘quick-fix’ solutions to these deep community divisions and the issues that 
exacerbate them, I highlight that a greater understanding of the triggers for violence can assist 
future peacebuilding efforts. Some of these triggers are structural forms of violence, which can 
be categorised as either causes or consequences of violence depending on the context. As the 
previous discussion on violence and insecurity in Timor-Leste demonstrates, triggers and 
consequences of violence are all interconnected, in complex and non-linear patterns. Structural 
violence can result in grievances, which if left unresolved, cause further cycles of violence. In 
this next section I summarise some specific root triggers for violence (Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.5) 
and broad issues of structural violence (Sections 5.3.6 to 5.3.11), which will be discussed 
further in Chapters Six to Eight. 
 
5.3.1 Land, property, and resource disputes 
 
In Timor-Leste intra-communal violence is triggered by land and resource disputes that have 
been exacerbated by the long history of armed violence (Wily, 2009; Cryan, 2015a). The current 
inadequacy of formal legal mechanisms to resolve land and property rights disputes causes land 
tenure insecurity, homelessness and can trigger further violence (Batterbury et.al., 2015; Belun, 
2009; Meitzner Yoder et.al., 2003). Stabilisation of land and property rights remains key to 
poverty reduction, economic stability, and strong and enduring links to Indigenous culture and 
identity (Fitzpatrick, 2002; Fitzpatrick et.al., 2008; Fitzpatrick et.al., 2013). 
 
Approximately forty-two per cent of Timor-Leste is viable agricultural land, half of which is 
cultivated primarily by subsistence farming (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p.2). Portuguese colonialism 
introduced a four-tier land rights system that combined the East Timorese Indigenous land 
rights system and a ‘modern’ land titling system aimed to benefit plantation owners and elites 
(Wallace, 2007, p.26). During Indonesian occupation approximately 44,091 titles were 
registered, mostly to non-East Timorese (Gomes, 2007, p.6; Wallace, 2007, p.27). During 
Indonesian occupation East Timorese communities were forced to relocate causing 
displacement and dispossession. Over twenty-four years these ‘settlers’ had usually gained user 
and access rights to land and property through intermarriage into customary landowner 
communities or through labour and capital investment such as sharecropping (Thu, 2012). After 
the violence in 1999, most of the official land records were destroyed and approximately fifty 
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per cent of property in Dili was illegally reoccupied (Neupert & Lopes, 2006, p.33). After 1999, 
settler, returning diaspora families, and East Timorese communities in West-Timor displaced 
from violence in 1999 and 2006, have repatriated back to their home communities. Their claims 
to traditional and titled lands that have not yet been resolved and negotiations about land rights 
and use have resulted in exacerbation of decade-long rural community violence (Dale et.al., 
2010; Thu, 2012; 2013).  
 
Since 1999 both UNTAET and then the Government, have failed to build an effective land 
administration system to support sustainable development including the legal rights, the 
technical supports for record keeping, a mapping system, the land tax system, planning and 
development systems, and national land policy. Land system reform has been ad hoc and 
without inclusive community consultation or cohesive planning from the Government 
(Batterbury et.al., 2015; Cryan, 2015a; 2015b; La’o Hamutuk, 2010; Wallace, 2007, pp.25-27). 
Since 2002 Portugal has supported the Ministry of Justice to develop land rules and structures 
and the World Bank has provided policy analysis on land use for private sector investment. 
From 2008 to 2012 USAID implemented the controversial Ita Nia Rai (Tetum: our land) 
program that aimed to establish a land administration system and a national Land Law. Ita Nia 
Rai failed to meaningfully involve local communities and failed to consider the complexity of 
land use and ownership fundamental to Indigenous land management practices (Cryan, 2015a; 
2015b; International Crisis Group, 2010; Rede ba Rai, 2012).  
 
The focus on land has uncovered decade-long unresolved land disputes increasing the potential 
for direct and structural violence. Legislation alone will not resolve these challenges and while 
Indigenous peacebuilding processes are central to the transformation of land-related violence, 
some disputes are so complex that hybrid justice mechanisms may be required (Fitzpatrick 
et.al., 2013). Unless East Timorese have secure access to and use of land and support to engage 
in their Indigenous practices, land-related violence will be one of the biggest ongoing cause of 
violence in Timor-Leste. 
 
5.3.2 Weak, corrupt or inaccessible governance systems 
 
Approximately eighty per cent of East Timorese live in rural areas and neither the Portuguese, 
Indonesians, UNTAET nor the new state of Timor-Leste have been very effective in delivering 
services to these people (Ingram, 2012, p.12). Only five per cent of the UN mission spend 
between 2001–2002 went into the local economy and around eighty per cent was concentrated 
in Dili (Carnahan et.al., 2006, pp.12, 54; 2007). This created a parallel economy to meet the 
needs of international personnel that distorted labour and retail markets. The lack of effective 
decentralisation has exacerbated minimal outreach to the districts, including poor health and 
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education service delivery and poor infrastructure resulting in minimal access to markets. 
Brown (2009, pp.148-150) notes the inadequacies of the statebuilding and decentralisation 
model and reminds us that disconnection between the state institutions and elite decision-
makers and citizens, combined with existing triggers, regularly translate to instability and 
ongoing violence. 
 
There have been three main decentralisation programs since 2002 aimed at reducing poverty 
and increasing governance in rural areas: the Programa Dezenvolvimentu Lokal (PDL – Local 
Development Program), and the Pakote Dezenvolvimentu Desentrilizadu (PDD – Decentralised 
Development Package) and since 2011, the Planu Nasional Dezenvolvimentu Suku (PNDS – 
National Suku Development Plan). These programs had weak participatory processes, missing 
important sectors of the community, weak complaints mechanisms, difficulties in integrating 
development priorities, and poor maintenance systems once programs were finalised (Cummins 
& Maia, 2012). Centralisation exacerbated economic divisions between urban and rural 
communities regarding service delivery and access to markets, justice, health and education 
(Scambary, 2013). 
 
The absence of reliable information is a significant threat to community unity and stability, 
fuelling misinformation, exaggeration and disempowerment (Engel, 2003, p.178). Collier 
(2013) emphases the importance of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 
building transparency and accountability in states reliant on extractive industries. NGOs have 
worked hard to provide information about resource extraction and governance issues in multiple 
languages, and facilitated community consultations to diffuse potential violence (Hunt, 2008a, 
p.284). However, trust has not been built or sustained through the Government consultation 
mechanisms (Engel, 2003, p.171). This has heightened frustrations and widened the gap 
between the Government and citizens. In May 2014, the Government passed a proposed law 
regulating the media by forcing all local and foreign journalists to gain government 
certification. Human Rights Watch (2014) labelled the law “repressive” and in August 2014 the 
East Timorese Supreme Court found it to be “unconstitutional”. This authoritarian step risks 
subverting the emerging participatory democracy.  
 
Corruption and nepotism are common political devices in authoritarian governance systems and 
the Government has made a number of poor choices compounding corruption and alienating 
citizens and the international community (Kingsbury, 2007). The Global Integrity Report (2013) 
rated Timor-Leste as having weak integrity levels; with sixty-five per cent for legal frameworks 
and forty-eight per cent for implementation. The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014 
(Schwab & Sala-i-Martin, 2013, p.366) rates Timor-Leste low at 138 of 148 countries and cites 
corruption as the most problematic factor to doing business. Transparency International’s 
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Corruption Perceptions Index (2013) rated Timor-Leste as very corrupt rating it 119 out of 175 
countries. The Government initiated an Anti-Corruption Commission in 2009 with the power to 
monitor, investigate and inform the public on human rights, good governance and corruption. 
Sluggish bureaucracy has slowed the ability for the Commission to engage in meaningful 
reform. 
 
5.3.3 Political differences between elites and manipulation to gain power 
 
Leadership is both a cause of violence and a means to accord in Timor-Leste. Strong and 
courageous leadership from some key men and women during the 1974–1975 period and 
throughout the Indonesian occupation provided direction and unity to the cause of 
independence, and the CNRT alliance smoothed over tensions in favour of a unified stance 
toward self-determination. Since 1999 there have been significant tensions between East 
Timorese political elites and between elites and citizens, chiefly after power struggles that led to 
the breakdown of CRNT in 2001 to form separate political parties to contest the Constituent 
Assembly elections. Cabral (2002, p.425) notes that since 2001 divisionary political tactics 
between parties, unilateral decisions made by Gusmão and other elites without broad 
consultation has been highly divisive. Richmond and Franks (2008, pp.193-194) add that 
international efforts to promote democratic elections have failed as elections have been 
“hijacked” resulting in an “unrepresentative and dictatorial state government” that fails to act 
inclusively or share power. While the current Government is considered to be broadly 
representative of all key parties, elite decision-makers continue to dominate decision-making 
and there are significant differences in political power between elite East Timorese and citizens 
resulting in limited participation by citizens. 
 
Unresolved elite leadership tensions inflamed other community grievances during the 2006 
crisis resulting in widespread violence. The failure of these political leaders to reconcile after 
the 2006–2008 violence has slowed community-level reconciliation efforts, and emphasised 
existing societal divisions and priorities between the centralised elite and the broader population 
identified by Babo-Soares (2004, p.19). Significant ongoing violence has led to a “powerful 
undercurrent of discontent” directed at elite leadership and centralised state government (de 
Carvalho, 2007, p.4). These divisions are discussed in detail in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight 
under the sections on Power. 
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5.3.4 Gendered power imbalances 
 
Timor-Leste is a heavily patriarchal society. Women and girls continue to disproportionally 
suffer from family and sexual violence and marginalisation from decision-making that affects 
their lives. During the Indonesian occupation thousands of East Timorese women were 
subjected to sex slavery, rape, torture, murder (de Oliveira, 2002). While cultural and gender 
norms are slowly changing, women continue to be vulnerable as a result of this historically high 
level of tolerance of violence against women (Harris-Rimmer, 2009; 2010). Rates of family and 
sexual violence in Timor-Leste are some of the highest in the Asia-Pacific. Nearly forty per cent 
of East Timorese women over the age of fifteen have experienced physical and/or sexual 
violence, while 34.6 per cent of women who have been married report having been abused by 
their husbands (UN Women, 2011, p.6). This violence is linked to the long history of hyper-
masculinity, violence and trauma.  
 
In 2010 the Government passed the Law Against Domestic Violence (Law No.7/2010) providing 
access to shelter, legal, medical and psychological assistance and emergency support. This law 
obligates Xefe de Suku (Tetum: elected chief of the village) to promote domestic violence 
awareness and prevention, and obligates the state to monitor rights violations, investigate and 
prosecute where there is sufficient evidence (Burgess, 2012, pp.3-6). Despite these legal 
advances, access to services remains scant or non-existent, particularly in rural and remote 
areas. While rates of reporting rape and family violence have increased since Indonesian 
occupation, in 2005 only 118 of 492 cases were referred to the prosecutor. Ospina (2006, p.48) 
explains that these low referral figures were caused by police recommending the use of 
Indigenous justice mechanisms and the withdrawal of accusations due to social pressure. The 
violent abuse of children continues to be an underreported matter (Burgess, 2012, p.7). The UN 
Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (2011, p.32) reports that East Timorese men 
and women with a disability are up to three times more likely to experience physical and sexual 
abuse and rape, and that women with a disability suffer double discrimination because of their 
gender. 
 
5.3.5 Weak justice system and continued impunity for crimes 
 
There are intrinsic challenges in negotiating the dual legal systems in Timor-Leste: the 
Indigenous lisan or customary system and the formal (also called Portuguese, UN or 
constitutional) justice system. There are no explicit laws or policies linking the Indigenous 
justice system to the formal justice system and the latter is highly overburdened and severely 
dysfunctional (TTR-0900-061010). After 1999, the UN and Timor-Leste created a formal 
justice system based on the Portuguese model that effectively marginalises the majority of 
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citizens from easily accessing legal documents or decision-making. There are now four local 
courts, but there is a need to effectively address the huge backlog of cases promptly to maintain 
the credibility of the system (La’o Hamutuk, 2010, p.14). The formal legal system is relatively 
inaccessible and understood by few lawmakers and citizens. Conversely, the Indigenous justice 
systems are widely understood and used, and civil society is calling for the two systems to be 
linked (Meitzner Yoder, 2007). However, there are some negative outcomes generated from the 
use of customary justice systems, including gendered violence and inter-generational debt (TX-
1600-260910). 
 
Serious problems currently facing the judicial system include the independence of the courts 
and the separation of powers, customary law practices and the issue of the President’s 
competence to grant pardons or amnesty (International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2010). 
Limited budgets or adequate staff, poor planning and coordination, and backlogs in the courts 
hamper efforts in establishing a rule of law and addressing human rights violations and crimes 
against humanity. The major perpetrators of atrocities during the Indonesian occupation and 
during the 2006 crisis were pardoned. CAVR was formed to address community-level 
reconciliation and reparations for past violence but its quite legitimate focus on pre-1999 crimes 
failed to address much of the intractable internal divisions from earlier in the occuption (Kent, 
2007). This culture of impunity for past crimes has sparked significant frustration with East 
Timorese (de Carvalho, 2007, p.4). Inadequate law enforcement and a weak judicial system 
inflames grievances and is a continued threat to community security.  
 
5.3.6 Poverty  
 
UNDP’s 2014 Human Development Index ranks Timor-Leste as a medium human development 
country as its rank has grown significantly from 0.418 in 2000 to 0.620 in 2014, and it is now 
ranked 128 of 185 countries (UNDP, 2014, pp.262,226). However, 49.9 per cent of the 
population are deemed to be in severe poverty (UNDP, 2014, p.181). The GNI per capita is 
USD 5,446 and the GDP per capita is USD 1,393, which while considerably increasing since 
2000, most of the East Timorese population remain very poor (UNDP, 2013b, pp.146,160,164). 
 
The National Census states that the population in 2015 was 1,167, 242, with 71.88 per cent of 
the population living in rural areas (Government of Timor-Leste, 2015, p.22). The maternal 
mortality ratio is 300 deaths per 100,000 live births and the infant mortality rate of 48 per 1,000 
live births makes Timor-Leste one of the most dangerous places in the world to give birth 
(UNDP, 2013b, p.158). 44.7 per cent of children are underweight and have malnutrition, and 
non-communicable diseases such as malaria are highly prevalent and life threatening (UNDP, 
2013b, p.168). 41.4 per cent of the population is under the age of fourteen, life expectancy at 
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birth is 62.9 years, and the annual population growth rate is high at 3.9 per cent (UNDP, 2013b, 
pp.146,196). Only 58.3 per cent of those aged fifteen and older are literate, and the mean years 
of schooling is 4.4 years, with only fifty-six per cent of eligible young people enrolled in 
secondary school (UNDP, 2014, p.194). These demographic factors point to a ‘youth bulge’ that 
Urdal (2004, p.1) defines as: “extraordinarily large youth cohorts relative to the adult 
population” of a state.  Collier (1999) and Urdal (2004, p.16) find that poverty, poor access to 
education and low economic growth can increase the likelihood of intra-state political and social 
instability and violence. This research highlights that Timor-Leste’s high poverty levels, low 
educational attainment and high youth population continue to be a risk factor for violence, as it 
was in 2006. 
 
5.3.7 Food insecurity and food sovereignty 
 
Food insecurity is one of the key drivers of rural poverty and cultural and structural violence in 
Timor-Leste, aggravated by low agricultural productivity and limited access to markets due to 
poor road infrastructure (Castro, 2013; Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2002; Kammen, 
2012). Approximately a quarter of the population lived in hunger in 2010. Subsistence farming 
is the primary income source for seventy per cent of the population and provides links between 
Indigenous identity, culture and the environment. Based on principles of self-determination, 
local NGOs are calling for a diversification system of “food sovereignty”, which takes into 
account: “[T]he right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through 
ecologically sound and sustain-able methods, and their right to define their own food and 
agriculture systems” (La’o Hamutuk, 2013, p.6). 
 
The current quality and diversity of crops and the quality of food available is uncertain. There 
are systematic food shortages across Timor-Leste between the end of the dry season and the 
start of the rainy season caused by a range of issues including food production, transport and 
storage systems, water supply system. The Government, together with Australia, is working to 
develop food security in the agriculture sector by providing high-yielding seeds, fertilisers and 
improving irrigation (International Monetary Fund, 2012; República Democrática de Timor-
Leste, 2011a). However, critics of this approach question the sustainability of this program and 
its ability to build national self-sufficiency, seeing it as a high-spending, short-term solution that 
will not meet the long-term nutrition needs of the population and distort customary agricultural 
practices. They argue that the Government should focus on promoting diverse diets, improved 
farming techniques and rural infrastructure to achieve food sovereignty (La’o Hamutuk, 2013, 
p.8). 
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5.3.8 Limited access to education 
 
During Portuguese colonialism only very few elite East Timorese were educated, while the rest 
of the population remained illiterate, marginalised and submissive (Cabral, 2002, pp.162-3; da 
Silva, 2012, p.129; Hill, 2002, p.39; Taylor, 1999). This system reinforced colonial, patriarchal 
and urban socio-economic inequalities (da Silva, 2012, pp.44-45; Durnan, 2005, p.109). When 
Indonesia invaded, literacy rates were around five percent and gender disparities were high. 
FRETILIN drew on Fanon (1963; 1967), Freire’s (1970) and Cabral (1970) to promote popular 
education though mass adult literacy (Cabral, 2002; CAVR, 2005, p.50; da Silva, 2012, pp.87-
90). Between 1976–1978, FRETILIN and OPMT established 400 schools across the country 
using Tetum and local languages aimed to non-violently ‘decolonise’ the education system that 
had co-opted elites and kept the majority of East Timorese illiterate and submissive, resulting in 
the suffocation of Timorese culture (da Silva, 2012, p.134, 208-9; Hill, 2002).  
 
Indonesia focused on compulsory education, banning Portuguese and Tetum. Education 
performance and quality were low, affected by a shortage of classrooms and teachers and the 
unwillingness of many East Timorese to participate in the repressive school system (Justino 
et.al., 2011, p.10). When the Indonesians left, ninety-five per cent of schools and post-
secondary institutions were destroyed or looted (Hill & Thomas, 2005, p.14). Durnan (2005; 
2006), Lederach (1997) and Spence (2009) assert that inclusive education is critical to 
rebalancing socio-economic opportunities for youth and create and sustain a culture of peace in 
conflict-affected contexts. It engages the rural majority people as agents of social transformation 
and is a particularly important tool to rebalance gender inequalities by mobilising and 
empowering women (Durnan, 2006, p.94).  
 
Limited education has consequences for intergenerational poverty traps where young people 
become stuck in a cycle of low human capital and low productivity, drastically impacting future 
economic and political stability (Boughton, 2009). World Bank analysis (Justino et.al., 2011) 
indicates that the Indonesian occupation has resulted in a substantial loss of human capital 
particularly among young men who were removed from school to work. This has affected 
labour market participation and has impacted the health status of individuals and households. 
Since 1999 young women have increased access to education but overall the education sector is 
in inadequate (Justino et.al., 2011). Progress developing curriculum, teaching materials and 
training teachers has been slow due to the difficulties of re-introducing Tetum and Portuguese.  
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5.3.9 Unstable state institutions and limited community participation  
 
Timor-Leste has established unstable governance processes and institutions that systematically 
exclude communities from participating in decision-making. In 1999 UNTAET was mandated 
to support capacity-building for self-government, and the focus has been on the rebuilding of, 
and transfer of power to, key liberal institutions (Nakamura, 2004). This model described by 
Brown (2009, pp.146-147) as “breathtakingly mechanistic” has been heavily critiqued (Brown, 
2009; Chopra, 2000; 2002; Grenfell, 2012; Richmond, 2005). They assert that it is impossible to 
deliver the state as a product without engaging in the deeper, more intrinsic questions of what 
makes up a political community, and the essential complexity of governance including 
participation, legitimacy and social-cultural contextual engagement. Grenfell (2007) argues that 
the focus on the state is disproportionate to its influence over East Timorese. They highlight that 
state building should not be addressed as a technical exercise as this creates further dysfunction, 
disconnecting and alienating citizenry from their government. Many elites supported UN’s 
focus on capacity building. However, NGO representatives stressed that sustainable political 
and administrative governance transition required the inclusive involvement of all East 
Timorese, not just the elite (Reis, 2000). 
 
In 1999 political elites, UNTAET and other international practitioners considered Timor-Leste’s 
political and economic systems as tabula rasa (Brown, 2009 p.23; Kent, 2012; Shepherd, 2013, 
p.124; Wallis, 2014, p.79). Tabula rasa incorrectly assumed that there were no governance 
institutions in place which resulted in the delegitimisation of Indigenous institutions and 
structures and minimised the participation of East Timorese (Boege et.al., 2008, p.11). The false 
assumption of tabula rasa is at the heart of the failure to build trusting and respectful 
relationships between East Timorese and outsiders. In 1973 Alkatiri highlighted the sociological 
aspect of colonialism, pointing out that the capacity malaise was more complex - it was 
structural and systemic (da Silva, 2012, pp.55-56; Jolliffe, 1978, p.56) 
 
The 2006–2008 violence indicated that despite significant capacity support the state remained 
unstable (República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2011b). In 2008 the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) assessed that government capacity remained low, efforts by international 
practitioners had been limited, fragmented, uneven and slow (Witheford et.al., 2008, p.2). 
Brown (2009, pp.145-146) notes that the Government and the majority of international 
development organisations have failed to equally support the capacity of civil society or 
Indigenous institutions.  
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5.3.10 Economic insecurity, unemployment and the ‘resource curse’ 
 
Urbanisation, unemployment and lack of equal access to economic opportunities and education 
have become a significant problem and cause of inequality and violence (Rae, 2009, pp.102-3; 
TTJ-1500-011010). Timor-Leste’s GDP was USD 4.5 billion in 2011: seventy-seven per cent 
was from the petroleum sector and only four per cent from agriculture and manufacturing. The 
Ministry of Finance projects that in 2014, sixty-one per cent of state revenue will come from oil, 
thirty-two per cent will come from past investment of petroleum income, and only seven per 
cent from non-oil sources (Scheiner, 2014). This points to serious concerns for economic 
security, Timor-Leste’s trade deficit and the need to work closely between government, private 
sector resource companies and civil society, with support from international organisations, to 
avoid the ‘resource curse’ experienced by other similar conflict-affected economies that are 
export-dependent on non-renewable resources (Collier, 2013; Scambary, 2015). 
 
The Government is currently export-dependent on exploited petroleum resources within the 
Joint Petroleum Development Area in the Timor Sea. Oil revenues from the Bayu-Undan and 
Kitan fields peaked in 2012 (Scheiner, 2014). Timor-Leste established a Petroleum Fund in 
2005 to provide a stable source of budget revenue. However since 2005, annual withdrawals 
have exceeded the Fund’s sustainability guidelines. It is estimated that the resources will be 
exhausted in 2026 at 2012 production rates and if spending rates continue they will exceed 
revenue by 2019. NGOs are lobbying the Government for a halt to unequal cash handouts, 
cancelling large, unviable projects like Tasi Mane and the Oecusse Special Economic Zone, and 
a refocussing of public spending toward a more sustainable model (Scheiner, 2012; 2014). 
There are continuing tensions with Australia over ongoing negotiations to establish a permanent 
maritime boundary between the two countries which influences treaty rights to the substantial 
oil and gas fields in the area, where Timor-Leste currently receives 30 per cent less revenue than 
Australia.  
 
While the Government has worked hard to minimise external debt, among resource-rich 
countries, Timor-Leste is one of the highest spending. Expensive, and politicised Government 
programs such as the 2009–2010 Pakote Referendum (Tetum: Referendum Package) (funding 
for small-scale infrastructure using local companies) and cash payment schemes financed by the 
Petroleum Fund from 2008 continue to drive high Government expenditure and create 
dependency while failing to target some vulnerable groups (Scambary, 2015; Scheiner, 2012; 
Wallis, 2015). The difference in payments is huge: “Conditional cash transfers are limited to 
USD 240 per year, elderly pensions are USD 360 per year, and annual veterans’ pensions range 
from USD 2,760 to USD 9,000” (ADB, 2014, p.251). World Bank analysts explained that these 
policies are temporary and inflationary (Dale et.al., 2014, p.292). I argue that these policies are 
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ineffective in redistributing income to those most in need, and they potentially create 
community unrest by favoring ‘spoilers’, who have engaged in violence and corruption over 
other citizens. 
 
Use of an international currency (US dollar) has moderated inflation and partially hedged 
currency fluctuations however, in 2011, inflation climbed to 14.5 per cent, driven by higher 
global commodity prices, a weak US dollar and large increases in fiscal spending (IMF, 2012). 
High inflation places disproportion costs on poorer citizens, leading to significant economic 
pressure on the rural population who already experience higher poverty rates.  
 
While much of the population is engaged in the informal sector the labour force participation 
rate for people over fifteen years is low with only 38.4 per cent women and 74.1 per cent men 
engaged in the formal labour force (UNDP, 2013b, p.158). Urban unemployment is higher than 
in rural areas (16.7 per cent versus 6.9 per cent) (NSD, 2011, pp. xvi – xviii; UNDP 2014, 
p.214). 63.1 per cent of households are involved in crop production, eighty-six per cent of 
households are rearing livestock and thirty-six per cent of the population work in subsistence 
agriculture (Scheiner, 2014). High rates of urban migration and youth unemployment create an 
environment for social tension, frustration and unrest and the gangs provide a source of status, 
livelihood, companionship and protection (Scambary 2009, p.2). These youth are vulnerable to 
manipulation and incitement to violence (Crockford, 2000; Kingsbury, 2007; Wigglesworth, 
2005; 2007). 
 
The Net Emigration Rate is significant at -9.4 per cent, where economic stagnation, 
unemployment and poverty have lead many young people to seek work overseas (UNDP, 
2013b: p.184). Migration and remittances are rapidly increasing from USD 3,642,322 in 2006 to 
USD 130,765,500 in 2011 (Index Mundi, 2012). Remittances provide stimulation for 
community-level business and have boosted the economy and household incomes (McWilliam, 
2014). Importantly these employment programs absorb some of the surplus labour of young 
men, possibly reducing their potential as conflict actors (Hunt, 2015, pers. comm., 7 July). 
 
5.3.11 Inadequate infrastructure 
 
Infrastructure was largely destroyed in the aftermath of Indonesian occupation in 1999 and 
approximately ninety per cent of roads are in poor condition and seaport, airport and 
telecommunications infrastructure require urgent attention. One-third of East Timorese do not 
have access to improved drinking water, sixty per cent lack decent sanitation facilities and two 
thirds are living without access to electricity (UNDP, 2013b). The World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012 (Schwab & Sala-i-Martin, 2013, p.346) notes that 
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constrained access to domestic and international markets due to inadequate infrastructure is the 
key barrier for doing business in Timor-Leste.  
  
Under the SDP, the Government is focused on large-scale multi-year infrastructure spending, 
financed by withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund. The Government spent USD 268 million on 
capital in 2010, capital expenditure jumped to USD 718 million in 2011 and a planned USD 
1,078 million for 2012 (IMF, 2012, p.4). While this focus is clearly necessary for long-run 
economic growth there are significant risks in undermining Petroleum Fund savings. A fall in 
oil prices would heavily impact the national budget. The IMF’s 2011 Article IV Consultations 
recommends slower capital spending to align with the absorptive capacity of the economy and a 
continued focus on building public financial management capacity to manage economic growth 
(IMF, 2012). 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I reviewed the history of peacebuilding, development and violence in Timor-
Leste. I argue that there are four important historical periods and two transition periods from 
pre-colonial times to independence in 2002 that have each contributed to the current root causes 
of violence in Timor-Leste. These periods are: pre-colonialism prior to 1511, Portuguese 
colonialism from 1511–1974, the civil war and Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste from 1974–
1975, the Indonesian occupation from 1975–1999, the end of Indonesian occupation from 
1998–1999, and UNTAET’s administration from 1999–2002. These periods are important to 
understanding interpersonal dynamics, violence and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. Indigenous 
East Timorese culture, power dynamics and relationships between key actors are central to 
understanding the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste. However, I stressed that from 
Portuguese colonialism to 2002, Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems were 
deliberately marginalised, delegitimised and distorted by external actors who were in power. 
 
I then examined the history of intra-state violence and human insecurity in Timor-Leste from 
2002 onward, with a particular examination of the security sector and the root causes of the 
2006–2008 crisis. I provided a broad analysis of the root causes for violence with a focus on 
land, property, and resource use disputes; weak, corrupt or inaccessible governance systems; 
political differences between elites and manipulation to gain power; gendered power 
imbalances; and a weak justice system and continued impunity for crimes. I reviewed 
significant related causes of structural violence including: poverty; food insecurity and food 
sovereignty; limited access to education; unstable state institutions and limited community 
participation; a lack of economic security including inequalities exacerbated by rewards to 
potential spoilers; unemployment and the ‘resource curse’; and inadequate infrastructure.  
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 Many of these triggers are directly impacted by development and peacebuilding interventions. 
These interventions can exacerbate violence by not focusing on understanding and transforming 
these root causes. Therefore development, if executed poorly, it is a tool, or an enabler of 
development-related violence. The complexity of the violence creates challenges for an 
‘outsider’ or international practitioner to understand, or predict how, when and where violence 
will occur.  
 
In line with Lederach (2003) East Timorese participants explained that some level of conflict 
has always existed in Timor-Leste communities enabling necessary societal transformation. An 
East Timorese NGO peacebuilder clarified: “Conflict is part of being a human being, it is a 
natural thing…Conflict is always with us” (TX-1600-260910). I agree with Dewhurst (2008) 
who categorises Timor-Leste as currently experiencing “violent peace”; where continuing 
inequality and cultural violence create low-level direct and structural violence in communities 
and broader intra-state violence. Dewhurst (2008) argues that the historically high levels of 
violence in Timor-Leste have been sustained by a cultural-legitimisation of violent behaviour, 
where violence is normalised and is not condemned, resulting in the perpetuation of violence at 
all levels of society. In Timor-Leste, violence is experienced differently in rural and urban areas, 
between elites and citizens, and between genders and generations.  
 
From the perspective of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge, the root cause of the protracted 
intra-state violence and insecurity in Timor-Leste is an imbalance in the secular and 
cosmological worlds. This imbalance manifests itself in multiple ways including physically, 
through violent combat; mentally, through emotional trauma and violent thoughts and words; 
structurally, through institutions; and culturally through repressed and marginalised cultural 
practices. It is also engendered through sexual and family violence and inequity. This violence 
is complex and interconnected.  
 
I argue that since 2002, East Timorese elites have continued the marginalisation of Indigenous 
knowledge systems and peacebuilding practices. However, the resilience of these Indigenous 
systems is remarkable, and, while they have changed over time, these knowledge systems are 
strong and vital to communities today. In Chapter Six I will examine Indigenous East Timorese 
methods of peacebuilding used to transform community violence for thousands of years. 
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6 Indigenous East Timorese Knowledge Systems: Culture, 
Power and Relationships 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Five surveyed the history of Timor-Leste from pre-colonialism to 1999 and elaborated 
on the systemic root causes of violence in post-1999 Timor-Leste. In Chapter Six I expand on 
this discussion by establishing the foundations of the Indigenous East Timorese knowledge 
systems and providing a deeper analysis of my theoretical framework based on culture, power 
and relationships. I use historical, anthropological and political science texts and field 
interviews to expand on Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. 
 
Not all East Timorese have equal access, responsibilities, belief and trust in Indigenous 
knowledge systems and not all East Timorese peoples categorise themselves as Indigenous. I 
asserted in Chapter Three that East Timorese peoples are the customary owners of Indigenous 
knowledge systems – a shared set of widely used cultural categories that stretch across and 
within localities. In line with other Indigenous knowledge systems, East Timorese knowledge 
systems are categorised by multiple ontologies and epistemologies.  
 
Respect for and use of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems are deeply influenced by 
an individual’s historical experiences during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation. 
Understanding also differs across and within language groups and leadership and governance 
hierarchies, depending on gender, age, and formal and informal education levels. As a result 
there is no single understanding of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge. However, there are a 
some common principles within Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems that have 
emerged through analysis in my fieldwork findings (discussed further in Chapters Seven and 
Eight). In this Chapter I highlight and expand on these three central themes, culture/lulik, 
power/lisan and relationships/slulu as a framework to understand the complexity and 
adaptability of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. 
 
At the start of this chapter I explore how Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding practices are 
explicitly linked to Indigenous self-determination. In Timor-Leste, Indigenous peacebuilding is 
both a metaphysical and practical process aimed at bringing the cosmos and the secular world 
into balance. Realising tempu rai-diak (Tetum: a time of tranquility) or dame (Tetum: peace) is 
essential to the achievement of ukun rasik a’an (Tetum: self-determination). I draw on the work 
of East Timorese academics Babo-Soares (2004), da Silva (2012) and Trindade (2014) to 
examine how Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding practices, such as tarabandu, nahe biti, 
juramentu, matak-malarin, and halerik act to transform violence.  
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 I move into an analysis of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems through the framework 
of culture, power and relationships (see Table 2). I highlight relevant Indigenous knowledge, 
practices, processes or rituals that specifically transform or exacerbate violence, particularly at a 
community level. In the first section on culture/lulik, I examine sacred houses and localised 
identity, maubere-ism, multilingualism and complex systems of land and water ownership and 
use. In the second section on power/lisan, I detail governance structures, leadership, FPIC and 
processes of participation and consultation. Finally, I extrapolate on how cooperative 
relationships/slulu are built and sustained between East Timorese, with a focus on the 
relationships between women and men and processes of installing the outsider inside. 
 
In exploring East Timorese knowledge through these central themes, my analysis broadly 
differentiates between East Timorese knowledge systems and the modern knowledge systems of 
international development practitioners. As identified in Chapter Two, while modern knowledge 
systems are centred on Western liberal ideas, modern knowledge systems are also complex and 
plural, as demonstrated by so many practitioners originating from different countries. Often, 
East Timorese and modern knowledge systems overlap, and both are used pragmatically by East 
Timorese peoples who fluidly engage with and interconnect the knowledge systems depending 
on whichever system is most practical for a given scenario. McWilliam et.al. (2014) draw on 
Sahlins (1985) and Tsing (2005) to explain that East Timorese flexibly respond in “culturally 
inflected ways” to change and difference.  
 
Many of the Tetum terms described in this Chapter are used to group common rituals, processes 
or forms from across different uma lulik and ethno-linguistic groups in Timor-Leste. For each of 
these terms there are multiple local language forms and arrangements that may be different to 
the way I describe them in Tetum.  
 
6.2 Indigenous self-determination and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste 
 
East Timorese peacebuilding processes are deeply ingrained in Indigenous East Timorese 
knowledge systems and have been practiced in Timor-Leste for centuries to actively manage 
community violence (Babo-Soares, 2004; Laakso, 2007; Ospina & Hohe, 2002). Trindade 
(2014) explains tempu rai-diak (Tetum: the tranquil time) as a time of balance and dualism 
between the secular (physical and material) and cosmological (the world of the spirits and 
ancestors) worlds. In tempu rai-diak people are connected to hun (Tetum: the roots of the tree or 
source), meaning their ancestors, origins and history, and rohan (Tetum: tips of the tree 
branches), meaning the present or the future. Babo-Soares (2003, p.89) describes tempu rai-diak 
or tempu beiala (Tetum: time of the ancestors) as a holistic, sustainable existence without 
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violence, when the Indigenous social, political and economic systems were in place before 
Portuguese colonialism: 
 
“…life in the beiala period is portrayed as peaceful, calm and governed by the rules of 
ukun (rule or regulate) and bandu (forbidden) or customary law. Emphasis is placed on 
the point that in the time of the ancestors’ life was peaceful, calm and bountiful. There 
was no shortage of food and the people lived the good life. This is the kind of life later 
interrupted by the invasion of outsiders”. 
 
These complex peacebuilding systems are continuous, non-linear and multidimensional. The 
system connects multiple generations, maun-alin (Tetum: elder-younger siblings), lineages and 
clans, rai (Tetum: the land one stands on), uma (Tetum: house), moris (Tetum: life and the 
future one seeks), and rate (Tetum: the graveyard of your kin) (Babo-Soares, 2004, pp.22-23). 
This cycle of balancing is also a process of reconciliation, where throughout their lifetime an 
individual aims to heal past mistakes and move to tempu rai-diak (McWilliam, 2007a) . People 
and society become out of balance if the correct rituals and processes are not followed. 
Breaching these systems or creating imbalance can cause disaster, illness, violence, retribution 
or death and can only be rectified by following the correct ritual processes (McWilliam, 2007a; 
Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.24; Trindade, 2014). If the imbalance between the secular and 
cosmos is unaddressed, violence will continue (Babo-Soares, 2004). 
 
One experienced East Timorese NGO peacebuilder explained that conflict is natural, but it is 
important to understand the root causes to resolve violence. When he trains other East Timorese 
in peacebuilding he uses the analogy of hun to highlight unseen or invisible triggers for 
violence: 
 
“I say to them conflict is a normal thing. Even if you solve the conflict, please analyse it 
first, why did this conflict happen? If you want to plant a eucalyptus tree, and then you 
cut it down, and leave the root there. One day the root will grow again. This is the same 
as conflict. People want to try to solve the conflict, the thing they can see – people 
fighting each other – but they do not know why they were fighting each other. If you do 
not know the root cause of the conflict, you can solve the one that you can see, and you 
think that it is resolved, but in a month, or three months, you will have conflict again. If 
you dig deeply you can see the root, the root is like a coconut root, or like a tamarind 
tree [spreads out his fingers]” (TX-1600-260910). 
 
The ultimate goal of Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding is to achieve tempu rai-diak or 
dame (Tetum: peace, a time of harmony and tranquillity) and hakmatek (Tetum: stability or 
quiet, a situation where violence and disorder are absent) (Trindade & Castro, 2007). These 
ideals are associated with ukun rasik a’an (Tetum: self-determination), a concept that 
holistically encompasses self-determination and concepts of sovereignty, self-sufficiency and 
independence (Babo-Soares 2004; Hunt, 2008a). Ukun rasik a’an is closely paralleled with 
tempu rai-diak, dame and hakmatek because it is also grounded in ethical concepts of balance 
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and fairness. Ukun rasik a’an is also closely associated with empowerment, and holistic and 
integrated forms of governance that are responsive and inclusive (Pinto, 2015, pers. comm., 10 
November).  
 
I assert that ukun rasik a’an is the East Timorese equivalent of Indigenous self-determination as 
detailed in the Declaration, and an vital pre-requisite to the concept of Indigenous self-
determined development discussed in Chapter Four. As one East Timorese academic explained: 
“We struggled very hard for independence; we want people to live in harmony, peace and 
prosperity” (TL-1300-170910). The fundamental difference between East Timorese and modern 
conflict transformation processes are that Indigenous East Timorese processes are grounded in 
both secular and cosmological dimensions. In theory, when these complex systems are 
legitimised, accessible, used and respected East Timorese peoples will achieve ukun rasik a’an. 
 
6.2.1 Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding practices 
 
The following section details some of the most widely observed Indigenous East Timorese 
peacebuilding practices used today. Separately they demonstrate tangible alternatives to liberal 
peacebuilding practices, together they contribute to building an understanding of Indigenous 
East Timorese knowledge systems, and their deep connection to land, place and kinship 
networks.  
 
Colonialism, Christianity, violent occupation and modernisation have significantly impacted 
these practices. As a result, there are differences between and within communities of how these 
peacebuilding practices take place, the actors involved, and the level or types of violence to 
which they are applied. Most of these practices are described using Tetum, but there are many 
local language equivalents of each term that have more specific applications (McWilliam, 2014, 
pers. comm., 16 November). 
 
6.2.1.1 Tarabandu 
 
Indigenous ancestors set rules and prohibitions known today as tarabandu: a combination of 
tara (Tetum: to hang up or suspend [often a piece of cloth]) and bandu (Portuguese: prohibition; 
customary law or morals) (McWilliam et.al., 2014, p.313). This practice is controversial and 
McWilliam et.al. (2014, pp.313-315) assert that tarabandu is not an Indigenous practice, and is 
at best an amalgamation of different practices appropriated by international development 
organisations and the Government to press their conservationism and homogenous rule of law 
on rural communities. However, they position tarabandu as an important example of modern 
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knowledge systems and institutions harnessing and codifying Indigenous knowledge systems 
for the purposes of natural resource management (McWilliam et.al., 2014, pp.317-318).  
 
Today tarabandu is used as a customary legal process of agreement making within the 
community to regulate behaviour and relationships between people, and between people, natural 
resources and economic decisions. If tarabandu are transgressed, communities believe the 
ancestors in the spiritual world will be angry, resulting in implications for the physical world 
including violence, starvation, disease or war (Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.17-18). An East 
Timorese university student described this living system to me:   
 
“We believe that trees, they are not just trees, but that they are something, and that there 
are spirits that have been living there for ages. So we are not allowed to just [cut] them” 
(TJ-1500-150910).  
 
Tarabandu are used today to place limitations on shifting agriculture, controlling natural 
resource harvest, deforestation, determining fencing boundaries and maintenance, deterring 
theft, prohibitions on pre-marital sex or killing of particular animals (Meitzner Yoder, 2007; 
McWilliam et.al., 2014; Palmer, 2007; Shepherd, 2013). A tarabandu can now be authorised by 
customary and Government leaders who pronounce the prohibition to the community. The 
tarabandu is usually symbolised by placing a distinctive cloth, sign or document in a prominent 
place to inform and remind the community of the decision and punishment for transgression. 
This process is concluded by the community participating in ritualised animal sacrifice and a 
shared feast (Meitzner Yoder, 2007). An East Timorese university student explained how 
communities used tarabandu to make decisions about natural resource management: 
 
“I used to work in Viqueque. The people there do a ceremony called tarabandu. It is a 
way of telling people that they should not [cut down] the trees, so they put a sign in that 
area so that people are aware. If they cut down the trees, they will have to pay a fine. 
We were doing advocacy and traditional law on a Tarabandu project. They did a water 
project where they have very big trees… [The INGO] wanted to cut down the trees so 
that they could build a water tank in that area for their program. The community said no 
and it did not happen” (TJ-1500-150910).  
 
An East Timorese peacebuilder described how the tarabandu process works to create harmony 
and balance: 
 
“All the good people in this community have to follow this tarabandu process. If youth 
fight, they have a penalty, they have to pay USD 1,000, or USD 100, or give pigs or 
buffaloes. People do not want to pay a penalty, so when people are angry with each 
other, they think, “We have to stop it”. If you have a paddy field, and my buffalo comes 
and eats something in your paddy field, then I have to pay you a penalty” (TTG-1500-
300910). 
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Brown and Gusmão (2009, p.67) see tarabandu as “dynamic and adaptable”, empowering 
communities to “resolve problems and meet needs”. Tarabandu work best where there is 
stronger adherence to Indigenous cultural practices and when communities are not economically 
pressured to transgress the prohibition. Tarabandu can work well in rural locations, where 
communities are more cohesive and less transitory, and where customary authorities and local 
government can enforce the decision. Meitzner Yoder (2007, pp.45-46) provides examples of 
how tarabandu has regained legitimacy through hybridising with state justice regulation 
mechanisms. For example, in Oecusse, by 2004 there were 402 tarabandu in place across 
twelve sukus (Tetum: local level government areas), ranging from small areas encompassing 
sacred rocks and water to entire mountainsides.  
 
6.2.1.2 Nahe Biti 
 
An important cultural practice of seeking peace, resolving differences and creating a stable 
social order is called nahe biti (Tetum: stretching or laying down the mat as a means to facilitate 
consensus, truth-telling or reconciliation). Nahe biti is a series of complex ideas and processes 
that can be used for both wider kinship matters and smaller family-group conflict 
transformation, distinguished by biti bo’ot (Tetum: large mat) and biti kiik (Tetum: small mat). 
Minor disagreements between members of the same family are usually resolved by the head of 
the family unit, within the uma lulik. Large-scale violence involving multiple families, such as 
divorce, theft or land disputes, may need to involve elders from outside the uma lulik especially 
the Chefe de Aldeia and Chefe de Suku (Trindade, 2006, p.12). The function of nahe biti 
expanded in 1974–1975 to included political violence (Carroll-Bell, 2013, p.37).  
 
The process of nahe biti is grounded in community participation. It requires extensive 
preparation, and the willingness on both sides to commit to the process, voluntarily accept 
culpability for past wrongs, and compromise to achieve tempu rai-diak. Babo-Soares (2004, 
p.24) explains that the five stages in weaving a biti are linked to the process of nahe biti: 
“Conceptually, a ready biti symbolises consensus. Bringing together different leaves in the form 
of a mat symbolises the willingness to bring together the conflicting parties and to find a 
common settlement”. He explains the first stage, preparing to plait the biti is likened to the 
process of contacting all the key parties to the conflict. The second, selection of the heda 
(Tetum: pandanus leaves) translates to seeking agreement and willingness from all parties to 
meet. Arranging the logistics; the third step is ensuring the heda matches each other, akin to the 
process of setting the parameters of the process including the recommendations for legal 
prosecution. The fourth step is the plaiting of the heda, which is the complex process of 
mediating compromise and consensus, creating a balanced or win-win solution; the final step is 
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the completion of the biti, which is accomplished by ritual ceremonies such as juramentu 
(described below).  
 
Nahe biti is an active peacebuilding process grounded in Indigenous authority that facilitates 
participants to resolve their fear and intolerance. It creates a safe space (geographically defined 
by the mat) where conflicting parties can seek common ground and talk through complex 
violence, achieve reintegration and acceptance of wrongdoers and seek shared outcomes. While 
each uma lulik has slight differences in this process according to their differing customs, nahe 
biti is a Timor-Leste-wide conflict transformation tool. Carroll-Bell (2012, p.36) describes how 
the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) undertaken by CAVR used a version of nahe biti 
to discuss and resolve community violence in 1,371 cases by 2004. Indeed, The Asia 
Foundation (2004) found that ninety per cent of people surveyed wanted community leaders to 
take primary responsibility for dispute resolution. Nahe biti remains an important tool for 
transforming violence in Timor-Leste. 
 
6.2.1.3 Juramentu 
 
The practise of nahe biti includes a ritual ceremony to conclude and legitimate the process, 
usually before the uma lulik, where a juramentu (Tetum: binding oath, blood oath or oath of 
loyalty) is used to seal the agreement and bind all parties to the agreement (Babo-Soares, 2004, 
pp.21-28; Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.23-26). The juramentu ritual is a symbolic ‘death’ of 
violence and exchange of blood to bind the conflicting parties together as ‘blood brothers’. It is 
usually done by mixing the blood of a sacrificed animal with local palm wine and the mixture is 
drunk by both parties. Often juramentu is concluded by chewing of buah malus (Tetum: betel 
nut) to symbolise the normalising of relationships.  
 
Juramentu is used to conclude conflicts, establish new social structures or relationships between 
groups so that family groups are not hostile to each other. These physical ritual connections 
parallel the new spiritual relationships created concurrently where the ancestors of each party 
are also engaged to maintain the peace to ensure a juramentu can be enforced inter-
generationally (Trindade, 2006; Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.20-25).  
 
6.2.1.4 Matak-malirin and Halerik 
 
At the conclusion of Indigenous peacebuilding rituals participants hope to be provided with 
matak-malirin (Tetum-terik: newly green or sprouting, cool), dualistic symbols of good health 
and productive life force, which creates a balance between heating (physical and spiritual 
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danger) and cooling (well-being and fertility) (Kehi & Palmer, 2012, p.447; McWilliam, 
2007b). Matak-malirin can be physically represented by harvested food and water in a pot that 
is called matak inan malirin inan (Tetum: mother of greenness and coolness). It is also the point 
where marriage exchanges took place at the conclusion of warfare (McWilliam, 2007b). The 
food and water received in these rituals are a metaphysical representation of peace, prosperity 
and protection from bad luck. The pots are exchanged during ceremonies to signal the 
harmonious and inter-connected relationships between visible and invisible life forces 
(Trindade, 2014). Matak-malirin and similar local processes that balance heat/cold, fire/water, 
sun/moon, are practices that both individuals and groups can use to create unity and harmony. 
Kehi and Palmer (2012, p.450) comment that water matak-malirin is also used to mark 
newborns as part of a symbolic ritual to bless them with good health and productive life energy.  
 
Trindade (2014, pp.56-57) explains that when East Timorese do not have tempu rai-diak or 
matak-malirin they will undertake halerik (Tetum: the singing or chanting of the suffering). 
Halerik represents ema kbi’it laek (Tetum: the voice of the powerless), where those who are 
experiencing suffering express their problems to ema bo’ot (Tetum: the powerful). The act of 
halerik is a non-violent form of protest; through articulating their experiences, the sufferers gain 
strength and purpose. Halerik has numerous practical applications; it was used during 
Indonesian occupation by the resistance and clandestine networks to express desires for 
independence and self-determination. Mason (2005, p.743) illustrates the importance of 
women’s halerik during Indonesian occupation: “Central to both levels of struggle was the 
nonviolent resistance of women who took to the streets, staged sit-ins and yelled, sang and 
danced for East Timorese freedom”. Halerik is now used by civil society to protest and draw 
Government attention to socio-economic disparities. 
 
6.2.2 Summary: Liberal versus Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding 
 
East Timorese communities have been weaving Indigenous and modern methods of resolving 
violence and building peace since the arrival of Portuguese colonialism and Christianity. 
Ongoing violence has necessitated the use of Indigenous peacebuilding practices at a 
community level, and some East Timorese including Babo-Soares (2004) support use of 
Indigenous systems at a national level. However, many elite East Timorese and international 
practitioners do not support the widespread use of Indigenous peacebuilding practices, 
particularly for violent or complex criminal matters (Babo-Soares, 2004; Trindade & Castro, 
2007). Babo-Soares (2004, p.17) states that political leaders only supported Indigenous 
processes after they were proven effective. 
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The liberal peacebuilding model rarely legitimises concepts of tempu rai-diak, dame and ukun 
rasik a’an or uses Indigenous knowledge systems to transform violence. Instead, liberal 
peacebuilding practices, such as mediation and the formal justice system using police and courts 
are prioritised, which do not always work smoothly in practice (TL-1300-170910). Many East 
Timorese are critical of liberal or hybrid peacebuilding processes, for example, Trindade and 
Castro (2007, p.2) note that “Recent Government-sponsored dialogue and peace-making 
initiatives by international actors present in East Timor have shown little impact on the 
sentiments and root causes underlying the eruption of violence”. An East Timorese peacebuilder 
elaborated: 
 
“International experiences and the elite Timorese interests, they ignore our culture. One 
example, in 2006…we wanted nahe biti bo’ot, but they completely used malae [Tetum: 
foreigner] way, very international way [sic], and ignored local ownership. So in that 
way it was not working” (TTR-0900-061010).  
 
Historically, the Portuguese, Indonesians and international practitioners have also 
systematically manipulated Indigenous peacebuilding processes of juramentu and nahe biti. An 
international development consultant said: 
 
“The Indonesians were not stupid, they brought in the traditional ceremonies. In the 
militia, they would do oath-binding ceremonies, blood drinking ceremonies. They 
would give people a sense of being impervious to bullets by getting people to perform 
rituals. That might have denigrated the power of some of the processes. You can draw 
parallels with CAVR, where we drew on nahe biti. It is the same thing, perverting a 
traditional process and using it to your own ends” (TZ-1430-280910).  
 
Liberal and hybrid peacebuilding efforts, such as the rule of law, have not been well understood 
or supported by communities, which limits their effectiveness. For example, a senior East 
Timorese peacebuilder stated that communities did not accept formal justice outcomes as 
retribution for past crimes: “They [people who had fought in militias] went to jail for five years 
and the community still would not accept them, so they had to go back to the refugee camp” 
(TTK-1630-100713). I asked what approach would have worked better. She explained that 
customarily a payment would be given. An East Timorese analyst illustrated that use of 
customary mechanisms can also contribute to the maintenance of relationships between parties 
to the disagreement:  
 
“If I go through the legal process and my neighbour has stolen my pig, if I win, they 
will go to jail. But then the neighbour will still hold some kind of sense of sentiment. 
He might not accept the accusation. It's very difficult, when he comes back it is very 
difficult to stay together especially if we are neighbours” (TTT-1400-011010). 
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The emphasis on compensation also potentially leads to the problem of Indigenous practices 
exacerbating intergenerational poverty and violence. A East Timorese NGO peacebuilder 
expanded: 
 
“If we are fighting each other, and I go to you to solve the conflict, you say I have to 
provide one pig and two boxes of rice, but at the time I have no money. I have to go and 
borrow from someone, and I say: ‘no worries I will return it back in two weeks, in order 
to solve the problem’. So I give the pig [sic]. Everything is resolved. But, in two weeks, 
the person who I borrowed money from comes to ask for my money. I said: ‘sorry right 
now I do not have money’. So now my conflict with you is gone but I have a new 
conflict” (TX-1600-260910). 
 
There is recognition that the scale of the violence determines what form of peacebuilding is 
used. A larger crime often necessitates use of the modern, criminal justice system, but the 
majority of East Timorese participants emphasised that it was preferable to use Indigenous 
systems to manage community violence and minor criminal acts:  
 
“It depends on the level of the problem. When we involve the police [they] say this is a 
small problem, go back to your community and use tarabandu. Tarabandu is still 
relevant to use because the people in the community they feel more respect [for] the 
traditional than the legal law” (TN-1300-200910). 
 
Peacebuilding is difficult to achieve if some portion of Indigenous knowledge is missing due to 
historical marginalisation of Indigenous knowledge holders and cultural practices. While 
recognising the importance of Indigenous peacebuilding at a community level, McWilliam et.al. 
(2014) and Grenfell et.al. (2009) question the effectiveness of these practices. They argue that it 
is unclear whether Indigenous peacebuilding can be used to transform widespread and endemic 
violence. They highlight that the practice of Indigenous peacebuilding has shifted, particularly 
since 2006–2008, and that significant gaps in knowledge and procedures may cause the overall 
process to be ineffective.  
 
Trindade and Castro (2007, p.31) agree that often Indigenous peacebuilding practices used 
today are ineffective because they do not follow the correct process. They explain that all the 
correct customary standards and procedures must be followed by beseeching the ancestors and 
for balance to be restored. Failure to correctly implement standards and procedures leads to 
further imbalances and violence. A senior East Timorese peacebuilder suggested that more time, 
funds and patience are needed to follow the correct Indigenous peacebuilding process: 
 
“During the crisis they tried to do the traditional conflict resolution. It is called nahe biti 
bo’ot, where you put down the mat; everyone sits down together to find a solution. I 
think it [nahe biti bo’ot] was more of a spectacle; it did not really address the 
underlying issues. I don’t think it could have. I think we need a much longer time to do 
it, logistically, the money and the time. Patience. There [are] still a lot of unresolved 
disagreements” (TTK-1630-100713). 
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 Brown (2009), Kent (2007; 2011; 2012) Laakso (2007), Trindade and Castro (2007) and 
Trindade (2006; 2008) differentiate between Government-supported and internationally funded 
liberal or hybrid peacebuilding processes and Indigenous peacebuilding processes. Babo-Soares 
(2004, p.30) and Rae (2009, p.212) contend that CAVR did not respect Indigenous 
peacebuilding processes because political elites and internationals had a lack of understanding 
of East Timorese culture. An East Timorese development practitioner described liberal 
peacebuilding practices as confusing with minimal results: 
 
“People were coming in here to teach conflict resolution. But we already have conflict 
resolution methods in place that we have used for maybe thousands of years. But then 
international people come in, they do a conflict resolution training for the Timorese. It's 
just confusing. All [these] new conflict resolution methods from outside are not always 
working because people don't believe in [them]. The result is very very minimal” (TG-
1500-140910). 
 
Ongoing significant levels of intra-state and community-level violence indicates that the current 
prioritisation of liberal peacebuilding over East Timorese peacebuilding practices is failing to 
transform the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste. The prioritisation of liberal peacebuilding 
practices appears to be exacerbating existing forms of cultural and structural violence.  
 
6.3 Culture / Lulik 
 
The concept of culture is central to Indigenous self-determined development and peacebuilding 
practice. Using anthropological and ethnographic sources and my field research, I explore how 
Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems are grounded in multiple narratives of culture. I 
also examine how the use of culture can cause, exacerbate or transform structural violence in 
Timor-Leste.  
 
Timor-Leste is not culturally homogenous. However, some symbols or behaviours signal a 
shared Indigenous East Timorese culture. This includes concepts such uma lulik, barlaki 
(Tetum: marriage exchanges) and nahe biti and shared rituals and rites using similar artifacts. 
Culture is the active customary practices and socio-political and economic structures occurring 
across Timor-Leste, particularly in the rural areas where 71.88 per cent of the population resides 
(Government of Timor-Leste, 2015, p.22).  
 
I link Indigenous East Timorese culture with the term lulik, which can be embodied in place and 
artifacts, but is also practiced as norms, behaviours and ideas. Bovensiepen (2014b) highlights 
that lulik has agency, it can create and destroy life, and is associated with reverence and awe but 
also fear. Lulik in Timor-Leste determines all Indigenous systems of power and relationships 
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between people, land and place. It is the “preeminent philosophical, religious, moral and 
epistemic order” guiding relationships between East Timorese and with outsiders (McWilliam 
et.al., 2014, p.318). In Timor-Leste, multiple approaches to understanding and practicing lulik 
result in each individual and group imagining culture and identity differently.  
 
Historical experiences in Timor-Leste, including experiences of violence and trauma, are critical 
to East Timorese culture (Brown & Gusmão, 2009, p.69). Fox (2000a, p.1) emphasises that 
because of the multiple layers of geology, history, language, and cultures “Timor is not one 
place, but many”. Traube (2001, p.1) observes that “In East Timor today, culture both divides 
and unites the local peoples, or rather, local groups continue to draw on their cultural traditions 
both to assert distinctive local identities and to imagine themselves as members of a national 
community, that is, to identify themselves as East Timorese”. Da Silva (2012, pp.83-87) asserts 
that culture is the basis of all resistance and where there is strong Indigenous culture, outsider 
domination is not sustainable. 
 
Constructing a shared East Timorese identity is core to any nation building and must involve all 
East Timorese (da Costa, 2010). The challenge is for East Timorese leaders to affirm, encourage 
and include plural East Timorese identities and acknowledge the “multiple dimensions of 
Timor-ness” (Crockford, 2000, p.231). Babo-Soares (2003, p.41) emphasises the importance of 
culture in constructing nacionalismo (Tetum: East Timorese nationalism). Nationalism can 
unite, but also holds risks of alienating and isolating individuals and groups, leading to violence. 
Brown (2009, p.158) acknowledges that nationalism constructed around a common enemy 
(Indonesia) was useful but highlights that building nationalism primarily around resistance is 
potentially divisive. For example, Kent (2011, pp.451-454) highlights an emerging ‘victim 
consciousness’ that broadens the discussion about the impact of violence during Indonesian 
occupation, including the specific experiences of women, and recognises the continued 
structural impacts of systemic violence. Kent (2011) warns that this ‘victim consciousness’ may 
pit one group against others, causing resentment. As one East Timorese expanded: 
 
“When the UN handed over power to the Timorese Government there is [sic] a lot of 
diaspora in that group, who went on to include their diaspora family in key offices. 
There are reasons for doing so, related to capacity. But many people who remained 
here, and did the hard yards during the occupation, where is their payback? I lived in 
the jungle, and left my family for five years. Where is the pay off for all that in this new 
world? When do I get mine? Life has, for sure, got harder for most people. They are not 
getting shot, but the general cost of living is high” (TZ-1430-280910).  
 
Actively practicing culture is intimately linked to Indigenous self-determination. However, 
some researchers such as Brown (2008; 2012), Brown and Gusmão (2009), Hunt (2008) 
Trindade (2008; 2012; 2014), Kent (2012) commented on the suppression or distortion of 
Indigenous culture by the Government for statebuilding in Timor-Leste. Brown and Gusmão 
119 
(2009, p.63) argue that elite educated East Timorese and the diaspora viewed East Timorese 
culture as backward and extraneous to achieving a modern political state. Consequently many 
Government and international practitioners framed their development interventions based on 
their own knowledge systems rather than drawing on Indigenous East Timorese systems 
(Wigglesworth, 2005, p.126). These actions sidelined East Timorese culture and devalued local 
governance processes, which alienated communities who linked these practices to their deeply 
held Indigenous knowledge systems.  
 
Morphy (2014, pp.14-15) calls this a “museum” perspective which views Indigenous culture as 
backward, and where culture is categorised as “incapable of adaptive change”, where moving to 
a “modern culture” requires leaving behind the culture of the past. People who cling to past 
cultures are disparaged as “existing between worlds”, and are seen as dysfunctional and lacking 
decision making capacity. This “museum” perspective does not accept that culture can change 
and adapt, and does not acknowledge that many Indigenous people hold multiple identities or 
cultures simultaneously. An East Timorese academic explained how the “museum” perspective 
occurs in Timor-Leste:  
 
“At the moment, they [traditional leaders] are sharing their knowledge in rural areas. 
They still practise their culture and traditions, but at a national level, it is being ignored. 
It is because they [East Timorese elites] think Timorese culture is backward, so they 
don't need to value it that much. Many Timorese elite who are in the Government right 
now, they don't have any connection to Timorese culture. For example if you are a 
mixed Timorese, half Portuguese - half Timorese, you do not live the life of a Timorese. 
They did not suffer during Portuguese time. They don't understand how Timorese live 
their lives, the value of the culture, the dos and do nots” (TG-1500-140910).  
 
In the next section, I explore the plural and multi-layered Indigenous East Timorese culture to 
understand how lulik can be better understood and integrated into development and 
peacebuilding practice. 
 
6.3.1 Sacred Houses and Localised Identity 
 
East Timorese have multiple layers of national and localised cultures defined by geographical 
boundaries, and common ancestral and ethno-linguistic heritage. Da Silva (2006, p.1) 
elaborates: “Being East Timorese means both belonging to a nation and also to a locality”. 
Indigenous social, economic and cultural life in Timor-Leste is constructed around complex 
physical and temporal systems of uma lulik that unite seemingly antagonistic or opposing/binary 
principles. Babo-Soares (2003), Bovensiepen (2014b), Brown (2009), da Silva (2006), Fox 
(2000a), Hicks (2004; 2008), McWilliam (2005; 2007a), Traube (1986; 2001; 2011), and 
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Trindade (2006; 2012; 2014) all stress the physical and metaphorical importance of the uma 
lulik across Timor-Leste.  
 
Uma lulik are the basis for identity in Timor-Leste, they are the central physical repositories of 
memory and culture, embody and localise all social relationships and ritual exchanges between 
people, and provide structure for all Indigenous East Timorese governance, judicial 
mechanisms, leadership, decision-making and conflict transformation processes. Uma lulik are 
the “fundamental epistemological orientation” of Indigenous East Timorese society and 
governance and are the basis for relational systems of social and moral order (Fox cited in 
McWilliam, 2005, p.32). Hicks (2008, p.167) highlights that uma lulik are not merely “ritual 
artefacts”, but “objects engaged in continuous dialectic relationships with the human beings 
they serve”. Babo-Soares (2003, p.39) cites a lia-nain (Tetum: owner of words, spokesperson, 
responsible for ritual authority and moral behaviour) describing the importance of uma lulik:  
 
“We, human beings should know our house and our siblings. Those who do not know 
these do not know their roots. If people do not know their roots, they do not know their 
future; people of this kind live as an animal, no origins - no future. The East Timorese 
also say 'ran ida be mai housi hun' (Tetum: the blood inherited from the source), a 
reference to one's origin, identifying someone to a clan due to the blood inherited from 
their lineage”.  
 
Each uma lulik is hierarchically ordered in sequence from the oldest to youngest ancestor who 
settled that land and provided it with security and fertility (Hohe & Nixon, 2003, p.14). The 
uma lulik contains the origins of the sacred ancestors, identified through use of sasan lulik 
(Tetum: ancient relics) and oral histories, and ritually remembered, reaffirmed and respected 
through ceremonies and rituals that unify and bind family members to the specific geographic 
territory of the uma lulik (Trindade & Castro, 2007, pp.19-20). Sasan lulik allow East Timorese 
to acknowledge, relate to and position themselves appropriately to the past–the dead, the 
ancestors–and the future through the marriage ceremonies. Marriage ceremonies create and 
reaffirm a web of gendered relationships and peaceful alliances to form continuously larger 
social units to extend the family into the future (this matter is discussed in the section below on 
relationships). 
 
Architecturally there is great variety in uma lulik across Timor-Leste; they differ regarding their 
orientation, structure, construction techniques, materials and symbolic properties. Like other 
nearby Indigenous South-East Asian communities, these sacred structures, while different, share 
“common properties and cultural concerns” within which “configuration of space and structural 
elements is encoded a rich cosmological and cultural system of meanings connected with ideas 
of life, death and gendered symbolism” (McWilliam, 2005, pp.29-30). For example, Traube 
(1986, p.140) describes the Mambai uma lulik as “polysemous”, where each built structure 
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symbolises the complexity and multiple layers of the gendered human body and geographic 
landscapes to form social and physical enclosures that both divide and unify.  
 
During, but particularly at the end of Indonesian occupation in 1999, uma lulik were burnt by 
militias and the Indonesian military. They were viewed as a central symbol of resistance and 
cultural resilience (Bovensiepen, 2011; Brown & Gusmão, 2009, p.4; McWilliam 2005; 2007a; 
2007b; Trindade & Castro 2007: p.20). Indeed, McWilliam (2005; 2007a; 2007b) and Taylor 
(1991) place the reason for Indonesia’s failure directly on the continuation of strong Indigenous 
systems.  
 
Since 1999, many communities are focused on rebuilding their uma lulik. The rebuilding 
process, including the reinterring of the sacred objects, is critical to community healing. This 
process is connected to laying to rest ancestors who have died without attendant funerary 
rituals, where appropriate rituals at the site of the umu lulik can consecrate the bones, or 
symbolic bones (stones) of the dead, and rebuild relationships across generations (Brown, 2009, 
p.153; Loch, 2007). To fail to undertake processes of rebuilding and interring the dead risks 
disturbing the ancestors who may react by cursing their uma lulik, causing further imbalance or 
violence. Due to the isolated location of many killings during the Indonesian occupation and the 
suppression of Indigenous practices, often no customary burial, sacrifices or other rituals were 
enacted by relatives as per customary obligations (Rawnsley, 2004). Some East Timorese say 
that the 2006 Crisis was a “malisan husi matebian sira” (Tetum: curse of the martyrs) resulting 
from the failure to restore balance and respect the sacred lulik power (Trindade & Castro, 2007, 
p.18). 
 
Prioritising the rebuilding uma lulik is a good example of the different perspectives of local 
communities versus international development practitioners. The latter often did not perceive 
rebuilding as critical given the range of development needs. However, Loch (2007, p.291) 
estimates that between 1999 and 2004 approximately 150 to 200 uma lulik were built or 
reconstructed in the Baucau area alone. Each required their makers to follow correct ritual 
processes and to rebuild took between two and five months work and at least 1000 days of 
labour. “Rebuilding ancestral origin houses is a collective, traditional affair. It mobilises an 
array of social groups, combines technical with ceremonial activities, and is part of a complex, 
contested process of negotiating local and national identities” (Traube, 2001, p.2).  
 
6.3.2 Maubere-ism 
 
Indigenous East Timorese identity is linked with the term maubere or mau bere (Mambai: 
people of the countryside). During Portuguese colonialism the term maubere was a 
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condescending or derogatory term for an Indigenous person, used by Portuguese and Chinese 
people (Traube, 2011, p.216). It was used to insult and denigrate East Timorese and was 
associated with being “backward”, illiterate or poor; similar to the term indigenas as discussed 
in Chapter Three (Leach, 2002; Traube, 2007, p.9).  
 
During 1974–1975 and the Indonesian occupation, FRETILIN proudly reclaimed maubere as a 
political symbol for grassroots emancipation (da Silva, 2012; Jolliffe, 1978, pp.103-105). 
Tobias (2011, pp.330-333) adds that maubere was powerful in its capacity to unify individuals 
and groups for independence, based on solidarity and social trust. It was a tool to collectivise 
and mobilise the dispossessed peoples of Timor-Leste and to popularise East Timorese 
nationalism by celebrating what the colonialists had maligned (Babo-Soares, 2000, p.61; 
Cabral, 2002, p.363; da Silva, 2012, p.21, 102). Trindade (2008) explains that maubere 
identifies a unique identity and cultural perspective associated with a specific worldview that is 
different from Portuguese or Indonesian. Cristalis (2009, p.40) notes that maubere was 
considered racially divisive by UDT and KOTA, distinguishing “pure-blooded” East Timorese 
from mestiços.  
 
Da Silva (2012, pp.310-311) argues that the resistance was grounded in maubere philosophy or 
mauberism, which has five tenets. The first element is social solidarity; this is the concept of 
working together, or working cooperatively which is expressed in local languages as slulu 
(Mambai), fulidaidai (Makaleru) or hakawak (Tetum) and is demonstrated through uma lulik 
and barlaki (Pinto, 2015, pers. comm., 8 December). The second element is the intrinsic and 
reciprocal relationship between East Timorese people and their surrounding ecology. The third 
is the spiritual and ritual relationship between the living and the dead and links to ancestors 
through the umu lulik. The fourth factor is the common historical experience of East Timorese 
peoples, their colonisation, oppression and liberation, which is linked to other freedom 
movements internationally. Finally, da Silva explains that mauberism values popular democracy 
and active participation in decision-making at all levels. A senior East Timorese public servant 
explains that mauberism supports unity and self-determination:  
 
“We are Maubere people; we fought against colonisation. It’s become an identity. The 
struggle of the people of Maubere, it is the struggle of the people of Timor-Leste. It can 
be used to differentiate from Chinese, mestiços, Arab, and now malae, for foreigners. 
That word could be positive to use, to bring up again the spirit of nationalism, a sense of 
belonging to this country. We struggled very hard for independence; we want people to 
live in harmony, peace and prosperity. I use that word when our nation has a crisis of 
conflict, a crisis of identity, and can use that to raise awareness, to make people aware 
of their identity” (TL-1300-170910). 
 
The different perspectives on and use of maubere emphasise the contested and complex nature 
of identity in Timor-Leste. 
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 6.3.3 Multilingualism 
 
Widespread use of Indigenous languages is critical to the intergenerational transfer and 
sustainably of Indigenous culture and knowledge systems (Kirkness, 1998; Settee, 2008). In 
Timor-Leste, lulik practices are tied to the accurate naming of sacred places and spirits, and 
allow Indigenous knowledge holders to share myths and speak during rituals. The Declaration 
specifically mentions that loss of Indigenous languages is linked to the loss of cultural and 
intellectual diversity (Hale, 1992; Krauss, 1992; Settee (2008). Most East Timorese are 
multilingual from a young age, speaking their lian inan (Tetum: mother tongue) for example 
Galoli or Makassae (Caet & Taylor-Leech, 2012). The UNPFII (2008, p.8) recommend the use 
of mother tongue as the first learning language in bilingual or multilingual primary education. 
Indigenous language revitalisation is also supported by documentation and preservation, 
curriculum and resource development, teacher training, policy development and political 
advocacy, research, language classes and immersion practices (McIvor, 2009).  
 
 
Map 2: Ethno-linguistic Map of Timor-Leste (Australian National University, 2011) 
 
While speaking Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesian, the language of the colonisers, has always 
been contentious, post-1999 language policy is a highly politicised issue and a trigger for 
structural and cultural violence. From 1999, there was often no common language, except 
Portuguese, English and Indonesian, to communicate between international practitioners and 
East Timorese. Smith and Dee (2003, pp.105-112) propose that the lack of a common language 
or an effective public information program affected the ability for the international community 
to build trusted relationships.  
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Older resistance leaders and the diaspora generally favour Portuguese and do not consider 
Tetum as an effective language for governance although ninety-one per cent of East Timorese 
can understand it (Simonsen, 2006, pp.585-586). Hunt (2008a, p.272) highlights that Tetum is 
an important intergenerational connector and a common identifier across the multilingual state. 
However by 1999, ninety per cent of people under thirty understood Bahasa Indonesian and did 
not speak Portuguese (Simonsen, 2006, p.586). In 2002, the Constituent Assembly 
controversially determined Portuguese and Tetum as the official languages, and English and 
Indonesian as working languages. The aim was to develop Tetum within ten years to enable its 
use as an official language (Ingram, 2012, p.10). Ramos-Horta (cited in Simonsen, 2006, p.587) 
claimed this was a “strategic decision” that would “strengthen the uniqueness [and] the national 
identity of East Timor”.  
 
Simonsen (2006, p.584) maintains that language policy is a “dangerously divisive issue”.  
Kingsbury (2007, p.371) also labelled the adoption of Portuguese as “divisive”, and Leach 
(2007, p.6) acknowledges that while Portuguese and Tetum were chosen for symbolic, 
economic and political reasons, Portuguese is now a contested signifier of difference. The 
younger generation is very critical of the older generation’s decision to prioritise Portuguese, 
which they believe will exclude them from employment and education opportunities.  
 
The language policy is also linked to the effectiveness of education policy and programming 
(Caet & Taylor-Leech, 2012; Taylor-Leech, 2013). Use of a second or foreign language for 
instruction is a major cause of educational underachievement, poor literacy and early dropout 
(Caet & Taylor-Leech, 2012, p.295; Bühmann & Trudell, 2008). Brown (2009, p.150) adds that 
language policies have impeded Government and international organisations’ efforts to reach 
effectively beyond Dili, compounding rural poverty. The 2010 National Census statistics 
(National Statistics Directorate, 2011, p.xvii) shows that women are less literate than men, and 
rural people are less literate than those in urban areas. UNDP (2013b, p.146) reports that the 
mean schooling years is a low 4.4 years. While there are other barriers to education, the poor 
command by teachers and students of Portuguese has worsened poor educational outcomes 
since 1999. In response, in 2012 the Government launched a pilot program to evaluate the 
effectiveness of mother tongue based-multilingual education (MTB-MLE). Soares (2015) 
reports that oral reading proficiency has significantly improved as a result of this program. 
 
Balancing education in all four official languages will continue to be a significant challenge to 
unity and equal socio-economic opportunities in Timor-Leste. I assert that it is critical to resolve 
this controversial policy to prevent structural and cultural violence. This view was emphasised 
by some East Timorese participants. One declared: 
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“National identity. So many of the ideas are coming from the outside. Some people 
present Portuguese language as Timorese identity. We have never been Portuguese - 
even if we speak Portuguese it doesn't mean we are Portuguese. I speak English, I speak 
Indonesian, I don't claim that my identity is Anglo-Saxon. I am just East Timorese. But 
because of this lack of discussion about who we are, people manipulated it” (TG-1500-
140910). 
 
6.3.4 Complex systems of land and water ownership and use 
 
In Timor-Leste, Indigenous knowledge, identity and culture are connected to particular physical 
and geographic sights and places. Timor-Leste’s land system reflects its cultural, legal, social 
and spiritual heritage (Rede Ba Rai, 2013, p.6). Babo-Soares (2001; 2003; 2004), Fitzpatrick 
et.al. (2013), Forman (1977), Hicks (1976; 2008), Kehi and Palmer (2012), McWilliam (2007b), 
Palmer (2007; 2015), Palmer and de Carvalho (2008), Rawnsley (2004), Traube (1986; 2011) 
and Trindade (2012; 2014) extensively discuss the interconnectedness between culture and 
physical environment within Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems, where the land is 
the root of all lineages, where ancestor spirits dwell and are respected with fear and awe. Visible 
and invisible objects including rocks, escarpments, old trees and water sources are all potential 
lulik objects and this sacred realm gives and sustains the meaning of life.  
 
Under customary law, all land is owned by liurai and/or customary groups and is accessed 
differently depending on gender and usage rights (International Crisis Group, 2010; Thu et.al., 
2007). Wallace (2007) states that before Portuguese colonialism there were three categories of 
Indigenous land ownership: land recognised as common property by the liurai; land owned by 
one family but used by another family (who were required to pay ‘rent’); and land to which a 
family has full ownership rights. Fitzpatrick and Barnes (2010) emphasise the relative resilience 
of these customary systems, despite the violent, colonial past, in managing displacement and 
land and resource ownership and use. 
 
The majority of rural East Timorese rely on Indigenous leaders and customary authorities and 
mechanisms, such as tarabandu, to address local land and resource rights, use and access 
disputes. Palmer (2015) and Kehi and Palmer (2012) discuss the complex systems of managing 
water access and use, where water can permeate the boundaries between the visible and 
invisible worlds providing access to matak-malarin to the living. Interactions with the natural 
environment through rituals such as matak–malirin encompass the complex socio-ecological 
world and connect these visible and invisible boundaries. 
 
Multiple land rights systems have resulted in the dispossession of Indigenous land in Timor-
Leste and a ‘jigsaw’ of land use and occupation. Large tracts of this arable land and urban 
property have been appropriated from Indigenous East Timorese communities with significant 
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social, cultural and economic implications and, as discussed in Chapter Five, are a significant 
root cause of violence (Cryan, 2015a; 2015b).  
 
6.3.5 Summary: Lulik 
 
Lulik, and its equivalent more local-level specific terms, is fundamental to unpacking the 
complex, pluralised understanding of Indigenous cultures in Timor-Leste. I established that 
culture and identity in Timor-Leste is localised, linked to uma lulik, kinship and place, which 
regulate and delineate all Indigenous social, cultural and economic practices. Grounded in lulik 
is the active participation of individuals and groups in the process of fluidly balancing secular 
and cosmological systems. As Morphy (2014, p.16) emphases, culture itself is critical to how a 
community makes decisions about development and peacebuilding. 
 
Prior to colonialism, conflict and violence regularly occurred between members of uma lulik 
and outsiders, although these were also resolved using Indigenous peacebuilding processes 
including nahe biti, juramentu, matak-malarin, tarabandu, and halerik. These processes are 
complex, adaptive and are used to transform violence at local and State levels. 
 
Throughout Portuguese colonialism, Indonesian occupation and UN administration, Timor-
Leste has been controlled by outsiders and subjected to policies and programs resulting in 
significant division and marginalisation of communities and de-legitimisation of Indigenous 
knowledge and socio-cultural practices and the militarisation of society. In claiming that 
international practitioners have ignored or marginalised Indigenous practices, Trindade and 
Castro (2007, p.18) add that the Government’s lack of acknowledgement and respect for 
Indigenous culture and authority has also contributed to the imbalance of the Indigenous social 
order, leading to structural and cultural violence. The divisive language policy, that prioritises 
Portuguese over Tetum (and mother tongue languages) as the language of law, education and 
governance, excludes the majority of the population from participating in decision-making.  
 
Indigenous identity, spirituality and culture in Timor-Leste are intrinsically linked to the 
physical landscape and natural environment. Indigenous land ownership and use practices, 
while resilient, have been distorted as a result of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian 
occupation, and have contributed to economic, social and importantly cultural 
disenfranchisement. Current Government policies and international development interventions 
supporting land reform have not fundamentally resolved this imbalance and land and water use 
and ownership continues to be a highly contentious issue that can create community-level 
structural, cultural and direct violence.   
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6.4 Power / Lisan 
 
Indigenous East Timorese governance systems are based on knowledge, custom, authority and 
power that is derived from the ancestors, agricultural cycles and from kinship networks (Fox, 
2000a; 2006). Balancing these power dynamics enables both leaders and East Timorese citizens 
to practice lisan. This section explores lisan and its role in localised governance, leadership, and 
decision-making in Timor-Leste. As before I use the broad Tetum terms, and highlight that there 
are multiple local-level equivalents for lisan and accompanying Indigenous governance 
systems. 
 
Brown (2008; 2012), Brown and Gusmão (2009), Boege et.al. (2008), McWilliam (2008), 
Ospina and Hohe (2002), Taylor (1999) and Tilman (2012) emphasise the importance of 
Indigenous East Timorese forms of governance, leadership and decision-making to maintain 
social order at a community level. Babo-Soares (2003; 2004), Hohe (2002a; 2002b), Ospina and 
Hohe (2002), Trindade (2008; 2014; 2015) stress that there is a complex and multilayered 
governance system in place sustained by a holistic Indigenous cosmological and secular system. 
Hunt (2008a, p.271) agrees, noting that: “[western-style] democracy is a complex idea and is 
only barely functioning…more traditional power structures remain actively in place”.  
 
In Timor-Leste, as in many Indigenous knowledge systems, power is differentiated from 
authority; spiritual and political power are also separate. This system is gendered, connected to 
land and place, incorporating kinship ties and relationships with outsiders. Power and authority 
in Timor-Leste is dispersed across a broad range of Indigenous and modern institutions and 
individuals. Respect and use of Indigenous governance, leadership and decision-making 
structures and processes differ depending on each individual, their understanding and respect for 
Indigenous knowledge and practices, and their historical experiences. However, as I highlighted 
in Chapters Three and Five, if the Indigenous systems are significantly distorted or co-opted, an 
imbalance occurs and violence can result. 
 
6.4.1 Governance structures 
 
In this section I draw on Brown (2012; 2009), Cummins (2014) and Grenfell (2012; 2008) who 
underline the ideological and geographical divisions of the governance systems in Timor-Leste. 
The modern administrative governance structures are located primarily in Dili and district 
capitals, and Indigenous structures of decision-making usually occur at the community level. 
The multiple governance systems operating differentiate the experiences of East Timorese 
located in rural and urban areas; differences are also intergenerational and gendered. I 
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underscore that the lisan system is not stable or static across different Indigenous governance 
systems in Timor-Leste; it is in flux and is contested (Brown, 2012). The co-existence between 
the Indigenous and modern systems of governance (which are themselves multiple and 
interconnected) must be acknowledged. 
 
Indigenous governance systems in Timor-Leste are grounded in interconnecting relationships 
between and within allegiance networks of uma lulik. Uma lulik do not exist alone; they are part 
of an interconnected geographic network of houses that are hierarchically ranked and locate 
each person socially, morally and physically within the community. Uma lulik determine 
community membership, identify and connect lineages, providing clarity about leadership roles, 
which are typically hereditary, and decision-making processes, which are usually consensus-
based (Brown & Gusmão, 2009, pp.65-66; McWilliam, 2005, p.28). Each aldeia (Tetum: 
hamlet or sub-village) has its uma lulik and under each uma lulik is between two and twenty 
uma fukun (Tetum: sacred house for extended family or clan) that belong to a knua (Tetum: 
larger group or clan), that would represent up to twenty uma kain (Tetum: immediate 
household) (Sarmento, 2011, pp.13-15; Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.19). 
 
Each uma lulik and sub-structures uma fukun, knua, and uma kain are associated with animist 
totems. Totems are associated with food and behavioural taboos that originate from ancestral 
myths that pass on restrictions for their descendants. For example, eating crocodile meat is 
forbidden across much of Timor-Leste and in Malabe the consumption of fish from Bee-Malai 
lake is prohibited due to its lulik powers (Castro, 2013).  
 
A cornerstone of the Indigenous lisan systems is barlaki. Barlaki are made to build 
complementary and asymmetric relationships of exchange and reciprocity among members of 
uma lulik (McWilliam, 2005, p.34; Niner, 2012; Trindade, 2015). Exchanges are preferably 
unilineal, cross-cousin and intergenerational (Hohe & Nixon, 2003, p.13). A senior East 
Timorese peacebuilding practitioner explains: 
 
“[Barlaki is] the exchange of gifts between families. The man’s family will give certain 
things and the women’s family will give tais [Tetum: woven cloth] or other things. In a 
cash economy they have quite different [things to exchange]. In our culture, barlaki was 
a value between men and women to recognise that women had rights. It also had a 
social value, to recognise that the families are joining together, that also the women is 
leaving her village and going to someone else’s village” (TTA-1600-280910). 
 
The uma lulik that bestow the women are ‘wife givers’ and are symbolically male (Tetum: 
mane) and the sacred houses that receive the women are ‘wife takers’ (Tetum: fetsa) who are 
symbolically female (Tetum: feto) and indebted to the ‘wife givers’ (Tetum: umamane) (da 
Silva, 2012, p.149) (see Figure 2). The act of giving enables the symbolic ‘flow of life’ and 
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asserts the importance of women’s fertility. Any children resulting from this union continue the 
regeneration of the houses and forms the basis of intergenerational allegiances and patterns of 
exchange of gifts and labour. These ongoing exchanges must be enacted to minimise 
community violence by peacefully binding families and building reciprocal and 
intergenerational relationships between uma lulik (McWilliam, 2005, p.33; Niner, 2012; 
Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.20; Trindade, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 3: System of wife giver and wife taker relationships between houses (Ospina & Hohe, 
2002, p.25). 
 
Through the barlaki system, outsiders are ‘installed’ as insiders, and both ritually and in 
practice provided positions within the cosmology and governance systems (McClean, 2014, 
p.11). This exchange acts as a reminder of continued obligations and forms a specific social 
contract between uma lulik. This complex system of barlaki also allows families to claim land 
ownership and user rights, for example, ‘wife givers’ claim land ownership, and ‘immigrant’ or 
‘wife takers’ gain rights to cultivate and live on the land. Silva (2013) also explains that a 
modernised version of the barlaki system is ‘brokered’ by lia-nain who combine Indigenous 
and Christian systems to negotiate more symmetrical marriage ‘contracts’ between Dili-based 
elites.  
 
The suku level is the focal point of modern administrative governance in Timor-Leste (Brown, 
2012; Ingram, 2012). Suku-level governance, which has been occurring since Portuguese 
colonialism, while seemingly uniform at a national level, is extraordinarily diverse in practice. 
The suku usually encompasses multiple uma lulik and aldeia (Hicks, 2014) (see Table 5).  
 
To support decentralisation, since 2005, the State has endorsed suku-level elections enabling the 
Government to have local-level administrative structures and contact points. The system focuses 
below the sub-district (Tetum: posto – now sub distritu) level. This system has Xefe de Suku, 
and at a sub-village level or aldeia, the Xefe de Aldeia (Tetum: sub-chief), and the Conselhos de 
Suku (Tetum: Village Development Councils). The Conselhos de Suku consists of two women 
and two youth representatives, the head of each aldeia, and a katuas (Tetum: customary elder) 
(Cummins, 2014; dos Santos & da Silva, 2012, p.206).  
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Table 5: Levels and numbers of administrative governance units across Timor-Leste. 
Administrative  
Division 
District Subdistrict 
(posto) 
Village 
(suku) 
Hamlet or  
sub-village 
(aldeia) 
Totals across 
Timor-Leste 
13 65 442 2336 
 
The elected authorities in the suku and aldeia are responsible for administrative matters, 
particularly the implementation of national development priorities including health, education 
and infrastructure initiatives. Indigenous Timorese leaders linked to uma lulik are responsible 
for customary governance (which includes land and resources management, customary justice 
and social order). This model differs between communities depending on relationships between 
those involved in the different governance institutions and in many communities the Xefe de 
Suku is also the lia-nain (Marriot, 2010). This model attempts to divide governance tasks 
between Indigenous and modern systems, but Cummins (2014, p.66) claims the Indigenous 
system is regarded with “suspicion” by international practitioners pushing for decentralised 
democratisation. 
 
There are high expectations by the Government and international actors for the capacity of 
community-level governance despite mixed experiences with decentralisation and hybrid 
governance since 1999 (Cummins, 2014; Nixon, 2013; Wigglesworth, 2013). The Asia 
Foundation (2004) suggests that both Government and international practitioners assumed that 
Indigenous governance systems could easily ‘scale-up’ to incorporate the responsibility toward 
and ownership of infrastructure and other local development programs (Cummins & Maia, 
2012, p.7). Despite these assumptions, the focus on centralised institutional strengthening has 
reduced East Timorese participation in modern governance to voting in national and suku 
elections, or as recipients of service delivery and compensation (welfare) payments. Trindade 
and Castro (2007, p.14) and Ingram (2012) emphasise the lack of community ownership and 
argue that modern governance does not engage with lisan at an uma lulik level or provide 
accessible avenues for citizen participation. Wigglesworth (2013) adds that women are 
underrepresented and infrequently participate in both formal and Indigenous local-level 
governance resulting in exclusion of women from decision-making that affects them. 
 
In my view problems have arisen because of an over-assumption of the strength of governance 
connections between uma lulik within a modern suku, and what community responsibilities and 
obligations mean if translated to a modern governance model. The checks and balances that lend 
power and authority to Indigenous mechanisms have not yet been generated for suku-level 
governance. The suku is a relatively large and dispersed grouping of peoples, incorporating 
many different uma lulik, some of which would not yet be connected by cultural and marriage 
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obligations. Tobias (2015) highlights the decreasing trend in national budget funds for 
decentralisation programs, which indicates it will take decades for these new systems to flourish 
at a local level. 
 
It is clear that lisan has not been entirely co-opted by international or national statebuilding 
efforts. Many communities actively participate in governance at a local level exercising lisan. 
By using these mechanisms, they are: “generators of political community rather than passive 
recipients of the state-building project” (Brown, 2012, p.57). Efforts to decentralise governance 
create imbalances, inequity and divisions, and this modern system must be moderated by lisan 
and lulik processes to strengthen participation and ownership. Without this shift efforts to 
decentralise will continue to be unsustainable, exacerbating community-level inequalities and 
increasing the potential for structural violence.   
 
6.4.2 Leadership 
 
This section highlights the existence of three major groups of leaders or decision-makers in 
Timor-Leste. The first is the Indigenous leadership and decision-making system. Indigenous 
governance systems are stronger in rural areas, where leaders are primarily older men. The 
second group of decision-makers are the elite, represented by those politicians in Government 
and the bureaucracy, who are often overseas-educated and former diaspora. The third are 
international practitioners, represented primarily in international development and 
peacebuilding organisations, advisers to Government, and in INGOs and the private sector.  
 
Social order and Indigenous leadership in Timor-Leste has been systematised through 
relationships of allegiance and ritual exchange within and between networks of uma lulik, 
extended families or houses (Fox, 2000a, p.18; Tobias, 2014, p.15). These mostly hereditary 
leadership positions are at the heart of complex leadership hierarchies grounded in political and 
ritual power and people in these positions are connected to key uma lulik across different ethno-
linguistic groups (McWilliam, 2005, p.34). Leadership and social status is based on hierarchies 
of precedence founded on relative seniority recursively applied and is usually patrilineal 
(McWilliam, 2007c, p.359). Pre-colonial groups were divided into: chiefs and nobles (Tetum: 
dato); commoners; and slaves (Kammen, 2003, p.74). 
 
Brown and Gusmão (2009), Cummins (2014), dos Santos and da Silva (2012), Hicks (2014), 
Hohe and Nixon (2003), and Trindade and Castro (2007) describe the three primary types of 
Indigenous leaders in Timor-Leste. The liurai (Tetum: local king, chief) is responsible for 
political authority, justice and resource management. The dato-lulik (Tetum: noble) has spiritual 
authority grounded in ancestral order and values (Brown & Gusmão, 2009, p.66; McWilliam, 
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2011). The lia-nain who is the judicial authority or arbitrator, has knowledge of ancestral rules, 
can determine compensation, land matters and interpret tarabandu for the community, and bind 
agreements by conducting juramentu (Marriot, 2010; Trindade & Castro, 2007, p.21). The 
liurai was customarily seen as inferior to the spiritual authorities, the dato-lulik and lia-nain, so 
dealt with all outsiders, such as the Portuguese and Indonesians, designing peace agreements 
and initiating juramentu or marriage processes.  
 
Additional Indigenous leadership positions include the bee na’in (Tetum: owners of the water) 
that provide important conduits between the sacred and secular worlds to manage water use and 
infrastructure (Hicks, 1976, pp.21-24; Palmer, 2015; Trindade, 2015). There are also specialist 
knowledge holders including daia (Tetum: midwives), people who can assist women give birth) 
and matan-do’ok (Tetum: soothsayers, people who diagnose illness and use traditional plant 
medicines) (Castro, 2011).  
 
Generally, older men hold these customary positions although women can be lia-nain, and 
within the few matriarchal uma lulik older women hold customary authority (Cummins & Leach 
2012; Trindade & Castro 2007, p.33). Knowledge exchange is passed between generations 
through an apprentice system using training, inheritance, spiritual powers and other means. An 
East Timorese government adviser observed: 
 
“So local concepts, local ideas and values have been kept by traditional elders. Which 
often, because they do not have university degrees, people often ignored them. But if 
you talk to them, they are absolutely the ones who keep traditional knowledge. And 
they have a very different concept about life, about creating relationships with people, 
about how to live peacefully, about how to live in harmony” (TG-1500-140910). 
 
Elite capture, corruption and abuse have resulted in contested relationships between elites and 
East Timorese citizens (Palmer, 2007). These hierarchical divisions occurred in pre-colonial 
times, which became distorted by the co-option of leaders through governance systems 
introduced by the Portuguese and Indonesians that sought to incorporate Indigenous leadership 
into formal and informal political authority (Ospina & Hohe, 2002). Traube (2011, p.217) 
describes elite co-option as “Timorese who had ‘put on trousers’ (Mambai: tam kalsa) and knew 
little about the people in whose name they claimed to speak”. 
 
McWilliam (2005), Traube (1995) and Taylor (1991) argue that the Portuguese model 
paradoxically had the opposite effect to what was intended, resulting in the reinforcement of 
Indigenous systems. Traube (1995, p.47) explains that the Indonesian system regulated secular 
politics and reduced opportunities to enact ritual hierarchies. The Indonesian system of “erasing 
or denying” the structures and ritual practices of the uma lulik and “co-opting or excluding” 
East Timorese leaders also failed to eradicate these Indigenous systems (McWilliam, 2005, 
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p.34). Cummins (2014, pp.24,64) explains that some lia-nain were co-opted by the Portuguese 
and perpetrated violence against East Timorese. Therefore some East Timorese see the modern 
democratic system as a better model to achieve self-determination.  
 
Timor-Leste has a long history of co-option and top-down, highly centralised decision-making 
associated with bureaucratic authoritarianism, including a pre-colonial history of hereditary 
Indigenous liurai rulers, Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation that promoted 
hierarchical, semi-presidential leaders (Kingsbury, 2007). Since 1999, leadership has been 
accorded primarily to those who fought in the resistance. Different historical experiences in 
communities affect the legitimacy and use of Indigenous leadership, for example, strong 
resistance leaders (who had no previous liurai lineage) may continue to have authority in the 
community; or if a liurai died without sharing their Indigenous knowledge, their community 
would usually use modern systems of governance (Brown, 2012, pp.64-65). Kinship is much 
less geographically focused due to forced resettlements during the Indonesian occupation, and 
now urban migration for education, employment and trade.  
 
Identity pluralism and modern governance systems have allowed people to play leadership roles 
both within the sacred and secular spheres. Since independence, political leaders have not used 
sasan lulik to rule, but relied on elections to legitimate their power. Effective leaders tend to 
have both customary leadership and elected representative power and this power can be 
transferred during rituals where the liurai formally grants authority to the Xefe de Suku 
(Bovensiepen, 2014b; Brown, 2012, p.64; Ospina & Hohe, 2002). This ritual sharing of power 
is more prevelant in rural areas, as the legitimacy of liurai or uma lisan in urban or mixed 
communities tends to be diminished.  
 
It is clear that some Indigenous leaders are co-opted, particularly those who collaborated with 
the Indonesians and had become wealthy, benefiting from lucrative jobs, status and power 
(Cristalis, 2009, p.33). These co-opted elites maintain their status quo hierarchies, including 
economic, social and political inequalities, through modern governance systems. For example, 
Belo (2014) explains that the proposed 2014 media regulation laws act to consolidate elite 
political power at the expense of citizen’s informed participation. Scambary (2009, p.2) cites the 
“irresponsible use of gangs” by elites for protection and provocation, the tolerance toward the 
Petitioners, and the pardoning of key participants in the 2006 violence as factors contributing to 
a culture of elitism and impunity. 
 
The elite vision of independence, reflected in modern statebuilding, disables the ability of East 
Timorese citizens to frame their aspirations for independence through Indigenous knowledge 
systems (McClean, 2014, p.4). State power does not co-exist easily with Indigenous governance 
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systems, which created confusion and tension at a community level. Many East Timorese do not 
view the political elites as holding spiritual power, and many elites have indicated that they do 
not believe in lisan (Ospina & Hohe, 2002). Brown (2009, pp.143-144) and Brown and Gusmão 
(2009, p.61) assert this disequilibrium of power exacerbated negative attitudes toward 
Indigenous governance, polarising national politics and, “weakening the [local] capacity to 
resolve problems”. Trindade and Castro (2007, p.27) cite Alkatiri, then FRETILIN Secretary 
General, who expressed views that many elites hold: 
 
“[T]o be East Timorese, we don’t need to go back to the uma lulik, we better defend our 
sovereignty and independence. [Whether] we like it or not, people of East Timor do not 
have uma lulik anymore, because the ancestors of East Timor are all wanderers”. 
 
6.4.3 Free, prior and informed consent, participation and consultation  
 
Seeking FPIC in Indigenous communities is a very contentious issue. I discussed this concept in 
Chapters Two and Four and while I will not reiterate those points here it is important to note 
that FPIC, indeed the entire notion of choice, participation and consultation, has been a 
significant challenge for East Timorese and processes toward ukun rasik a’an. FPIC is linked to 
meaningful consultation and active participation in decision-making for all community 
members affected by the decision. FPIC has clear implications for development, where there is 
a demand for increased education and literacy, adequate infrastructure so that people can attend 
meetings, and the production of legislation that promotes citizen engagement. 
 
Customary decision-making, such as nahe biti, takes place through a process of inclusive 
discussion and agreement. Those who held power and some community members would discuss 
all the possible solutions, sometimes for days. At the end of the discussion all parties must 
consent to the outcome, creating a ‘win-win’ scenario (Ospina & Hohe, 2002, p.72). The 
opposition is therefore reviewed, considered and subsumed, similar to the way in which 
‘outsiders’ become ‘insiders’ (described in the section on relationships below). Balance is 
maintained and those opposed become reconnected through rituals like juramentu.  
 
Importantly, neither the Indigenous nor the elected governance system strongly supports FPIC 
from all community members. Customarily only an elite few, usually men, made decisions on 
behalf of the general population. Women, youth and people with disability were informed of the 
decision and would have accepted and implicitly given their consent to this outcome. This trend 
has continued during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation to the current modern 
governance system. As a result, most East Timorese do not have significant political power or 
agency to engage actively in FPIC. This lack of agency is increased for rural people, women 
and youth who are often subjected to gender and age-discrimination.  
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 Currently, the state provides minimal scope for community consent. In Chapter Eight, I expand 
on the example of the 2010 ‘consultation tour’ undertaken by then Prime Minister Gusmão for 
the SDP 2011–2030. I contend the SDP failed due to the lack of safe spaces for genuine 
discussion, inadequate listening skills, and limited practical capacity to take account of 
consultation outcomes (Brown, 2012, p.59). While modern governance systems are certainly 
more outwardly inclusive of women, minority and vulnerable groups, this does not mean these 
groups play a significant role in decision-making (dos Santos & da Silva, 2012, p.209). Brown 
(2012) highlights that elections and modern democratisation do not necessarily have the 
capacity to support genuine participation. These modern governance processes highlight how 
some East Timorese adjust to contemporary conditions and expectations, but they also signal 
processes that may trigger co-option, imbalance and exacerbate gendered violence (McWilliam, 
2014, pers. comm., 16 November). 
 
Leading on from Indonesia’s authoritarian governance, decision-making since independence 
tends to be top-down, patriarchal and Dili-centric. Limited or non-existent FPIC is the 
inevitable outcome of this autocratic governance model; that is unable to promote genuine 
participation, transparency and accountability and has a lack of respect for and marginalisation 
of Indigenous knowledge. This model is not conducive to unity or nation-building or democratic 
governance (Simonsen, 2006). Unfortunately, there are many significant blocks, interests and 
incentives hindering a shift to a more inclusive governance model that prevents FPIC. 
 
6.4.4 Summary: Lisan 
 
The clash between Indigenous and modern systems of power, governance and authority is 
directly connected to colonialism, occupation and the security and stability of the state 
formation process. These hierarchical inequalities between elites and East Timorese citizens 
have deep historical roots and are intimately linked to the root causes of violence.  
 
Indigenous East Timorese governance and decision-making systems are finely attuned to 
maintaining a balanced system of power between and within uma lulik. History demonstrates 
that imbalances and power asymmetries between Indigenous and modern leaders, elites and 
community members; elders and youth; women and men, girls and boys; resistance fighters and 
collaborators; diaspora and those who stayed during Indonesian occupation; has led to direct 
and structural violence.  
 
This section on Power highlights the differences in governance systems prioritised by citizens 
and elites, noting that not all East Timorese have respect for Indigenous knowledge systems 
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(Brown & Gusmão, 2009, pp.67-68; Brown, 2009, p.151; Brown, 2012). Current East Timorese 
governance is an entangled web of Indigenous and modern models of leadership, decision-
making, authority and legitimacy sourced from across the island and from outside. There are 
East Timorese who use and perpetuate these Indigenous systems, and also East Timorese who 
value or prefer modern knowledge systems to find solutions to development-related challenges 
and resolve violence. This division is loosely between the elites, the majority of leaders in the 
Government, security forces and other key institutions, who hold very different views from the 
majority of the East Timorese population. This division exposes a rural-urban divide, which is 
also intergenerational and gendered. Importantly, these divisions are not clear cut; the pluralism 
of East Timorese identity results in individuals using a range of options depending on their 
context. 
 
At the heart of these power asymmetries is the question of who participates in decision making. 
Elites in Timor-Leste tend to seek minimal participation in decision-making and respond to 
dissent with authoritarianism (for example, the 2006–2008 Crisis, the shutdown of NGO 
protests and recent media laws). Authoritarian models are risky in conflict-affected contexts, 
where flexibility, agility and inclusion are critical for peacebuilding. The modern governance 
system undermines Indigenous governance and distorts power dynamics. Understanding how 
violence has been caused or exacerbated by power imbalances is core to understanding why the 
current development system does not achieve self-determination and peace.  
 
Timor-Leste must better recognise and prioritise mechanisms within Indigenous governance 
systems that creates balance and inclusion. To do otherwise will further exacerbate 
disenfranchisement, inequality and structural violence of East Timorese who are committed to 
using Indigenous systems to achieve self-determined development. To break down elite 
hierarchies and enable community FPIC, leaders must encourage citizen participation that 
includes Indigenous leadership and decision-making processes. 
 
6.5 Relationships / Slulu 
 
Previous sections have elaborated on lulik and lisan and explained why they are central to 
Indigenous knowledge systems in Timor-Leste. In this section, I illustrate that Timor-Leste is a 
localised, relationship-based society that has created and reinforced inter-generational 
connections between individuals and groups through reciprocal exchange and ritual obligations. 
Relationships between past, present and future generations are at the heart of all Indigenous 
cosmological, social, cultural, economic and environmental knowledge in Timor-Leste. As one 
senior East Timorese public servant described:  
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“People in the past were enemies, and they fought each other, but when they got 
independence they thought, “my goodness, we are brothers, we are from the same clan, 
we are from the same family”. And then they [got] back together, to build again this 
unity. Not only among them, but with their ancestors and the nature, the land itself. To 
reinvent a relationship. That is a very old sort of peacebuilding we are talking about” 
(TL-1300-170910). 
 
It is important to acknowledge that there are three broad categories of relationships that I focus 
on within this research. The first are relationships between elite East Timorese and East 
Timorese citizens, the second are relationships between East Timorese citizens and outsiders, 
and the third relationships between elite East Timorese and outsiders. Relationships between 
East Timorese should also be analysed by gender, geography and age. Earlier chapters have 
revealed that there is a lack of strong and sustainable relationships between elite and East 
Timorese citizens, which is a fundamental block to peacebuilding and self-determined 
development in Timor-Leste.  
 
In this section I examine what processes East Timorese value in building and sustaining 
relationships. I investigate Indigenous relationship-building processes in Timor-Leste where 
outsiders are incorporated ‘inside’ the society to regulate relationships. These processes seek 
balance and inclusion of different value and belief systems, where predictable and enduring 
relationships are built peacefully. These Indigenous peacebuilding processes must be done at a 
pace that is both ritually approved and enacted by Indigenous leaders, with active community 
participation and consent.  
 
6.5.1 Relationships between women and men 
 
In Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems authority is balanced between feminine and 
masculine power; both are required to create harmony (Trindade, 2012). The visible secular 
world on top of the earth is dominated by men, and the sacred underworld of the ancestors and 
the feminine earth god is the sphere of women who hold symbolic and ritual power in a deeper, 
less obvious way than men (Niner, 2011, p.417). There are many gendered deities which are 
seen as sun / fire / masculinity and moon / stars / water / rain / femininity (Kehi & Palmer, 2012, 
p.455). Maromak (Tetum: one who gives light or enlightens) refers to both male and female 
deities at the time of creation, when unity was balanced.  
 
Within Indigenous East Timorese systems women practice high levels of socio-familial 
responsibility and hold important roles in financial management, income generation, health care 
and medicine. While predominantly patrilineal, there are three matrilineal groups, the Bunak, 
the Tetum-Terik Fehan and the Galolen, who represent about twelve per cent of the population 
(Niner, 2012, p.144). Da Silva (2012, pp.147-164), Kent (2011, p.446) and Wigglesworth 
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(2013) underscore the importance of women leaders in the resistance and clandestine 
movement, and highlight women’s use of collectivism and social solidarity to heal.  
 
Trindade (2014; 2015) believes that before Portuguese colonialism, roles between women and 
men were complementary and interdependent, but Niner (2011) highlights that these Indigenous 
structures were not gender equal. She notes that while femininity and fertility are fundamental 
and powerful, and senior women have social and ritual responsibilities, women’s social status 
and power was and is below men: “feto hakat klot; mane hakat luan (Tetum: a woman is born 
for narrow steps, while a man is born for wide steps)” (Niner, 2011, p.418; Niner, 2012, p.140).  
 
Niner (2011; 2012), Harris-Rimmer (2006) and Wigglesworth (2013) argue that East Timorese 
women’s political participation has been limited by the patriarchal Indigenous governance 
system, supported and reinforced by the Portuguese colonial system and the Catholic Church 
that is grounded in ideas of hierarchy and obedience. In 1975, OPMT identified the structural 
and cultural causes of gender inequality in Timor-Leste. It describes how under the colonial 
system cultural practices, such as barlaki, had become distorted from their original aim of 
aligning uma lulik, and that customary governance had become discriminating, forcing women 
into polygamy and hard labour, and alienating them from the resistance movement.  
 
Distorted versions of barlaki have been particularly blamed for a sense of ownership, 
subjugation and commodification of women, where any sense of a woman’s inadequacy 
becomes a source of frustration and pressure on relationships that can result in violence. It has 
also become an economic burden for many families, placing several generations in debt (Hicks, 
2012). I agree that firmly entrenched gender stereotypes including forced and early marriage 
and distorted versions of barlaki compound gender inequality in Timor-Leste. 
 
In Timor-Leste today both Indigenous and modern systems can be characterised as conservative 
and deeply patriarchal; senior men hold responsibilities for power, authority and status. Niner 
(2011, p.415) argues that since 1999 dominant male elites “have patriotically promoted 
indigenous culture while denigrating international ‘gender equity’ policies as a foreign 
imposition, which will destroy Timorese culture”. De Oliveira (2002, p.58) contends that there 
are social and cultural structures in Timor-Leste that support men to maintain their power and 
influence, and where violence against women is part of a broader, state-sanctioned system of 
violence. As a result, dominant concepts of masculinity in Timor-Leste are militarised, tough, 
virile, aggressive and heterosexual (Niner, 2011; 2012). Imbalanced relationships between 
women and men are at the root of much direct, structural and cultural violence in Timor-Leste 
as discussed in Chapter Five. 
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6.5.2 Installing the outsider inside 
 
Archaeological and anthropological research indicates Timor-Leste has experienced over 
42,000 years of multiple waves of migration across the South-Asian archipelago resulting in 
constant and pervasive social and political change. To negotiate this change and manage any 
potential conflict East Timorese peoples developed systems and processes that flexibly 
‘installed’ strangers into their Indigenous cosmological and secular systems. Babo-Soares 
(2003; 2004), Bovensiepen (2014a), Fox (2008), Hohe (2002a; 2002b), Ospina and Hohe 
(2002), Trindade (2008; 2014; 2015) all discuss how Indigenous East Timorese knowledge 
systems were maintained over time by peacefully incorporating outsider perspectives.  
 
Relationships between the Indigenous and the outsider are central to all political and ritual 
authority and identity in Timor-Leste. Since 1999, outsiders have been primarily international 
development and peacebuilding practitioners and private sector investors. In Land and Life in 
Timor-Leste (McWilliam & Traube, 2011) Traube, Fox, McWilliam and Barnes discuss how 
East Timorese communities engage in complex customs and rituals that bind and incorporate 
outsiders (both people from other parts of Timor-Leste and outside) into the myths and rituals of 
East Timorese identity, governance and leadership. The goal of these practices is to recreate the 
balance that is at the heart of East Timorese Indigenous knowledge systems. Fox (2008, p.202) 
highlights the flexibility of Indigenous structures and notes that the complexity and pluralism of 
East Timorese culture has led to the development of processes that simplify the cultural 
diversity, where: “The installation of the outsider inside effects a reordering of precedence 
whereby an outsider comes to represent the inside”. Hoskins (cited in Bovensiepen, 2014a, 
p.292) describes this process as a “diarchic balance” where power is politically constructed, 
constantly unstable and flexible to achieve equilibrium.  
 
Customarily, violence and warfare are activities waged on the periphery or ‘outside’ (Traube, 
2007, p.16). Under Indigenous Timorese peacebuilding systems, intra-group conflict (between 
peoples who share kinship and allegiance to the uma lulik, knua or uma kain) was actively 
managed through processes such as nahe biti, so that recourse to violence within a group would 
have been rare. Within this system of balance and reciprocity it is considered that “violence 
perpetrated within a house” by those who understand the system, is a greater moral fault than 
violence perpetrated upon a house by “outsiders” (Traube, 2007, p.21). Therefore, most 
conflicts in Timor-Leste are between communities, families or uma lulik, not within them. Since 
1999, economic migration to urban centres has added to the complexity of these inter-uma lulik 
conflicts where violence often spread from an argument between two rural aldeia to the 
corresponding two family aldeia in Dili (Scambary, 2009, p.2).  
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Hohe and Nixon (2003, p.14) and Trindade (2012) note that the insider / outsider ritual is 
entwined with the marriage process of wife-giving and wife-taking, where the wife-giver is 
‘autochthonous’ representing fertility, and the wife-taker is the ‘immigrant or outsider’ 
representing security. Binding together fertility and security, or insiders and outsiders, is the 
ritual process that allows the community to evolve and multiply. This marriage system allows 
outsiders to negotiate land use, power and rights, and ties previously separate families into 
lifelong responsibilities of mutual exchange and reciprocal obligations.  
 
Traube (2011) describes the ritual of the ‘Stranger King’, an origin myth on diarchic leadership, 
where power is transferred from the Indigenous leader to an outsider who becomes the chiefly 
ruler. The liurai is separate from the spiritual or cosmological ‘inside’ world led by the lia-nain 
and dato-lulik. The liurai is the focal point for ‘external’ political decision-making or 
engagement with the ‘outside’ or secular world and leads this ritual. There are versions of this 
myth across different language groups across Timor, each view outsiders as returned ancestors 
who have come to share new knowledge (Ospina & Hohe, 2002, p.47). This myth allows all 
peoples to trace their identity to a common source, whether they are born in Timor or elsewhere 
(Traube, 2001). In this way, all outsiders are incorporated into the ordered system of Indigenous 
knowledge. Whether or not they integrate smoothly or cause violence depends on how they 
respect and fulfil their reciprocal rights and obligations within the system.  
 
Traube (2007) elaborates on the insider / outsider myth through the Mambai story of Tat Felis, a 
Christ-like character whose persecution and suffering has been linked to the struggles to attain 
East Timorese self-determination. The myth of Tat Felis incorporates ritual exchange 
obligations, where those who suffered are ‘repaid’ or compensated for their sacrifice. This 
reciprocity myth indicates a naïve but “widespread expectation…that nationhood would usher 
in a general utopian transformation” (Traube, 2007, p.18). However, continuing high poverty 
levels since 1999, combined with a lack of a shared peace dividend has resulted in ongoing 
frustrations within the East Timorese community (Brown, 2009, p.143; Rae, 2009, p.106). 
Many East Timorese people believe they have not yet been adequately compensated for their 
suffering by the State, and are ignored by the elite in favour of former collaborators and the 
diaspora (Traube 2007; 2011). As a result, East Timorese see both international practitioners 
and many elites as outsiders. 
 
The sheer volume of international practitioners in Timor-Leste has made it logistically 
challenging to undertake the necessary processes to incorporate these ‘outsiders’ as ‘insiders’. 
The majority are geographically located in Dili, rarely regularly interacting with East Timorese, 
who have a stronger history and great access to the necessary knowledge and rituals to 
undertake these processes. It is often also difficult to connect East Timorese with elites and 
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international practitioners who do not share languages. As a result, these logistical, geographic, 
and linguistic boundaries the majority of international practitioners have not been ritually 
incorporated ‘inside’. Insider / outsider practices have symbolic and tangible implications for 
balancing relationships in East Timorese society. 
 
Indigenous cultural practices that locate outsiders ‘inside’ are very important for modern 
understandings of political leadership, representation and relationships between East Timorese. 
It also helps us to understand why East Timorese have been able to ‘forgive’ Indonesia and 
Portugal (and others) for their past crimes, but why it is still a challenge to manage the internal 
violence between East Timorese. It highlights the challenges for Timor-Leste in trying to build 
a unified national identity–with all East Timorese ‘inside’–when there are continuing divisions 
between East Timorese (Trindade, 2012). Bovensiepen’s (2014a) research shows the 
experiences of violence and displacement have engendered new modes of identity in Timor-
Leste resulting in the recalibration of previously immutable binary relationships. She finds that 
individuals and groups have now become autonomous, self-replicating entities that embody 
both insider and outsider elements simultaneously.  
 
The myth of ‘unpaid wages’ for past sacrifices has strong implications for East Timorese 
statebuilding, nation-building and justice. The concept has implications for the differences in 
behavioural expectations placed on insiders as opposed to outsiders. If the insider / outsider 
myth is applied to modern relationships, many East Timorese see a moral obligation for 
foreigners to assist them to achieve their goals of self-determination, and to this end, 
interventions from international development and peacebuilding practitioners were welcomed. 
However, this ‘obligation’ has resulted in raised expectations for assistance, and a number of 
my participants highlight a growing entitlement mentality from East Timorese – who see 
Government and international development assistance as their due, both as an outcome of 
economic and political emancipation from their violent and colonial past, and also as an 
ideological end point, grounded in custom and myth. An international consultant elucidated: 
 
“Sacrifice has been made to gain independence. Whenever sacrifices must be made they 
must be paid back. You make a sacrifice to the ancestor spirits in order to retain their 
help. Almost everyone you meet will have some family member who has been injured 
or killed. Is the expectation that the state must now do the right thing by the people? 
That is the way I look at the discourse of self-determination. It is not a passive 
expectation, it has been written in terms of exchange and reciprocity. It is a two way 
process” (TTI-1400-011010). 
 
Failure to pay back this debt highlights divisions in relationships between the State, represented 
by elites, and East Timorese citizens, and also with international practitioners. An international 
program manager expanded: 
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“It is almost like a religious figure, this person who struggles on behalf of the country, 
dies for development, then the rewards come in the end. I think people see the 
Government in [that] way. They have struggled, they have shed their blood for 
independence, and now it is their turn to have their debt repaid by the Government” 
(TTS-1700-290910). 
 
6.5.3 Summary: Slulu 
 
At the core of enabling peace and Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste is 
the need to create and sustain balance in the relationships between and within groups. Fox 
(2000a), Kent (2011), McWilliam (2005) and Traube (1986; 1995; 2011) show that East 
Timorese successfully practiced these Indigenous methods of building and sustaining 
relationships during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation. However this history 
left behind communities cauterised by deep societal rifts, distrust and enmities, many of whom 
were elites, isolated from the Indigenous relationship-building systems. Historical experiences 
have affected Indigenous practices of building and sustaining of relationships between East 
Timorese and between East Timorese and outsiders.  
 
Distorted Indigenous practices, such as barlaki, aimed at creating a balance between women and 
men, have been blamed for gender inequality and violence, but the reality is far more complex. I 
agree that Indigenous East Timorese systems did not provide women and girls with what the 
international human rights system now terms ‘gender equality’. However, I also agree with 
Brown (2009, p.155) who asserts: “Upholding the rights of women and young people, while 
profoundly important, is not in itself an argument for sidelining East Timorese culture. It is 
rather an argument for engaging in a more sustained way with cultural practice”. Cultural 
processes that are harmful, discriminatory or endorse violence need to be carefully but 
systemically sanctioned and stopped through processes of public education, awareness and 
shaming (McWilliam, 2014, pers. comm., 16 November). I agree with Niner (2011) who says 
we must consider barlaki as part of a complex holistic system that provides women with pride, 
status and safeguards, and any changes to Indigenous practices many have additional negative 
impacts on East Timorese women. 
 
Balanced and equitable relationships between women and men are key to Indigenous self-
determination and peacebuilding. It is critical to sustainable peacebuilding and self-
determination that women are active participants in decision-making at both national and local 
levels (UN Security Council, 2000). The triggers for violence, particularly against women and 
children in Timor-Leste, are deep and are linked to a history of violence and institutions and 
practices that cause gender and economic inequality. Research shows that the gender 
dimensions of violence in patriarchal societies are exacerbated, and women are more vulnerable 
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when their access to services and socio-economic opportunities are through male relatives who 
provide their security, as it is in Timor-Leste (Ospina, 2006, p.45).  
 
With the influx of international practitioners since 1999, and a range of logistic, geographic and 
linguistic reasons, Indigenous systems of building relationships have been overwhelmed and 
unable to incorporate thousands of ‘outsiders’. As a consequence, relationships between East 
Timorese citizens and international practitioners have been very difficult to build and sustain. 
This process is similar to the experience for elite East Timorese, many of whom were of the 
diaspora and returned to Timor-Leste after 1999. International practitioners have tended to 
interact disproportionally with elite East Timorese and the majority of international practitioners 
and elites do not understand or respect Indigenous knowledge systems. This breakdown in 
relationship systems has resulted in significant challenges in achieving East Timorese goals of 
peaceful self-determination (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2008). 
 
Indigenous practices that aim to enable better relationships between East Timorese and between 
East Timorese and ‘outsiders’ continue to affect modern relationships. The role and 
responsibilities of the State and international development and peacebuilding practitioners lies 
in the Indigenous East Timorese myth of Tat Felis (Traube, 2007). This myth directly 
incorporates international development and peacebuilding practitioners into East Timorese 
relationality, imbuing this mixed group with responsibilities and obligations. If this insider / 
outsider myth is followed to reasonable conclusions, there is a moral obligation for the 
Government and foreigners to assist the East Timorese in their goals, first to achieve 
independence in 1999, and then self-determination.  
 
It is important to support good relationships between East Timorese as well as working to 
building and sustaining good relationships between international practitioners and both elite and 
East Timorese citizens. 
 
6.6 Conclusion: An Indigenous East Timorese framework for analysis 
 
The complex and pluralised Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems have embraced 
differing localised cultures and ritual practices, Christianity, and a broad range of historical 
experiences. Indigenous East Timorese peoples seek to find balance within their plural 
knowledge systems. This balance was symbolised by tempu rai-diak, dame and hakmatek in the 
past, and now it is envisioned as self-determined development and peace, or ukun rasik a’an.  
 
From the perspective of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge, the root cause of the protracted 
intra-state violence and insecurity in Timor-Leste is an imbalance in the secular and 
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cosmological worlds. This imbalance manifests itself in multiple ways, including physically, 
through violent combat; mentally, through emotional trauma and violent thoughts and words; 
and structurally, through institutions. It is also engendered through sexual and family violence 
and inequity. These imbalances and the resulting violence are complex and interactive. 
 
The heterogeneity of East Timorese identity means that each individual will experience and 
engage with Indigenous knowledge systems differently. Similar to the experiences of other 
Indigenous peoples, East Timorese skillfully negotiate complex public and private spaces on a 
daily basis aiming to achieve their goals. However I conclude that while individual East 
Timorese have pluralised identities there are significant differences in the way in which elite 
and citizens respect, understand and use Indigenous knowledge systems.  
 
Internationally led and Government-supported modern governance model have marginalised 
ukun rasik a’an, and its associate concepts of tempu rai-diak, dame and hakmatek. This 
highlights the limitations of this external and elite-driven model, which does not have the 
capacity to encompass the much broader concept of ukun rasik a’an. To achieve ukun rasik 
a’an elite East Timorese people and international development and peacebuilding practitioners 
need to acknowledge and work with the complexity of knowledge systems in place in Timor-
Leste. Until East Timorese Indigenous knowledge is valued and respected by elite East 
Timorese and international practitioners, consultation will continue to be merely an exercise in 
politicking, enabling self-promotion by co-opted leaders who do not want to or are unable to 
take account of community views.  
 
This Chapter has provided a foundational understanding of Indigenous East Timorese 
knowledge systems with respect to lulik, lisan, and slulu. Throughout I have emphasised how 
each theme is interconnected to the next, providing complex, plural knowledge systems. 
Chapter Five outlined some of the key triggers for violence in Timor-Leste, each of which is 
caused or exacerbated by imbalances within the three central themes explored within 
Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. Seeking a greater understanding of about how 
these Indigenous knowledge systems can both transform and trigger violence is a critical 
element of my thesis. 
 
• Culture / lulik: a plural system of cosmological and secular unity expressed through 
cultural practices and rituals;  
• Power / lisan: a governance system grounded in the balancing of power dynamics 
through cultural practices; and  
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• Relationships / slulu: the primacy of localised relationship-based land, place and kinship 
systems. 
 
East Timorese peoples are currently experiencing a predictable disjunction within the 
complexity between Indigenous knowledge systems and the fast pace of modernity where 
Indigenous knowledge systems are weakened and where Indigenous peacebuilding processes 
create only superficial or negative peace. This secular and cosmological imbalance within East 
Timorese Indigenous knowledge systems is seen within a development context as inequality, 
and within a peacebuilding context as structural violence and insecurity. Combined with 
existing unresolved violence, human insecurity, inequalities and structural violence, Timor-
Leste can be categorised as experiencing a violent peace. 
 
In Chapters Seven and Eight I provide concrete examples of how development and 
peacebuilding efforts have caused or exacerbated violence or human insecurity in Timor-Leste 
voiced through the experiences of East Timorese and international development and 
peacebuilding practitioners. By exploring the differences between these knowledge systems, I 
assert that a greater understanding, respect for and integration of East Timorese knowledge 
systems can support ukun rasik a’an and transform structural violence in Timor-Leste.  
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7 Through the Voices of East Timorese 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Using ethnographic methods, in this chapter I explore the root causes of violence in Timor-
Leste and the effectiveness of post-1999 development interventions on transforming these root 
causes from the diverse perspectives of East Timorese peoples. During my field research, I 
interviewed twenty-three East Timorese development and peacebuilding practitioners. Unless 
specified, all direct quotes in this chapter are from East Timorese who participated in my field 
research and who are referenced as “participants”. The range of people who participated in this 
research included a UN adviser, former politicians, senior Government advisers and CSO 
representatives. As discussed in Chapter Two, many of my East Timorese participants are 
themselves elite, providing an interesting source of refection on elite power and co-option. The 
deliberate methodological intention in this chapter is to enable these practitioners to voice their 
experiences and to share their solutions to development and peacebuilding challenges in Timor-
Leste. I interrogate the responses of these participants to understand better the context and 
nuanced meanings of the information they are sharing.  
 
In Chapter Six I discussed Indigenous knowledge systems in Timor-Leste through an analytical 
framework with three primary themes of culture / lulik, power / lisan and relationships / slulu. I 
argued that Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems are plural, differing across and within 
communities in Timor-Leste, and that these systems are fundamentally different from the 
modern knowledge systems that the majority of elite East Timorese and international 
development and peacebuilding practitioners prioritise.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections, culture, power and relationships in line with the 
Indigenous East-Timorese knowledge framework developed. I initially explore how culture 
affects development practice with a focus on creating a unified national identity, shared 
languages, prioritising land and belonging. This section is followed by an examination of power 
with a focus on dependency, security, governance, leadership and elites, corruption, gender 
equality and education. Finally, I review the impact of development interventions on 
relationships. I propose the importance of sustainable capacity strengthening, cooperation, 
active consultation and participation, timing and targeting context to build and strengthen 
relationships and how international practitioners or ‘outsiders’ can work to become ‘insiders’ 
(Close, 2014). 
 
Using case studies I elaborate on three development and peacebuilding interventions led by East 
Timorese NGOs: Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute (KSI) and the Ermera Agricultural Union, La’o 
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Hamutuk and PRADET (Psychosocial Recovery and Development in East Timor). These case 
studies are explored through the three primary themes of culture, power and relationships, and 
provide examples of how East Timorese are transforming the current development system in 
Timor-Leste.  
 
7.2 Culture / Lulik (prioritise systems of people, land and place) 
 
This section demonstrates my argument that the current development system fails to engage 
with or incorporate Indigenous East Timorese culture/lulik. This section provides examples of 
how Indigenous East Timorese culture/lulik is currently marginalised by international 
practitioners and East Timorese elites in development decision-making. I examine how 
marginalising issues of identity, land and natural resources, and language use and policy, 
contributes to cultural and structural violence in Timor-Leste.  
 
Participants explained that while Indigenous knowledge and lulik practice is widely used, they 
emphasised that knowledge holders are usually older men and women based in rural and remote 
communities. As a result of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation both elites 
(many of whom were political refugees during the Indonesian occupation) and citizens who 
experienced significant violence and trauma, have been disconnected from their customary links 
to Indigenous knowledge.  
 
These historical experiences have resulted in a divide between those who acknowledge, respect 
and use Indigenous knowledge and practice lulik, and those who do not. This section explains 
such divisions and provides participants’ solutions for connecting and sharing knowledge and 
ideas. I also investigate how two local NGOs, KSI and the Ermera Agricultural Union work 
together to transform land-related violence using Indigenous peacebuilding practices. 
 
7.2.1 Cultivate and affirm Indigenous knowledge systems 
 
Across Timor-Leste there is mixed respect, understanding and use of Indigenous knowledge and 
lulik. One senior development practitioner affirmed that respect for lulik is high, but that history 
has affected East Timorese access to this knowledge. He further explained that while 
Indigenous knowledge is taught, practiced and respected at a rural and remote community level, 
at a national level this knowledge is ignored and undervalued:  
 
“It is because they [elites] do not value Timorese ideas that much. Because they think it 
is backward” (TG-1500-140910).  
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Elite East Timorese, in particular those who emigrated or were refugees overseas during the 
Indonesian occupation, usually did not have access to Indigenous knowledge and cultural 
practices. It is difficult for many of them to reconcile their modern belief systems with the 
Indigenous knowledge they are exposed to in Timor-Leste. People who migrated to urban areas 
have also experienced significant disconnection from Indigenous knowledge, sacred land and 
culture. A senior NGO peacebuilder observed that it is not a firm division between East 
Timorese respecting the culture, and outsiders and elites rejecting culture. People’s beliefs and 
practices are a complex mix of Indigenous and modern knowledge (TN-1300-200910). I asked 
who practiced Indigenous knowledge, and a senior UN adviser asserted that the majority of 
Indigenous lulik practices are politically conservative, prioritising men’s participation and that 
generational change will be necessary for both women and men to equally participate: 
 
“While the old generation is still there, they will say this place is for men and those are 
the ones who have the power and the rights [sic] to talk and to make decisions. They are 
not really open to new ideas. There are some who adapt themselves to the new situation, 
but there are some who are very slow” (TA-1100-090910). 
 
One senior peacebuilding specialist confirmed that some East Timorese elites continued to 
practice lulik, but that it was often done in secret. She frankly explained that she was challenged 
to believe in lulik:  
 
“My grandma did it at home. I just watched. I am not sure [if I believe in it]. I believe in 
spirits and things. But rituals, I don’t know” (TTK-1630-100713). 
 
I asked a peace researcher why there was such distinction between rural and urban use of 
Indigenous knowledge and she explained that it was due to the history of forced relocations and 
urban migration, which had disconnected communities from their customary practices (TTG-
1500-300910). Participants proposed that international practitioners could best learn about lulik 
in rural communities. A university student informed me that:  
 
“They [international donors] do not understand our culture. If they go to the fields, they 
will learn. But if they just come to work with Government, they will not learn” (TO-
1000-190910). 
 
An analyst with a multilateral organisation confirmed: “In the rural areas people are still 
connected to uma lulik, customary sacred houses and ceremonies. Compared with people in 
urban areas it is not happening” (TTT-1400-011010). A university student agreed:  
 
“Grandmothers and grandfathers tell us the stories…linked to the land or cultural place. 
We still have the spiritual culture and rules. They still exist in all the districts. In Dili 
[they do] not [exist] anymore” (TM-1000-190910).  
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A UN adviser explained that since 1999 communities were reviving lulik practices and that 
many East Timorese, including herself, were actively seeking to learn. She identified the 
important role of the Government, particularly the Ministry of Education and Culture, in 
promoting this knowledge exchange (TA-1100-090910). A senior NGO peacebuilder also 
firmly placed responsibility on the Government to prioritise Indigenous culture and actively 
legitimise and sustain Indigenous knowledge systems:  
 
“If we want to remain with our culture we must socialise and protect our culture” (TN-
1300-200910). 
 
An NGO peacebuilder affirmed the strength and depth of East Timorese culture. He proposed 
that when international practitioners and elites prioritised modern knowledge systems over 
existing Indigenous knowledge systems failed or ineffective development resulted (TX-1600-
260910). I asked an experienced development practitioner whether international practitioners 
understood and respected East Timorese Indigenous knowledge and culture. He replied: “100% 
no. That is why many programs go to the wrong place” (TF-0900-140910). An experienced 
peacebuilding practitioner agreed, extrapolating:  
 
“East Timor opened for the malae. Some people want to know more about the Timorese 
culture and they respect, but these other people, they just come with their culture. They 
do not want to know about the Timorese culture” (TN-1300-200910).  
 
A program manager at a bilateral development organisation suggested that to rebalance this 
power disparity international practitioners and elites should seek to understand and respect 
Indigenous knowledge: 
 
“One thing that I always say is before you do something in an area you have to have 
enough knowledge about context, local context; not just knowledge but you have to 
respect that (knowledge). I feel that sometimes people are very arrogant and they think 
that because they have the money they have more power” (TJ-1500-150910). 
 
7.2.2 Recognise identity is plural and localised 
 
Participants recognised that East Timorese hold plural identities. As a development analyst 
declared: “We are all Timorese. I am Timorese, and I am also Makasai” (TD-1700-130910). 
Participants explained that until a shared national identity is collectively negotiated, their 
community will be divided politically, spiritually, socially and economically. Many participants 
maintained that a lack of clarity on national identity has intensified violence in Timor-Leste 
since 1999. They explained that aiming for and achieving the goals of liberation from Indonesia 
and gaining rapid independence in 2002 were fundamental to national identity, but many East 
150 
Timorese now lacked a shared vision of who they were, and where they should be headed. One 
government adviser warned of a “national identity crisis”: 
 
“It is because for many years we [have been] colonised, and our culture and tradition 
has been oppressed. The Portuguese, the Indonesians, the church, they come in and they 
claim they are culturally superior. Timorese feel really bad about themselves, their ideas 
and their concepts. We have a sense of cultural insecurity, because of the impact from 
external people. That makes us less able to discuss what we have” (TG-1500-140910). 
 
He elaborated that it will be a difficult and slow process to develop a national identity, as the 
range of historical experiences and multiple ethno-linguistic groups means identity is localised: 
“Our identity should come from our culture. What kind of culture is still under discussion” (TG-
1500-140910). He argued that nationalism has been imposed citing the National Constitution as 
divisive and a potential contributer to future violence, because by only recognising certain 
resistance groups it prioritises an idealised “warrior society”: 
 
“We have never said that we will live together under one country, one nation. It has 
been imposed by the UN, by the elite. Because we fought together it does not mean we 
want to live together. It is another process…We will have more conflict in the future” 
(TG-1500-140910). 
 
A university student urged that the lack of a cohesive identity and inequality separated East 
Timorese from achieving their development goals: 
 
“How can we develop our country if Timorese are not united? They [the Government] 
have one strong national vision, but we still have lives in very bad conditions [sic], and 
these separate us” (TM-1000-190910).  
 
A former politician also linked building a shared national identity to achieving development 
outcomes. He explained that people had been united in resisting Indonesia, and strong common 
beliefs and experiences were more important than divisions (TTH-0930-011010). An academic 
asserted: “They are talking about [difference] rather than seeking commonalities.  You talk 
about national identities, but we don’t have a sense of identity or vision or a clear debate about 
where we are going” (TU-1230-240910). A development analyst also emphasised the 
importance of focusing on common issues to build a cohesive and inclusive national identity, 
and affirmed the effectiveness of the “Maubere Nation” as a cohesive concept which “brought 
together all the different ethno-linguistic groups” (TD-1700-130910). He warned that unless 
divisive issues of identity are carefully addressed it could trigger further violence:  
 
“I think Government and [development] agencies need to be very careful when they 
have something to do with issues that are about identity. They would not want to 
generate Loromono/Lorosa’e thinking…you could certainly increase the number of 
conflicts in the country…Once we start fighting each other it will be a never-ending 
cycle” (TD-1700-130910). 
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 Solutions for creating a harmonious and cohesive national identity were posited by 
participations. The uma lulik and its associated rituals were considered by many participants to 
be a key part of Indigenous East Timorese peacebuilding (TL-1300-170910). An academic 
suggested that as the uma lulik remained a unifying force, Timor-Leste could create a national 
uma lulik: 
 
“A Timorese clan lives together under one house. Within that house, they are not 
allowed to fight or create problems and if you create problems you always resolve it. So 
I propose to create a national house [uma lulik], where it can shade everybody, 
regardless of whether you are Portuguese or Indonesian or mixed. Then we can have a 
good connection with each other” (TG-1500-140910). 
 
A senior public servant explained that Timor-Leste has a competing mixture of Christianity, 
modern political democracy and Indigenous systems. He believed that no one system can 
dominate, and that East Timorese must work within their plural identities to seek solutions: 
 
“Timor-Leste is in the process of building a nation, an identity…We are aware that this 
is a hybrid society, we can not always live only with one [system], if you are going to 
live with all the traditional things, it might not [work]. But if you only live with modern 
things, you are going to be modern. So, how to combine [sic]?” (TL-1300-170910).  
 
7.2.3 Preserve customary links to land and place 
 
Participants cited lack of access to, and ownership of, customary land as one of the greatest 
barriers to achieving self-determined development in Timor-Leste. They explained that land 
conflict triggers direct, cultural and structural violence across communities in both rural and 
urban Timor-Leste. Most participants emphasised the sacred nature of land and place to East 
Timorese knowledge systems and cultural practice. They described the central role of land to 
how relationships between and within communities are generated, and identity and belonging 
are formed. A former resistance leader explained:  
 
“In my town, we say we belong to the land and the land belongs to us. The land is our 
mother, the motherland. [It is] where we get food, water, anything, where we play and 
pray. In my town there is really a strong connection to the land” (TV-1530-240910). 
 
Anthropomorphism is an important component of East Timorese identity. A university student 
revealed: “Most of our ancestors are very familiar with the natural world. Some of them get 
their power from what is around them. Our ancestors say that they can talk with the stones, the 
trees” (TO-1000-190910). A senior peacebuilding specialist illustrated the sacred and spiritual 
connection to land, highlighting that despite Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation, 
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Indigenous rituals and practices continue to take place according to the seasons and needs of 
rural people: 
 
“Land is very important to Timorese, sacred land. It is something that you have [inside 
you]. They do tarabandu, you still have agricultural rituals, rain dances…Last year in 
Same, we had a big festival. At that time it was raining a lot. They brought all the wise 
men together to stop the rain, and it worked” (TTK-1630-100713). 
 
These strong spiritual and cultural connections to land have fundamental implications for the  
use of natural resources and development decision-making in East Timorese communities. A 
former resistance leader described an incident where a community refused Government funding 
to build a school on sacred land: 
 
“Some areas that are very sacred to them, that you cannot touch for resources [sic]. And 
the Government says I would like to build this school in this area, and they go to 
negotiate about an area that is sacred to us, so we say can you build it somewhere else?” 
(TV-1530-240910). 
 
Access, use and ownership of land are critical issues for East Timorese. For communities to 
have control over sacred land, the Government must protect sacred sites and other areas of 
cultural significance. A university student warned that many East Timorese feel marginalised 
within a “capitalist” land-tenure system and were worried about the economic and political 
implications of foreign ownership of land and resources (TM-1000-190910). Another university 
student identified the responsibility of the Government to provide clear information to its 
citizens: 
 
“Many tourists and many visitors have got the lands, they say ‘I have bought it, I have a 
certificate’. To me it is not good. The Government need[s] to go to the community and 
explain to them that according to the constitution they are not allowed to sell their land. 
Because of the lack of information this is happening” (TO-1000-190910). 
 
An NGO director stated that since 2002 the Government has reviewed the land law and policies, 
but without any real progress or genuine consultation with communities. The Constitution does 
not provide adequate protection for Indigenous landowners, because the Government provides 
land rights to those who have certification of land ownership, the majority of which were 
granted under Portuguese and Indonesian occupation. She confirmed that this practice unequally 
benefits elites and outsiders, disrespecting East Timorese identity and culture, and further 
distorting land systems. She observed the disempowerment of women within the current 
administration of land: “Us Timorese, the majority of us are illiterate and the patriarchal system 
is very strong. So how are we going to listen to women about land?” (TTA-1600-280910). She 
provides an example to highlight her argument: 
 
153 
“In 2009 the Minister for Justice did a consultation on the proposed land law. It was not 
a real consultation. There was no real participation. It only happened at the district 
level, the only people who came were the administrator, the Xefe de Suku, the elected 
leaders. People live their lives in their local communities, not at the district level. The 
land law does not reflect people’s identity. The constitution says that people have the 
right to land for their daily needs, but the law gives more rights to those who have 
certificates. Does this respect Timorese identity and culture? No it doesn’t” (TTA-1600-
280910). 
 
Access to, ownership and use of, land is also linked to food sovereignty. As one development 
practitioner explained, the land practices of the past will not satisfy current population needs 
and many rural people are reliant on cheap rice subsidised by the Government: 
 
“Before, I had one hectare and it was enough to reserve food [for my family] for one 
year. But what if they have grandchildren? It is not enough [land]” (TF-0900-140910). 
 
Before 1975, East Timorese nutritional sources were more varied, providing greater food 
security for rural and urban communities (Oliveira, 2008). Many participants believed that since 
1999, agricultural policies and development interventions had not adequately focused on 
sustainable rural development. A former politician identified the importation of rice as a failure 
of the current development system and Government policy, triggering food insecurity and 
reduced nutrition across the community: 
 
“Food security is dependent on what we import. The nutrition is getting worse in 
Timor-Leste because, for them, nutrition is to fill their stomachs with the rice. That is 
why I would say this country is a complete mess” (TTH-0930-011010). 
 
7.2.3.1 Case Study: KSI and the Ermera Agricultural Union 
 
As an alternative to the huge influx of international development institutions, in March 2000, 
East Timorese student activists formed Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute (KSI) (Tetum: streams 
meet to become one river) to mobilise farming communities to become actively involved in 
campaigns for land reform, democracy, adequate housing, livelihoods and fair trade. KSI is 
based in Dili, but works closely with rural communities and receives funding from international 
development organisations (da Silva, 2012, pp.287-295). KSI advocates for land law that aligns 
with customary land use and ownership practices, and supports communities to claim their 
customary lands. One KSI development practitioner proposed the use of cooperatives to 
advocate non-violently for land rights and economic development:  
 
“If conflict happens it will not give people the opportunity to improve their lives, 
through economic activities. If we have a gap in economic activity in the community, 
we also give an opportunity for the conflict to arise. You need to transform the 
mentality of the community, to improve their lives through economic activities, to give 
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motivation and capacity building to resolve their problems with nonviolence” (TN-
1300-200910). 
 
The local NGO Ermera Agricultural Union has strong leadership and receives funding, training 
and support from KSI to undertake non-violent mediation over land conflicts across the Ermera 
District. One senior community member explained: “In every area where there is a conflict 
about land claim, or land and property…our objective is to try to solve the problem” (TQ-1000-
210910). One of their community leaders explained that the Ermera Agricultural Union had 
helped landowners prove their ownership:  
 
“We will try to solve this problem and fight against the one who is not the owner of the 
land but tried to say the land belongs to him. The problem is this certificate of land. 
Sometimes people have false certificates” (TQ-1000-210910). 
 
With KSI’s assistance, the Ermera Agricultural Union draws on Indigenous knowledge of land 
use and occupation. Using stories, ritual and customary peacebuilding techniques they record a 
legal document detailing the history of use, ownership and responsibility to a particular area of 
land so communities can claim back their land. By 2009, members of the Ermera Agricultural 
Union had resolved non-violently 27 land conflicts in the Ermera District over three years. Their 
community leader elaborated on the process they used: 
 
“We go to the community and share with them that, if that is your land then you have to 
write a story – who is the owner of that land, and who was living in this place, and what 
trees were in this place. If their story is clear they will have a strong argument to claim 
that this land belongs to them. If they are telling the truth, we will write it down as 
evidence, and take pictures…Their stories are true, because it is from their fathers and 
their grandfathers” (TQ-1000-210910). 
 
All communities needed to clearly articulate what they would use the land for when they gained 
legal ownership (TQ-1000-210910). Importantly for KSI and the Ermera Agricultural Union, 
this process of resolving land conflicts was directly linked to economic development in rural 
communities. 
 
7.2.4 Learn and use local languages and Tetum 
 
Participants affirmed the localised and multilingual identity of East Timorese. A former 
politician indicated the linguistic diversity: 
 
“I did my primary school in Lautém. While I was there I could only speak Fataluku and 
Portuguese. If you don't know Fataluku you will be left alone, so I had to learn 
Fataluku. But then because of the Indonesian occupation we started using Tetum and 
Tetum became so popular. I'm not saying that everyone speaks Tetum. If you go to 
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Oecusse, you can speak Tetum but you need to translate that into Baikeno because that's 
what everyone there speaks” (TTH-0930-011010). 
 
Complex language policy, and the varied use of Tetum, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesian and 
English are highly politicised and an area of ongoing tension. Many participants contended that 
the current language policy mandating the use of Portuguese in Government legal and policy 
documents discriminated against poor and un-educated East Timorese. There were mixed views 
about the use of Indonesian and English in the workplace. The use of both these languages was 
considered to have neo-colonialist implications, empowering different groups over others and 
marginalising the use of mother tongue or local languages. Participants postulated that language 
issues exacerbated inequalities and divisions between communities, stating that use of some 
languages reduced access to, and participation in, development decision-making and processes. 
 
One goal of peacebuilding is to create safe shared spaces where disputing parties can seek or 
build common ground. Common languages are an enabler to clear communication and open 
discussion. An academic explained that “Language is very fundamental…you need to find a 
common language to communicate with each other” (TU-1230-240910). A security analyst 
explained that the Government’s language policy isolated many East Timorese from 
participating in decision-making. He declared that this policy affects development outcomes and 
also stability and peace:  
 
“The language policy has to change…[Those who do not speak Portuguese] feel as 
though they are visitors in our own country. Ninety per cent of the prisoners are youth. 
Why are there increasing numbers of young people in prison? Because they cannot 
understand the law that is written. Why? Because it is written in Portuguese language, 
the language that they cannot understand…It is a silent takeover, by Timorese leaders 
and by foreigners, especially Portuguese-speaking countries…It is going to be a big 
bomb that is going to explode in the future. It will destabilise the country. It will have 
an effect on the security sector and the peace process” (TTR-0900-061010).  
 
The inability of many international development and peacebuilding practitioners to clearly 
communicate with East Timorese in Tetum or local languages is an issue of ongoing concern 
and for one senior public servant, a new form of colonialism with a significant potential for 
violence. In his experience, this kind of neo-colonialism can be combatted by international 
practitioners learning Tetum and local languages: 
 
“When people have a hard time communicating with each other they [East Timorese] 
say, ‘You can not hear me, and you colonialise me’. They [international practitioners] 
say, ‘Timorese are stupid, I come here to help you, and you don’t understand my 
position’. But that’s not valid. Foreigners [should] come and learn the language. When 
they learn language and live together, they understand each other” (TL-1300-170910). 
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He observed that without shared languages, there are limited opportunities for communities to 
communicate with international practitioners and the Government, or participate in decision-
making. He explained, “If all this information is written in this language that they don’t 
understand. It alienates the people. Development has no meaning for them, so they don’t have 
freedom” (TL-1300-170910). He recommended that using Portuguese to develop Tetum would 
take time, but that it was a necessary process to create a unified national identity: 
 
“We are trying to promote and preserve East Timor’s culture and identity. It will take 
time to develop our own language…because what the Indonesians did was intensify the 
cultural alienation of this country…We [can] use Portuguese to develop Tetum, to have 
a language that unites the people” (TL-1300-170910). 
 
A focus on language in education policy was seen as a key step to creating a shared language, 
but some barriers were identified. A former politician explained that these changes would take 
the time to implement, as not enough teachers spoke Tetum and that a dual process must 
continue to take place to develop Tetum as a national language that should then be disseminated 
through a cohesive education policy (TTH-0930-011010).  Other practitioners suggested that 
the best way to support community-level decision making is to prioritise the use of mother 
tongue through translators or locally engaged staff. A senior UN adviser suggested: 
 
“The best way to do that is through a local. [The local] will be the best person to get 
good and accurate information from the community.  Because even me, if I go to 
Bobonaro or Covalima, those persons speak another language…so it may be better for 
local to talk to local” (TA-1100-090910). 
 
7.2.5 Deliver education for all  
 
Access to education was one of the issues raised most often by my East Timorese participants. 
They linked education to sustainable capacity building, allowing people to have power and 
ownership over the development that takes place in their communities. An analyst with a 
multilateral organisation illustrated this point:  
 
“Education should be fundamental, over other sectors. I give you an example; people 
have lots of tractors that few people understand how to fix. Instead of patching, we 
could train people to fix it first” (TTT-1400-011010).  
 
Importantly, education was highlighted by the majority of participants as the primary tool to 
help people gain independence and achieve self-determination. A former resistance leader said:  
 
“To [be independent] people need to be well educated to be able to say yes and no, 
because after the long time under colonialism, we always say yes, yes, yes. Now we 
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have to start thinking. People think that education it is only to get a job, for me it is not. 
Education is much bigger than this” (TV-1530-240910). 
 
A security specialist argued that the current education system established by the Government 
and international development organisations is exclusionary and reduces the ability for East 
Timorese to access and participate in development (TTR-0900-061010). I asked why the 
Government had not been successful in providing inclusive education and he explained that the 
elites continued to perpetuate a system that excluded many East Timorese. He warned that this 
unequal education system has the potential to fuel violence within the community: 
 
“The poor Timorese will continue not to be well educated because the system does not 
help. They cannot go and study abroad and they will not be able to access or understand 
the global information system. It is a time bomb: if the elite continue with this, it will 
create problems” (TTR-0900-061010). 
 
A university student agreed with the difficulty of accessing quality higher education and she 
cited poverty, economic pressures, gender inequality, family expectations and culture as barriers 
(TM-1000-190910). Another university student observed that gender inequality, particularly in 
rural areas was a key barrier to education for women: 
 
“The woman's right is limited. The women finish their high school and have to marry. 
They say let their brothers continue. That is why most of our young females do not 
continue their studies, mostly in the districts. In Dili it is different. They say both our 
sons and daughters need to finish their education because we need these people for the 
future of our country. But in [the] districts, no” (TO-1000-190910). 
 
A former politician explained that much greater investment in research and education would be 
needed to actively encourage youth and provide the tools for future generations to learn about 
their Indigenous knowledge: 
 
“There is a need for much more investment, to have expertise to study the culture, and 
ethno-linguistics, in order to incorporate it into the curriculum so that the young 
generation can understand and keep on with all these cultural values (TTH-0930-
011010). 
 
7.2.6 Implement targetted and context-specific models 
 
The majority of participants criticised the way the current development system did not take 
account of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge, cultural and governance practices. They stated 
that development in Timor-Leste was less productive because the models used did not fit the 
local context and were not targeted to meet the needs of each different community. Participants 
equated this as a development systems issue perpetrated by, but not necessarily the fault of, 
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international practitioners. A development practitioner explained that poor untargeted 
development is widespread, perpetrated by many international actors: 
 
“More of the programs are not going to the right sites. [International practitioners are] 
choosing the wrong places, the wrong people, the wrong groups” (TF-0900-140910). 
 
A government adviser confirmed that the majority of development decisions are made by 
outsiders: 
 
“[Development] is carried out by internationals most of the time. All the planning was 
carried out by internationals. They are the ones that are writing the reports, the 
recommendations, they are the ones that are creating the national plan. Local ideas are 
undervalued” (TG-1500-140910). 
 
A development analyst saw that many outsiders come to Timor-Leste with unrealistic 
expectations about their ability to transform the situation. He stressed that international 
practitioners working in Timor-Leste regularly implement programs that are designed for other 
country contexts: 
 
“[International practitioners type] ‘Control F Afghanistan, replace all with Timor-
Leste’. Development partners are too lazy to sit down and talk to people who have been 
working in country for a long time, they just skip that dialogue and go in and find the 
closest country with a similar history and just copy that model” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
An academic explained that international practitioners bring a “one size fits all” approach, but 
that they need to first learn about the history and context of Timor-Leste before they start to 
make decisions (TU-1230-240910). An NGO peacebuilder concluded that learning from other 
contexts is important, but that ultimately the Timor-Leste context should be used to find 
solutions: 
 
“You need to learn from another country but if you want to implement something you 
cannot take everything from another nation and then implement it in this country. It 
does not work” (TX-1600-260910). 
 
A senior public servant explained that while outside concepts and practices work well in other 
contexts, they often do not work well in Timor-Leste: 
 
“Many people are thinking, especially those from outside, that peacebuilding or conflict 
could be solved by using [outside] methodologies. In Timor-Leste that is not the case, 
Timor-Leste has our own culture of solving these conflicts” (TL-1300-170910). 
 
A government adviser clarified that there is, “resistance coming from the inside” to a lot of 
development interventions as “most of it is very patronising” (TG-1500-140910). He linked the 
lack of context with systemic failures that promote unrealistic timeframes: 
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 “Everyone coming in here has a fixed agenda. Often they will say we will civilise the 
uncivilised. Most people have worked somewhere else, and they think that this has the 
same problems. People are dark and black, and it must be the same. Most of the time 
development practitioners forgot about local contexts, because they have too little time. 
That is one of the failings of development” (TG-1500-140910).  
 
Practitioners recognised that many international practitioners did attempt to contextualise their 
work by consulting with local people, however consultations were often done poorly. A senior 
UN adviser said that international practitioners should never assume they know what 
communities want. She suggested that the onus is on practitioners to seek this crucial 
information: “[otherwise] you are just wasting your money and your time” (TA-1100-090910). 
Ultimately participants suggested that international practitioners must be more flexible and 
understand that a different approach will be needed for each context (TJ-1500-150910). As one 
development analyst explained:  
 
“You have to be flexible, and understand that in the community you will find elements 
that will respond to things in one way, and then something completely different might 
not respond to change” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
An academic pronounced that development interventions do not effectively target vulnerable 
groups or meet community needs. He suggested that fewer interventions with more targeted 
assistance from international practitioners and greater ownership by communities are needed: 
 
“When people do it themselves they do it better. We are driven by models that do not 
apply here…People are not critical about it, they accept it because they need jobs and 
they need money. There are too many interventions. So much confusion…They just 
need a little bit of assistance and they will do so much better” (TU-1230-240910). 
 
A senior public servant advocated that development practitioners need to find ways of creatively 
combining approaches using both ‘Western’ and East Timorese knowledge systems: 
 
“International agencies and the community need to improve how to combine these two 
ideas, Western perspectives of development and [the] Timor-Leste context. Some 
people, they need to try [harder] because we come from different histories, different 
backgrounds and climate, and it is not easy” (TL-1300-170910). 
 
7.2.7 Summary: Lulik 
 
My research reveals many different perspectives on the use of Indigenous East Timorese culture 
to achieve development and peacebuilding goals. There are distinct, complex and overlapping 
differences in the way in which Indigenous East Timorese culture is respected, acknowledged or 
used. Principally, the divisions indicated by my research are among citizens, elites and 
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international practitioners. There are also divisions between those who live in rural or remote 
Timor-Leste or urban areas, men and women, older people and youth, those who fought in the 
resistance, were involved in the clandestine movement or were Indonesian collaborators. The 
plural identities of most East Timorese mean that few individuals are easily categorised. My 
research shows that differing historical experiences under Portuguese colonialism and 
Indonesian occupation have left many East Timorese with very different perspectives, respect 
for, understanding or use of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and cultures.  
 
Participants stressed the importance of prioritising Indigenous peacebuilding practices; the need 
to recognise and value complex and diverse Indigenous knowledge systems; and understanding 
that East Timorese identities are plural and localised. They argued that it is important that 
decision-makers prioritise customary links to land and place, and the importance of land and 
place to community kinship networks and belonging, and food sovereignty. Participants also 
emphasised the importance of teaching and using local languages and Tetum to facilitate greater 
participation and consultation with East Timorese communities. Equal access to education for 
all citizens is viewed as fundamental to inclusive and informed decision-making. Finally, 
participants emphasised the importance of working with local contexts to target development 
and peacebuilding. 
 
The movement towards a revival of cultural practices is crucial and is supported by some 
elements of the Government and international practitioners. This active support, coupled with 
greater use of Indigenous knowledge and lulik practice at a rural level provides a potential base 
for elites and international practitioners to learn more. To support these changes, international 
practitioners will need to undertake attitudinal changes that enable individual and organisational 
openness to learn about Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. To facilitate this change, 
East Timorese will also need to be open to sharing elements of their Indigenous knowledge 
systems with outsiders. This process of sharing knowledge and listening is and will be 
challenging for all pracititioners.  
 
Support for Indigenous knowledge exchange must entail more than rebuilding physical 
structures, such as uma lulik, or practicing customary dances or weaving. Revitalising 
Indigenous knowledge practices entails exploration into alternative perspectives on leadership 
and decision-making, conflict transformation and economic exchange, as I described in Chapter 
Six. These efforts will be complex because different communities across Timor-Leste hold very 
different Indigenous knowledge and practices but this living diversity underlines the importance 
of this endeavour. 
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7.3 Power / Lisan (seek balance within power) 
 
At the heart of East Timorese Indigenous knowledge systems is an ongoing balancing of 
power/lisan between individuals and between and within groups. Chapter Five, particularly the 
sections on Indigenous peacebuilding practices and insider / outsider rituals, provides examples 
of how Indigenous East Timorese knowledge is used to rebalance systemic inequalities and 
transform structural violence. Using these techniques, Timor-Leste has negotiated this balance 
throughout its challenging history with mixed results.  
 
Participants saw inequality as a primary trigger of violence, and the crux of the failure to 
transform the root causes of violence. In this section I highlight issues of inequality and 
imbalance that East Timorese participants have witnessed or experienced which have distorted 
and changed power dynamics, and affected development and peacebuilding outcomes.  
 
I study the inequality between East Timorese, and assess the impact of international 
practitioners and programs on inequality or structural violence. A program manager with a 
bilateral development partner explained that high levels of inequality impacted the effectiveness 
of development interventions: 
 
“If there is no balance in power, [there is] also no balance in development impact. It 
will lead to [conflict] one day! In ten or fifteen years after the 2012 elections, we will 
see” (TTM-1500-150910).  
 
In a case study of the East Timorese NGO La’o Hamutuk I observe some of the challenges of 
enabling FPIC. Participants offer suggestions on how to build greater equality across Timor-
Leste, drawing on Indigenous East Timorese knowledge. It should be stressed that in the case of 
gender equality, participants also cited the importance of learning from modern relationships 
between women and men. This flexible approach demonstrates the pragmatism of East 
Timorese and underscores the complexity and adaptability of Indigenous knowledge systems 
and customary practices. 
 
7.3.1 Work within Indigenous leadership and governance systems 
 
Participants explained that Indigenous leaders still play very important roles within the rural 
communities, particularly in regards to decisions on land use and ownership. A community 
leader emphasised the importance of the lia-nain explaining that they were the people who 
know the stories and the background of land ownership and use (TQ-1000-210910). A former 
resistance leader agreed that the lia-nain continue to play a critical role in resolving community 
land disputes, particularly to alleviate the blockages within the modern court system (TV-1530-
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240910). Participants asserted that both Government and international practitioners should work 
more closely with Indigenous leaders to support community-level decision-making and 
participation.  
 
Many participants saw the modern, top-down, patriarchal and Dili-centric governance system as 
highly problematic, creating a disequilibrium of power between citizens and elites. An academic 
explained that the colonial system is still influencing current power dynamics: “Today we have 
a very centralised and top-down state government. You could call it a little fascist. It is no 
different [from] Suharto in Indonesia” (TU-1230-240910). A development analyst agreed, 
describing the governance system as “feudal” (TD-1700-130910). One senior peacebuilding 
specialist explained that “In Timor leaders are quite strict, because they have been oppressed for 
so long. If someone tells you what to do, you do it” (TTK-1630-100713).  
 
A peace researcher viewed top-down governance as a systems failure that created inequality and 
aggravated violence. She explained that this power imbalance prevents Timor-Leste’s 
development: 
 
“At the bottom of the pyramid people feel nothing. In the top there is just a few people 
but they control everything. I would describe that as a conflict between people …The 
Government has the power to change that system, but the Government does not use this 
power in a good way yet. All the Ministries just sit together and talk, and when they 
have to implement [programs] it is so hard, because they never involved the people [at] 
the bottom” (TTG-1500-300910).  
 
Examination of the elite divide is fundamental to understanding how violence is triggered in 
Timor-Leste. All participants tied divisions between citizens and the elites to historical and 
recent violence triggered by the conflict between leaders. A security specialist expanded:  
 
“There are unresolved problems during the resistance, and between the resistance 
leaders in the jungle and the resistance leaders abroad. After we got independence, we 
think everything is okay [sic]. But…when the crisis happened, most of these people 
were involved” (TTR-0900-061010). 
 
Many participants cited poor leadership and unresolved violence as the key drivers for the 
2006–2008 intra-state violence. Two university students described East Timorese leaders as 
self-interested and immoral, noting that the 2006 crisis could have been resolved without 
violence if the leaders had put aside their personal interests and talked (TM-1000-190910; TO-
1000-190910). A program manager at a bilateral donor explained that strong elites dominated 
political decision-making and excluded and disempowered Indigenous and local peoples: 
 
“The Indigenous people do not have power against those elite Timorese, who we call 
mestizos: half Timorese, half malae…There is no justice here, there is no rule of law. It 
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is the rule of deals. Rule of Xanana. Rule of Horta. Rule of Alkatiri. Not what we call 
the rule of the people, no” (TTM-1500-150910). 
 
Political parties were seen to manipulate groups, especially youth, for their interests. As a result, 
many participants reported that they did not want to be involved in politics or political parties. 
An NGO peacebuilder illustrated the links between elite level conflict and violence in grassroots 
communities: 
 
“They are fighting in the television and then you are fighting in the community. You 
know why? Tonight they are fighting on television, tomorrow night they are gathering 
together and having a big drink, eat, they are one, together. But you, you in the 
community are fighting for nothing. If two buffalo fight each other, they fight each 
other in the green grass, the buffalo never dies, but the green grass all around them has 
died. This is a simple example” (TX-1600-260910). 
 
Politicians raise unrealistic expectations. A former politician criticised the unrealistic views of 
elites who think they can use the oil revenues to create a “mini-Singapore” (TTH-0930-
011010). He observed that the current centralised government system did not yet have the 
institutions and structures to achieve development: “They have a lot of money but they cannot 
implement it…If you look at the rural areas, [there is] no significant change at all” (TTH-0930-
011010). To manage these challenges, he explained that it was essential to create an inclusive 
national development plan and prioritise realistic goals in each sector so that people can live “by 
their own means, rather than live on handouts” (TTH-0930-011010). A development analyst 
agreed, emphasising that weak state institutions prevented effective decentralisation and he 
suggested that development practitioners should focus on empowering communities:  
 
“The perception in villages is that there is no presence of the state. The only way to 
empower people is to give them some responsibilities and teach them how to perform 
[these responsiblities]” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
Many participants questioned the sustainability and purpose of the current high level of 
government expenditure. An NGO director agreed that while there were benefits to the 
Government cash handouts, they could cause further dependency on the state. She asserted that: 
“The problem is that you [the Government and international organisations] are creating a 
handout mentality, they [recipients] lose their creativity and innovation. It is also a potential for 
conflict in the future” (TTA-1600-280910). An analyst with a multilateral organisation 
explained that using oil revenues for cash transfers was a culturally appropriate way of 
“repaying” those who fought in the resistance, but he questioned the sustainability and argued 
the practice increased corruption in communities. He suggested “not to give out money, but to 
increase the social services” (TTT-1400-011010). An academic declared that continuing 
economic disparities have caused tensions between elites and citizens: 
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“They told us that when you have independence in East Timor, everyone will be the 
same. But some people in the parliament they have USD 3,000 [per month] and how 
much do the people in the village earn every year? People don’t talk about this” (TU-
1230-240910). 
 
7.3.2 Break patterns of dependency 
 
East Timorese expectations regarding reciprocity are not clear. Participants also highlight the 
contradiction between these expectations, which have their roots in customary systems, and the 
problems associated with high levels of dependency. Dependency places East Timorese in a less 
powerful position where they rely on outsiders and modern knowledge systems to resolve 
challenges. Systemic inequality creates structural violence. A majority of participants linked 
dependency to a lack of ownership and sustainability. They blamed high levels of dependency – 
by either international practitioners or government – for the failure to achieve peace and self-
determination in Timor-Leste.  
 
Participants explained that historical dependence on outside or elite authority figures had 
distorted East Timorese participation in decision-making and customary leadership. This past 
makes it very difficult to break patterns of dependency. A senior public servant identified that 
dependency as having left many East Timorese feeling disempowered and marginalised: 
 
“Sometimes we take away people from the development, instead of putting people at 
the centre of development, and many people feel that they have been eliminated from 
their own country …People are starting to slowly deepen their dependency to the 
outside. It builds between people inferiority and superiority. It has changed the whole 
social system” (TL-1300-170910). 
 
An analyst with a multilateral agency explained: “Many people are expecting the state to give 
them everything they need” (TTT-1400-011010). A senior peacebuilding specialist echoed 
Traube’s (2007) “unpaid wages” theory, explaining that many East Timorese have expectations 
that they deserve compensation for their suffering, without being accountable for their actions 
(TTK-1630-100713). An academic linked dependency to future violence (TU-1230-240910). A 
program manager at a bilateral development agency agreed that the failure to achieve 
development outcomes has resulted in unmet high expectations in communities, and created 
frustration toward international practitioners and the Government: 
 
“I just feel like everyone is starting to have high expectations. They are complaining: 
‘You said that once independent we would get a house for free’. The concept of self-
determination wasn't very clear…When we talk about self-determination, we talk about 
independence. We must be free from everything” (TJ-1500-150910). 
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A former politician accused international bilateral and multilateral organisations of increasing 
dependency by raising expectations, and accused the Government of corruption. His statement 
indicates the significant levels of frustration many East Timorese participants directed toward 
international practitioners: 
 
“I do not deny the support that we are receiving from the Australian Government, but 
they played a very bad role in Timor-Leste. They helped to raise expectations and to 
accuse the previous Government of corruption. It was very hypocritical. Other donors 
as well, even the World Bank…this is a sort of [moral] corruption. Probably they 
wanted to say this so that they could say that the Timorese are not capable of governing 
this country: ‘we should all stay here in Dili to teach them how to do things’ ” (TTH-
0930-011010).  
 
A senior UN adviser declared that communities want ownership over development programs; 
they do not want their needs determined by outsiders:  
 
“Self-determination means that they [communities] are independent, that they don't 
want to be dependent on anyone economically, financially or socially. At the village 
level…they [communities] want these projects managed by the locals. We want to own 
these ourselves. We [international practitioners] want to encourage them to do this, 
because when we leave they [communities] are the ones who should continue to sustain 
whatever we have set up” (TA-1100-090910).   
 
She added that independence equally applies to women who do not want to be economically or 
socially dependent on men (TA-1100-090910). A former resistance leader advocated that 
citizens must reclaim their independence: 
 
“After a very long time under Portuguese colonialism, and twenty-four years under 
Indonesia's brutal regime, we have not jumped to develop an independent mentality. 
Under colonial rule we always were told what to do, but now we have to say: how can I 
develop this country?...We have to be independent thinkers, we need to be independent 
in economic ways. Everything must be transparent, accountable, credible and 
responsible” (TV-1530-240910). 
 
A university student explained that East Timorese should work collectively, relying on local 
intelligence and capacities to meet challenges: 
 
“We have potential, we have intelligence, we can change the future of this country. The 
most important thing is to sit together, discuss, and try to find out a solution. As a wise 
person said, just one stick will not be able to sweep the rubbish, but a group of sticks, 
they can sweep” (TO-1000-191910). 
 
A peace researcher put long-term education and information sharing as the solution to 
dependency, pointing out: “In rural areas, people have no access to electricity, television, radio, 
and if nobody goes there to share information, how can they know?” (TTG-1500-300910). A 
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senior public servant suggested slowing the pace of development to fit the capacity and needs of 
communities to overcome dependency: 
 
“They will just take time because their way of life is different. We need to continuously 
support, not undermine, and value what exists and then go ahead. Sometimes we will 
fall down and fail; then they will find a way to get up. Development provides a way to 
gain experience, find an idea, to get their own small community and build confidence” 
(TL-1300-170910).  
 
A development analyst saw community empowerment as the best way to reduce dependency 
toward the state and outsiders: 
 
“I guess the best way of empowering people would be to set up a proper framework that 
allows co-management. People [should be] actually taking responsibility for the 
resources instead of the state becoming like the patron and people knowing, every time 
they encounter a problem, that the Government will do something about it. A lot of the 
time the solution is already there” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
7.3.3 Recognise corruption as both moral and economic 
 
Some East Timorese respondents saw corruption as being a widespread, influential and highly 
sensitive issue. Corruption was not just seen as an inappropriate exchange of goods or services 
where those involved benefitted materially. Poor moral decisions were also seen as corruption 
with respondents citing impunity, domestic violence, extra-marital affairs and substance abuse 
as examples of moral corruption. Participants identified three main perpetrators of corruption: 
individuals, the Government and international practitioners.  
 
Economic corruption was attributed to selfishness and immorality, but there was also an 
acknowledgement that this type of corruption had roots in a distortion of the customary 
reciprocal exchanges used to cement relationships and agreements. A university student 
elaborated that relationships and cultural links through one’s uma lulik and ethno-linguistic 
groupings were often still more important than national identity. He believed this led to 
workplace discrimination where family members were prioritised over more skilled workers 
(TO-1000-190910). Another development practitioner explained how this corruption works in 
practice:  
 
“If someone manages to become wealthier, they have to give their money away to their 
families. If I don’t have any money in my pocket, I will take it from my 
company…This is a mix of cultural and personal because it is obligatory” (TF-0900-
140910). 
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This finding highlights how complex Indigenous systems can be distorted by modern 
development and governance systems. Many East Timorese find it very difficult to negotiate 
complex and plural governance systems without transgressing the rules of these different 
systems. Imbalances and corruption between and within these systems were seen as a key cause 
of inequality as well as structural and cultural violence.  
 
Participants speculated that the foundations of corruption seen mostly in the Government and 
the private sector lay in the patron-client governance systems used by the Portuguese and 
Indonesians. A university student explained that the patron-client system worked to exacerbate 
differences between groups, which she described as “racial discrimination”. She warned that 
this unequal development could exacerbate intra-state violence (TM-1000-190910). A senior 
public servant believed that Timor-Leste’s history created a more individualistic and avaricious 
society: 
 
“We just fought against colonialism and occupation, and we are just free from that, but 
we still [have] a long way [to go], a long struggle to free our people from our own 
selfishness, from our own idea of just thinking about ourselves, from the temptation that 
we will take more” (TL-1300-170910). 
 
International development and private sector organisations were particularly seen as 
contributing to greater inequality and moral corruption. A former politician explained that it is 
important to review and publicise which organisation and sectors receive international, private 
sector or Government funding because financing can silence dissent and advocacy: 
 
“The problem is that most of the national NGOs, most of them are now quiet because 
they receive money from the Government. They don’t dare to criticise the Government. 
International agencies are probably are also frightened to criticise, probably because the 
Government has threatened them [by saying] that they must leave the country...Now 
they are in a dilemma” (TTH-0930-011010). 
 
One development analyst suggested that while he did not condone corruption, providing 
targeted support is an important part of building trusted relationships between partners. He 
explained that international practitioners should find ways to work within the existing patron-
client system to support reciprocal exchanges:  
 
“Be willing to provide before you ask them to do things. It’s all about exchanging 
favours. They need to trust you as a development partner. It’s a patron-client system. If 
you are a development partner you have to be a good patron. We are not talking about 
hundreds of dollars of unrestricted funds. If you target those little things you will build 
trust. Now if someone comes and asks for an international trip, well, no. Or if they ask 
for more per diem – just say no” (TD-1700-130910). 
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Participants equated moral and economic corruption with building resentment between citizens 
and elites, and international practitioners. Ultimately, both moral and economic corruption 
distort power and compound inequality. Greater levels of transparency of information, 
education and increased accessibility to free, accurate information were cited as key ways to 
resolve both types of corruption. Participants explained that transparent information sharing is 
an important way of enabling communities to make informed decisions and control the type of 
development and peacebuilding that occurs in their communities. Participants suggested that 
international practitioners should work closely with the Anti-Corruption Commission and 
NGOs which target accountability and transparency, such as La’o Hamutuk and the Judicial 
System Monitoring Program (JSMP) (TL-1300-170910).  
 
7.3.3.1 Case Study: La’o Hamutuk 
 
The Dili-based East Timor Institute for Development Monitoring and Analysis, known as La’o 
Hamutuk (Tetum: walking together), is an independent local NGO formed in 2000. It is funded 
by private foundations, NGOs, governments of small countries and individual donations. La’o 
Hamutuk monitors and analyses the activities of the Government, the private sector and 
international organisations operating in Timor-Leste, to share information and build 
understanding between international actors and East Timorese. By sharing and making 
information public, it supports transparency and provides communities with the information 
fundamental to enabling their FPIC.   
 
La’o Hamutuk provides written reports, government submissions and radio broadcasts in 
Tetum, English and Indonesian on diverse topics including security sector reform, land reform, 
law and justice and economics. La’o Hamutuk (2010, p.10) was the first organisation to publish 
information that between 1999 and 2009 Timor-Leste received approximately USD 5.2 billion 
in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), but only one-tenth reached the local economy. 
The majority of this ODA funding went to infrastructure and international staff salaries. This 
practice of paying international staff larger salaries is colloquially known as ‘boomerang aid’ 
and is seen to exacerbate social and economic imbalances within society. An NGO director 
elaborated: 
 
“Often they have big budgets, but only a small part of this is shared with the people. 
Often there is an emphasis on companies to create physical infrastructure, or they spend 
a lot of money paying advisers. Twenty-five per cent stays in the country and seventy-
five per cent goes overseas. One of our colleagues did a calculation and said that ten per 
cent of the last ten years of aid budgets stayed in Timor-Leste” (TTA-1600-280910).  
 
A senior public servant voiced his frustration with this form of ‘boomerang aid’: 
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 “What percentage of the money goes back to the country that sends the money? Buy a 
nice car, a nice laptop, rent a nice house with a huge salary, with a high per diem. How 
many people could be empowered with that small little bit of money? Australia declared 
USD forty million to Timor-Leste, but do they count how many million goes to 
Australia, and how many million goes to the people of Timor-Leste?” (TL-1300-
170910). 
 
Participants explained that East Timorese feel disempowered by the lack of control they have 
over the funding decisions of international organisations. They added that international 
organisations who held the funding consequently held the majority of power, even if they did 
not understand the context or the best way to deliver the programs.  A senior peacebuilding 
specialist agreed: 
 
“International aid should be left up to the locals to decide, because [internationals] tend 
to focus on different areas [sectors], and other areas get underfunded. Then everyone 
offers to work on that area, because that is what the donors are funding, so that there are 
ten projects in one development area” (TTK-1630-100713). 
 
An NGO director assessed that a lack of education and access to information aggravated 
violence and corruption during the 2006–2008 crisis: 
 
“Part of it was a lack of information but part of it was the interests of foreign 
institutions and nations in Timor-Leste’s resources. Because of this lack of information, 
it was easy for these institutions and nations to influence Timor, to influence the 
political parties and it made it much easier for the people to fall” (TTA-1600-280910). 
 
La’o Hamutuk’s widely publicised information about the extent of ‘boomerang aid’ in Timor-
Leste had a big impact on bilateral aid policy. Their research, combined with information from 
other organisations, sparked international condemnation toward the very large salaries paid to 
international advisers. As a result, Australia changed its policy in 2010, setting a maximum cap 
on adviser salaries. La’o Hamutuk continue to make public information on a range of 
controversial issues and programs. Staff work with communities that are affected to understand 
the impacts of Government and international organisations’ funding decisions. This information 
sharing is key to enabling FPIC by East Timorese communities, supporting their response to 
potential violence and corruption.  
 
7.3.4 Create balance between women and men 
 
Inequality in relationships between women and men was raised as a significant issue causing 
structural and cultural violence in Timor-Leste. Gender rights, participation, family and sexual 
violence and economic empowerment were all cited as concerns involving a complex clash 
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between Indigenous and modern systems. Despite the increased focus on gender equality by 
international practitioners and some areas of the Government, many participants said gender 
continued to be overlooked or marginalised. Participants also explained that ‘gender’ is a tricky 
issue to discuss because the word is now associated with a range of negative connotations by 
many East Timorese men, and some women. Not only is ‘gender equality’ strongly and 
negatively associated with the type of liberal peacebuilding pushed by the UN and many 
international practitioners, but it is also associated with an abrogation of the customary 
relationships between women and men. As a result, participants said that many East Timorese 
do not want to talk about gender equality. 
 
Some participants explained that in Timor-Leste, women are viewed as divine. Customarily 
they hold authority and power in a sacred balance with men. However, participants also 
acknowledged that these Indigenous systems do not equate with the modern concept of gender 
equality. As a result of colonialism and modernisation, the customary lisan balance between 
women, men and the sacred/divine has often been ignored, causing men to dominate decision-
making and modern governance processes. An NGO director described how gender 
relationships had changed as a result of colonialism: 
 
“In the time of our grandfathers’ grandfathers’, women and men could both access the 
land. When the colonialists came, they started to put limitations on what men and 
women could do. This started to undermine local culture” (TTA-1600-280910). 
 
A government adviser extrapolated further on the gendered changes to Indigenous culture: 
 
“Power is [with the men]. Ritual and authority is with the woman and men cannot act 
without the authority of women…The symbol that we have on the sacred house 
represents these values. The pigeon represent the female values, the star represents the 
sacred core or values, the buffalo represents strength, the male values…Our society 
functions based on the balance between the three [pigeon, star, buffalo]. Now it has 
been ignored, we have been functioning with only the buffalo horn” (TG-1500-140910). 
 
He also observed that patriarchal colonialism and particularly the Catholic Church distorted 
Indigenous gender relationships: 
 
“[The] Church came in and they introduced the idea of men as god. And they saw 
women as the sinner, and that changed Timorese’ minds when they saw all women as 
sinners. Which is not very good for gender at all. Before, we said ‘women are sacred’ ” 
(TG-1500-140910). 
 
Gendered power dynamics in Timor-Leste create situations where women are confronted with 
both ideological and physical barriers to active participation. A senior UN adviser said that it 
was essential to establish a dialogue about gender equality and what that meant for changes to 
culture and relationships: 
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 “It was very challenging for us to talk to those traditional leaders…In their mind they 
do not think that women also have a human right, like the others – like men…They say 
are you coming to change our cultures and traditions?...So we are trying to explain to 
them that we are not trying to change the culture, but we are trying to bring something 
that will change our lives” (TA-1100-090910). 
 
She added that there are long-term systemic and cultural barriers to achieving greater women’s 
participation: 
 
“I think from the patriarchal point of view we have been living in this kind of cultural 
system for a long time. Normally women are placed as second-class citizens. They are 
given roles in the domestic sphere but not the public sphere…Men are the ones who 
hold the power and make the decisions. If the women want to run, for example as Suku 
or village chief, or for an MP [Member of Parliament], then she has to sacrifice her 
family or children. If they don't have the support of the family or community then it is 
another challenge for them” (TA-1100-090910). 
 
Many participants believed that gender inequality contributes to uneven and failed development 
in rural areas. As an NGO director confirmed, “In the rural areas in particular, women and 
mothers die because they cannot access health services” (TTA-1600-280910). A former 
politician agreed that women in rural areas experienced greater gender inequality and that this 
discriminatory culture must change for equal development to occur (TTH-0930-011010). A 
peace researcher argued that threats of violence prevented rural women in particular from 
participating in discussions:  
 
“It is very hard for the women in rural areas to express what they feel and what they 
want for themselves and their families. They think everything that is decided by their 
husband or the father is the best thing for them…In the districts, the women will just 
say, ‘okay, okay my husband’, even though violence is happening in their houses” 
(TTG-1500-300910). 
 
All female and many male participants agreed on the importance of taking the time and creating 
inclusive spaces to encourage women’s participation in discussions and decision-making. An 
NGO director explained that a simple method to encourage women’s participation in a culture 
dominated by men is to hold women’s only consultations: 
 
“We need to give encouragement to women to participate. It is a patrilineal system. 
Men dominate. Often in meetings where there are both men and women, women don’t 
feel comfortable to participate. They think, ‘who is going to listen to me?’ One way is 
to have women only discussions” (TTA-1600-280910).   
 
She also recognised the need to prioritise the education and inclusion of men to achieve gender 
equality: 
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“Often [men] do not give priorities and opportunities to women. Often our grandfathers 
will say, what is the point of a women to be educated if she is also going to come back 
and be in the kitchen? So part of it is also needing to [focus on] men too. So the men 
can cook and look after the kids while the women go to the consultation” (TTA-1600-
280910). 
 
Participants highlighted education as the primary, long-term method that can achieve balance in 
the relationships between women and men and women’s engagement in decision-making. A 
former politician acknowledged that increasing women’s education is a long-term process 
(TTH-0930-011010). A government adviser agreed, noting:  
 
“If the woman gets enough education then they will know what they have to do for 
themselves. They will become an independent person. It is very long-term” (TG-1500-
300910). 
 
The complexity of gender inequality discussed by participants underscores that there is a need 
to find a new way of balancing relationships between women and men. This new relationship 
will need to be gradually negotiated, and should draw on Indigenous concepts of gender to 
examine how these concepts apply to today’s world (Hunt, 2015, pers. comm., 18 November). 
 
7.3.5 Summary: Lisan 
 
Much of the power and decision-making during Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian 
occupation was held by non-East Timorese. Elites were co-opted into the colonial system and 
supported the integration and domination of modern knowledge and development practices. My 
research indicates that these practices continue today.  
 
Participants highlight that the process of rebalancing power has been clouded by international 
development interventions and elites who have not understood or respected the need to rectify 
existing power imbalances within the East Timorese community. Evidence shows that the 
complex processes, institutions and structures that create violence and imbalance are sometimes 
difficult for both insiders and outsiders to identify and address.  
 
Dependency and economic and moral corruption are forms of structural violence, supported by 
institutions and cultural expectations that disempower and position East Timorese knowledge, 
skills and capacities as less worthy. Increased access to education and transparent information 
sharing was recommended to overcome these challenges. Creating balance in the relationships 
between women and men is vital in order for all East Timorese to benefit from development.  
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Policies and programs from international practitioners that do not act to empower local 
communities, compound these structures of inequality. It is important to re-frame these 
development and peacebuilding institutions and approaches to allow East Timorese to take 
control over all decision-making and reduce dependency. Even if mistakes are made, or change 
is slow, this shift is seen by East Timorese as being a fundamental condition for preventing 
international practitioners from perpetuating structural violence. 
 
Participants highlighted that to continue to exclude Indigenous East Timorese governance 
systems from the broader governance of Timor-Leste will result in the continued 
disenfranchisement of significant parts of the population who are committed to Indigenous East 
Timorese self-determined development.  
 
7.4 Relationships / Slulu (work cooperatively) 
 
Building strong and trusting relationships was cited by all participants as critical to achieving 
peace and development. Centuries of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation left 
behind a community characterised by deep societal rifts and historical distrust. Participants 
highlighted that historical unresolved violence is at the root of the asymmetrical relationships 
between East Timorese and elites. In Timor-Leste, trust between the Government and citizens 
existed only where pre-existing relationships and mutual understandings had been built (Hunt, 
2008a). A senior peacebuilding specialist observed: 
 
“Some [conflicts] have lasted for hundreds of years. Others are about who was in the 
resistance and who wasn’t. Some [are] about ‘you killed my brother’, those kinds of 
unresolved issues. They have not had justice” (TTK-1630-100713). 
 
Trust is a critical part of relationships. A senior UN adviser illustrated how poor development 
destroys trust: 
 
“Our work should bring trust. There are some organisations trying to help people, but 
after the project finishes, the building does not last long. The quality of the project is 
not very good. Are you just coming to bring the rubbish to bring here?  Or are you 
trying to build something that can be used for a long time?  Give it to them to build it so 
they can use it for a long time…It is very hard to build relationships” (TA-1100-
090910). 
 
Participants identified the importance of slulu, working in solidarity, to achieve self-determined 
development goals (Pinto, 2015, pers. comm., 8 December). This cooperative relationship 
building has deep cultural roots that lead to reciprocal exchanges across generations. An 
experienced NGO peacebuilder identified the importance of working collectively to achieve 
community goals: 
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 “In traditional language we call it slulu. This is to motivate people to work together in 
their community, to contribute to the development in their community. The people 
always use the term slulu to participate in all the activities in their community” (TN-
1300-200910). 
 
She emphasised the importance of a strong working relationship between East Timorese and 
international practitioners to achieving development outcomes: 
 
“The relationship, between [the NGO] and the partners, donors, can also contribute to 
development. The relationship with donors is through the financial support. Our donors 
have the same vision to contribute to development, in terms of transforming conflict in 
the community. We meet often with donors to develop our program better, discussing 
how to develop [the] capacity of staff, how to contribute to the community activities” 
(TN-1300-200910). 
 
A government adviser also explained that the Government needed to value and work with all 
citizens, particularly Indigenous leaders, to resolve ongoing and unresolved violence:  
 
“Peace should be coming from people. Government should facilitate people to have 
their meetings, to create relationships. This is another thing they [the Government] 
misunderstood about this country, because if they are smart, they can use elders. The 
traditional elders to create unity and peace among the population” (TG-1500-140910). 
 
A former resistance leader adds that there are clear signs for international practitioners to help 
them know if they have been successful in building strong relationships while working in 
Timor-Leste: 
 
“If you go to the airport and leave the country, all the local staff will accompany you to 
the airport. But if nobody comes, you need to make question marks” (TV-1530-
240910). 
 
This section describes East Timorese values of building and sustaining relationships, and their 
views on whether and how post-1999 international interventions have built relationships. I focus 
on the relationships between East Timorese elites, citizens and international practitioners. I also 
include a case study on East Timorese NGO PRADET, which supports psychosocial health and 
trauma work for peacebuilding.  
 
7.4.1 Engage in respectful and sustainable capacity strengthening 
 
At the heart of open, positive and constructive relationships is respect and acknowledgement for 
the inherent capacity within each person. Among all the topics discussed during my fieldwork, 
capacity was the issue that clearly differentiated the views between East Timorese participants 
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and international practitioners. At the heart of discussions was the passionately held belief by 
East Timorese that they possessed a strong capacity for change that was not valued. This view 
was differentiated from the negative assumptions toward East Timorese capacity perpetuated by 
the majority of international practitioners I interviewed in Timor-Leste.  
 
A senior public servant acknowledged that a long history of Portuguese colonialism and 
Indonesian occupation, where the majority of East Timorese had no access to formal education, 
resulted in less capacity. He emphasised that this did not mean there was no capacity, just that 
the capacity was different (TL-1300-170910). He blamed international practitioners who, 
because of their assumptions that Timor-Leste was tabula rasa excluded East Timorese from 
participating in decision-making:  
 
“When we got independence, a lot of people came from countries all over the world…in 
solidarity. People came with their perceptions, and they thought Timor-Leste is like a 
white paper. People come in and thought ‘we will start from scratch’. They undermined 
our local capacities, our local knowledge, local experience; humiliating people, their 
culture and identity” (TL-1300-170910). 
 
A former politician agreed that the human capacity of East Timorese was limited after 1999, but 
not absent. He added that this limited capacity reduced the ability to decentralise quickly and 
provide development impacts in rural areas:  
 
“Most of the institutional memory was taken by the Indonesians. That's why we start 
from practically zero. I would never say that we started from zero” (TTH-0930-
011010).  
 
East Timorese participants stated that their knowledge and capacities are often unrecognised 
and devalued by both Government elites and international practitioners. A program manager 
explained that criticisms of capacity were driven by international practitioners and Government 
unfairly comparing Timor-Leste to more developed contexts (TJ-1500-150910). A government 
adviser argued that development has been less effective as a result of assumptions about the 
limited capacity of East Timorese: 
 
“Local ideas are undervalued and Timorese are undervalued. Maybe if you give the 
Timorese the chance to design some of these development projects, they will consider 
the local context, and culture. But because it has been designed by internationals some 
of the things they do are strange” (TG-1500-140910). 
 
Most East Timorese participants described the international focus on increasing state capacity as 
a failure, citing the need for international practitioners and elites to recognise, value and 
empower the use of Indigenous knowledge and skills to achieve peace and development. A 
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development analyst said poorly targeted capacity building had reduced the sustainability of 
development interventions: 
 
“I think most of the development agencies have been a big failure. In ten years of 
capacity development and capacity building and still the reports always say that there is 
no capacity in the country. So what were they doing for the last ten years? I'm pretty 
critical of all of them. You need to be careful with the incentives that you are providing 
and make sure that the community will be able to maintain whatever you are providing, 
that it will not become a burden or create more needs” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
A senior NGO peacebuilder asserted that East Timorese have strong Indigenous capacities, 
particularly to resolve problems non-violently (TN-1300-200910). A security specialist agreed, 
emphasising the need to work with existing capacities: “Set up the institutions for all Timorese, 
not for the malae, but for the Timorese. If we do not have enough capacity, set it up based on 
our capacity” (TTR-0900-061010). A senior public servant stated that international practitioners 
must value East Timorese capacities to achieve results: 
 
“For international agencies I say, come and see the worth of the people, their potential, 
their experience, their skills. Sometimes the international agencies, undermine that. It 
makes people lose their freedom for their own development. Sometimes you need to 
take a long time. You can do it in different ways to make things happen” (TL-1300-
170910). 
 
He criticised the reliance on international consultants and advisers and said these outsiders must 
create genuine partnerships with their East Timorese colleagues to build capacity: 
 
“International people are paid USD 17,000, USD 12,000 per month, Timorese get USD 
200 to USD 150 per month. They [internationals] sit alone in their nice room and when 
they go home they have left nothing for us. It’s because of the language, their 
confidence. Some people work to transfer slowly their knowledge and they also have 
got [sic] experiences and knowledge from their partners, and their partnership is a 
genuine partnership with the local people” (TL-1300-170910). 
 
Some participants cited limited human resources as a reason to slow the pace and timing of 
development, and to view development as a gradual process (TM-1000-190910; TTA-1600-
280910). A program manager at a bilateral development organisation explained that 
international practitioners must focus on building community ownership, otherwise, she 
warned, communities will refuse development interventions (TJ-1500-150910). Another 
program manager suggested that programs needed monitoring, checks and balances to support 
sustainability and ownership (TTM-1500-150910). An analyst with a multilateral organisation 
emphasised the importance of capacity building to strengthen community ownership: 
 
“[Otherwise] if the pipe is broken, we have to wait for people to come and fix it. It takes 
time. We need to own any project” (TTT-1400-011010). 
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A program manager for a bilateral development organisation declared that the focus on 
institutional capacity building resulted in dependency: “Everything is dependent on importing 
from Indonesia and externally” (TTM-1500-150910). A former politician explained that 
relationships between East Timorese and international practitioners have been damaged by poor 
development. He asserted that while there are issues of dependency, there was still a need for 
targeted and sustainable external assistance: 
 
“Yes, [donors have] less power, because our people have become more aware that we 
are being stuffed up by those people…There is a belief that everything needs to be done 
by Timorese, I don't disagree, but while we still do not have the capacity, accept that we 
need to bring people in to help us…People with real expertise who come here willing to 
transfer their knowledge…not people who just graduated from university. We can pay 
for it, rather than waiting for donors to do everything (TTH-0930-011010). 
 
Participants agreed that there was a need for external assistance to achieve development, but 
that Indigenous knowledge and capacities should also be valued and used to resolve the 
complex challenges in Timor-Leste. A peacebuilding practitioner agreed: 
 
“We can adopt some models but we don't need to adopt all of it. Sometimes it can 
become a reference for Timorese to understand the development model” (TTO-1330-
061010). 
 
A senior public servant further illustrated this message: 
 
“People here in Timor Leste, they know how to teach their young children about their 
identity, their culture, their systems. I say bring that international knowledge, and then 
bring others, and let them meet in the middle: two different perspectives” (TL-1300-
170910). 
 
Participants had many suggestions to help achieve stronger capacity. A senior public servant 
suggested learning a local language or Tetum (TL-1300-170910). A government adviser 
emphasised that international practitioners should be facilitators “rather than teaching them, 
patronising them” (TG-1500-140910). Participants proposed the importance of mentoring to 
achieve sustainable learning. A senior peacebuilding specialist explained: 
 
“I prefer mentoring because it is more about building people’s confidence. I always try 
to mentor my staff. [A good mentor is] someone who is patient, good at listening, not 
someone who will takeover and do it because it is quicker” (TTK-1630-100713).  
 
She asserted the importance of having East Timorese decision-makers in leadership roles, 
underlining that international practitioners should promote competent local staff to leadership 
positions: 
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“International heads of organisations tend to come and go, and they are not here for 
long. I think [my East Timorese colleagues] find it easier to work with a [Timorese 
director], it is more relaxed, less stressful. He has a deeper understanding of the context 
and is more able to form relationships with his staff” (TTK-1630-100713).  
 
7.4.2 Enable inclusive consultation and participation 
 
One of the key failures to building relationships identified by participants is the failure by 
international practitioners and the Government to engage effectively with and involve 
communities in decision-making. As a result, many East Timorese people feel voiceless, 
unrepresented and powerless. Exclusion of communities from decision-making is a form of 
structural violence, reinforced by patterns of cultural violence and threats of physical violence.  
 
An NGO director explained that there is confusion in Timor-Leste about what consultation 
means. She explained that in Timor-Leste, communities use the term “socialise” to describe the 
model of information exchange, widely used by international practitioners and the Government, 
that does not require active participation from East Timorese: 
 
“In Timor people often use the term ‘socialise’. It is kind of like a consultation, but you 
are not asking people what they think. For example if the donor wants to help people it 
doesn’t go and speak to the people, it speaks directly to Government. The donors never 
seem to realise this mistake. It is clear that people don’t participate in this process [of 
socialisation]” (TTA-1600-280910).  
 
Her example illustrated that without community consultation, development interventions do not 
target community needs: 
 
“The ideas [are] all brought in from the donors and often these projects do not bring 
benefits to the people. In Oecusse, the donors decided that the community needed to 
plant vegetables, keep chickens and pigs. They did not look at the basic needs. The 
community needed water and until that was resolved, how are they going to do 
anything?” (TTA-1600-280910). 
 
A peace researcher outlined that limited community participation in determining and addressing 
their own development needs was a primary barrier to achieving development. She contended 
that centralised decision-making does not facilitate rural community participation:  
 
“Outside of Dili, in the rural areas, they do not feel any development. They do not 
participate in the development process. We have not set up a good system of 
development that all Timorese can participate in” (TTG-1500-300910).  
 
179 
The current national strategic-planning processes used by the Government and supported by 
international practitioners were also roundly criticised by most participants. An NGO director 
provided an example:  
 
“We don’t yet see an inclusive process. The reality is that the big important people 
make all the decisions. The referendum package [a Government funded program] had 
been used to build a school for the community. But the school was built far away from 
the community, and the road was bad, so people could not use it. It showed that there 
was a really bad planning process from the Government” (TTA-1600-280910). 
 
A program manager at a bilateral development agency agreed that East Timorese did not feel 
part of the decision-making process, describing the lack of consultation as “arrogant” (TJ-1500-
150910). An analyst with a multilateral organisation gave another example of development 
failure: 
 
“A company said: ‘we will construct this road from here to here’. But when the design 
changed, they did not complete any consultation. So when it was completed there were 
people who were unsatisfied because the road is not what they expected. It is lack of 
transparency and accountability. There are not any clear complaints mechanisms” 
(TTT-1400-011010). 
 
A program manager for a bilateral development agency pointed out that each community had 
different development needs that required localised solutions: 
 
“Just a few people get together in a room with a laptop and come out with their strategic 
plan and go out to the community and say this is our plan. It is always a top-down 
approach. Different districts have their own needs. Development should come from the 
people who live in that particular area. Not us, strange people, who come from the 
outside” (TTM-1500-150910). 
 
A government adviser suggested that failure to support consultation or participation is linked to 
incorrect assumptions about the limited capacity of East Timorese (TG-1500-140910). A senior 
UN adviser also observed additional barriers to consultation including poor road conditions, bad 
telephone and other communications systems, everyday commitments and routines including 
harvests and elections, and changeable weather (TA-1100-090910).   
 
Women continue to be marginalised through both the distorted Indigenous and modern 
consultation and decision-making structures. A senior UN adviser explained that involving 
women in all aspects of decision-making were essential:  
 
“Participation has been challenging because of the patriarchal culture. It is hard to talk 
to women to bring their own ideas about development…We have to have their 
[women’s] participation. But before we try to involve them we had to build their 
confidence, their self-esteem…Sometimes you have to go further, to dig down. You 
have to ask them what do they really want.” (TA-1100-090910). 
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 Some participants cited the participation of youth as critical to the future development of Timor-
Leste and observed that youth were also excluded from decision making (TF-0900-140910; 
TTK-1630-100713; TO-1000-190910). A senior peacebuilding specialist emphasised the need 
to work with East Timorese youth, to help them stand up as role models and engage positively 
in change (TTK-1630-100713). A university student declared that youth must contribute to 
development: 
 
“We need to change their [young people’s] minds. They cannot sit and do nothing, 
otherwise in ten years Timor will still be underdeveloped. If we start to do something, 
maybe [in] three or five years we can get out of conflict” (TO-1000-190910). 
 
Participants explained that duplication of development programs was an outcome of non-
cooperation, failing to share information, and poor relationships. Duplication resulted in a waste 
of finite resources and community energy. A former politician argued that the Government 
should continue to facilitate regular donor coordination meetings every month to eliminate 
duplication. He observed: “Now everybody is left by themselves. They are doing what they can 
do in their own way. They are wrecking this country” (TTH-0930-011010). A peace researcher 
expanded:  
 
“The donors, the Government and the NGOs need to work together, because if there is 
no information sharing, we just duplicate the work” (TTG-1500-300910).  
 
Participation by communities in planning and decision making was suggested as the best way to 
build ownership and sustainably implement development. A senior UN adviser recommended 
that East Timorese are the best people to facilitate consultation processes to “get good and 
accurate information from the community” (TA-1100-090910). A development analyst 
explained that by building good relationships, working within community timeframes, and 
empowering local actors; participation will increase: 
 
“To get more participation, you actually need more time and proper relationships with 
the people. Few agencies do that…When you come, don’t show that you have a 
timeframe. If people perceive you as being stressed, you will not get the right answers. 
Take the time to talk to people. Just ask, sit down, expect to wait a lot. If development 
partners take this approach I think they would get more out” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
Participants endorsed extensive and long-term consultation in local languages with informed 
rural communities to support active participation. A former resistance leader believed that at the 
heart of consultation and active participation is listening, which indicates respect between all 
parties: 
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“I listened to you, I say something, you listen to me, and then we find a solution. In that 
way everybody respects each other: how to live in harmony and peace” (TV-1530-
240910). 
 
A development analyst explained that while there are many meetings, listening rarely occurs in 
the current combative development system. He said, “I think people don’t talk to each other 
here, and when they talk they are not willing to listen because the point of the meeting was to 
get your points across, not to listen” (TD-1700-130910). He described how international 
practitioners can support the participation of East Timorese in decision making by slowing 
down and prioritising relationship building: 
 
“You will spend seventy to eighty per cent of your time talking about things that are not 
relevant to the topic that you are discussing. But in the last twenty per cent of the 
meeting you reach all the decisions that [you would] in a normal meeting. It may take 
longer, and you may get bored with the process. They [East Timorese] are trying to 
build a relationship with everybody in the room and the development partners do not 
see that because they are trying to do everything really fast, and to push Timorese to 
work in the same way. Sit down. [Spend] two hours meeting, and in the end have 
everything neatly organised and resolved. In the end we get the results, but they are not 
neatly organised. I think there are some serious problems with development partners 
understanding the process by which Timorese will participate in the process” (TD-
1700-130910). 
 
7.4.3 Design timeframes that suit communities 
 
Almost all East Timorese participants perceived the short timeframes that international 
practitioners work to are highly unrealistic. These timeframes negatively affect the process of 
building relationships between communities and international practitioners, leading to limited 
participation, unmet high expectations, frustration and lack of trust. These unrealistic 
timeframes, supported by inflexible program cycles, indicate systemic failures within the 
current development system.  
 
The problems with timeframes were perceived to be twofold. First, that the pace of development 
was seen as too slow to meet the high expectations of communities. Communities expected to 
see early development impact, or perhaps rewards for their sacrifices to gain independence. 
This perspective is in line with customary expectations around compensation for hardships 
experienced as discussed in Chapter Six. Because widespread development impacts have not 
occurred there is growing frustration toward elites, the Government and international 
practitioners. Second, practitioners disparaged the short timeframes for consultation, design, 
implementation and evaluation perpetuated by international organisations. They stressed the 
need for flexibility and long timeframes to allow for active participation and to meet the diverse 
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needs of communities. Both of these problems occur simultaneously, are contradictory and must 
be resolved in different ways. 
 
An academic acknowledged that while most international practitioners have good intentions, 
relationships with communities have been soured by the failure of the current system to 
implement development evenly across Timor-Leste: 
 
“Development is supposed to mean progress, but progress has been very slow. People 
are disappointed with all these development programs. International agencies, they have 
very good intentions, but sometimes [these intentions are] fake. Development is 
supposed to be long-term, say ten or twenty years. But the donor timeframes are 
maximum five years. Sometimes what we expect to achieve does not fall into the 
donors’ timeframe” (TG-1500-140910). 
 
A senior peacebuilding specialist explained that a slow bureaucracy with hierarchical, lengthy 
or unclear approval processes delayed decision-making. She identified that this was the same 
whether she was working for an NGO, multilateral organisation, bilateral donor or national 
government – although she cited the UN and the EU as having particularly slow decision-
making processes (TTK-1630-100713). A development analyst discussed the specific problem 
of different development organisations having different planning and reporting calendars. This 
led to a lack of coordination and has been a barrier to collegial environments, exacerbating 
frustrations and poor relationships:  
 
“One starts in October and finishes in September, one starts in January and finishes in 
December. The one with the four-year program will take it easy, while the one with the 
one-year program will push the four-year program to do it faster so he can piggyback on 
the other’s work” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
A development practitioner explained that the majority of development interventions in Timor-
Leste are short term, resulting in minimal impacts. He suggested long-term systemic change is 
necessary to resolve this problem (TF-0900-140910).  
 
A senior public servant emphasised a systems failure where individuals and organisations are 
pressured to design, implement, evaluate and report in very short timeframes: 
 
“People want to do things very quickly because all this money is put under conditions, 
with all those indicators. People say yes, we will meet the criteria, meet the indicators, 
and we will give them a very nice report. We will take ten per cent and our people are 
free from poverty. Sometimes the system of aid puts them in a hard situation” (TL-
1300-170910). 
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He also warned that implementation can be delayed by inflexible staffing and reporting 
requirements and that development practitioners need to be much more flexible and work with 
longer timeframes: 
 
“Development partners have very strict deadlines…but here you have constant delays 
so you have to be open to postpone things. Development partners are not that flexible. 
Development partners just need to bear in mind, what you have budgeted might be right 
but it will take twice as long to implement. [Development partners should] provide, not 
more funds, but more time” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
He explained that pushing East Timorese to achieve faster results had a negative impact on 
relationships: 
 
“I think for the development partner agencies, they must realise by pushing they 
actually create more harm than good. A lot of the time they push, and they have a 
Timorese actually trying to drive that process. When the development partner is doing 
this [he] will destroy his whole social network, because other people will see him as a 
puppet of the aid agency…Just another way of colonising” (TD-1700-130910). 
 
Participants suggested greater flexibility and much longer timeframes as the solution to 
unrealistic, rushed timeframes that hinder active community participation within the current 
development system.  
 
7.4.3.1 Case Study: PRADET 
 
Many participants concluded that there has been a comprehensive failure by the Government 
and international development practitioners to acknowledge the extent of trauma in East 
Timorese society. This trauma, caused by a history of repressive colonialism and violent 
occupation deeply affects many East Timorese adults, and also has a direct impact on the 
younger generation, many of whom lived through the intra-state violence in 2006–2008 (Brooks 
et.al., 2011; Field, 2004; Toome, 2012; 2013). Candio and Bleiker (2001, p.71) suggest that it is 
at the personal and grassroots domain where peacebuilding transformation emerges, and 
Lederach (1996, p.20) emphasises that peacebuilding transformation must involve grief and 
trauma work.  
 
Since 2002, the East Timorese NGO Psychosocial Recovery and Development in East Timor 
(PRADET) has operated in Dili and rural Timor-Leste. PRADET is funded by the Government, 
UN agencies, bilateral donors (i.e. Australia, United States), INGOs and faith-based 
organisations (i.e. Trocaire, Plan International, Christian Blind Mission, Caritas Australia) and 
works with other local NGOs. PRADET targets people experiencing trauma, mental illness and 
other psychosocial problems, works to provide safe houses for women and children 
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experiencing violence, and assists youth offenders in prison. They are the only local NGO that 
holistically targets psychosocial health and trauma (Hawkins, 2010). All mental health care 
takes place at a community level and there is limited coordination with hospital-based health 
services (Hawkins & Tilman, 2011). A senior peacebuilding specialist described how 
widespread trauma is: 
 
“A lot of people suffered but they don’t talk about it. Sometimes without warning, they 
will say, this happened to me, and you just don’t know what to say. Timorese will tend 
to laugh when it is painful or sad, I guess it is a coping mechanism. There are mental 
health taboos here. I think it is quite widespread. Mental health is not well serviced” 
(TTK-1630-100713).  
 
As a result of historical violence, many participants acknowledged that development in Timor-
Leste required rebuilding physical infrastructure, but also healing and rebuilding of community 
psychological, spiritual and mental structures. An NGO peacebuilder identified this deeply 
personal challenge: 
 
“If we are talking about development, you have to talk about healing. There are many 
people in remote communities who suffer from stress and trauma. We need to talk about 
it in development. Many people think about changing the world but no one things about 
how to change him or herself…Talking about development is good, but it is better to 
change yourself first, and then you can look after [others]” (TX-1600-260910). 
 
An NGO peacebuilder agreed, reinforcing the point that complex peace and development goals 
take a long time to achieve: 
 
“If you want to change [behaviour], it does not mean it will be happening in a week or a 
month. Maybe it will happen in four or ten years. When you are talking about change 
you are talking about transformation” (TX-1600-260910). 
 
Participants acknowledged that unless this healing took place and healthy relationships were 
created, peacebuilding and development would not occur. Participants explained that 
unfortunately psychosocial health and trauma has not been an area of focus for policy or 
programming. Unless these are given much greater focus, and relationships are rebuilt within 
East Timorese communities, the risk of future violence is high. An international program 
manager explained: 
 
“No one is taking on this aspect that will affect everybody’s people’s [sic] lives every 
day for a long time to come. People don't heal their differences inside, the hurts inside, 
the conflict inside. It just swells up and bursts out, and once they find an avenue for it, it 
will happen. A lot of the stuff that happened in 2006–2007, was just people expressing 
hurt and disorder within themselves, people venting” (TB-1000-100910). 
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7.4.4 Draw on insider / outsider practices to build and sustain relationships 
 
The evidence presented here shows that both international practitioners and some elite East 
Timorese, many of whom lived overseas for long periods of time, are often viewed as outsiders 
by other East Timorese. Participants suggested that Indigenous practices of negotiating 
‘outsiders inside’ should be promoted to manage and sustain more positive relationships 
between East Timorese and with international practitioners. Becoming an insider is both a 
physical, ritual practice and an intellectual, spiritual process, allowing outsiders to become more 
aware and respectful of Indigenous East Timorese systems, and for East Timorese to peacefully 
negotiate a social, cultural and political space for newcomers. Such processes could contribute 
to better supporting self-determined development and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. 
 
Participants strongly linked the processes and rituals of insider / outsider as a potential method 
for creating a shared common cultural perspective with outsider development practitioners and a 
shared national identity for all East Timorese. A senior UN adviser explained that outsiders 
must commit time to building relationships and understanding Indigenous cultures and 
traditions to overcome the differences in knowledge systems and practices: 
 
“You have to know the people and the culture first, to get involved. If you want to do 
something in this village then you have to get involved with [these] people” (TA-1100-
090910).   
 
Participants drew on Indigenous knowledge and cultural practices to explain and understand 
how outsiders fit into their complex social, political and economic system. A government 
adviser described the insider / outsider process as a way to possibly integrate development 
practitioners into East Timorese culture. He explained that it had happened successfully many 
times, particularly with Portuguese colonialists and the Catholic Church, to integrate peacefully 
new concepts and groups of people into Timor-Leste:  
 
“We have the concept of insider and outsider and there are ways to integrate these two 
ideas, to include people….If we still see them as an outsider, there will be 
conflict…When we do the ritual you are considered as an insider and the ideas that you 
are bringing will be incorporated. Our concept is that all the foreigners, all the outsiders, 
are a returned insider… This is how we traditionally function” (TG-1500-140910). 
 
7.4.5 Transform the root causes of violence 
 
An NGO peacebuilder emphasised the critical importance of analysing and understanding the 
root causes of violence to create more effective development interventions (TX-1600-260910). 
He saw state building and peacebuilding as mutually interconnected, and advocated for a 
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partnership approach between government and communities to achieve peace and development 
goals: 
 
“It doesn't mean that state building is on top and peacebuilding is underneath. We have 
to connect them together. If peacebuilding works then state building will also work. [If] 
peacebuilding is strong then development is also strong. But if there is no peace there 
will be no development” (TX-1600-260910).  
 
An academic agreed, noting that the current development focus in Timor-Leste is on poverty 
reduction, but that high levels of corruption and ongoing violence highlight that international 
practitioners have failed to identify the root causes of violence: 
 
“If you look at the World Bank reports or UN reports they always talk about poverty. 
Not looking at the causes of the poverty…I think the 2006 crisis, and today the crisis of 
governance reflects how we have missed the very important fundamental objectives of 
building our country” (TU-1230-240910). 
 
Participants argued that long term, unresolved violence within the community must be 
transformed prior to achieving self-determined development. A program manager for an 
international development agency explained: 
 
“The other issue that hinders development [is] the internal conflict that we have in this 
country…It is essential to have stability and security. If there is stability then everything 
can happen” (TTM-1500-150910). 
 
A senior UN adviser confirmed that peace itself is key to development, and that without peace 
and security, Timor-Leste will not achieve development: “If there is no security they cannot 
develop themselves or their community as well” (TA-1100-090910). She explained that 
ongoing violence made it difficult for development workers to consult with rural communities, 
resulting in fewer programs targeting rural and remote areas (TA-1100-090910). An 
experienced NGO peacebuilder provided an example of how violence affected her work: 
 
“Starting from 1999 up to 2005–2006, we feel secure to contribute to developing our 
community. In 2006 we faced the crisis, for almost one year we did not feel free to stay 
in Dili. We [went] to the mountains, secure places, to protect ourselves there with our 
families. [Now] our situation is peaceful, so we can come back to Dili to do our 
activities” (TN-1300-200910).  
 
While discussing the significant level of ODA funding provided to the security sector, an 
academic warned that if the Government responds to ongoing violence by increasing support to 
security agencies they distort funding away from other important areas of development and 
peacebuilding. He maintained that East Timorese should look to their long history of using 
Indigenous knowledge systems to respond to violence: 
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 “We need to be very careful about the link with security and development because we 
run the risk of building the militaristic culture. People should look after their own 
security. They have the mentality that police or military will come and solve the 
problem. [This] creates dependency of high investment into security instead of 
education and health. Their defence budget goes up, at the expense of social welfare. It 
is a very insecure country. Building up strong security will undermine a lot of other 
issues” (TU-1230-240910). 
 
These views highlight the need to understand the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste and to 
explore the range of options, including Indigenous peacebuilding solutions, to transform these 
ongoing challenges. Participants advocated that without first working towards peace, self-
determined development will not be achieved. 
 
7.5 Conclusion: complexity and pluralism in the East Timorese system 
 
Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems incorporate complex plural worldviews that, 
despite colonialism and violent occupation, continue to be relevant to the daily lives of East 
Timorese. Despite Timor-Leste’s long history of colonialism and occupation my field research 
provides evidence that while some Indigenous knowledge and lulik practices are lost, distorted 
and disrespected, respect for lulik remains strong in rural communities and cultural revival is 
taking place in a variety of ways. In this chapter I detail East Timorese participants’ 
perspectives of how the current development system exacerbates violence, and provide their 
solutions to transform the root causes of violence. In doing this a number of recommendations 
or guiding principles emerge, which I will summarise in Chapter Nine. 
 
When considering how violence can be transformed in Timor-Leste it is important to engage 
with the cultural plurality and asymmetries of power and relationships between East Timorese, 
and between East Timorese and international practitioners. In Timor-Leste, unresolved violence 
within and between communities acts as a trigger for violence and a barrier to effective 
development. Direct violence is deeply connected to unresolved cultural and structural violence. 
It is necessary to understand the interconnected root causes of violence in Timor-Leste and to 
explore the range of options, including Indigenous peacebuilding practices, to transform 
violence. Participants asserted that Indigenous East Timorese knowledge must be validated and 
given equal worth to determine the direction and priorities of any development agenda, and so 
achieve self-determined development goals. Participants consistently contended that without 
peace, self-determined development will not occur. 
 
My participants emphasised the importance of outsider knowledge to help achieve Timor-
Leste’s development goals, but it is also clear that East Timorese participants strongly 
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emphasised the need for change to happen in a way that recognises and respects their 
knowledge systems and capabilities. For example, international practitioners are perceived as 
creating the specific conditions that cause and exacerbate economic and moral corruption.  
 
The push by many East Timorese women and international practitioners to achieve gender 
equality poses a particularly challenge to my thesis which asserts the prioritisation of 
Indigenous knowledge systems in development practice. In this chapter, I have expanded on the 
views of East Timorese men and women, and explained that evolving relationships between 
men and women in Timor-Leste highlight the adaptability of Indigenous East Timorese culture 
and practice. Differing views on and practices of gender equality confirm the pluralism of 
Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. Indeed, how gender relationships occur in 
Timor-Leste is an excellent example of the complexity of these systems.  
 
The deep divisions between elites and East Timorese citizens are trigged by a lack of respect, 
understanding and use of Indigenous knowledge systems. These divisions are at the heart of the 
cultural and structural violence perpetrated mostly by elites toward citizens who want to 
prioritise Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. I argue that transforming these 
relationships is the basic precondition for peacebuilding and for implementing self-determined 
development.   
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8 Perspectives of International Practitioners  
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I analyse the views of approximately fifty international development and 
peacebuilding practitioners, called ‘international practitioners’. This evidence has been collated 
over my three separate fieldwork sessions in 2009, 2010 and 2013 in Australia, the US, UK, 
France, the Netherlands and Timor-Leste. All quotes in this chapter are from these international 
participants, and those interviewed represent a broad cross-section of institutions operating in 
the current development system, including bilateral and multilateral organisations, international 
financial institutions, civil society, faith-based organisations, research think tanks and INGOs. 
Most participants have worked for over twenty years in multiple developing and conflict-
affected contexts. International practitioners who have not worked directly in Timor-Leste have 
been interviewed because of their expertise and lengthy practical experience in similar complex, 
conflict contexts. Participants interviewed in Timor-Leste are coded TA to TTV; all other 
participants are coded A to JJ.  
 
The majority of international participants specifically assessed the effectiveness of development 
and peacebuilding interventions that occurred in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2010. The 
discussion incorporated how each practitioner, and their institution, engaged in the current 
development system and with Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. My analysis 
draws out the levels of direct, structural and cultural violence that result from the interaction of 
these complex systems (Close, 2014).   
 
Overall, international practitioners raised many of the same issues about development practice 
as East Timorese, but often from very different perspectives and with different solutions. 
Participants were careful to say that not all internationally driven development and 
peacebuilding was harmful, and emphasised the relative success of Timor-Leste in achieving 
development outcomes. However, all participants acknowledged that it would be a long time 
before development and peacebuilding goals were achieved in all communities across Timor-
Leste.  
 
In this chapter I share the views and recommendations of these international practitioners to 
suggest how the current development system could better work with Indigenous East Timorese 
knowledge systems to achieve development and peacebuilding goals. The issues raised under 
the section on culture include Indigenous knowledge systems; identities and cultures; a focus on 
the violence and peacebuilding context; land and resources; and local languages. In the section 
on power I look at issues of elitism, gender inequality, ownership and FPIC. Finally, in the 
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section on relationships, I draw out comments from participants on trust, commitment, 
competition, working with capacities, and the need to look after yourself and others 
simultaneously. I focus on understanding how international practitioners could reframe their 
relationships with East Timorese people to better support development and peacebuilding goals. 
 
I illustrate these issues through three case studies: culture: the World Bank’s CEP a nation-wide 
program which ran from 2000 to 2004; power: the development of the SDP 2011–2030; and 
relationships: a new approach to capacity strengthening by the ILO.  
 
8.2 Culture (respect cultural pluralism) 
 
This next section reviews aspects linked to aspects of Indigenous culture in Timor-Leste 
detailed in Chapter Six, and describes how international participants viewed these aspects of 
culture regarding the current system of development and peacebuilding practice in Timor-Leste. 
Broadly, there was a general admission that international practitioners know little of Indigenous 
East Timorese knowledge systems and culture.  
 
In this section, I describe some of the systemic barriers to greater understanding of Indigenous 
culture.  This section draws on the voices of my international research participants to 
extrapolate some of the challenges to eradicating those barriers, and provides their suggestions 
about how to better value and engage with Indigenous culture. I include a case study of the 
CEP, which provides an example of a program that did not take account of local knowledge and 
governance systems and cultural context, creating unsustainable and parallel decision-making 
structures. 
 
8.2.1 Value and engage with Indigenous knowledge systems 
 
Most international practitioners admitted that they do not understand or actively engage with 
Indigenous knowledge systems, identities and cultures in their development and peacebuilding 
work. Most acknowledged that Timor-Leste has a complex and violent history and that East 
Timorese peoples have a mixture of cultures, languages and customary practices that are 
changing and adapting to modernity. They recognised that Indigenous knowledge remained 
important and was valued by many East Timorese. One international practitioner saw that East 
Timorese culture was very different from his: 
 
“They have strong relationships with the natural world. More like the relationships you 
and I would have with each other. They see the creatures of the world, the sun and the 
moon, and aspects of flora and fauna. They have a kind of relationship with those 
things” (TK-1700-160910). 
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 However, international practitioners confirmed that learning about and engaging with these 
complex and plural East Timorese knowledge systems is extremely difficult. As an international 
program manager explained: “It is really hard for a white person to understand the Indigenous 
worldview” (TTU-1600-280910). Another international program manager asserted that 
complexity, lack of trust and lack of access to knowledge influence why Indigenous knowledge 
systems are ignored by international practitioners:  
 
“There are many Indigenous systems that go largely ignored. There are untold layers of 
Timorese society that are really difficult to explore, immensely complex and very much 
misunderstood by the development community….What exists is very difficult for a 
foreigner to access without trust, which of course does not exist. Mistaking its visible 
absence for a complete lack of culture…the development community places very little 
stock in the prior systems that exist. Instead it is a wholesale push to develop 
westernised or modern systems, without adaptation [to] local culture” (TP-1830-
200910). 
 
An international development consultant identified the cultural violence resulting from 
international practitioners who manipulate Indigenous culture: “All of us choose what we say is 
culture. That is particularly poisonous I think” (TE-0800-140910). An international 
development practitioner explained that the process of distorting or marginalising Indigenous 
knowledge systems is racist: 
 
“I tell my students relying upon Western [knowledge systems], ‘claiming that 
everything has to be valued through the lens of Western science is just an invisible form 
of racism’. It is racism, and it is based on racist privilege. We as Westerners…get to 
decide what has value, against our own system of knowledge. To throw out what we do 
not think is of value, or to call it superstition, or to call it crazy or whatever” (GG-0700-
290110). 
 
Many practitioners saw identity and culture in Timor-Leste as a binary distinction between 
‘Indigeneity’ and ‘modernity’, not as dynamic, pluralised and complex systems. One 
international analyst expanded: 
 
“I still find the extent to which a person's political identity can be so diverse 
bewildering. The depth. It's very difficult to focus what people want at any one level. If 
you add another level you get a completely different breakdown. It is taking me a very 
long time to get the full sense” (TC-1500-130910). 
 
An international peacebuilder explained that many people had lost part or all of their Indigenous 
knowledge systems (TT-1500-230910; TTF-0830-300910). An international consultant 
described these changes: 
 
“I have witnessed an uma lulik ceremony, where you saw all the elders sitting around in 
a circle, from a few different villages, and conferring. They had forgotten a lot of the 
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rituals and incantations. So they were borrowing bits from each other and you could see 
that what was going to come out on the day had never been done before. It is part of 
modernity” (TZ-1430-280910). 
 
One international practitioner also underscored the flexibility in Indigenous knowledge systems 
and the pragmatism of Indigenous peoples: 
 
“Traditionally in Timor, there are food taboos, because your ancestors were cows or 
fish or a pig. Therefore you cannot eat them [cows or fish]. In most places it has almost 
died away, but it is strong still in the mountainous areas of Oecusse. They had access to 
prawns and fish but they could not eat them. We were thinking that because this is a 
traditional thing, you just had to leave it, and think of somewhere else for them to get 
some protein. We came back three or four weeks later, and all the children are eating 
prawns. And we said: ‘we thought it was forbidden’. They said: ‘yes, but we did a big 
ceremony and the ancestors said it was okay’ ” (TTF-0830-300910). 
 
An international contractor saw his East Timorese colleagues as pragmatically and dynamically 
balancing their pluralised Indigenous and modern knowledge systems. He observed however, 
that the ambiguity within plural and localised East Timorese identity has been used to trigger 
instability and violence. Using this approach elites and international practitioners have actively 
contributed to these divisions: 
 
“People who are divided are much easier to govern. So foster the infighting and use it to 
your own ends” (TZ-1430-280910). 
 
An international program manager also warned that if international practitioners do not 
acknowledge the recent history of violence, sustainable development will not be achieved (TB-
1000-100910). An international practitioner agreed emphasising that, “a lack of fit between the 
identity and culture of the people and the programs and agendas of the development agencies” 
can trigger violence (TK-1700-160910). One international practitioner accused international 
organisations of deliberately manipulating Indigenous culture leading to structural and cultural 
violence (TE-0800-140910). The head of a multilateral organisation agreed: 
 
“When you are trying to bring in changes to systems and processes you are bringing in 
cultural change. That can potentially be a destabilising factor, or it might lead to a 
failure in the reforms that you are trying to promulgate” (TTD-1700-290910). 
 
Participants explained that international practitioners must incorporate Indigenous knowledge 
systems and cultural practice into development and peacebuilding (TP-1830-200910).  
While many international practitioners recognise that plural identities exist, many do not 
understand how to incorporate this diversity within the current development system. One 
international analyst claimed that the international focus on state building is flawed because 
state institutions do not have the capacity to incorporate Indigenous pluralism: 
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“Timorese have the capacity to speak one language, which is the language of the 
modern state and its institutions, but also speak another language. It is a challenge 
because most of the work the international donors are doing is located in the modern 
world. The problem with the state is if you are unable to build strong institutions in 
which you can express the different identities” (TC-1500-130910). 
 
An international program manager saw the international focus on state formation and 
centralised institutions as a potential trigger for violence: 
 
“People's identities are localised. The notion of being Timorese, is a relatively new 
concept. People don't have a sense of identity, a sense of loyalty to the state or to 
institutions. They are more likely to reject or oppose those institutions, as a potential for 
conflict. I feel sometimes efforts to create national identity and develop cohesion are by 
identifying an ‘other’ ” (TY-1000-290910). 
 
An international adviser saw the creation of a cohesive national identity as a challenging and 
urgent priority (TW-1730-240910). To facilitate this, an international consultant explained that 
international practitioners must step away so East Timorese have space to construct their own 
national identity: “[Donors] could potentially positively or negatively influence it [national 
identity] from the outside but I do not think that they can create it. They should not be meddling 
in it” (TTE-1930-290910).  
 
8.2.1.1 Case Study: Community Empowerment and Local Governance Program 
 
The World Bank managed three phases of the CEP in Timor-Leste, a ‘community-driven 
development program’, from 2000 to 2004 (World Bank, 2000; 2006). Funded through the 
multi-donor TFET and an additional grant from Japan, CEP aimed to “strengthen local capacity 
to build institutions that reduce poverty and support inclusive patterns for growth” (World 
Bank, 2006, p.xi). The World Bank has been accused of applying a ‘one size fits all’ approach 
with the implementation of the CEP in Timor-Leste because the CEP was modelled on the 
Indonesian Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) by the World Bank between 1998 and 
2009, and is similar to Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program (NSP) run since 2003 
(Guggenheim, 2006). Both programs have been accused of failing to achieve sustainable 
development impacts or democratic governance institutions (Beath et.al., 2015; Carroll, 2009). 
CEP was also accused of not working in partnership with UNTAET (Cummins, 2014; Hohe, 
2004). 
 
CEP attempted to form democratically elected village development councils to support local 
governance. It established parallel governance mechanisms, called Conselhos de Suku at the 
suku and posto levels. CEP provided small block grants to the Conselhos de Suku to rehabilitate 
and reconstruct social infrastructure (meeting halls, water and sanitation, health clinics, school 
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classrooms), for economic recovery (seeds, livestock), and social welfare activities (sport). By 
2002, there were 416 Conselhos de Suku with 6,400 elected members. Women held fifty per 
cent of the available Council seats. Phung and Bauer (2004) note that while the CEP did not 
integrate into any other community-level capacity-building programs, it was able to deliver 
resources quickly to reach a large number of communities. Pires (2002) comments that the CEP 
was useful because the policy on equal gender representation created an expectation that women 
should and could participate in governance and decision-making.  
 
Cummins (2014), Chopra (2002), Conroy (2004), Hohe (2004), Kingsbury (2012), Moxham 
(2004), Nixon (2013) and Ospina and Hohe (2002) are very critical of the CEP. They argue it 
failed to work in parallel with Indigenous community governance structures. Kingsbury (2012, 
pp.266-267) explains that CEP rapidly imposed external values, including on governance and 
gender equality, and did not allow for change to happen sustainably out of local, long-term 
processes. Chopra (2002) and Hohe (2004, pp.295-297) note that by excluding Indigenous 
leaders from the Conselhos de Suku, the World Bank established competing community 
governance systems resulting in uneven implementation, duplication and poor planning. Cliffe 
et.al. (2003, p.9) and Cummins and Maia (2012) explain that poor participation also resulted in 
increased community tensions. Moxham (2004) also claims that CEP was financially 
unsustainable: USD 9.7 million was spent between 2000 and 2002 to establish the program and 
approximately fifty-eight cents in every dollar was spent on administering the program (World 
Bank, 2003, p.25). 
 
Carroll (2009) highlights that the CEP/KDP/NSP model is merely an alternative approach of the 
current development system to embed and sustain the neo-liberal market-based agenda through 
community-level governance structures. CEP’s failure to integrate with the existing Indigenous 
governance structures and knowledge systems created parallel governance structures, raised 
expectations without substantive or sustainable outcomes, and lowered community buy-in 
(Moxham, 2004; Ospina & Hohe, 2002). The failures of CEP demonstrate the importance of 
understanding, valuing and applying Indigenous knowledge and cultural systems to governance 
and decision-making.  
 
8.2.2 Prioritise peacebuilding analysis and programming 
 
Participants emphasised that the underlying triggers for violence are not easily apparent to 
international practitioners, and the state remains weak. Participants admitted that the 
international community did not predict the 2006–2008 Crisis. An international consultant 
explained that “There was a sense that we were on the right track and yet it unravelled so 
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quickly” (TTE-1930-290910). She asserted that the root causes of violence threatened 
development: 
 
“The big challenge [here] is the underlying conflict in this country that has not been 
adequately dealt with. It is politically challenging, it is not somebody else's fault, it is 
not somebody else's problem. It is internal, still exists [and] simmers away” (TTE-1930-
290910).  
 
An international consultant believed violence was enabled within the current development 
system in Timor-Leste: 
 
“Because of the policies of divide and conquer, there is a tendency for people to 
factionalise very easily, to divide along linguistic or political allegiances. That all 
ferments away. In a development context, you have a very strong and enabling 
environment for conflict” (TZ-1430-280910). 
 
Some international practitioners identified the need to broaden the current international focus on 
state security to take a human security approach to peace and development. As an international 
security adviser explained: 
 
“We went out to the community and asked how they perceive the police and military, 
what were their security issues. Quite often they would come back and say floods or 
locusts or food. These are the issues that concern them” (TTB-1000-290910). 
 
Practitioners acknowledged that Indigenous knowledge and use of peacebuilding practices in 
Timor-Leste are strong, particularly in rural areas. An international consultant asserted the 
continuing value of Indigenous peacebuilding practices and strong intergenerational 
relationships in balancing, stabilising and unifying rural communities: 
 
“These communities are much stronger and have much more unifying social forces than 
in Dili. There is more intense confrontation and escalation of conflict in Dili. There is 
the whole thing about balance within customary practices. The good community leaders 
will talk about balancing those needs” (TZ-1430-280910).  
 
After the violence in 2006–2008, the Government provided a range of pension and 
infrastructure programs targeting violence reduction by potential spoilers, including ex-
combatants and military veterans. Many participants, including one international consultant 
explained that these Government policies pacify people in the short term, but do not address the 
root causes of violence: 
 
“The short-term solution is being used as the long-term solution, but the short-term 
solution could become a huge long-term problem. If you don't address some of the 
underlying issues, money itself is not going to solve Timor's issues. It is not a panacea” 
(TTE-1930-290910). 
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Another international adviser explains that this policy was pushed by vested interests: “You 
have a government that has obligations to various groups which it has to pay out on in order to 
maintain power” (TW-1730-240910). A head of a multilateral organisation speculated on the 
potential for further violence caused by this policy: 
 
“You try and limit the competition on resources, so that you try [to] divide up the 
spoils, between the limited number of actors, to maintain the peace. So you have this 
very messy, imperfect arrangement between those who have the ability to generate 
violence, [who are] kept content through a division of the spoils” (TTD-1700-290910). 
 
Some international practitioners emphasised the importance of integrating conflict sensitisation 
or explicit peacebuilding into development programming. An international consultant explained 
that because of the focus on short term goals international practitioners were not engaging in 
critical reflection or analysis: “In Timor, the way things are with Government capacity, no one 
is doing a lot of critical analysis. No one is interested in the reasons why things don’t happen” 
(TZ-1430-280910). One bilateral program manager said, “Donors just don’t get it. It is 
breathtaking, the absence of discussion to develop a coherent development strategy. We are 
trying to do work without any clear guidelines” (TTC-1230-290910). An international program 
manager explained why he tried to integrate conflict-sensitivity into all programs and sectors: 
 
“Our goal is to be able to track the impact on conflict of our programs. Not just 
negative, that we have done no harm, but also positive, that we have contributed 
towards peace. Some are about working on conflict issues but some are about working 
more broadly in a conflict context” (TY-1000-280910). 
 
Many international participants warned that conflict and peacebuilding analysis and 
programming needed to be supported by conflict-sensitive approaches, including 
acknowledging and managing the role and power of international practitioners. Any 
development and peacebuilding programming from the Government or international 
organisations must explicitly target root causes of violence. 
 
8.2.3 Respect connectedness to land 
 
International participants acknowledged that land and natural resources are very important to 
East Timorese, to sustain and renew Indigenous culture and to engage in economic 
development. Participants admitted, however, that the complex land system was not well 
understood. One international program manager declared that both international practitioners 
and elites – “Timorese outsiders” – failed to understand communities’ customary connection to 
the land (TTF-0830-300910). One international program manager explained the complexity of 
land ownership and use, noting that land remains a key trigger for violence: 
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 “Traditionally, the landowners are the caretakers. People do not own the land, they own 
the right to use the land. This is hard because you might be able to use the land to raise 
your cattle, and I might actually own all the palm nuts that come off the palm trees. So 
if you went down and cut down one of those palm trees because you wanted to build a 
house, that would be an enormous problem” (TTF-0830-300910). 
 
Many international participants described the confusion caused by unclear rights to land 
ownership and use. One international analyst explained that, “A lot of the questions about land 
conflict have been deferred until now because ownership rights have not been clear (TC-1500-
130910). Many participants asserted the disruptive effect of colonisation and occupation. One 
international consultant explained that Indigenous knowledge systems had changed as a result 
of recent histories of economic reallocation and forced migration: 
 
“A lot of people are dislocated from their home locations. When you are doing adat, 
when you are doing uma lulik, it is extremely connected to the landscape. Where are the 
locations of your lulik, the locations of your sacred sites? It is important. If you are 
disconnected from that, maybe the systems change” (TTI-1400-011010). 
 
A clear land tenure system was seen as fundamental to economic development. An international 
consultant explained that the lack of clarity on land rights has created a dual economy in the 
capital and rural areas. He declared that the lack of regulation has led to corruption and poverty 
in rural areas where, without clear land laws, it is very difficult for investors to engage with 
communities on land (TTJ-1500-011010). An international analyst agreed that the current lack 
of a land titling system exacerbates insecurity (TC-1500-130910).  
 
Opinions differed as to what type of land tenure system would best serve all East Timorese. The 
majority of participants recommended a new system, driven by the Government, that clarified 
land tenure and ownership. Others were more hesitant about a solution, acknowledging that 
government and community interests often differed on land and resource management. 
 
8.2.4 Learn local languages and prioritise inclusive education 
 
Participants asserted that in Timor-Leste languages are intimately connected to both localised 
and national identity. As a result, issues around language were viewed as a potential trigger for 
violence, particularly cultural and structural violence. Participants conceded that current 
language policy was determined by historical links with Portugal and a need to differentiate 
Timor-Leste from Indonesia and Australia (TTN-1900-051010). One international adviser saw 
the current language policy as divisive (TW-1730-240910). 
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Many participants stated the current language policy facilitated elite decision-making. The head 
of an INGO said, “The elite speak Portuguese and English; the people who have higher 
education are largely [of the] diaspora. They represent the cultural values of elitism” (TTP-
1100-061010). Another international practitioner linked the language policy with the failure to 
achieve sustained and inclusive development: 
 
“It is my sense that there is an elitist grouping in Timor that wanted to ensure that this 
club remained exclusive. It excludes great tracts of the population. I think that this has 
pushed the whole development of the country back” (TTB-1000-290910). 
 
Participants acknowledged that strong local languages are at the heart of recognising and 
reinvigorating strong cultures and that shared languages facilitate building relationships and 
connecting groups. Some participants affirmed the importance of teaching children local 
languages to maintain strong cultural survival (TE-0800-140910). One international practitioner 
explained: 
 
“At the moment it [Tetum] is rarely spoken. Most times when you are in rural areas, 
when people are chatting among themselves, they are speaking in their mother tongue. 
And they will flip back to Tetum to speak with you. I imagine with the way society is 
going this will die out, and this is a shame” (TTF-0830-300910). 
 
Participants declared that the current language policy has contributed to poor access to and 
quality of education. Expectations of fluency were too high and timeframes were seen as too 
tight. One international practitioner said that a transition process should take place, using 
mother tongue and that Portuguese should be taught as a foreign language: 
 
“It is a Government decision to promote Portuguese. They expect the teachers to speak 
in Portuguese but a lot of kids aren't learning anything at school. Our advice was to 
teach Portuguese as a foreign language. Teaching would be in Tetum or a local 
language. We are advocating for a transition solution. In two generations people will be 
more fluent” (TS-1000-220910). 
 
Many international participants stressed the fundamental importance of learning local languages 
to build relationships, and demonstrated a commitment to listening and engaging with 
communities. An international consultant emphasised that shared languages build relationships 
and enable long-term engagement: 
 
“Relationships are so important. Here language is a huge barrier toward developing 
solid relationships. I do not think all donors are investing sufficiently in language. The 
short-termism is a constraint, I think. Having a long-term focus, investing in building 
relationships: I do not think there is enough of that going on. That is a systems issue” 
(TTE-1930-290910). 
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An international peacebuilder (who speaks eight languages) demonstrated how learning 
languages breaks down barriers and helps practitioners learn how to work effectively: 
 
“If you can really show that you care, that you are not just there to make a lot of money, 
it really helps. It really opens doors, the fact that I have learned to speak the local 
language” (T-1600-011009). 
 
A head of a bilateral organisation urged that it was critical for effective development for 
international practitioners to learn local languages and Tetum: “The transfer of knowledge is 
obviously more effective than if you are having to work through an amateur language assistant” 
(TI-1400-150910). One international adviser explained that even if international practitioners 
learn the local language, they also need to recognise the cultural context of language, and that 
meanings differ between individuals and across groups. He cautioned that practitioners’ should 
never assume they understand what is going on:  
 
“In terms of building relationships [and] trust, learning the language is a huge mess in 
Timor. How many people understand or are fluent in the four languages that the 
constitution prescribes? There are different cultural understandings in different sectors 
of society. So people’s perception of things is different from yours” (TTN-1900-
051010).  
 
8.2.5 Summary: Culture 
 
The majority of international participants affirmed that they needed to value and engage with 
Indigenous knowledge systems, identities and cultures much more thoroughly than they 
currently did. Many practitioners saw that their failure to understand Indigenous East Timorese 
cultural pluralism resulted in a systemic bias toward modern cultural systems within the current 
development system.  
 
Participants confirmed that although Timor-Leste is classified as a conflict-affected state, 
conflict and peacebuilding analysis and programming is not prioritised by international 
practitioners or their organisations. This lack of targeted and integrated peace programming 
demonstrated that the root causes of violence were ignored, which was seen as a key reason 
development efforts since 1999 have not been effective or sustainable. 
 
International participants understood that while land and natural resources were critical to 
economic development, they were very complex, and connected to East Timorese culture, 
identity and spirituality. They saw that they needed to respect East Timorese spiritual and 
emotional connection to the land, and to do that would mean learning more about what this 
connection was like for individuals and communities. They also recommended international 
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practitioners support the Government to work with East Timorese citizens to develop a land 
rights system that took account of community connections to land and resources. 
 
Participants linked the current language policies with elitism and division causing cultural and 
structural violence. They explained that prioritisation of Portuguese languages in schools 
resulted in poor access to and quality of education. They asserted that international practitioners 
should learn local languages to begin the process of better understanding Indigenous cultures. 
 
8.3 Power (rebalance the disequilibrium of power) 
 
International practitioners indicated a range of issues within the current development system in 
Timor-Leste that they believed caused or worsened inequality and power asymmetries. Many of 
these issues created or contributed to direct, structural and cultural violence. This section details 
the issues that were most often cited by international practitioners, including the need to 
acknowledge significant levels of elite co-option; rebalance the power disequilibrium; the 
fundamental importance of FPIC; community-level ownership and the complexities of gender 
equality. A case study of the national SDP 2011–2030 is used to draw out some of the 
challenges Timor-Leste experiences in unpacking and restructuring these asymmetries of power. 
 
Many participants explained that the root of the current power disequilibria between 
international practitioners and East Timorese in Timor-Leste began with UNTAET’s 
administration in 1999. As one international practitioner described: “They [East Timorese] have 
had to deal with a new occupying force, in the sense that an international community has been 
here since 1999. Its presence sometimes facilitates people's aspirations, and sometimes it 
completely obstructs [them]” (TK-1700-160910). Participants asserted that the UN assessed 
Timor-Leste’s human capacity as zero or very limited and consequently focused on state 
formation as centralised institutional capacity building. One head of an INGO explained: 
 
“State building is focused on formal institutions. Other areas are neglected. There is an 
institutional bias on the part of the UN. The UN does not work well with non-traditional 
structures, which has precluded meaningful involvement of non-state actors” (TTP-
1100-061010). 
 
As a result, the UN and other international organisations systematically excluded non-elites and 
rural communities from decision-making, which enhanced existing power asymmetries of 
power. Participants acknowledged that unless power asymmetries were more evenly balanced 
relationships between East Timorese and with international practitioners would continue to 
suffer. One international consultant suggested that international practitioners must deliberately 
work to reduce corruption and structural violence:  
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 “If you have money and you are giving it to somebody else, you are in a position of 
power. And that should go right to the heart of all programming. Your aim should be to 
even out the power disparity. That is the core of all relationships” (TTL-0930-110713). 
 
An international consultant explained that the disproportionate focus on strengthening 
centralised institutions and maintaining bilateral relationships with the Government was due to a 
combination of expediency and proximity, exacerbating inequality, which would lead to 
violence: 
 
“I think that donors have concentrated too heavily on the centre, and on Government. 
Civil society and NGOs have not really had much of a look in. You cannot keep 
presuming to invest at the centre without actually making a difference at the district 
because it undermines the whole legitimacy of government. If districts continue to feel 
that they are being left out that has the potential to create division and potential conflict 
down the road” (TTE-1930-290910). 
 
Importantly, international participants recognised that funding should be shared equally 
between the Government and civil society. An international program manager said, “There is 
now pretty much a consensus view that we do not have the balance right. We have not been 
channelling funds to civil society enough” (TTC-1230-290910). Another international program 
manager gave an example: 
 
“If all the focus is on [the] state, is that really encouraging the right thing? Aid 
effectiveness really means building Government institutions and local actors. AusAID 
[former Australian bilateral aid program] have admitted that they have made that 
mistake. That they have put ninety-five per cent of their funds into Government 
institutions and then shared the five per cent [among] civil society” (TS-1000-220910). 
 
Power asymmetries were most clearly seen in the lack of development in rural and remote 
Timor-Leste. An international consultant predicted that decentralisation would be slowed by 
resistance from elites and capacity constraints: “The current Government does not have control 
over the districts. If they decentralised, they will lose that power. There is fear associated with 
that decision” (TZ-1430-280910). An international consultant stressed that development must 
decentralise, enabling all East Timorese to experience positive changes:  
 
“There needs to be genuine opportunity for people to participate, and not just people 
who are in Dili. There needs to be genuine service delivery in the districts. It needs to 
change otherwise it will just be a story about Dili, and the rising and falling of Dili. 
That is not Timor-Leste” (TTE-1930-290910).  
 
Participants criticised the failure of both the UN administrations and the Government to 
administer decentralisation but explained that the ongoing violence contributed to continuing 
centralisation: 
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 “Most of the conflict that has happened in the last ten years has either taken place in 
Dili or had their genesis in conflict and political issues in Dili. So it was felt that 
because Dili was the epicentre of conflict, certain things needed to happen in Dili before 
going out into the district” (TW-1730-240910).  
 
In this section I include a case study critiquing how the SDP 2011–2030 was created, 
commenting particularly on the limited consultation and participation of communities, which 
failed to enable FPIC. 
 
8.3.1 Acknowledge elite co-option 
 
Participants expressed the need for all practitioners to recognise that there are both internal and 
external power disequilibria in Timor-Leste. This is the power disequilibrium between 
international practitioners and East Timorese (which occurs differently between elites and 
citizens), and the power disequilibrium between East Timorese elites and citizens.  
 
Most participants emphasised the complexity and historical nature of elite co-option in Timor-
Leste. An international practitioner explained that the Portuguese co-opted Indigenous leaders; 
“So that the power that people have does not just derive from Indigenity and Indigenous culture, 
some of it derives from their colonial power” (TK-1700-160910). The head of an INGO 
affirmed that identity pluralism meant that individuals pragmatically aligned themselves with 
different identities or groups depending on the context: 
 
“Timorese leaders get mileage out of emphasising difference. Ministries favour certain 
districts because of clan links. It is not as black-and-white as if you are elite or other” 
(TTP-1100-061010).  
 
He explained that on the whole, decision-making is dominated by elites who do not respect 
Indigenous knowledge systems, and that the focus by international practitioners on the state and 
elite leadership increases divisions between East Timorese, and contributes to structural 
violence: 
 
“They [elites] see the suku level as something that is backwards and not relevant to 
moving the country forward. They don't understand how important suku are to people's 
lives. If donors focus on the state it puts a fork in the road leading to increased elitism. 
[The] diaspora is co-opted. The elite do not identify with the Indigenous community, 
they are deferential to people with a white face” (TTP-1100-061010). 
 
One international consultant agreed that over time the diaspora elite have lost their respect for 
Indigenous knowledge systems: “The current elite in Dili, who often do not speak the language 
and think that tradition is really backward, are essentially non-Indigenous Timorese” (TTL-
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0930-110713). An international consultant reported that a senior Minister had said to him, “We 
are not savages and we will not use customary law” (TTJ-1500-011010). An international 
adviser extrapolated on the elite divide between Indigenous and modern knowledge systems: 
 
“Members of the elite do not play enough attention to traditional culture in terms of 
building the country's identity. I think that there is a perception that traditional culture is 
opposed to a certain sense of modernity. Seeing it as backwards, that they cannot live 
together” (TTN-1900-051010). 
 
Many international participants reported that corruption and wealth disparity were increasing. 
One UN practitioner stated that economic inequality was a trigger for violence: 
 
“Corruption is getting out of control. It is not getting to the people in the countryside. It 
isn’t even going to all the people in Dili; it is going to small elites. This is 
unsustainable. You don’t need to have the brains of an archbishop to work out that ain’t 
fair and [will] cause some sort of reaction” (TTB-1000-290910). 
 
Many participants said that their international colleagues rarely acknowledged that they 
prioritised consultation and engagement with the elite, and that this practice limited who 
participated in decision-making. International participants admitted that they assumed that they 
were engaging with people who represented the majority of East Timorese, and cited the OECD 
Fragile States Principles to support their focus on statebuilding and work with Government 
decision-makers (OECD, 2007). However, some participants did not seem to recognise that they 
worked and made decisions primarily with people who were Dili-based elites. Overall, 
participants cited time pressures, geographical inaccessibility and funding constraints as 
additional barriers to engaging more broadly with East Timorese. 
 
The head of a multilateral organisation acknowledged that the Government’s goals can be 
different from the goals of the average citizen (TTD-1700-290910). Elites tended to support 
modern, liberal peacebuilding, market economies and democratisation. A UN practitioner 
agreed:  
 
“You need to be careful not to work on the assumption that everyone’s goals are the 
same. The mestizos, the Portuguese-born Timorese, have got [a] particular view, which 
is based round their heritage and their exclusivity. People [average citizens] were made 
to feel a foreigner in their own land. The people [the mestizos] actually making this 
decision might only reflect about three per cent of the population” (TTB-1000-290910). 
 
One international consultant said that Indigenous leaders often had a better understanding of 
community needs and were less likely to be co-opted than the Xefe de Suku: 
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“We find it so much more effective to organise through the uma lulik because they have 
much more power to talk about the land, rather than the local leaders [Xefe de Suku]. 
The local leaders are more likely co-opted or swayed by the state” (TTL-0930-110713).  
 
However, other participants recognised that elite co-option occurs widely and affects both state 
and customary leadership. One international practitioner warned that communities can be 
disempowered and marginalised by both international practitioners and elites: 
 
“Unless it is empowerment right down to the beneficiary I don't see that it is 
intrinsically any more wonderful to have the Xefe de Suku making decisions for his 
people than having a public servant who has [had] fifteen years of training in Canberra. 
He is still imposing things and that is disempowering” (TE-0800-140910). 
 
8.3.1.1 Case Study: A failure to consult: the Strategic Development Plan 
 
In 2009–2010 the Government undertook a broad consultation process across all sixty-five sub-
districts to finalise a new medium-term SDP 2011–2030 that focuses on four strategic sectors: 
social capital; infrastructure development; governance and institutional strengthening; and 
economic development (República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2011a). The process of 
developing the SDP was widely criticised by many participants it was seen as top-down, 
patriarchal and promoting a “patron-client type of relationship” (TTD-1700-290910). This 
criticism highlights tensions between East Timorese citizens and elites over participation in 
decision-making. An international adviser explained the consultation process used for the SDP: 
 
“The Prime Minister [Gusmão] has embarked on a consultation throughout the country. 
The entire community comes, he expresses the vision of the Government. Then 
representatives from each of the Aldeia and sub-Suku will provide him with a five 
minute discussion about their priorities. It is everything from corruption, to access to 
water, access to health centres, or schools with no teachers. It lasted three hours, and he 
will answer questions. The method of the consultation was in a very indigenous process. 
It is not easy, it is hard work and it is a full day” (TW-1730-240910) [my emphasis].  
 
Some international participants believed that elite East Timorese represented the views of all 
citizens. The international adviser continued: 
 
“The way that the Government conducts its strategic planning always has at the very 
forefront a deep knowledge of the people of Timor. Particularly Prime Minister 
Gusmão, who spent twenty-five years fighting side-by-side [with the resistance]. If 
anyone knows Timor, it is him. This is one of the reasons Timor has been able to 
experience this period of peace” (TW-1730-240910). 
 
However, the SDP process was roundly criticised by many East Timorese and some 
international practitioners. They claimed that the ‘community consultation’ process was merely 
to ‘socialise’ the SDP after it was written, and to act as an early election campaign for Gusmão 
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(TTC-1230-290910). An international consultant cited Gusmão’s leadership in achieving 
substantial control and ownership over decision-making: “Xanana is the sort of guy that really 
digs in his heels. It is difficult for donors to influence someone like this” (TTJ-1500-011010). 
An international program manager also described the politicisation of the SDP: 
 
“The strategic plan is really Xanana and he developed it in his office by himself with 
advisers. It is not his party or his Government’s plan. It is a political issue. Politics is 
part of development” (TS-1000-220910). 
 
An international consultant added: 
 
“Policy processes here tend to be really weak and not very well thought out. The SDP 
just appeared. This consultation process was actually just a political process. So there 
was no opportunity to really influence it, and you can see that when you look at it, it 
does not reflect any of the priorities [of] civil society. There is so little accountability” 
(TTL-0930-110713). 
.  
As one international adviser confirmed, the SDP had limited consultation: 
 
“In reality the people who are speaking at those [consultations] are the political voices, 
Xefe de Suku, Xefe de Aldeia. It would be good to speak to people on both sides. It isn't 
so free. If someone came along and wanted to say something, they would not have the 
chance” (TTF-0830-309010). 
 
Another international consultant remarked that the SDP, while flawed, is a step toward greater 
ownership of development by East Timorese (TTE-1930-290910). A UN practitioner agreed:  
 
“They said, ‘we have waited twenty-five years for independence; we want to do this 
ourselves. If we do it wrong, and we have to redo it, ok, we learn from it. If you want to 
help us do that–fine’. The key word here is ownership. It can’t be artificial” (TTB-
1000-290910).  
 
Despite the elite support, without substantive consultation with and participation of all 
stakeholders, implementation of the SDP will not eventuate. It remains to be seen how trust, 
consent and participation will be built and sustained, but certainly without these factors the 
current decision-making process will continue to disenfranchise and divide elites and citizens. 
 
8.3.2 Encourage gender equality 
 
All international participants cited the complexity of achieving gender equality in Timor-Leste. 
They acknowledged that gender inequality was a significant challenge and underscored their 
discussions of this issue with an understanding that East Timorese women experienced greater 
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poverty, had less access to education, health and legal services, experienced high rates of family 
and sexual violence, and had limited engagement in the cash economy.  
 
Most international participants cited East Timorese culture or custom as the cause of gender 
inequality and many also acknowledged the damaging and distortionary impact of patriarchal 
colonialism. Many participants cited the comparatively high numbers of East Timorese women 
participating in formal and customary political spaces, but stressed that this participation was 
often limited, and cited barlaki as an institution that compounded gender violence. They linked 
gender inequality with unsustainable development and continued high levels of violence. The 
head of a multilateral organisation explained that the gender equality clashed with culture: 
 
“Through these projects you are trying to effect change, and people are not often 
comfortable with change. What we might perceive as a development outcome might not 
be consistent with the local traditions and cultures” (TTD-1700-290910). 
 
An international analyst agreed noting that sometimes women are marginalised in “non-formal 
governance systems”, and that there are differences in participation and engagement between 
Dili-based women and rural women (TC-1500-130910). An international program manager 
agreed, noting that some aspects of Indigenous systems disproportionately impacted women: 
 
“Sometimes tarabandu is not very gender sensitive. There is a whole bunch of issues 
where you have to work out what are the gender implications of some of these rules. 
Are they impacting much more on women than men?” (TTF-0830-300910). 
 
A UN practitioner agreed, explaining that Indigenous systems did not promote modern ideals of 
gender equality, but that incremental change was possible: 
 
“Traditionally, culturally women are not used to being vocal or expressing their ideas or 
taking the lead in things. If it is a cultural thing it takes a long long time to change it. 
And sometimes changing it is controversial, but [it] is possible” (TT-1500-230910). 
 
The refusal of many East Timorese men to share power with women was viewed as the key 
barrier to gender equality. An international consultant stated, “The constitution: it says that men 
and women are equal. It doesn't mean that the people want it. When I say the people I mean the 
men” (TE-0800-140910). She added that this provided a dilemma for international practitioners 
regarding respecting and working with East Timorese perspectives: 
 
“We might say, ‘well, women have rights, individuals have rights. We don't care what 
your tradition is.’ And you can apply that to almost everything. It [marginalising East 
Timorese gender norms] probably will [cause violence]. You know, for certain almost 
everyone [international] agrees that we have to ignore local opinion. And the question is 
where do you draw the line?” (TE-0800-140910). 
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Participants argued that gender equality is a systemic challenge made more challenging in the 
context of a conflict-affected state (N-0900-230909; Z-1600-261109). One international 
peacebuilder observed that engaging male leaders was extremely challenging: 
 
“In post-conflict environments the dominant idea is that they [men] are dominant and 
aggressive. How do development agencies engage with powerful men that object to 
change?  There are issues of masculinity and a sense of entitlement to power” (W-1600-
251109). 
 
Some international participants emphasised the importance of embedding gender equality early 
in all new institutions and structures to create new power dynamics (TI-1400-150910). An 
international program manager underlined the history of violence and economic insecurity as 
major factors exacerbating gendered structural violence, and observed the current weakness of 
the Government to resolve gender inequality: 
 
“With gender equality one of the major issues is culture, changing mindsets and 
practices. Another issue is the legacy of conflict. Violence is part of people's experience 
and it is not surprising that it manifests in the home. Another challenge is the inability 
of state institutions to tackle the problem” (TY-1000-280910).  
 
Many participants explained that the way in which gender equality or a rights-based agenda had 
been prioritised by the UN and many other international organisations was not culturally 
sensitive, and had created divisions between international practitioners and East Timorese, and 
between East Timorese men and women. An international practitioner expanded: 
 
“If you look at the Millennium Development Goals that have to do with gender, it is 
obvious that we are doing something that we all agree on in the international 
development community, but it is not always something that resonates well with local 
cultures” (Q-1030-250909). 
 
They perceived that as a result, many East Timorese men, and some women, had rejected 
gender equality, seeing these ideas as culturally and structurally violent – distorting and 
rejecting customary practices and customary roles of women and men. Some suggested that 
because the term ‘gender’ was considered so divisive by many East Timorese, different 
language should be used to discuss gender equality. Grenfell (2015) suggests using the 
terminology: ‘relationships between women and men’ to reopen discussions. This approach 
could reframe the terminology and restart conversations on this critical issue. These participants 
recommended that East Timorese people need to be supported to engage gradually in these 
issues at their own pace. One international peacebuilder suggested:  
 
“Do you say, ‘this is not what we perceive to be equitable, however we will take the 
soft path and look to take a long-term approach and seek to work with those who have 
the views to educate women in the long term?’ ” 
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 8.3.3 Facilitate community ownership 
 
Many participants recognised that a history of repressive top-down governance and elite co-
option has perpetuated minimal community ownership of internationally supported 
development and peacebuilding processes. A UN practitioner explained that the current 
development system systematically disenfranchised Indigenous communities: 
 
“We, the international community, we don’t mean to but we smash the existing 
infrastructure, the honour code, the command structures of these indigenous 
communities [and] expect them to adopt our ways. We should not be surprised when it 
does not work. They have to do this in their own way in their own time. Mould it to suit 
their particular character” (TTB-1000-290910). 
 
An international consultant described this situation: 
 
“I came back in August 2006. It was very much like when I had arrived in August 2000. 
A lot of humanitarians arriving, none of whom had any experience in the country. It 
seemed to be much more about people coming in to save the nation, and the 
Government could be involved if they wanted to be” (TZ-1430-280910). 
 
Corruption was viewed as the reason many international organisations decided not to 
decentralise decision-making. An international program manager explained: “Many donors are 
resistant to that [decentralisation] because they don't feel that corruption is under control and 
they do not trust the Government to implement their money directly” (TS-1000-220910).  
She affirmed the need for trust: “You need to trust us to be a strong institution that will not just 
swallow your money and run away” (TS-1000-220910). One international adviser stressed the 
complexities of this position: 
 
“Development partners are reluctant to provide direct budget support [because] budget 
execution figures are low. The response [from the Government] is: ‘the systems are not 
strong enough to support this because you guys are not supporting it. How do you feel 
you can criticise Treasury, when you are not sitting here and helping us’ ” (TW-1730-
240910). 
 
Some international participants linked the lack of community ownership to structural violence. 
One international program manager said that prioritising one community over another can cause 
inequalities, exacerbating structural violence (TTF-0830-300910). Participants agreed that 
paternalism and lack of information prevents ownership (TTC-1230-290910). An international 
consultant explained:  
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“[International development organisations] profess to have Government ownership but 
really the Government has agreed to something (all too often imposing from the 
outside). I think it is a very paternalistic approach” (TTE-1930-290910).  
 
One international consultant predicted future violence if the current system continued without 
reform and suggested strategically disengaging to encourage greater East Timorese ownership 
(TTJ-1500-011010). Other suggestions were made to increase community-level ownership. A 
bilateral program manager said that international practitioners must provide “space and time” to 
facilitate East Timorese ownership: 
 
“We must give time to let things happen. I think that we can give them the knowledge, 
give them instruments, but let them find their way. From my experience they are rather 
happy, and we are trying to break their happiness with our model. Maybe their 
happiness is different from ours” (TTQ-1600-061010). 
 
Participants explained that the heavy presence of international development organisations 
reinforced communities’ high expectations but did not enable community ownership (TP-1830-
200910). Participants cautioned that international practitioners should enable greater community 
ownership by supporting East Timorese to make decisions without interference. One 
international program manager cited “a lack of a space to resolve conflict without either a donor 
money or military presence, that will be one of the key obstacles to Timor retaining a non-
violent future” (TP-1830-200910).  
 
8.3.4 Enable free, prior and informed consent 
 
Many international practitioners recognised that many East Timorese communities were 
excluded and silenced from processes that would enable FPIC. An international consultant 
underscored the failure of the UN in establishing these processes: 
 
“Participation of communities in government decision-making processes have been 
uniformly poor. The UN did not prioritise the involvement of the local population. They 
did not have a coherent or overarching strategy of consultation with local communities. 
They did not establish the forums where you effectively devolve decision-making 
powers to district levels” (TZ-1430-280910). 
 
A head of a bilateral organisation agreed: “Overall there continues to be minimal genuine 
consultation with NGOs, civil society or ordinary East Timorese people on development 
priorities” (TI-1400-150910). One international consultant admitted that she had limited 
practical experience of community-level engagement: 
 
“I don't know what happens at the district level, and the reason is because when I have 
been working inside a donor agency, my whole life was spent [at] a desk in Dili. I think 
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donors have been very focused at the centre, focused on planning and less on doing” 
(TTE-1930-290910).  
 
Participants cited customary and historical hierarchies as barriers to wider participation. An 
international program manager explained, “It is hard to tell here which hierarchies are cultural 
and if they are influenced by colonialism” (TTU-1600-280910). An international program 
manager explained that a widespread lack of coordination compounded problems:  
 
“People are fed up and sick and tired of people wanting to come in and wanting to talk. 
It is the same nine or ten people who are being met by several different donors, and they 
are going to several different training courses or interventions. There is no coordination. 
It’s a big problem of human resources, capabilities and availability” (TB-1000-100910).   
 
One international practitioner explained the complexities of correctly assessing who to consult 
with: that there are differences between those who use, and those who are the custodians of the 
land, and that everyone must be included. An international consultant gave an example of failed 
community consultation, which resulted in violence: 
 
“The road that was going to get built, they decided it would go through three or four 
different aldeia. What the people from the aldeia said [was] ‘we need to share the 
workers, everybody needs a piece of this pie’. That is a way to avoid conflict, it is 
cooperation. The project changed, so it ended up only going through a few aldeia. All 
these people who agreed to the co-operation are annoyed because the people whose 
village the road would now go through said, ‘this is ours’ ” (TTI-1400-011010). 
 
International participants working in Timor-Leste explained that the term ‘socialisation’ was 
often used instead of seeking FPIC. An international consultant explained that socialisation is a 
process of: “sharing information about what a project is supposed to be doing and how it is 
functioning” (TTS-1700-290910). Socialisation was seen as different from consultation, which 
“is the process of getting feedback” (TTS-1700-290910). Many participants described FPIC as 
processes that enabled communities affected by the change to have a choice; which was 
fundamentally different from consultation or socialisation. One international program manager 
explained that for communities to consent they needed to have access to information and 
education; “If they have knowledge they can choose. Knowledge is the key to liberty” (TTQ-
1600-061010). One international practitioner illustrated this point: 
 
“Self-determination is about choice. Until people have the resources to make choices 
there is no choice. So agencies have to give people a capacity to make a choice. That 
means they have to improve their economic circumstances and give them an 
opportunity to educate themselves. If their kids cannot get an education, if they cannot 
feed themselves without working twelve hours a day, then they do not have a choice” 
(TK-1700-160910). 
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Many participants recognised that East Timorese felt excluded and marginalised from 
government and international decision-making. As one international consultant said, “It just 
comes down to national development [as] the priority, and it doesn't matter who you are, you do 
not have the right to get in the way” (TTL-0930-110713). A senior development researcher 
expanded: 
 
“There are two barriers to the implementation of [FPIC]. The first is that developing 
country governments do not care about their Indigenous peoples. They don't see support 
for Indigenous people as a benefit for their economies. There is also the barrier of end 
users, such as companies, [who do] not really [want] to share benefits. They see free, 
prior and informed consent as a burden. We need to find points of self-interest…but this 
is a very slow process” (CC-1300-011209). 
 
Participants affirmed that enabling communities to practice FPIC was very challenging. Neither 
international practitioners, the Government or communities were experienced in processes that 
enabled FPIC. An international adviser explained the complexity of seeking consent, and the 
difficulties communities had in articulating what they want: 
 
“There is another issue which further complicates things: people not wanting to tell you 
they don't want it. Are they really against what you are trying to do or did they not 
understand it? And they can't tell you what they want. You need to learn how to read all 
the signs” (TTN-199-051010). 
 
8.3.5 Summary: Power 
 
My research indicates that a power disequilibrium exists between international practitioners and 
East Timorese elites, international practitioners and citizens and between East Timorese elites 
and citizens. Understanding these power disequilibria is key to transforming the root causes of 
violence in Timor-Leste. This imbalance directly causes or exacerbates structural violence. 
International practitioners need to acknowledge these internal and external divisions and seek 
common ground and ways of working that engage and connect communities, not exacerbate 
these existing divisions. Decentralising power is critical to achieving self-determined 
development in rural communities beyond Dili and balancing power from elites to citizens. 
 
Many international participants blamed high levels of gender inequality and gendered violence 
on Indigenous cultural systems. They saw barlaki and limited women’s public participation in 
decision-making as proof of the inherent misogyny within Indigenous East Timorese culture. 
They argued that change was necessary and long term, and over time East Timorese men need 
to share their cultural, economic and political power with women. They recognised that as 
international practitioners they had not yet supported state or community-level institutions and 
structures that could support these changes. Some international practitioners also recognised 
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that the way in which the UN and other organisations had discussed and prioritised gender 
equality in Timor-Leste had been divisive, and had not included the diverse views of East 
Timorese.  
 
Evidence indicated that international practitioners had not established the conditions to facilitate 
greater community ownership over development and peacebuilding efforts. They cited 
geographical isolation; a lack of shared languages; complex and inflexible decision-making; and 
widespread corruption as the key reasons for minimal levels of community ownership. 
However, some international practitioners acknowledged that they themselves were culpable. 
These international practitioners cited their internally focused decision-making systems and 
prioritisation of relationships with elites, which established or perpetuated the existing 
conditions for corrupt behaviours.  
 
Participants acknowledged that while FPIC was in theory, critical for self-determination, in 
practice the current development system is not an environment that enables consent to occur. In 
Timor-Leste international practitioners and the Government both use restricted processes of 
socialisation and consultation instead of engaging in processes that would enable widespread, 
informed participation in any decision-making process. Practitioners acknowledged that 
enabling FPIC is key to rebalancing the current disequilibrium of power; supporting 
communities to decide how, when and where they want self-determined development and 
peacebuilding to occur.  
 
8.4 Relationships (value humility and self-reflection) 
 
Poor relationships are at the heart of perpetuating ongoing power asymmetries and structural 
violence. Conversely, strong, enduring and respectful relationships are at the heart of 
peacebuilding practice. The majority of participants affirmed the fundamental importance of 
building relationships with communities to achieve sustainable development outcomes and 
peace. However, international practitioners held very different perspectives on relationships 
from East Timorese. While East Timorese are connected within and between communities 
through deep historical and cultural links to land and place that are entwined with their plural 
identities, international practitioners tend to view the natural environment as a resource to 
achieve economic development. Some international practitioners had ties to Timor-Leste 
through historical links or shared languages, but most identified as outsiders. One international 
adviser underlined the deep historical divisions and conflicting relationships between outsiders 
and East Timorese: 
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“There is a certain divide between malae [foreign] people and Timorese people. You 
are always an outsider. It is a difficult culture that feels betrayed by generation after 
generation. The responsibility lies on our side. If you have a sense of history you'll 
understand where people are coming from” (TTN-1900-051010). 
 
Some participants explained that the relationship between international practitioners and the 
Government in Timor-Leste has changed significantly since 1999 as ODA funding decreased. 
An international program manager outlined the differences between the East Timorese and 
outsider models of partnership: 
 
“International groups talk about partnership. They say that that does not mean that we 
provide the money and you do all the work. But very often that’s all it does. The 
partnership model in Timor is to sit and to listen and to talk” (TB-1000-100910).   
 
In this section I explore the ways in which relationships are formed, sustained or fractured 
between and within groups of international practitioners and East Timorese. A case study of the 
ILO illustrates how one international practitioner overcame challenges to support capacity and 
sustain better working relationships in Timor-Leste. 
 
8.4.1 Nurture trust 
 
An international program manager asserted that a lack of trust perpetuates divisions: 
 
“One of the other biggest problems certainly in Timor is the stratification between the 
development community and the local population. Lack of trust leads to complete social 
separation. It creates a tendency to objectify the Timorese as difficult to relate to, 
particularly for people who are white” (TP-1830-200910). 
 
A multilateral program manager highlights that these divisions also occur between East 
Timorese elites and between the Government and communities: 
 
“It would be difficult for the Government to have high levels of trust between civil 
servants and suku leaders. They draw their sources of legitimacy from totally different 
places. I do not think that gives them [the Government] much legitimacy at a local 
level. There is often a lack of trust” (TTS-1700-290910).  
 
One international program manager agreed, noting that understanding history and context was 
critical and that the current development system compounded the lack of trust in relationships: 
 
“People don't realise: you need trust from the community in order for them to tell you. 
They just get caught up in this western modality of delivering programs, and they 
maybe do not necessarily reflect back on these things [history]” (TTF-0830-300910).  
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More concerning, some alleged that the economic and political interests of international 
organisations and individuals distorted relationships and broke trust. One international program 
manager stated: 
 
“They [foreigners] are fuelling it [violence]. They have massive interest in Timor.  
Twenty per cent of the world is controlling eighty per cent of what is happening here. I 
would be critical of Australia. You are giving all this money and aid but you are taking 
over AUD 200 million per day in oil revenue. I'd be critical of what happened in 2006, 
and the months leading up to it. What donors were funding the emergence of different 
political parties at that time?” (TB-1000-100910).   
 
An international program manager blamed “donor fatigue” as a failure to build trust: 
 
“Donor fatigue is an explicit [consequence] of the way things have been set up. It 
promotes a lack of trust in non-state actors, and foreigners in general. People are so 
used to NGOs coming through, doing a project, making a splash out of it and then 
pulling out without any follow-up or making empty promises that they cannot keep. The 
parachute model is happening in abundance in this country, which is an absolute waste 
of resources, a waste of time and a waste of credibility” (TP-1830-200910). 
 
He suggested that long-term strategies, mandated follow through, and active monitoring and 
evaluation could be tools to promote trust and make sure programs are having the intended 
effects (TP-1830-200910). Participants consistently confirmed the importance of dialogue to 
manage changing relationships and sustain partnerships (TTF-0830-300910). The head of a 
bilateral organisation recommended the need to make information as accessible as possible, and 
then undertake open discussions so that communities can understand and own decisions that 
affect them: 
 
“We know that it is an oral culture here so we do try to do things by reducing lengthy 
documents that are produced, and reports that are never going to be read by Timorese 
Government officials, for example, and to simplify language” (TI-1400-150910). 
 
8.4.2 Commit for the long term 
 
Participants pointed out that since 1999 East Timorese communities have experienced an 
enormous volume of social, economic, political and cultural change in a very short period of 
time. Participants observed that the development and peacebuilding needs in Timor-Leste are so 
broad and diverse that it is extremely difficult to prioritise across sectors, geographic areas or 
population groups. Government and international partners are under tremendous pressure to 
create development outcomes and peace dividends in short time frames. One international 
adviser asserted that this pressure took a personal toll: 
 
“There is this four month barrier. International people hit a wall and say: ‘I want to go’. 
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The other hit the wall moment is after four years. Cycles of hitting the wall. Every time 
you look to the side things go back to ground zero. It's so complex and it's so unfair” 
(TTN-1900-051010). 
 
Participants identified two key systemic constraints regarding timing: employment contracts and 
programming funding cycles. The first identified that international practitioners usually work 
under short-term contracts, between three months and three years. This relatively rapid turnover 
by international (and sometimes local) staff means that long-term local staff and communities 
constantly have to rebuild relationships with newcomers. Building trust between East Timorese 
and outsiders takes time and the rapid turnover of staff makes this very difficult, if not 
impossible. One international practitioner criticised the focus on short-term engagements, 
highlighting the time that it takes to build trusted relationships: 
 
“There is not much you can do as a fly in fly out person, unless you are really, really 
skilled and your area of expertise is such that you can do it quickly. Almost everything 
else requires you to build long-term relationships. This constant churn makes it hard. If 
you are going to put people into a place like this, especially one that has had conflict, 
you have got to be prepared to put them in for five to ten years. It takes that long for 
people to tell you the truth” (TK-1700-160910). 
 
An international development practitioner asserted that it takes at least two years to begin to 
understand a given context: 
 
“I think it comes down to a lot of investment that you make in understanding the 
context. Because after two years you are starting to understand the country. Maybe in 
five years you are able to make a contribution, maybe by ten years you are accepted. 
But until then you are seen as a tourist. People claim to be experts after being in a place 
in six months. We need to have more humility” (Z-1600-261109). 
 
When I asked what long-term meant in Timor-Leste, a head of a multilateral organisation 
remarked: 
 
“Long term? It depends on your development cycles. Short term in a post conflict 
country is possibly a generation or two. How do you get over the trauma? The pages are 
turning so quickly, there is no stability” (TTD-1700-290910). 
 
The second systemic constraint is that development programs are usually only funded for up to 
three years, even in conflict-affected contexts. While there has been a significant push in the last 
decade to expand program funding to five or ten years, there continues to be constraints 
resulting in shorter programming time frames. Many participants viewed program sustainability 
and effectiveness as constrained by the poor timing of program cycles. Participants pointed out 
that international timeframes force the implementing agency to rapidly deliver complex 
programs, often without adequate design, monitoring and evaluation processes and without the 
time to consult and build meaningful partnerships with local institutions and communities.  
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 Together the rapid staffing turnover and the short program lifecycle place tremendous stress on 
all actors, often damaging or exacerbating violence in an environment where relationships are 
already strained. An international program manager argued that this leads to ineffective and 
unsustainable development: 
 
“A lot of development projects are time bound by the donor, not the communities. 
Projects planned to take place in twelve months, might take eighteen or twenty-four 
months. During that time they might not achieve any significant outcomes or outputs. In 
between the international donor might have a change in staff, so things will lose 
continuity, the projects are repeated and the same problems happen. The speed of how 
things can be done in Timor is very different from anywhere else” (TB-1000-100910).  
 
One international consultant explained how short-term deployments and programs led to “death 
by planning” as a systemic failure of the current development system:  
 
“Donors will come in with different ideas, changing it, and fiddling with that, and 
redesigning it. It is like putting the wheels on the bicycle while it is rolling down the 
road, and pulling them off again. There is no sense of the long-term. [They are] not 
giving things time to consolidate and invest[ing] in implementation. Some programs are 
never actually given an opportunity to get runs on the board before they are being re-
evaluated, redesign, tinkered with, and sent in another direction” (TTE-1930-290910). 
 
A UN practitioner elaborated that these short staffing and programming timeframes did not 
match East Timorese timeframes: 
 
“We are always in a rush. We are not really here for the long term. We are pushing. As 
donors, we say we have mandates and deadlines that we need to report to. But the 
Timorese are saying, ‘That is your problem. We understand, but we are going to go at 
our own speed’ ” (TTB-1000-290910). 
 
The head of a multilateral organisation also stressed that community members are busy, and that 
the Government and international practitioners needed to acknowledge the time burden 
associated with participation and consultation (TTS-1700-290910). She asserted that 
Government and community priorities were often different: 
 
“Suku development planning processes are currently within very very short timeframes. 
Usually there is a community meeting, where people are asked to identify their 
priorities. I don't think any of us could plan and identify in that time frame. If you look 
at what projects are being identified by communities, and then comparing [them] to 
what the Ministry have prioritised, you will find that they often do not match” (TTS-
1700-290910). 
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8.4.3 Build non-competitive work spaces 
 
Many international participants outlined that within the current development system, 
organisations and individuals were internally conflicted, highly competitive and incentivised 
quick results over sustainable, inclusive processes. Some asserted that this conflict-oriented 
work model perpetuates cultural and structural violence. As one international program manager 
explained: 
 
“As you know there are so many different agencies doing development projects. I'd be 
very critical of a lot of the so-called interventions. Are they interventions or are they 
interferences?  Development is very often about competition, collaboration or 
coordination – and very often it is about competition” (TB-1000-100910).   
 
An international consultant stressed the non-cooperative nature of the current development 
system: 
 
“Donor competition is alive and well. I do not know what it is about human nature, you 
get your patch, their thing that they want to do, and they do not cooperate. They do not 
play well in the sandpit with others. Donors are some of the worst. [Donors are] talking 
about Paris and Accra [best practice guidance from the OECD DAC]. [But] in reality 
people are not walking the walk” (TTE-1930-290910). 
 
Due to the high quantity of international practitioners and lack of coordination between 
organisations Timor-Leste has disproportionately experienced the negative outcomes of 
competition and lack of co-ordination. One international practitioner asserted: 
 
“There are two problems. One is that the objectives of an individual donor may not 
correspond with the recipient. But the second problem, which I think is a bigger one, is 
that the objectives of the donors are different, and those agendas are often in 
competition with each other” (TK-1700-160910). 
 
He stressed that competitive, conflict-oriented workplaces resulted in divisions and enmities 
between international practitioners, and within developing communities: 
 
“Every development agency has friends and enemies in it. So you just have to work out 
who are your friends, and who are your enemies. One of the biggest challenges for 
people in Timor now is to learn how to deal with a different kind of enemy. This is an 
enemy who comes to you with money not guns. And is prepared to buy your 
submission, not to force it upon you” (TK-1700-160910). 
 
I asked an international adviser the best way to achieve peace and development outcomes in 
Timor-Leste. She said that practitioners needed to depart from their competitive work cultures 
to build relationships through listening and dialogue: 
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“In Timor, it takes time, respect and humility: listening a lot more. Taking time to eat 
with people, really simple things. In Timor I have listened to a lot of ideas, and gone 
along with some things I did not agree with, because it was not my place to judge or 
jump in straight away. There have been times where I have got it so wrong. Because 
you are an outsider you have the capacity to move between different networks of power, 
which an insider cannot do. Recognising the power, but not abusing it; using it to help 
facilitate dialogue” (TTL-0930-110713).  
 
Participants recommended facilitating safe spaces internally within international organisations 
for dissent and constructive criticism. An international peacebuilder also emphasised that when 
international practitioners engage with communities it should be in a facilitative role, aiming to 
create safe, inclusive spaces: 
 
“Being a good facilitator is a radical thing to do. We have a paradigm [with] a limited 
range of options. That stops us from sitting down and hearing from the Indigenous 
people what they really want. Long-term engagement and flexibility is critical. A key 
word is respect. My role is to ask useful questions and bring useful comparisons from 
other places. But they are in the driver’s seat. The role of a good development specialist 
is going in and providing a safe space. Providing those outside ideas to stimulate and 
spark conversation” (FF-0703-280110). 
 
8.4.4 Recognise and work with local capacities 
 
The majority of international practitioners working in Timor-Leste described East Timorese 
human capacity as very low or zero at 1999. The head of a multilateral organisation summed up 
the views of many international practitioners: “The challenges are to deliver on their objectives 
given low capacity” (TTD-1700-290910). The head of a bilateral organisation said low capacity 
made achieving sustainable development extremely difficult: 
 
“I think Timor is a really hard country to work in as well. It is the hardest country that I 
have ever worked in. It's because the starting base of the Timorese is much lower than 
any other country that I have worked in” (TI-1400-150910). 
 
Some participants described East Timorese as lacking in strong modern work ethics. An 
international program manager agreed: “Culturally they are not pushed to develop their sense of 
initiative” (TP-18330-200910). Another international program manager said: 
 
“Timorese people do not have a very strong work ethic. If you ask two Timorese people 
to build a ditch it will take two weeks; if you ask two Chinese guys it will take two 
hours. They have not really been exposed to what it means to build a country” (TS-
1000-220910). 
 
Conversely, some international practitioners recognised the strength and resilience of East 
Timorese peoples: 
 
219 
“I just can't believe people who survived those things and come out the other side. They 
just humble me every day. You know I meet people who go through things that I don't 
think I could ever go through” (TK-1700-160910). 
 
An international program manager points out that with the assumption of zero or limited 
capacity, strong existing Indigenous knowledge and skills were ignored: 
 
“People say, ‘Timor has nothing, it is starting from zero’. But you have the majority of 
the people who can manage to feed and house themselves. That is pretty amazing for a 
small island with a big population and not much of a cash economy. It does not seem to 
enter into people's [international practitioners’] minds” (TTU-1600-280910). 
 
Within the current development system and liberal peacebuilding model, centralised state 
institutional capacity building is seen as the solution to increase governance and accountability 
(TTB-1000-290910; TTD-1700-290910). As one international adviser stated: 
 
“The goal of development is ultimately to work yourself out of a job. Ultimately it is 
about capacitating people through projects and programmes that are sustainable. 
Capacity development is a long-term project, which occurs at a different pace in 
different contexts” (U-1800-031009). 
 
In Timor-Leste the focus on capacity building or capacity substitution resulted in a very high 
use of international advisers working within central Government offices. One international 
consultant said this approach was driven by both the Government and donors, which gave 
advisers disproportional power and influence over decision-making (TTL-0930-110713). The 
head of a bilateral organisation believed that the UN and development partners had been too 
focused on state-centred capacity building and this had skewed development assistance, and 
failed to deliver on the short term needs of a conflict-affected community: 
 
“The donors are talking about building, strengthening capacity, institutional 
strengthening…when the ordinary Timorese just want to have food on the table and 
shelter. The Timorese can't see that capacity building. It doesn't necessarily give them 
any confidence in donors. Sometimes I just wonder whether we donors were too purist 
in saying we will look at capacity building and institutional strengthening. We perhaps 
needed to focus on getting goods and services out into the rural areas for example, 
where they are really needed. I think we still would have built processes, strengthened 
institutions along the way” (TI-1400-150910). 
 
An international analyst asserted that without advisers’ humility and a willingness to learn 
capacity building has been ineffective in Timor-Leste: 
 
“One thing I find depressing is the level of engagement with local context. There is very 
little thinking about how people are writing themselves out of a job. It starts with the 
level of humility. You have a lot to learn about Timor, it is a two-way street. This 
exchange is important to set up any kind of relationship. When people have not been 
willing to do that, it can set up conflict” (TC-1500-130910). 
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 An international program manager agreed: “Money has been spent on bringing in SUV’s [sport 
utility vehicles], setting up a development infrastructure, but not in developing Timor-Leste 
itself” (TP-18330-200910). One international consultant speculated that the significant salary 
differences for international advisers were a trigger for structural violence: 
 
“Within Government, consultants are on well paid consulting rates. All these feelings 
have the potential to cause jealousy, complex, challenges, problems. I have not seen any 
processes in place at this point to manage it, I am not sure it is even acknowledged as a 
potential source of conflict at this point” (TTE-1930-290910). 
 
One international program manager gave an example of unsustainable capacity building: 
 
“Sometime between 2004 and 2006, the World Bank installed nine community radio 
stations. Project ended, they stopped funding, stopped providing technical assistance. 
So what do you think happened? Someone even stole the solar panels off one radio 
station. Without any proper training or maintenance, it was a plan with little follow 
through. That happens all the time here. It's a shame to see that waste. [You need] 
capacity building from a local level so people can take care of their own country” (TP-
1830-200910). 
 
A head of a bilateral organisation explained that advisers who stay for longer periods and work 
to build strong relationships have been more effective in building capacity: 
 
“I think the more effective advisers that we have are those that have been embedded for 
longer periods. They have built their relationships and the Timorese have been able to 
tell them about the culture. It’s also about trial and error, and learning by doing” (TI-
1400-150910). 
 
Some international participants recommended the need for mentoring instead of capacity 
building. One international practitioner declared:  
 
“Timorese are not treated in the way that [they] need to be treated by the donors. Timor 
needs very much a mentoring approach. It needs people to come and stay with no set 
agenda and spend time working with the staff in informal training and [giving] support 
to staff. We need people to come and stay over a longer period of time” (TB-1000-
100910). 
 
I asked what makes a good mentor and a UN practitioner advocated patience and learning the 
local language: 
 
“This person has to speak Tetum and can work side-by-side with the Government staff 
and the project staff. Be very flexible and patient” (TT-1500-230910). 
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8.4.4.1 Case Study: The International Labour Organisation 
 
This case study provides an example from one UN agency, the ILO, which has a focus on 
capacity building of national counterparts to achieve strong international labour standards to 
promote equality and sustainable employment (2015). The ILO has been operational since 1946, 
and in Timor-Leste since 2003.  
 
A senior ILO development practitioner explained that he was asked to facilitate long-term 
capacity building and national ownership working with the Secretary of State for Employment 
Policy and Vocational Training. He took a very different approach from his previous ILO work 
in other countries, where he had used a model of capacity substitution where typically large 
numbers of international advisers, situated in UN headquarters separate from their national 
counterparts, completed much of the program. He explained how he met this challenge in his 
own words (all quotes from TH-1700-140910): 
 
“From the first day I was determined to have a different set up. It came from assessing 
the past. The ILO is an old institution, it takes all of us a while to be able to challenge 
the institution and to fight for the things that you believe that you can do better. I have 
worked with ILO since 1984, and I [have] never been able to go as far as we have gone 
here”.  
 
He explained that the ILO traditionally builds institutional capacity through a model where an 
international adviser, based in UN headquarters, works with a national counterpart, based in 
their office. 
 
“All the UN system works in the same methodology. You have a counterpart institution 
and that you are supposed to build its capacity. Each of the internationals has a specific 
counterpart assigned and works in a specific department. So in Timor Leste, we decided 
to try a new approach”.  
 
In this new approach he asked international advisers to permanently work in the same office as 
their counterpart, and all program tasking comes from national counterparts, not the 
international advisers. He described some of the challenges to working differently: 
 
“We are more vulnerable in this approach, because something tomorrow could happen 
to the Secretary of State [who] will say, ‘sorry guys, I would prefer to do something 
different’. For the international staff, you need a special team to be able to cope with 
that. Each one of our experts [is] in the same office with his or her own counterpart. 
Each works in a mixed and messy environment. It is an integrated approach. This helps 
you create synergies between projects”.  
 
As a result of this different approach, capacity strengthening has been sustained: 
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“We started in 2004 with one single project. Today all the programs we have are 
implemented through this [new process]. I'm not going to paint this all roses and tell 
you that everything happened exactly as planned, no. But after all these years there [are] 
very good results. The two directorates today [September 2010] have 147 staff; in 
October 2004 they had nine people. Today a competency-based training system has 
been approved by national legislation. When the project finishes things will not 
collapse. It would be never possible to achieve this in these years with the other option. 
The Timorese are fully involved. Most parts of the work is done by our colleagues”.  
 
He emphasised the importance of ownership of funding for sustainability: 
 
“If we start to give ILO money, the money comes from the donor. This is exactly what I 
wanted to avoid because there is no ownership from the national institution. So we tried 
a different approach. I managed to get permission to open an account in the name of the 
institution, managed by the department, and supervised by the Ministry of Finance. So 
today it runs on mixed funds from Government and donors. You create the system, but 
you give the system to them”.  
 
This senior practitioner recognised that the regular approach of capacity substitution was 
unsustainable and ineffective: 
 
“It's very easy to go in the traditional direction. If you do that again you have a situation 
in which you are promoting capacity substitution and not capacity building. Beautiful 
things [happen] during the project, but at the end we're leaving behind very little in 
terms of capacity built”.   
 
He asserted the importance of building strong relationships for this approach to work: 
 
“All this is only possible because of the approach, otherwise you would never reach the 
level of the relationship that allows you to work from inside the institution. I'm very 
happy with this set up. We worked really on the inside; there are no tricks and no 
beautiful reports. It is very simple but makes a big difference”. 
 
During feedback workshops in July 2015, I spoke with staff from ILO Timor-Leste who 
confirmed that this radical approach continued to work well six years after my initial interview 
(TTV-1900-110715). In contributing to internal systemic change, this practitioner used 
significant personal courage, patience and persistence, and most importantly leadership. 
 
8.4.5 Look after yourself and others simultaneously 
 
Many international participants, usually at the conclusion of a lengthy discussion, were very 
frank about the challenges they had experienced while working within the current development 
system. They advocated the importance of practitioners cultivating healthy personal 
relationships, humility and the need to critically reflect on one’s practice to overcome these 
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challenges. An international adviser explained the personal implications of practicing 
development and peacebuilding in complex conflict environments:  
 
“It's kind of difficult to answer these questions without making them personal. It gives 
you, or it should give you, a sense of responsibility because you’re here, and making the 
money I make, and being in the position I am, obviously helping solve issues, but also 
creating problems at the same time [sic]” (TTN-1900-051010).  
 
A number of participants questioned individual practitioner’s motivations for working in 
development and peacebuilding. One development practitioner asked:  
 
“Are we here for moral reasons? Can it be to share our wealth? Or are we here for our 
careers and wealth and privilege? Well, what is your incentive? How much does 
development have in common with colonialism? With social engineering? People get 
upset because they don’t like to see themselves in that light” (B-1230-150909). 
 
An international peacebuilder said that too many practitioners were arrogant, lacking in self- 
reflection, self-criticism and modesty: 
 
“I think that there are still too many colleagues [who] are arrogant. They say ‘what we 
represent is good’. They don't get it that we are looking at each other, but they [local 
communities] also look at us” (Q-1030-250909). 
 
Another international peacebuilder agreed: 
 
“There are too many people around who do this work because it pays very well.  They 
never have to commit to anything or anyone and they just move from one place to 
another. It is more about the lifestyle then about the commitment to what they are 
doing. Too much of our money is going to ourselves and not to the people that we are 
supposed to be supporting” (T-1600-011009).  
 
One senior development practitioner underscored the importance of employing the right people 
to work in complex conflict environments: 
 
“You need to send the best of the best. You need to send the best of Europe, no less. It 
is complex enough for people who have the passion and ability – otherwise you are 
wasting money and creating more damage” (Z-1600-261109).  
 
As one international consultant explained, international practitioners are outsiders and this will 
always have implications for power dynamics and relationships with the communities they 
purport to work with: 
 
“Every opinion I've expressed [to] you comes from the malae mindset, a malae 
understanding of politics. I will never be Timorese. As much as feel that I understand 
what is going on, I will always be an outsider. The quicker that some people realise that 
the better” (TW-1730-240910). 
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 Humility and self-reflection were suggested as key tools to break down power asymmetries. 
One development practitioner stated, “If you do not have humility you are not doing it right” 
(G-1000-170909). A senior development practitioner added that institutions and individuals 
needed to have humility and be brave:  
 
“Aid workers need to have humility in order to not make it worse. We don't think and 
we need to challenge what is being said and done. We need to get out of our comfort 
zones. We should be brave and radical in order to create the shifts that are necessary. 
We need independent analyses, and the freedom to say it like it is. As a whole we're 
very bad at that. If you want to make criticisms we have to look at our own backyard” 
(N-0900-230909). 
 
To assist creating healthy and holistic work practices, participants recommended practitioners 
engage in regular reflection. An international peacebuilder observed, “This approach is about 
providing peacebuilding at home first” (M-1400-220909). An international consultant reflected 
on the need to constantly be self-reflective to negotiate the inevitable power asymmetries: 
 
“As an international person, you end up asking yourself, what is a legitimate role for me 
in a country like Timor-Leste? I really have to consciously remind myself to do that. I 
really wanted to be the same as everybody else there. But I am not. My skin is a 
different colour. I am from a different place. My education, my background [sic]. How 
do you negotiate that? It is all a process” (TTL-0930-110713).  
 
One international peacebuilder highlights that organisations need to employ reflective people, 
engage in ethical debates and understand the limits of their organisation (R-1300-280909). An 
international peacebuilder also explained that each practitioner must model peace in their own 
relationships and organisations:  
 
“When you are in the midst of [violent conflict], and bullets are flying, it is very hard 
sometimes to hold on to yourself. Gandhi said be the change that you want to be in the 
word, and I don't think we can do it out there unless we're doing it within ourselves. We 
are modelling what it is we want to see out there.  The problems come when we lose 
sight of these core values and principles. Conflict is always about pain. For us to come 
in as healers into that pain we need to start with ourselves and our organisations, and 
take it out from there” (L-1000-220909). 
 
An experienced development practitioner advocated individual responsibility: 
 
“It was also important to develop people with listening skills and patience to hold 
conflict and allow it to take place constructively. Today I'm going to three meetings 
where there will be a lot of conflict. I will not get angry, I will not act hastily, I will not 
defend myself. I will listen, and I will try and understand. It all begins and ends with the 
individual” (P-0830-250909). 
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8.4.6 Summary: Relationships 
 
The type of relationships international practitioners build with East Timorese elites and citizens 
are just as important as the need to build them. This evidence indicates that it is critical to 
ensure that funding or ‘partnership’ arrangements create real equality between actors, not 
subordinate relationships where NGOs or civil society are seen as beneficiaries, contractors, 
providers or implementers. NGOs, as well as the Government, need to be supported to guide 
and determine strategy and decisions, and East Timorese communities need to be prioritised as 
the primary resource and repository of Indigenous knowledge.  
 
Building and sustaining good relationships is a complex process and requires the development 
of community capacity for all East Timorese. This process needs to be combined with systems 
that support broad and deep consultation; active participation; appropriate time frames – 
particularly longer-term programming and contracting; and decision-making that is grounded in 
FPIC. The current widely used process of ‘socialisation’ to inform citizens of decisions made 
does not equate to active, inclusive participation, and it certainly does not equate to a process 
that facilitates FPIC. 
 
Trust is at the heart of building sustainable and respectful relationships. It takes time to create 
trust where parties can confidently rely on each other, understand each other’s perspectives and 
respect each other’s differences.  
 
8.5 Conclusion: A flawed development system 
 
Overall international practitioners had very mixed views about whether development and 
peacebuilding interventions in Timor-Leste since 1999 had been successful. Mixed views 
underscore the practical difficulties in measuring and reporting development effectiveness. Most 
acknowledged some successes but said there was no evidence of sustained peace and 
development. Significant ongoing violence was seen as a major barrier to achieving these goals. 
An international head of a bilateral organisation stated:  
 
“In some ways, it could be seen as a giant experiment couldn’t it?...Development 
professionals saw Timor-Leste as an opportunity to test many of the new theories of 
practicing development in a fragile and conflict affected environment…I think there are 
some successes in Timor-Leste, but obviously it has been very difficult. There have 
been significant flare-ups of conflict. It is too early to say whether this has been a 
permanent success or just part of the country stabilising” (TI-1400-150910). 
 
Others confirmed that there was such a high level of need that it is difficult to measure 
significant change. An international consultant remarked that “The effort has become so diffuse 
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and so scattered that any progress is very incremental at best” (TTE-1930-290910). A senior 
international practitioner claimed that development had occurred, but not in rural Timor-Leste: 
 
“Timor has made some important steps in progress in the last ten years [with] 
institutions and processes to deliver services to people (building from a base that was 
pretty much zero). That has been successful. But poverty, getting service delivery 
outside of Dili, can be a challenge [sic]. Those problems do not seem to have been 
turned around” (TY-1000-280910). 
 
In 2010, an international program manager declared that despite the large numbers of 
international organisations working in Timor-Leste, development has not been broadly 
sustained: 
 
“It is just kind of disheartening. The sheer numbers of resources that have been invested 
here, keeping people alive, but the proportional lack of success [sic]” (TP-1830-
200910). 
 
Many argued that aside from ongoing violence, there were systematic issues preventing 
development from occurring in Timor-Leste. An international peacebuilder recommended 
investigating the underlying assumptions within the current development system: 
 
“The premise that we have based our entire argument on may be faulty. What we 
haven't done yet it is look deeply enough and say: ‘my gosh, it's the premise’. I think we 
might be wrong about that, and we wonder why we are in such a mess. We need to look 
at the underlying assumptions [democratisation will lead to development] that we have 
made, beginning with that premise” (M-1400-220909).  
 
Participants also stressed the importance of targeting development and peacebuilding programs 
to the East Timorese context: 
 
“There is a lot of cut-and-pasting that goes on. There [are] a lot of external values that 
are being promoted: democracy, human rights, and campaigns against violence against 
women. It is not to denigrate those ideas, but there have been references made to malae 
ideas and malae people. The saturation of those kind of campaigns has probably led to 
the Timorese feeling force fed” (TZ-1430-280910).  
 
One international adviser admonished international practitioners for taking this one size fits all 
approach: 
 
“Often they provide the assistance that they have provided in other countries that does 
not fit the Timor context, despite Timor being recently out of conflict. Projects are not 
tailored to this country. That is because they are following the cookie cutter approach. It 
is the easy way out” (TW-1730-240910). 
 
My evidence highlights that the current development system in Timor-Leste is deeply flawed.  
Findings from interviews with international practitioners, who are working in Timor-Leste and 
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other conflict-affected developing countries, show patterns in the types of direct, structural and 
cultural violence perpetuated by the interaction between the current development system and the 
East Timorese knowledge systems in Timor-Leste. 
 
My evidence shows the interconnectedness between understanding culture and power dynamics, 
and the importance of building and sustaining strong relationships with both elites and citizens. 
International practitioners acknowledged that unless they built trusted relationships with 
Indigenous peoples and communities they would not access or learn about Indigenous 
knowledge systems and culture or break down the current disequilibrium of power. Likewise, a 
lack of understanding and respect for Indigenous knowledge systems could often inadvertently 
or deliberately cause or exacerbate existing tensions and relationships.  
 
These findings demonstrate that the international and elite focus on centralised, institutional 
capacity building has failed to lay the groundwork for self-determined development. Instead it 
has increased inequality between elites and East Timorese citizens, strengthening and 
exacerbating structural violence.  
 
The case studies in both Chapter Seven and Eight provide practical examples of the challenges 
of development and peacebuilding interventions and examples. Importantly, the case studies 
unpack and explore a range of ways in which international practitioners can begin to engage 
differently with the current development and liberal peacebuilding systems.  
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9 Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Timor-Leste has changed rapidly since the majority of my field research in 2010. Since 2009 
the Petroleum Fund has increasingly been used to provide the state with significant extra-
budgetary funding for development programs. In 2011 the World Bank moved Timor-Leste to 
lower middle-income country status. UNMIT completed its mandate on 31 December 2012 and 
this event, combined with a decrease in overall ODA, precipitated a significant decrease in the 
number of international practitioners working in Timor-Leste. In February 2015 Xanana 
Gusmão stepped aside as Prime Minister provoking a generational change in leadership. These 
changes illustrate a veneer of stability or violent peace.  
 
Significant development and peacebuilding challenges remain. In December 2015 the President 
Taur Matan Ruak vetoed the 2016 Budget claiming it was disproportionately skewed toward 
large economic and infrastructure projects and failed to target health, education and agriculture, 
sectors that impact the majority of the population. Civil society supported the President and 
protested that the Budget process lacked transparency, sustainability and equity (La’o Hamutuk, 
2015). On 9 January 2016 the Parliament reconsidered the Budget and unanimously decided to 
make no changes and consequently the unchanged Budget was approved on 14 January 2016 
(Inder, 2016). This incident demonstrates that elite democracy continues to marginalise the 
voices and development priorities of the majority of East Timorese. 
 
My feedback discussions in Dili in July 2015 and the 2016 Budget difficulties reinforce that my 
research findings continue to be relevant to Timor-Leste. Elites in Timor-Leste continue to 
embrace the current development system categorised by centralised state sovereignty, the rule of 
law, elite democratisation and liberal economic reforms, with the support of the international 
community. The underlying triggers for violence continue to be ignored. 
 
In this thesis I sought to assess the extent to which the current development system supported 
the implementation of ukun rasik a’an or Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-
Leste. This final chapter summarises the findings from my field research within a theoretical 
framework grounded in Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems. Under three primary 
themes of culture, power and relationships I explore guiding principles that provide practical 
steps for how practitioners can engage in systems transformation to achieve Indigenous self-
determined development.  
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In summarising my major research findings I highlight my contribution to the ongoing critique 
of liberal peacebuilding and the current development system and assert the primary importance 
of Indigenous knowledge systems and Indigenous peacebuilding practice to achieving 
Indigenous self-determination. I reiterate the enabling link between Indigenous self-determined 
development and FPIC. I conclude with brief remarks about the possibilities for future research. 
 
9.2 Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development 
 
This section identifies my East Timorese and international participants’ practical suggestions 
about how to work toward ukun rasik a’an or Indigenous self-determined development in 
Timor-Leste. These findings are targeted at transforming the practice of international 
practitioners. I hope they are useful to elite East Timorese and those East Timorese citizens who 
are seeking new ways of engaging with elite decision-makers and international practitioners. 
 
In Chapter Three I expanded on my concept of Indigenous self-determined development. I used 
the Declaration to assert that “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development” (UN General Assembly, 2007). I argue that Indigenous “economic, 
social and cultural development” is grounded in Indigenous knowledge systems, which are 
different for each Indigenous peoples. Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems are the 
foundation of my research, as discussed in Chapter Six, and they in turn are integrated with the 
three primary themes: culture / lulik, power / lisan and relationships / slulu. 
 
Table 6 (below) is a summary of the research findings sourced from Chapters Seven and Eight 
incorporating practical guidance about how to transform the current development system to 
achieve Indigenous self-determined development. Both East Timorese and international 
practitioners discussed common themes of culture, power and relationships but often had 
different perspectives on how transformation could occur. The findings emphasise that to attain 
Indigenous self-determined development there must be active and vibrant Indigenous culture 
and customary practice; balanced power dynamics that facilitate peacebuilding; FPIC; and 
trusting, sustained relationships between individuals and communities. 
 
In July 2015 I travelled to Timor-Leste and met with twenty-two Dili-based representatives 
from key East Timorese and international institutions to discuss these guiding principles in my 
research summary (see Appendices D and E for English and Tetum versions). Overall, these 
findings were well received by participants. Many appreciated the constructive 
recommendations and responded that the findings resonated with their practical experiences. 
Many East Timorese participants had never been provided with the results of academic research 
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they had participated in – particularly not translated into Tetum – and they used the research 
summary to provide me with updates on Government policy, ongoing triggers for violence and 
new areas of concern. As a result of these discussions I made nuanced changes to sections on 
elite power, gender equality, use of mother tongue languages and land. The summary below 
includes comments and feedback from these useful discussions. 
 
Table 6: Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste. 
 
Recommendations by East Timorese 
practitioners 
Recommendations by International 
practitioners 
Culture / Lulik (prioritise systems of people, 
land and place) 
Culture (respect cultural pluralism) 
Cultivate and affirm Indigenous knowledge 
systems 
Value and engage with Indigenous 
knowledge systems 
Recognise identity is plural and localised Prioritise peacebuilding analysis and 
programming 
Preserve customary links to land and place Respect connectedness to land 
Learn and use local languages and Tetum Learn local languages and prioritise 
inclusive education  
Implement targeted and context-specific 
models 
 
Deliver education for all  
Power / Lisan (seek balance within power) Power (rebalance the disequilibrium of 
power) 
Work within Indigenous governance and 
leadership systems 
Acknowledge elite co-option 
Break patterns of dependency Encourage gender equality 
Recognise corruption as both moral and 
economic 
Facilitate community ownership 
Create balance between women and men Enable free prior and informed consent 
Relationships / Slulu (work cooperatively) Relationships (value humility and self-
reflection) 
Engage in respectful and sustainable capacity 
strengthening 
Nurture trust  
Enable inclusive consultation and participation  Commit for the long term 
Design timeframes that suit communities Build non-competitive work spaces 
Draw on insider / outsider practices to build 
and sustain relationships 
Recognise and work with local capacities 
Transform the root causes of violence Look after yourselves and others 
simultaneously 
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 This guidance for systems transformation is grounded in the identification of ongoing triggers 
for violence. These triggers are highlighted in Chapters Four, Five and Six. The evidence in 
Chapters Seven and Eight affirms that Indigenous self-determined development will be very 
difficult to achieve without transformation of these root causes of violence. These guiding 
principles provide concrete examples about what practitioners, both East Timorese and 
international, can do to work toward transforming the root causes of violence and achieving 
Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste. 
 
The next section examines each of the three primary themes and the summarised findings from 
both East Timorese and international practitioners. While these findings are presented in a linear 
framework, each suggestion feeds into a complex and interconnected systems approach. These 
guiding principles are holistic, multilayered and are framed within Indigenous East Timorese 
knowledge systems.  
 
9.2.1 Culture / lulik 
 
Table 7: Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste 
regarding culture / lulik. 
Recommendations by East Timorese 
practitioners 
Recommendations by International 
practitioners 
Cultivate and affirm Indigenous knowledge 
systems 
Value and engage with Indigenous 
knowledge systems 
Recognise identity is plural and localised Prioritise peacebuilding analysis and 
programming 
Preserve customary links to land and place Respect connectedness to land 
Learn and use local languages and Tetum Learn local languages and prioritise 
inclusive education  
Implement targeted and context-specific 
models 
 
Deliver education for all  
 
Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems remain strong and are actively practiced by the 
majority of East Timorese. East Timorese people in rural areas have a stronger link to 
Indigenous knowledge systems and their Indigenous identity than other East Timorese. These 
Indigenous systems have changed over time and have been impacted by the history of 
colonialism and violence but evidence demonstrates the widespread use, adaptability and 
resilience of these systems. 
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Participants emphasised that an understanding, by international and elite decision-makers, of 
Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and the root causes of violence discussed here, is 
limited. Both East Timorese and international practitioners acknowledged that misinterpretation 
or manipulation of Indigenous knowledge systems combined with ongoing direct, structural and 
cultural violence, has prevented the achievement of development. Participants identified that the 
models used did not fit the local context and were not targeted to meet the needs of each 
different community. Ultimately participants suggested that international practitioners must be 
more flexible and understand that a different targeted approach, realistic community 
timeframes, active participation and community ownership will be needed for each context. 
Practitioners also suggested incorporating Indigenous peacebuilding practices to transform the 
root causes of violence.  
 
International development and peacebuilding practitioners and East Timorese political leaders 
must acknowledge that Indigenous East Timorese are multilingual, hold plural identities and 
engage actively in both Indigenous and modern cultural systems. National identity in Timor-
Leste is plural and fluid. It is a combination of many lived experiences and multiple ethno-
linguistic groups with different Indigenous knowledge systems and lulik practices; it is 
expressed in multiple and different ways depending on age, gender, access to and belief in 
Indigenous knowledge systems. 
 
I assert that Timor-Leste must develop a coherent, shared national vision to achieve its goals of 
peace and self-determination. There are a range of non-violent solutions to the ‘identity crisis’, 
most of which will necessitate broad community consultation and participation to develop a 
shared understanding of the future directions of Timor-Leste. Solutions must prioritise and 
incorporate plural identities. International practitioners can support or facilitate the East 
Timorese community to hold discussions on these important issues, but they must not lead or 
influence the debate.  
 
East Timorese peoples express deep cultural, social, spiritual, economic relationships to land 
and water that are ignored, marginalised and violated by the majority of elite and international 
actors in the current development system in Timor-Leste. Without a clear land policy Timor-
Leste is in danger of experiencing ongoing unresolved violence and insecurity that prevents the 
achievement of self-determined development goals. The Government should prioritise extensive 
community consultations to develop an inclusive land policy that takes account of Indigenous 
knowledge of sacred and customary land ownership and use. International practitioners should 
focus on the variety of ways they can respect Indigenous relationships to land and water, and 
work with East Timorese communities and the Government to facilitate these discussions, 
providing support as requested. 
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 A shared and inclusive national language policy must respect the colonial past, acknowledging 
the usefulness of Portuguese, but make space to prioritise the development of Tetum as part of 
building a cohesive national identity. East Timorese policy-makers can achieve this change by 
funding Tetum language development and a cohesive education policy that acknowledges 
current capacity and supports teacher training and curriculum development. Outsiders must also 
take the lead on breaking down the communication barriers created by an absence of shared 
languages by learning Tetum and mother tongue languages where applicable. Language policies 
must also support the widespread use of mother tongue languages to sustain Indigenous East 
Timorese knowledge systems. Without shared languages, both elites and international 
practitioners will continue to make decisions without the active participation and FPIC of the 
majority of East Timorese. This is a major potential trigger for further cultural and structural 
violence. 
 
My evidence indicates that there is continued structural and cultural violence within the current 
education system in Timor-Leste. This violence directly and disproportionally affects rural 
women and the poor, compounding the marginalisation of these groups within the community. 
An exclusionary education system, without free access to all levels of education and 
information, has consequences for all East Timorese citizens who are making decisions and 
choices without full, prior and informed consent. Inequality in the education system also affects 
access to and respect for Indigenous knowledge systems.  
 
I warn, however, that an international practitioner can speak the local languages, understand 
customary practices and rituals and still perpetuate the underlying assumptions and knowledge 
systems of the current development system. More needs to be done to reframe the way in which 
international practitioners respect and work with Indigenous peoples and their knowledge 
systems to transform the current development system. Failure to do this compounds the existing 
high levels of structural and cultural violence. 
 
9.2.2 Power / lisan 
 
Table 8: Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste 
regarding power / lisan. 
Recommendations by East Timorese 
practitioners 
Recommendations by International 
practitioners 
Work within Indigenous governance and 
leadership systems 
Acknowledge elite co-option 
Break patterns of dependency Encourage gender equality 
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Recognise corruption as both moral and 
economic 
Facilitate community ownership 
Create balance between women and men Enable free prior and informed consent 
 
Timor-Leste is characterised by significant levels of economic and political inequality. The high 
poverty rate of at least 49.9 per cent of the population in 2007, combined with the evidence 
from my field research, provides qualitative and quantitative data that demonstrate a significant 
increase in structural violence since 1999 (Cornwell et.al., 2015, pp.5,7). It is fundamental that 
international practitioners work to rebalance this disequilibrium of power otherwise the root 
cause of much of the direct and cultural violence in Timor-Leste will persist. 
 
My research indicates three major power divisions in Timor-Leste: between elite leaders and 
citizens in Timor-Leste; between elites and international practitioners; and between citizens and 
international practitioners. The divisions between East Timorese are grounded in ongoing intra-
state violence that has deep historical roots, with particular emphasis on the Civil War period in 
1974–1975 and shifting allegiances during the Indonesian occupation.  
  
Many East Timorese elites have been co-opted into the current development system and the 
liberal peacebuilding model. In doing so these leaders perpetuate neo-colonialism through 
policies of welfare colonialism that perpetuate structural and cultural violence. My evidence 
shows that international practitioners’ focus on elite leaders results in the further exclusion of 
community-level voices. International practitioners must understand this divide and take a 
conflict sensitive approach to their work. This involves engaging in consultation and 
participation processes that facilitate decision-making, shared management and ownership at all 
levels of the community. The continued failure of the international community to consider the 
different needs and interests of elites and communities – including understanding, respect and 
use of Indigenous knowledge systems – exacerbates structural violence in Timor-Leste. 
 
States that are signatories to the OECD DAC guidelines and the New Deal are strongly 
committed to working through country systems to deliver development and peace outcomes. 
My research indicates that this is highly problematic because the state-centric systems currently 
in place compound inequality and limit community-level participation within Timor-Leste. If 
international practitioners continue to channel funding primarily to the Government it will 
exacerbate violence. A range of options, including core funding for local NGOs and civil 
society organisations, should be considered to rebalance the existing disequilibrium of power. 
 
Participants explained that colonial history created patterns of dependency. Dependency is 
compounded by cultural expectations that East Timorese deserve compensation for their 
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suffering, without necessarily being accountable for their actions. Unmet high expectations for 
development outcomes and peace have created tensions and dependency between citizens and 
their government, and between citizens and international practitioners. Working collectively to 
facilitate community ownership, and changing the pace to fit the capacity and needs of 
communities is the best way to overcome dependency. International development practitioners 
must value existing capacities and support East Timorese communities to take control of all 
decision-making through FPIC processes. 
 
Economic corruption was viewed as a colonial distortion of customary reciprocal exchanges 
resulting in patron-client governance. Moral corruption was viewed as rife, particularly among 
elites, and both forms of corruption were considered to cause cultural and structural violence. 
Greater levels of accountability and transparency of information and education were cited as 
ways to resolve corruption. 
 
Customarily women hold authority and power in a sacred balance with men, but these 
Indigenous concepts do not equate to gender equality. Colonialism and historical violence have 
compounded gender inequality. Gendered power dynamics in Timor-Leste create situations 
where women are confronted with both ideological and physical barriers to active participation. 
Gender equality is strongly and negatively associated with the type of liberal peacebuilding 
pushed by the UN and many international practitioners and it is also associated with an 
abrogation of the customary relationships between women and men. As a result, many East 
Timorese do not want to talk about gender equality. 
 
The complexity of gender inequality discussed by participants underscores that there is a need 
to find a new way of balancing relationships between women and men. This new relationship 
will need to be gradually negotiated; drawing on Indigenous concepts of gender and how these 
concepts apply to today’s world. Education was advocated as the primary long-term method for 
achieving gender balance. Participants also underscored the importance of taking the time and 
creating inclusive spaces to encourage women’s participation in discussions and decision-
making. 
 
The majority of East Timorese communities were silenced and excluded from processes that 
would enable FPIC. Socialisation, a widely used process of limited information sharing, does 
not equate to the criterion of informed consent, and international practitioners, the Government 
and communities are not experienced in processes that enable FPIC. FPIC is critical to greater 
ownership and sustainability of development and peacebuilding interventions and, without it, 
structural violence will persist. 
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9.2.3 Relationships / slulu 
 
Table 9: Guiding principles for Indigenous self-determined development in Timor-Leste 
regarding relationships / slulu. 
 
Recommendations by East Timorese 
practitioners 
Recommendations by International 
practitioners 
Engage in respectful and sustainable capacity 
strengthening 
Nurture trust  
Enable inclusive consultation and participation  Commit for the long term 
Design timeframes that suit communities Build non-competitive work spaces 
Draw on insider / outsider practices to build 
and sustain relationships 
Recognise and work with local capacities 
Transform the root causes of violence Look after yourselves and others 
simultaneously 
 
East Timorese participants asserted that East Timorese have strong Indigenous knowledge and 
capacities, particularly to resolve problems non-violently. They agreed that there was a need for 
external assistance to achieve development, but that Indigenous knowledge and capacities 
should also be valued and used to achieve development and peacebuilding goals. Many 
international participants viewed East Timorese capacity to engage in modern state building 
post-1999 as limited. This flawed assumption of limited capacity or tabula rasa is fundamental 
to the current failure to build trusting and respectful relationships between East Timorese and 
outsiders. Gaining a better understanding of the strengths of Indigenous East Timorese 
knowledge systems, particularly lisan, lulik and slulu, can help outsiders reframe their 
perspectives of East Timorese capacity. Participants agreed that even if programs take a long 
time to achieve results, development organisations need to be flexible with their timeframes and 
conditions to build genuine partnerships. Participants also suggested the importance of 
mentoring to achieve sustainable, shared learning.  
 
Low levels of consultation and participation from both genders at a community level are the 
inevitable outcome of the current autocratic top-down governance model. The current processes 
can be viewed as merely an exercise in politicking, enabling self-promotion by co-opted leaders 
and international practitioners to ignore both women and men’s views. The current governance 
system in Timor-Leste has limited transparency and accountability, and there is marginalisation 
of and lack of respect for Indigenous knowledge by elites and international practitioners. 
Without meaningful and inclusive consultation and participation this system is not conducive to 
unity or Indigenous self-determined development.  
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Organisational structures and culture continue to be strong reasons for this lack of effective 
consultation and participation by international practitioners. Inclusive consultation and shared 
decision-making processes require strong pluralistic institutions and leaders to promote and 
demonstrate coexistence. Systemic violence can be transformed by providing regular, timely 
and accessible avenues for all citizens to participate actively in decision-making. This change 
would require the Government to appropriately resource and make accessible national, district 
and local-level governance mechanisms that encourage community-level engagement. Without 
these mechanisms Government legitimacy and social cohesion will continue to be weak. 
 
Many international participants recognised that institutions within the current development 
system are non-cooperative and highly competitive with incentives for quick results over 
sustainable, inclusive systems change. These organisational models are structurally violent, 
resulting in divisions and enmities between international practitioners and between elites and 
communities. Practitioners recommended building relationships by listening and facilitating 
safe spaces for dissent and promoting constructive criticism.  
 
In a conflict-affected environment where there is often significant pressure to deliver 
development and peacebuilding outcomes in very short timeframes, building relationships is not 
considered to be a high priority. Practitioners highlighted that East Timorese experience 
tremendous stress from imposed external timeframes. The limitations of short-term contracts 
means that there are limited incentives, interests and time to communicate and build successful 
relationships between international practitioners and communities. These structural challenges 
destroy trust and perpetuate divisions between groups already experiencing a disequilibrium of 
power.  
 
Many groups within East Timorese society, particularly those who have had less access to 
information and education, require longer timeframes to meaningfully participate. To create 
self-determining development all East Timorese, including women, youth, veterans and peoples 
with disability, should be provided with capacity support to enable their active engagement in 
decision-making that affects them. International practitioners must consider how to flexibly 
change their institutional incentives and practices to support these changes. 
 
While it is a critical aspect of conflict-affected development contexts, the need to recognise and 
transform traumatised communities is rarely considered outside the peacebuilding world. Even 
when trauma is acknowledged as an important issue, it is rarely provided with funding. 
Development actors should take note that healing from trauma is long-term and inter-
generational, and that much greater attention, funding and programming for this issue is 
required in Timor-Leste. International practitioners should provide specifically targeted funding 
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and expertise focused on trauma and healing in both rural and urban communities. Use of 
Indigenous processes of healing and peacebuilding should be prioritised. International 
participants also need to engage constantly in regular processes of critical reflection, founded in 
humility and modesty, that acknowledge our limitations and weakness as individuals and 
organisations. This approach can help to break down the hierarchies of power and build stronger 
relationships. This approach acknowledges that unless international practitioners have strong, 
healthy personal relationships and good mental health, they will not be able to constructively 
contribute to peacebuilding in traumatised communities. 
 
Relationships are always deficient when violence prevails over dialogue. One of the major 
challenges in creating effective consultation and participation in Timor-Leste has been to build 
decision-making structures that include citizens, elites and ‘outsiders’. Elites and international 
practitioners have found it very difficult to build trusted relationships with those groups in 
society that refuse to (or have been unable to) participate in decision-making processes. 
 
A key to how international development practitioners can build strong relationships and 
integrate Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and culture into their practices lies in 
the customary processes that connect ‘insiders’ with ‘outsiders’. Evidence from anthropology 
and history indicates that, to manage potential violence, multiple waves of external cultures 
have been integrated into Timor-Leste’s knowledge systems. This practice of integrating 
‘outsiders’ is a pragmatic Indigenous peacebuilding process that creates a shared common 
identity and balances power between different groups of people. Ultimately these rituals provide 
systems for communities to learn to manage change and potential violence between different 
knowledge systems. These rituals will be different in different communities across Timor-Leste 
and development practitioners should seek to engage actively with these different processes in 
each community to build and sustain relationships. 
 
9.3 Major research findings 
 
In this section I discuss the four overarching theoretical findings stemming from my research. 
The first point, which has implications for the rest, emphasises the relevance of working with 
complex systems theory to better understand violence, peacebuilding, development and 
Indigenous self-determination. Understanding how these multiple and interconnected systems 
influence and change each other is critical to working out how to practically achieve ukun rasik 
a’an or Indigenous self-determined development and peace. I also propose that the current 
development system in Timor-Leste has perpetuated structural violence, and I critique the 
liberal peacebuilding model espoused by the majority of international practitioners and 
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recommend the prioritisation of Indigenous peacebuilding practices. Finally, I advocate the 
notion that Indigenous self-determined development is grounded in FPIC. 
 
9.3.1 The relevance of complex systems approaches 
 
My research points firmly to the existence of multiple complex, interconnected systems in 
Timor-Leste. In this research I have focused on analysing two systems and how they connect: 
Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems and the current development system. I have 
particularly emphasised the power asymmetries within and between each system to better 
demonstrate how violence, peacebuilding and Indigenous self-determination interconnect. 
 
These systems are adaptive. The multiplicity of knowledge systems held by East Timorese are 
more than a binary disjunction between Indigenous knowledge systems and modernity; they are 
complex webs that include religious faiths, differing localised cultures and ritual practices, and a 
broad range of historical experiences. I do not seek to pinpoint identity binaries or to categorise 
individuals into groups, instead I actively acknowledge East Timorese peoples’ pluralist 
identities and the importance of exploring how these differences affect development and 
peacebuilding practice. My findings show that, similar to other Indigenous peoples worldwide, 
East Timorese skillfully and pragmatically negotiate these complexities on a daily basis.  
 
I suggest that systems change is essential to transform violence and achieve ukun rasik a'an and 
Indigenous self-determined development. Timor-Leste’s struggle for self-determination from 
Portugal and Indonesia, and more broadly, the international Indigenous movement toward 
Indigenous self-determination are long and slow journeys. Both journeys are characterised by 
pragmatism, and have had some notable failures, but ultimately have been incrementally 
successful. Development systems change will surely be similarly gradual. 
 
9.3.2 The current development system perpetuates structural violence 
 
I argue that international development is dominated by Western ‘cultural underpinnings’, 
clearly apparent in the international guidelines and key conventions, declarations and policies 
that seek to control the nature of, and the right to development. As a result, development 
interventions are not centred on Indigenous communities’ knowledge systems, perspectives and 
goals. Current development practice often underestimates, undervalues or ignores Indigenous 
peoples – including their knowledge systems, local politics and leadership, socio-cultural 
realities, relationships with land, and spirituality. 
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Rejection of Indigenous knowledge by the current development system has resulted in the 
failure to transform the root causes of violence in Timor-Leste. I propose that greater use of and 
prioritisation of Indigenous perspectives can help build up a more contextualised understanding 
of peace and violence in Timor-Leste, thereby enabling positive peace and self-determined 
development to occur.  
 
My research in Timor-Leste provides evidence that there are possibilities of expanding current 
development policy and practice, particularly within areas of community engagement, 
leadership and governance. However, I highlight that without prioritising Indigenous knowledge 
systems these variations or technical adjustments within the current development model merely 
serve as peripheral, superficial modifications. These changes will not result in the necessary 
systems transformation for achieving lasting piece and self-determination for the Indigenous 
peoples of Timor-Leste. 
 
Both elite East Timorese and international practitioners perpetuate forms of structural violence 
through the current development system. Many elites actively marginalise, de-legitimate and de-
value Indigenous knowledge. These elites promote centralised state institutions, elite 
democratisation and a liberal market economy in Timor-Leste and hold radically different 
worldviews from the majority of East Timorese. They have also established policies of welfare 
colonialism through the Referendum Package and the cash payment schemes, which create 
dependency while failing to target some vulnerable groups. This behaviour is elite co-option.  
 
Not all elites reject East Timorese Indigenous knowledge; some elites, including those I 
interviewed, actively promote the use of Indigenous knowledge and culture. Nevertheless, 
prioritisation of modern worldviews places enormous pressure on outside knowledge systems to 
resolve complex challenges. International practitioners and the institutions they work within 
have structural and cultural barriers that prevent them from engaging with Indigenous 
knowledge systems. These barriers include restricted timing, funding, staffing, short-term 
contracting, limited language skills, and domestic political cycles in their home countries. My 
findings show that outside systems cannot fully encompass the complexity of the East Timorese 
context.  
 
These findings indicate a deeper systemic violence generated by the different worldviews and 
understandings of violence and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. I argue that this failure of some 
elite East Timorese leaders and international practitioners to respect, acknowledge or use 
Indigenous knowledge prevent the targeting and transformation of root causes of violence. In 
Timor-Leste, this failure to prioritise Indigenous knowledge systems has resulted in great levels 
of structural violence.  
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 A key conclusion from this complex systems approach is that Indigenous peoples are seeking a 
different type of development. I have termed this new approach ‘Indigenous self-determined 
development’ which draws on elements of ukun rasik a’an and Indigenous East-Timorese 
knowledge systems. I argue that the empowerment of Indigenous East Timorese knowledge 
systems will contribute to self-determined development in Timor-Leste. 
 
9.3.3 A critique of liberal peacebuilding and prioritisation of Indigenous 
peacebuilding practice 
 
My research contributes to the efforts to critique the liberal peacebuilding model still espoused 
and practiced by the majority of international development and peacebuilding actors in Timor-
Leste. The liberal peacebuilding effort in Timor-Leste is actively focused on working within 
state systems, prioritising Western knowledge systems to deliver peace. 
 
My research found that these efforts to target and transform the root causes of violence by the 
UN, then the Government of Timor-Leste after 2002, have been disappointing. Statistics show 
that there have been measurable improvements in health, education and infrastructure. The 
continuing high poverty measures and the ongoing community-level violence nevertheless 
affirm that peace remains elusive. Some East Timorese leaders and international practitioners 
have embraced a sanitised version of the Indigenous methods of peacebuilding, particularly with 
tarabandu and nahe biti. My evidence indicates that this remains superficial and does not 
demonstrate respect for Indigenous peacebuilding practices or Indigenous knowledge systems 
more broadly. I contend that the majority of international institutions and the Government, 
rather than transforming the root causes of violence, are instead creating further structural and 
cultural violence because they overlook or do not value or empower Indigenous knowledge 
systems or Indigenous peacebuilding practices. To achieve self-determined development, 
international practitioners must holistically engage with Indigenous peacebuilding practices. 
 
Nevertheless, given the deep changes to Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems resulting 
from 500 years of colonialism and violent occupation, these Indigenous systems alone may not 
have the capacity to resolve the complex challenges Timor-Leste faces. The solution may 
require a mix of Indigenous knowledge and modern systems. This is a pragmatic conclusion, 
however I do not want to detract from my main argument: Indigenous knowledge systems must 
be acknowledged, legitimated, revived, taught and shared to achieve Indigenous self-determined 
development or ukun rasik a’an. 
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To achieve peaceful systems change it is important to consider broadly all available actors as 
potential peacebuilders. Actors that might be considered ‘spoilers’ are also potential 
peacebuilders and should always be given space to evolve. Actors must work to their 
comparative advantages: for example, churches, CSOs and NGOs are well placed to lead on 
community-level violence transformation, and related public information campaigns. 
 
9.3.4 Indigenous self-determined development is grounded in free, prior and 
informed consent 
 
My fieldwork in Timor-Leste reveals the fundamental importance of prioritising and 
empowering Indigenous knowledge systems to achieve Indigenous self-determination. Unless 
Indigenous knowledge systems are respected and integrated into all aspects of decision-making 
through FPIC processes then Indigenous self-determined development will not occur. 
 
My case study on Timor-Leste demonstrates that limited forms of consultation or 
‘socialisation’, as practiced by the Government and many international practitioners, are not 
akin to participation. Socialisation is a tool that affords communities minimal opportunities to 
influence decisions. I have provided examples demonstrating that socialisation practices in 
Timor-Leste, do not have the capacity to enable the levels of empowered community 
participation in decision-making that is fundamental to FPIC as envisioned in the Declaration.  
 
Choice and empowered decision-making are essential to FPIC. My findings demonstrate a 
number of minimum conditions needed to create FPIC. In Timor-Leste the process of FPIC can 
be enabled by inclusive access to education that builds capacities. These processes must be 
supported by language policies that maximise community engagement and understanding of the 
process, and respect Indigenous knowledge systems. Participants also underscored the 
importance of timing that suited communities and the need for accessible and neutral locations 
for discusions to take place. These processes might require separate discussions to seek the 
consent of different genders and age groups. Supporting these processes could empower all East 
Timorese to actively participate in FPIC. 
 
9.4 Concluding remarks 
 
By prioritising Indigenous voices and Indigenous East Timorese knowledge systems I have 
provided guiding principles for East Timorese and international practitioners to reassert and 
rebuild radical Indigenous alternatives to the current development system in Timor-Leste. These 
guiding principles from my research contribute to the practical implementation of ukun rasik 
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a’an or Indigenous self-determined development and positive peace. My case study on Timor-
Leste provides a detailed example of how to apply this process to one location, but I believe that 
the methodologies I have used are highly applicable to other Indigenous and peacebuilding 
contexts. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Researcher:   
This research is being independently undertaken by Sophia Close towards her Doctorate (PhD) 
degree at the National Centre for Indigenous Studies (NCIS), Australian National University 
(ANU). She is a citizen of Australia and Britain (UK). This research is supported by a travel 
grant from the Australian National University. 
 
Project Title: Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Development and Peacebuilding – a case study 
in Timor-Leste.  
 
General Outline of the Project:   
Description and Methodology: The purpose of this research is to gain a better understanding 
of what “development” and “peacebuilding” means for local people and other stakeholders in 
Timor-Leste. I will examine views on the concept of Indigeneity and how this identity relates to 
experiences of, and ideas about, development-related conflict. I will discuss with participants 
their views on how development can assist them to meet their goals, including self-
determination. 
Participants: The data will be collected during approximately 90 interviews with participants. 
Use of Data and Feedback: The data will be used to complete my PhD thesis, publications and 
conference presentations and possible future research. Written and audio recordings will be 
made available on request to participants, a summary of the research will be provided to all 
participants in English and Tetum, and copies of the final thesis will be made available through 
the Peace and Conflict Studies Centre at the National University of Timor-Leste.  
Project Funding: This research is entirely self-funded except for travel grants received from 
the Australian National University. 
 
Participant Involvement:  
This study involves interviewing people in Timor-Leste and other selected locations between 
2009 and 2015. Potential participants are selected because you work or live in Timor-Leste or 
are experienced international development or peacebuilding practitioners.  
 
Voluntary Participation & Withdrawal:  
Participation in the project is voluntary and you may choose to stop participating in the 
research at any time without penalty. If you decide to stop participating in the research I will not 
use any of the information you have provided. Before we begin the interview there is another 
piece of paper called a ‘Consent Form’ that I will ask you to sign if you are happy to be 
interviewed. If you do not want to, you do not have to sign the form. 
 
What does participation in the research request of you?: If you participate in this research 
project, I will ask you to attend an interview that will last up to one hour, held at a time and 
place most convenient to you. This will involve signing a consent form and answering questions 
about your work and your experience of development-related conflict. If you agree, I will record 
the interview and transcribe it for analysis. I will be the only person who has access to the audio 
recordings and transcripts. 
 
Incentives: Your participation will not give you material benefits such as payment or 
development resources. 
 
Risks: I do not intend to seek any information in interviews that is particularly sensitive or 
confidential. Accordingly, it is important that you do not tell me information which is of 
confidential status, or which is sensitive or defamatory. Declining participation in this research 
will not have adverse personal or professional effects. 
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Confidentiality:  
Confidentiality: Only the primary researcher will have access to the material provided by the 
participants. During the collection phase and publication of results, anonymity of the 
participants will be preserved as no one except the primary researcher will have access to the 
coding key that provides details about the participants. Confidentiality will be protected as far 
as the law allows. In publications, participant information will be attributed using a coded 
pseudonym. 
 
The information you provide is anonymous and your name will not be publically used unless 
your permission is expressly given. When you have talked to me, if you decide there are things 
that should not be written in my PhD, you can tell me and I will remove it. If you decide you 
want me to get rid of the whole recording you can tell me and I will do that. You can do this any 
time until I finish the PhD in 2015.  
 
Data Storage: 
Where: The sound recordings and transcripts and personal information from the interviews will 
be maintained during collection, analysis and preparation of results.  
 
How long: This information will be securely stored by the researcher for a period of at least five 
years from publication. At the end of the storage period the data will be archived and/or used for 
future research projects and publications to be accessed only by the researcher. 
 
Queries and Concerns: 
For further requests for information or queries regarding the study participants should be 
directed to the Primary Researcher Ms Close or her PhD Supervisor. 
   
Sophia Close: National Centre for Indigenous Studies, Australian National University A.C.T. 
0200, Australia; Tel: +61 (0)411 361 076, E-mail: Sophia.Close@anu.edu.au 
 
ANU PhD Supervisor: Dr Janet Hunt, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 
Australian National University, A.C.T. 0200, Australia, Tel: +61(2) 6125-8209; E-mail: 
janet.hunt@anu.edu.au 
 
Overseas Contacts: Mr Antero Benedito Da Silva, Peace and Conflict Studies Centre, National 
University of Timor-Leste (UNTL), E-mail: anterob@gmail.com 
 
Ethics Committee Clearance: 
 
The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee.  If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been 
conducted, please contact: 
 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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Appendix B: Information Sheet (Tetum) (translated by David da Silva) 
 
PAJINA INFORMASAUN 
Indigenous Knowledge System, Development and Conflict – 
Estudu ida iha Timor Leste 
 
Periodu Peskiza: Janeru 2008 – Dezembru 2013 
 
Detalhu kona-ba Peskizadora: peskiza ida ne’e dadaun hala’o ho independentemente husi sr. 
Sophia Close ba ninia nivel doktoradu (PhD) iha National Center for Indigenous Studies, 
Australian National University. Nia nuudar sidadaun Australiana no Britaniku (UK) ida. 
Peskiza ida ne’e hetan apoiu fundu husi Australian National University. 
 
Objetivu husi Projetu: 
Objetivu husi projetu ida ne’e maka atu hetan kumpriendesaun diak liu husi ema nia ideia no 
esperiensia sira kona-ba dezemvolvimentu-relasaun konflitu. Hau sei ezamina opiniaun sira husi 
konsetu original nia no oinsa identidade ne’e relata ho esperiensia no ideia husi ema nia 
esperiensia kona-ba dezemvolvimentu-relasaun konflitu. Hau sei diskute ho partisipante atu fó 
sira nia opiniaun kona-ba oinsa atu dezemvolvimentu ne’e bele ajuda sira ho diak hodi hetan 
sira nia objetivu, inklui ukun rasik án. 
 
Peskiza terenu ida ne’e nia intensaun atu: 
 Bele hetan kumpriendesaun diak liu kona-ba signifika saída dezemvolvimentu-relasaun 
konflitu ba ema local no stakeholder sira iha Timor Leste. 
 Kompriende diak liu oinsa dezemvolvimentu bele kontribui ba jestaun no 
transformasaun konflitu. 
 Halo mapa ba Timor-oan sira nia objetivu dezemvolvimentu, no refleta Timor-oan sira 
nia hanoin kona-ba sistema dezemvolvimentu foun no prosesu sira ne’ebé diak liu hodi 
atinji objetivu sira ne’e; no 
 Konstrui framework ida ba dezemvolvimentu politika no programasaun ne’ebé bazea ba 
sistema matenek original (hanesan Timor-oan sira nia matenek) framework ida ne’e nia 
intensaun maka atu bele sai nuudar sasan pratika nia hodi minimiza dezemvolvimentu-
relasaun konflitu no kria rezultadu dezemvolvimenetu ida ne’ebé sustentavel liu no 
kulturamente apropriadu iha komunidade. 
 
Peskiza ne’e involve saída deit? 
Estudu ida ne’e sei halo intervista ba ema iha Timor Leste ba fulan 3-4 iha 2010 no 2011. Hau 
hili ona ita-bo’ot nuudar partisipante ida potensial tanba ita-bo’ot ema Timor-oan no ita-bo’ot 
servisu no hela iha area afetadu ka nuudar ema ne’ebé iha atensaun ba problema 
dezemvolvimentu-relasaun konflitu. Partisipasaun ida ne’e ho voluntariu no ita-bo’ot bele hili 
para hodi partisipa iha peskiza ida ne’e iha tempu ne’ebé deit laíha penalidade. Se ita-bo’ot 
diside hapara hodi partisipa iha peskiza ne’e hau sei la uza kualker informasaun ne’ebé ita-bo’ot 
fornese. Ita-b’ot nia partisipasaun sei la fó ba ita-bo’ot benefisiu material ruma hanesan 
pagamentu ka fontes dezemvolvimentu ruma. 
 
Se ita-bo’ot partisipa iha projetu peskiza ida ne’e hau sei husu ita-bo’ot atende intervista ida 
ne’ebé sei ramata iha oras ida nia laran. Ida ne’e sei inklui mos asina formatu akordu ida no 
hatan ba perguntas kona-ba ita-bo’ot nia servisu no esperiensia iha dezemvolvimentu-relasaun 
konflitu. Intervista ne’e hau bele hala’o iha tempu ne’ebé deit no fatin ne’ebe diak ba ita-bo’ot. 
Se ita-bo’ot aseita, hau mos bele grava intervista ida ne’e iha audio tape. 
 
Iha risku ruma se karik hau partisipa? 
Hau laíha intensaun hodi buka informasaun ne’ebé partikularmente sensitivu ka segredu iha 
intervista ne’e. Nune’e, importante duni katak ita-bo’ot lalika tatoli ba hau informasaun ne’ebé 
nia estatu segredu, sensitivu ka hafo’er naran.  
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Ita-bo’ot nia diretu hodi dada-hikas material informasaun 
Ita-bo’t nia partisipasaun iha peskiza ne’e no informasaun ne’ebé ita-bo’ot fornese ne’e ba hau-
nia teze PhD no bele mos publika iha jornal akademiku no livru. Informasaun ne’ebé ita-bo’ot 
hato’o ne’e segredu no ita-bo’ot nia naran publikamente sei la uza so iha lisensa ruma husi ita-
bo’ot karik husu ka fó duni. 
 
Wainhira ita-bo’ot ko’alia tiha ho hau, se ita-bo’ot diside katak iha buat ruma maka la presiza 
hatama iha gravasaun ka hakerek iha hau-nia PhD, ita-bo’ot bele hato’o ba hau no hau bele 
hasai tiha. Se ita-bo’ot diside atu hau soe hotu gravasaun ne’e bele mos hato’o ba hau no hau sei 
halo tuir. Ita-bo’ot halo ida ne’e iha tempu ne’ebé deit to’o ramata hau nia PhD iha 2013. 
 
Eskrita, audio no gravasaun visual bele iha nafatin kuandu husu. Hau sei fornese ba ita-bo’ot 
rezultadu husi peskiza wainhira publika ona.  
 
Prosesu Rai Material 
Gravasuan lian no eskrita sira husi itervista sei rai iha sentral arkivu ida seguru iha Canbera iha 
Australian National University. 
 
Formatu Akordu  
Sei iha akordu seluk mak hanaran ‘Formatu Akordu’ ne’ebé hau sei husu ita-bo’ot atu asina se 
ita-bo’ot kontente duni atu servisu iha projetu ida ne’e.  
 
Iha tan buat balun ne’ebé inklui iha ne’e maka hau sei halo tuir hamutuk ho ita-bo’ot molok 
ne’e sei esplika detalhu oituan. Se ita-bo’ot kontente halo servisu ne’e ho hau, tuir mai hau sei 
presiza ita-bo’ot asina molok hau servisu. Se ita-bo’ot lakohi hala’o ne’e, ita-bo’ot la presiza tan 
atu asina. 
 
Kontaktu Naran no Numeru Teleponika. 
Se-karik ita-bo’ot iha perguntas ka interesante kona-ba estudu ida ne’e ho livremente kontaktu 
ba: 
 
• Sophia Close: National Center for Indigenous Studies, Australian National University 
A.C.T. 0200 Australia; Tel: + 61 (0) 411 361 076, E-mail: Sophia.Close@gmail.com 
• ANU PhD Supervisor: Associate Professor Peter Veth, National Center for Indigenous 
Studies, Australian National University A.C.T. 0200 Australia, Tel: + 61 (2) 6125-
9321; E-mail: VethP@law.anu.edu.au 
• National University of Timor Leste: Sr. Antero Bendito da Silva, Peace and Conflict 
Studies Center, National University of Timor Leste (UNTL), E-mail: 
anterob@gmail.com 
• Timor Leste Ministry of Education: Ms Cecilia Assis, National Director of Culture, 
Ministry of Education, República Democrática de Timor Leste, Villa-Verde, Dili, Tel: 
+ 670 333 9647, E-mail: ceciliam.assis@gmail.com 
 
Se-karik ita-bo’ot interesante relasaun ho meius peskiza ne’ebé hala’o bele mos kontaktu:  
 
• ANU Human Research Ethics Committee, Human Ethics Officer, Human Research 
Ethics Committee, Australian National University. Tel: +61 (2) 6125 7945. E-mail: 
human.ethics.officer@anu.edu.au 
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Development and Conflict –  
A Case Study in Timor-Leste  
 
This statement will be administered in English or Tetum or given orally rather than in written 
form as appropriate. If required, the consent process can be conducted orally and taped.  
 
Name of Participant: [insert as appropriate] 
Name of Researcher: Sophia Close, National Centre for Indigenous Studies,  
Australian National University 
 
1. I ……………………………………… (please print) agree to participate in this project. I have 
read, or Ms Close has explained to me about this research project on Indigenous peoples, 
development and conflict. My consent is freely given. 
 
2. I understand that if I agree to participate in the research project I will be asked to attend an 
interview. This will take up to one hour. I agree that it is alright for Ms. Close to ask me 
questions or record me telling stories, and for this material to be recorded and put in a safe 
keeping-place. I know that I can tell her to take out anything if I decide it should not be kept 
forever, or if there are things I don’t want people from other places to know about or hear. 
 
3. Ms. Close has explained the following things to me, and I understand them: 
 
a) I understand that my personal information such as my name and contact details will be 
kept confidential so far as the law allows. The information discussed will be treated as 
‘culturally sensitive information’ and will be subject to privilege from discovery (unless 
under an Australian Federal Court subpoena). This form and any other identifying 
materials will be stored separately in a locked office at the Australian National 
University. Data entered onto a computer will be kept in a computer accessible only by 
the researcher.  
  
b) I understand that I can pull out of this research project at any time, without providing 
any reason and that this will not have any negative consequences for me. If I withdraw, 
the information I provide will not be used by the researcher. 
 
c) I understand Ms Close is conducting research on the relationships between development, 
conflict and Indigenous peoples. This research aims to gain a better understanding of 
what “development” and “conflict” means for local people and other stakeholders in 
Timor-Leste, so that researchers like Ms. Close and other people interested can know 
more about how aid and development work to minimise conflict and create more 
effective development outcomes within communities. 
 
d) Ms. Close has told me that while information gained during the research project may be 
published in academic journals or books, my name and position title will not be used in 
relation to any of the information I have provided, unless I indicate that I am willing to 
be identified when quoted. 
 
e) She has told me that what we talk about will be taped, videotaped, written down and 
translated, and that I can check this to make sure that it is written down properly. 
 
249 
I have read this Consent Form and I agree with it. 
I consent to have my interview audio taped by the interviewer. I understand that the tapes 
will be stored securely at the Australian National University and will be erased at the 
conclusion of the research study. 
 
 
 
 
Signature  ________________________________  Date  ________________ 
Research Participant/Witness 
 
 OR 
 
I read this Informed Consent Form aloud to [name of research participant] and I believe 
that s/he understood and agreed to it: 
   
 
 
 
Signature  ________________________________  Date  ________________ 
Research Participant/Witness 
 
 
 
 
Signature  ________________________________  Date  ________________ 
Researcher – Sophia Close (Signed by or on behalf of the researcher) 
 
 
  
250 
Appendix D: Research Summary (English) 
 
Indigenous Self-Determination, Development and Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. 
 
The Research Problem: 
Worldwide, it is estimated that there are approximately 370 million Indigenous peoples. After 
decades of international activism by Indigenous peoples, the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2007. The Declaration 
affirms the Indigenous right to self-determination as the right for all peoples to determine their 
own economic, social and cultural development and promotes development as a primary tool to 
implement this right peacefully and sustainably.  
 
Globally, development interventions are worth billions of dollars per annum but in over 60 
years this system has not yet achieved the outcomes promised. Many researchers and 
practitioners including Easterly (2006), Kothari and Minogue (2002), Moyo (2009), Rihani 
(2002), Ramalingam (2013), Sen (2001) discuss the ineffectiveness or failings of the current 
development system. Others including Anderson (1999), Collier (2007), Chand and Coffman 
(2008), Richmond (2005; 2015), Westoby and Dowling (2009) link the incidence of insecurity 
and violence to ineffective development. My thesis investigates these issues in Timor-Leste. 
 
While few East-Timorese people self-identify as being Indigenous, scholars such as Babo-
Soares (2004), Cabral (2002), da Silva (2012), Trindade (2008; 2014), Ospina and Hohe (2002) 
and Tobias (2011) explicitly link the struggles and experiences of East-Timorese peoples and 
Indigeneity. I argue Indigeneity in Timor-Leste is reflected in strong, vibrant Indigenous 
knowledge systems and East-Timorese peoples fit most of the categories of Indigeneity used by 
the United Nations. While complex, I argue that Indigenous critical theory is an important and 
relevant tool to better understand issues of violence and self-determination in Timor-Leste.  
 
Timor-Leste is a fragile, post-conflict Indigenous society with a long history of colonialism, 
conflict and violence. Since 1999, when East-Timorese exercised their right to self-
determination in a UN-sponsored ballot, the country has been impacted by numerous 
international development interventions with mixed outcomes. La’o Hamutuk (2010, p.10) 
estimates that between 1999 and 2009 Timor-Leste received approximately USD 5.2 billion in 
Overseas Development Assistance, but only one-tenth reached Timor-Leste’s economy. During 
this period health, education, infrastructure and governance indicators have slowly improved but 
38.7 per cent of the population remain in severe poverty (UNDP, 2013). My field research 
explores the extent to which the current development system in Timor-Leste supports the 
implementation of the Indigenous right to self-determination.  
 
Methodology: 
I worked with the Australian aid program’s Timor-Leste country program between 2006 and 
2010 and undertook my PhD field research between 2009 and 2013. My research contributes to 
the literature on development through a peacebuilding and Indigenous critical theory lens. I 
draw on Babo-Soares (2004), da Silva (2012) and Trindade (2008, 2014) to link Indigenous 
East-Timorese knowledge systems to conflict and development. I also acknowledge Alfred 
(1999), Garroutte (2003), Nakata (2007) and Smith (1999) who use complex analytical 
frameworks and nuanced language to build new paths for Indigenous knowledge.  
 
I used a ‘listening’ methodology to undertake my field research with around 90 East-Timorese 
and international development practitioners and abductive analysis to analyse the qualitative 
data and build my theoretical framework. By extensively quoting my research participants I 
facilitate direct engagement with their stories. 
 
Research Analysis: 
Conflict can be positive and constructive, enabling societies and individuals to evolve to 
achieve necessary change. Using Galtung’s (1969, 1990) work, I differentiate ‘conflict’ from 
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‘violence’. Galtung explains that direct violence can manifest visibly as physical, psychological 
and/or verbal behaviour. Structural violence is an indirect process caused by inequality and 
cultural violence involves aspects of culture used to justify or legitimise direct or structural 
violence. Significant levels of direct, structural and cultural violence exist in Indigenous East-
Timorese communities as a result of historical competition for resources and power, and prior 
and ongoing forms of colonialism. I agree with Alfred (1999) and Turner (2006) that this 
violence prevents the attainment of Indigenous self-determination and development.  
 
I constructed a comprehensive peace and conflict analysis focusing on the post-1999 period. I 
found that internal asymmetries of power, nurtured by the earlier Portuguese colonialists and the 
Indonesian occupation, are at the root of many current conflicts in Timor-Leste. This results in 
corrosive relationships between elites, their supporters and the broader East-Timorese society. I 
found that there are ongoing triggers for violence in Timor-Leste today, among them: poverty; 
security sector challenges; land, property and resource use and ownership; weak, corrupt or 
inaccessible governance; political differences between communities and elites; continued 
violations against human rights; food insecurity and food sovereignty; weak justice system and 
continued impunity for crimes; lack of economic security, high unemployment, reliance on oil 
and inadequate infrastructure.  
 
My research demonstrates that East-Timorese peoples have strong Indigenous knowledge 
systems, deeply linked to land and kinship networks and ritual practices. Indigenous knowledge 
systems were maintained during colonialism and occupation and they incorporated outsider 
views into their Indigenous cosmological and secular systems. Indigenous systems can co-exist 
with modern systems but if imbalance occurs, significant violence can result. Indigenous 
peacebuilding practices of tarabandu, nahe biti, and juramentu are widely used by communities 
to transform conflict. These Indigenous peacebuilding practices are usually cheaper, more 
readily available and more flexible than modern peacebuilding practices, but require elite 
support, resourcing and appropriate legislation, regulation and education.  
 
Research Findings: 
Drawing on experiences of East-Timorese peoples I argue that the current development system, 
rather than building peace, creates further structural violence in Indigenous communities 
because it does not value or empower Indigenous knowledge systems or peacebuilding practice. 
I suggest how international development practitioners can transform their practice to facilitate 
Indigenous self-determination in Timor-Leste. This analysis highlights the root causes of 
violence in Timor-Leste within a framework of culture, power and relationships. 
 
Perspectives of East-Timorese development practitioners:  
Culture: Many East-Timorese participants explained the widespread use of Indigenous 
knowledge and culture. They hold plural identities and highlighted that until a shared national 
identity is collectively negotiated, communities will be divided. Most participants emphasised 
the sacred nature of land and described how land is crucial in forming relationships, identity and 
belonging between and within communities. They cited lack of access to and ownership of 
customary land as triggers for violence across communities and as one of the greatest barriers to 
achieving self-determined development and food sovereignty.  
 
Complex language policy is seen to be highly politicised and discriminatory toward poor and 
un-educated East-Timorese, exacerbating inequalities and empowering some groups over 
others. Without a shared language, both elites and international development practitioners will 
continue to make decisions without the active participation or free, prior and informed consent 
of East-Timorese.  
 
Power: At the heart of East-Timorese Indigenous knowledge is an ongoing balancing of power. 
Many participants cited power imbalances and unresolved conflict as the key drivers for the 
2006 - 2008 violence and saw removing inequality as central to transforming the root causes of 
violence. Much of the power and decision-making during Portuguese colonialism and 
Indonesian occupation was held by outsiders or elites, many of whom were co-opted into the 
252 
colonial system, and supported the domination of modern knowledge systems. Decision-making 
today continues to be top-down, patriarchal and Dili-centric creating a divide between citizens 
and elites. This dependence has positioned East-Timorese knowledge, skills and capacities as 
less worthy and resulted in the further exclusion of community-level voices exacerbating 
structural violence. 
 
Inequality in relationships between women and men causes structural and direct violence. It 
involves a complex cultural clash between Indigenous and modern systems. Until East-
Timorese Indigenous knowledge and gender equality is valued and respected, active and equal 
participation in decision-making by women and men will not occur. Participants also saw moral 
and economic corruption as being a widespread cause of inequality. Inclusive education was 
linked to shared language policies, sustainable capacity building and ownership over 
development. They explained that the current education system compounds structural violence, 
disproportionally marginalising rural women and the poor. 
 
Relationships: Centuries of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation has left behind 
a community characterised by deep societal rifts, trauma and historical distrust. Unresolved 
conflicts and poor relationships with international practitioners act as triggers for violence and 
barriers to effective development. Duplication caused by non-cooperation and poor relationships 
resulted in waste of finite resources and community energy. Participants highlighted the 
importance of trust, ownership and working together. Cooperative relationship building has 
deep cultural roots that lead to reciprocal exchanges across generations.  
 
Capacity was the issue that clearly distinguished the views of East-Timorese and international 
practitioners. East-Timorese believed that they possessed a strong capacity for change and this 
differed from the negative views of the majority of international practitioners. One East-
Timorese practitioner explained: “They [international practitioners] undermined our local 
capacities, our local knowledge, local experience. Humiliating people, their culture and 
identity.”   
 
Consultation and planning without any visible development outcomes creates unmet 
expectations that can lead to frustrations. Participants stated that development in Timor-Leste 
was less productive because the models used did not fit the local context and promoted 
unrealistic timeframes. Participants saw this as a systemic issue and suggested increased 
flexibility and longer timeframes. It was suggested that East-Timorese use customary practices 
that connect insiders (East-Timorese) with outsiders (international practitioners) to build 
stronger relationships and manage change and conflict between different knowledge systems 
and cultural practices. 
 
Perspectives of international development practitioners:  
Culture: Overall international practitioners raised the same issues as East-Timorese, but often 
with very different perspectives. International practitioners admitted they did not often 
recognise and engage with the complex knowledge systems, cultures and plural identities of 
East-Timorese. Many participants described their frustration with the multiple layers of society 
and identity, noting that culture was not always visible. It was recognised that repressing or 
distorting culture can lead to violence and there was a need for flexibility and time to build 
understanding.  
 
Power: While most international practitioners viewed East-Timorese capacity as very low or 
‘zero’ they emphasised that short-term interventions would not strengthen capacities and that 
active participation from communities and long timeframes are critical to achieving sustainable 
change. They acknowledged that the complex and rigid systems and processes to implement 
development can systematically exclude communities from ownership of development 
processes. Practitioners also said that gender inequality, corruption and centralised decision-
making and service delivery exacerbated structural violence and limited development outcomes. 
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Many believed that the disproportionate power of international decision-makers and elites has 
increased inequality and fuelled structural violence. An international development practitioner 
explained: “To me, the relationship is paramount. The main point of the relationship is to 
recalibrate this huge asymmetry of power”. Free, prior and informed consent is a tool to balance 
power relationships but international practitioners identified systemic barriers to 
implementation. International practitioners tended to work with elites whom they can 
communicate with easily, and make decisions, because communities were difficult to reach and 
had limited capacities. 
 
Relationships: Relationships are often seen as combative and many workplaces were viewed as 
highly competitive, preventing co-operation and achievement of shared, sustainable 
development goals. Many international practitioners highlighted the need to restore their own 
individual wellbeing prior to working in complex, post-conflict environments. They 
acknowledged a need to support safe, inclusive spaces for active participation, shared dialogue 
and conflict transformation for communities. 
 
This table summarises what East-Timorese and international development practitioners 
say needs to change to transform the current development system.  
 
East-Timorese Development Practitioners International Development Practitioners 
Culture Culture 
Recognise and value complex Indigenous 
knowledge systems 
Understand existing conflict dynamics and 
use Indigenous peacebuilding processes 
Identity is plural and localised Celebrate and engage with plural identities 
Use and share local languages  Remove rigid systems and processes 
Prioritise customary links to land and place  Learn languages and prioritise inclusive 
education 
 Respect connectedness to land 
Power Power 
Imbalance in Indigenous and modern 
governance systems causes violence  
Institutional capacity building has 
exacerbated structural violence 
Dependency is a form of structural violence Rebalance the disequilibrium of power 
Gender equality is fundamental to inclusive 
development 
Free, prior and informed consent must be 
mandated 
Corruption can be moral and economic Decentralise power 
Education supports inclusive decision-making Gender inequality is exacerbated by 
inequality 
 Facilitate ownership 
Relationships Relationships 
Sustainable capacity strengthening Recognise and work with local capacities 
Prioritise personal healing from trauma Build non-competitive workplaces 
Active consultation and participation for all The importance of healthy individual 
relationships 
Timeframes must suit communities Active participation 
Revive insider / outsider practices to build and 
sustain relationships  
Commit for the long term to enable 
sustainability 
Target and work with context   
 
Conclusion and Implications of Research: 
Not all conflict or violence that exists in Indigenous East-Timorese communities is caused by 
development interventions. However, evidence from my research indicates that there are two 
major systemic faults within current development practice in Timor-Leste: it does not value or 
empower Indigenous knowledge systems; and it exacerbates structural violence. Indigenous 
peacebuilding systems are often not supported to transform this violence, and ongoing triggers 
to root causes of conflict prevent communities from achieving their right to Indigenous self-
determination. 
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I draw on Meadows (2008), Rihani (2002) and Ramalingam (2013) to argue that the current 
development system fails because it tries to apply linear, mechanistic models to a complex, non-
linear world. I argue for a paradigmatic shift in current development theory and practice that 
engages with Indigenous knowledge systems to find non-linear and holistic solutions for each 
context, drawing on culture, power and relationships. This practice of ‘Indigenous self-
determined development’ should be grounded in free prior and informed consent and owned and 
enacted by empowered Indigenous peoples who use Indigenous peacebuilding systems to 
transform violence.  
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Appendix E: Research Summary (Tetum) (translated by Maebh Cryan) 
 
Ukun rasik an, Dezenvolvimentu no Prosesu Harii Paz Indíjena iha Timor-Leste 
 
Peskiza nia objetivu:  
Agora dadaun iha mundu tomak eziste povu Indíjena liu millaun 370. Tanba aktivismu 
internasionál durante tinan naruk mak Nasoens Unidas aprova tiha ona Deklarasaun kona-ba 
Direitu Povu Indíjena ne’ebé aprova husi Assembleia Jerál iha 2007. Deklarasaun ida ne’e 
rekoñese povu Indíjena ninia direitu ba ukun rasik an hanesan parte ida husi ema hotu-hotu 
ninia direitu atu kontrola rasik nia dezenvolvimentu ekonomiku, sosiál no kulturál. Deklarasaun 
ida ne’e hateten katak dezenvolvimentu nu’udar dalan ida hodi implementa direitu ida ne’e ho 
paz no sustentabilidade. 
 
Agora dadaun iha mundu tomak ita gasta osan billaun ba billaun ba intervensaun 
dezenvolvimentu ba nasaun sira ne’ebé seidauk dezenvolvidu. Maske nune’e intervensaun hirak 
ne’e seidauk atinje sira nia rezultadu. Peskizadór barak, inklui husi Easterly (2006), Kothari no 
Minogue (2002), Moyo (2009), Rihani (2002), Ramalingam (2013), Sen (2001) halo mos 
peskiza kona-ba prosesu dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé la efetivu. Seluk tan, hanesan Anderson 
(1999), Collier (2007), Chand no Coffman (2008), Richmond (2005, 2015), Westoby no 
Dowling (2009) mós hateten katak iha ligasaun entre dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé la efetivu no 
kresimentu violénsia no konflitu iha mundu. Hau nia peskiza investiga asuntu hirak ne’e iha 
Timor-Leste. 
 
Maske ema Timor-Leste la dun uza linguajen ‘Indíjena’ hodi identifika-an peskizadór lubuk ida, 
hanesan Babo-Soares (2004), Cabral (2002), da Silva (2012), Trindade (2008, 2014), Ospina no 
Hohe (2002) no Tobias (2011) hateten katak iha duni ligasaun entre ema Timor-Leste ninia 
esperiénsia luta no konseitu ‘Indíjena’. Tuir hau nia peskiza rasik mos hateten katak ita bele 
haree katak konseitu Indíjena eziste duni iha Timor-Leste tanba ita bele haree sistema matenek 
lokál ne’ebé forte tebes no mós tanba kategoria Indíjena hotu ne’ebé Nasoens Unidas identifika 
bele mós aplika ba povu Timor-Leste. Hau nia peskiza hatudu katak konseitu Indíjena fó dalan 
ida hodi ita bele komprende di’ak liu tan asuntu ukun rasik an no violensia iha Timor-Leste. 
 
Timor-Leste nu’udar sosiedade Indíjena ida ne’ebé frajil no foin husik konflitu. Timor-Leste iha 
istória kolonializmu, konflitu no violénsia ne’ebé naruk tebes. Dezde votasaun ba ukun rasik an 
iha tinan 1999 (ne’ebé suporta husi Nasoens Unidas) nasaun Timor-Leste hetan mós impaktu 
husi projetu dezenvolvimentu oin-oin. Projetu hirak ne’e iha impaktu oin-oin ba nasaun Timor-
Leste, impaktu balu ne’ebé di’ak no balu ne’ebé la dun di’ak. Tuir La’o Hamutuk (2010:10) 
katak husi tinan 1999 to’o iha tinan 2009 Timor-Leste simu osan maizumenus US billaun $5.2 
husi ajensia dezenvolvimentu internasional. Maske simu osan to’o billaun $5.2 tuir La’o 
Hamutuk katak so 10% mak konsege to’o iha Timor-Leste ninia ekonomia rasik. Durante tinan 
hirak ne’e indikadór sira ba saúde, edukasaun, infrastrutura no governasaun aumenta neineik 
maibé iha tinan 2013 populasaun 38.7% hela nafatin iha pobreza laran (UNDP, 2013). Hau nia 
peskiza ninia objetivu hodi komprende di’ak liu tan oinsá sistema dezenvolvimentu husi rai li’ur 
ne’ebé agora implementa hela iha Timor-Leste impaktu ba ukun rasik an Indíjena Timor-Leste 
nian. 
 
Metodolojia: 
 
Husi tinan 2006 to’o iha 2010 hau servisu hamutuk ho programa Australian Aid (AusAid) iha 
Timor-Leste. Husi tinan 2009 to’o iha 2013 hau halo peskiza ba hau nia PhD. Hau nia peskiza 
hakarak fó kontribuisaun ba area dezenvolvimentu no area harii paz liu husi análize Teoria 
Kritika Indíjena. Hau nia peskiza mós bazeia ba peskiza ne’ebé halo husi Babo-Soares (2004), 
da Silva (2012) no Trindade (2008, 2014) no hakarak atu haree oinsa sistema matenek lokál 
Timor-Leste ninia ligasaun ba konflitu no dezenvolvimentu. Hau mós rekoñese peskizadór 
Alfred (1999), Garroutte (2003), Nakata (2007) no Smith (1999) ne’ebé ajuda hodi hakle’an no 
esplika diak liu tan matenek Indíjena nian. 
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Hodi hala’o peskiza ida ne’e hau rona  istoria husi partisipante hamutuk 90. Partisipante 
kompostu husi ema Timoroan no mós ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór 
dezenvolvimentu nian iha Timor-Leste. Hau uza prosesu análize ‘abductive’ hodi análize dadus 
kualitativa no hodi harii hau nia teoria, signifika katak hau nia teoria bazeia ba observa kedas 
kontextu Timor no liafuan ne’ebé partisipante sira fó mai hau.  Iha prosesu hakerek hau uza 
liafuan barak no citacao husi partisipante sira hodi lee nain sira bele liga diretamente ho istória 
partisipante sira. 
 
Analyza: 
Konflitu nu’udar buat ida ne’ebé dala ruma pozitivu no fó dalan ba sosiedade no ema ida-idak 
hodi muda nia moris. Hau uza teoria husi peskizadór ida naran Galtung (1969, 1990) nune’e hau 
nia peskiza mós rekoñese katak ‘konflitu’ no ‘violénsia’ hanesan buat rua ne’ebé la hanesan. 
Galtung esplika katak violénsia nu’udar ita nia hahalok fíziku, psikolójiku no verbal. Violénsia 
estruturál nu’udar prosesu indiretu ida ne’ebé akontese tanba inegualdade. Violénsia kulturál 
hanesan parte kultura ne’ebé uza hodi justifika ka lejitima violénsia estruturál ne’e. Violénsia 
direta, violénsia estruturál no violénsia kulturál eziste barak iha komunidade Indíjena Timor-
Leste nia let tanba istória kolonializmu no tanba konkorrénsia ba podér no rekursus. Hau 
konkorda ho peskizadór Alfred (1999) no Turner (2006) katak violénsia hirak ne’e hamenus 
ukun rasik an no dezenvolvimentu Indíjena. 
 
Hau hala’o análize konflitu no paz ida ne’ebé kle’an no fokus ba periodu 1999 to’o agora. Liu 
husi análize ida ne’e hau haree katak inegualdade podér ne’ebe eziste nanis ona no haburas tan 
husi kolonialista Portugés no okupasaun Indonesia sai nu’udar abut ba konflitu barak ne’ebé 
agora eziste hela iha Timor-Leste. Ida ne’e hamosu relasaun moruk liu  entre ema élite sira, sira 
nia apoiante no grupu, no mos povu Timor-Leste. Hau nia peskiza hatudu katak eziste hela 
problema barak ne’ebé bele hamosu violénsia inklui mos: pobreza; problema setór seguransa; 
problema rai, propriedade no nain ba rekursus; governasaun ne’ebé fraku no susar ba povu atu 
asesu; korrupsaun; diferensia polítiku entre élite no povu ki’ik sira; violasaun direitus umanus 
ne’ebé kontinua hela; menus seguransa ai-han no soberania ai-han; sistema justisa ne’ebé fraku; 
impunidade ba krime pasadu nian; menus seguransa ekonomia, dezempregadu barak; 
dependénsia maka’as ba setór petróleu no infrastrutura ne’ebé la to’o.  
 
Hau nia peskiza hatudu katak povu Timor-Leste iha sistema matenek Indíjena ne’ebé forte tebe-
tebes no katak sistema hirak ne’e liga ba rai, família no ritual lisan  ne’ebé halo hela. Sistema 
matenek indíjena eziste nafatin durante tempu kolonializmu no okupasaun. Dala barak sistema 
matenek indíjena foti no inklui konseitu balu husi ema li’ur no adapta konseitu foun ne’e tuir 
sira nia lisan rasik. Sistema Indíjena sira bele eziste hamutuk ho sistema modernu maibé kuandu 
laiha balansu entaun bele mosu violénsia. Prátika harii pas indíjena hanesan tara bandu, nahe 
biti no juramentu uza iha komunidade barak hodi muda konflitu. Prátika hirak ne’e hanesan 
prátika ne’e baratu, fasil atu asesu no fleksivel liu duke sistema modernu sira. Maibe iha parte 
seluk prátika indíjena sira presiza mos suporta husi grupu élite sira, rekursus, regulasaun 
apropriadu no edukasaun hodi nune’e bele la’o ho diak. 
 
Rezultadu Peskiza: 
Bazeia ba esperiénsia ema Timor-Leste hau nia peskiza hatudu katak sistema dezenvolvimentu 
ne’ebé ita uza hela hamosu violénsia structural iha komunidade Indíjena nia let tanba la fó valór 
no la hakbiit sistema matenek Indíjena ka prátika harii paz lokal. Hau nia peskiza fó dalan oinsá 
dezenvolvimentu internasionál bele muda ninia hahalok hodi fasilita ukun rasik an indíjena iha 
Timor-Leste. Análize ida nee fokus ba kauza abut violénsia iha Timor-Leste liu husi haree 
kle’an kultura, podér no relasaun ema nian. 
 
Perspetiva Timoroan ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu: 
Kultura: Partisipante Timoroan barak esplika katak matenek no kultura Indíjena agora uza hela 
iha Timor-Leste. Ema Timor ho nia identidade oin-oin. Partisipante sira hateten katak iha 
sentimentu fahe malu entre komunidade no katak ida ne’e so bele hadi’a liu husi prosesu harii 
identidade nasionál liu husi diskusaun koletivu. Maioria partisipante fó valór boot ba rai nu’udar 
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buat ida ne’ebé sagradu no hateten katak rai importante tebes ba identidade, kria relasaun ba 
malu no sentimentu ‘nain’. Sira hateten katak menus asesu ba rai kulturál nu’udar buat ida 
ne’ebé bele hamosu violénsia iha komunidade barak no hanesan mós problema ida ne’ebé bele 
impaktu negativu tebes ba dezenvolvimentu bazeia ba ukun rasik an no soberania ai-han. 
 
Partisipante barak hatutan katak polítika linguajen nasionál ne’ebé komplikadu, no polítiku 
tebes halo diskriminasaun ida ba Timoroan kiak ne’ebé laiha edukasaun. Wainhira la uza no 
haburas tan lingua Indijena bele hakle’an tan inegualdade iha rai laran no bele hakbiit grupu 
balu liu fali grupu seluk. Tanba laiha linguajen ne’ebe hanesan entre sira, grupu élite sira no 
ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu sei kontinua hodi foti desizaun 
ne’ebé la partisipativa no desizaun ne’ebé la livre no la bazeia ba informasaun dahuluk (free, 
prior and informed consent). 
 
Kbiit: Abut ba sistema matenek Indíjena Timor-Leste nian mak prosesu ida hodi halo balansu 
ba kbiit ka podér. Partisipante barak hateten katak tanba podér ka kbiit ne’ebé laiha balansu no 
mós konflitu ne’ebé uluk la resolve mak hamosu fali krize 2006. Tuir sira nia haree ita presiza 
resolve uluk inegualdade mak foin bele muda tiha kauza abut violénsia. Durante tempu Portugés 
no tempu Indonesia kbiit boot no podér atu foti desizaun rai hela iha ema estranjeiru nia liman. 
Kolónialista sira hakbesik an ba ema élite rai laran ne’ebé mós hakarak lori sistema matenek 
modernu domina fali sistema matenek Indíjena. Ohin loron prosesu foti desizaun iha Timor-
Leste nafatin prosesu ida ne’ebé ‘husi leten deit’ (top-down), prosesu patriarkal no prosesu 
bazeia ba desizaun iha Dili. Situasaun ida ne’e kria divizaun entre sidadaun baibain no ema elite 
sira. Situasaun ida ne’e la fó valór ba matenek no kapasidade Timor-Leste nian, hatún 
komunidade nia lian no haburas tan violénsia estruturál. 
 
Inegualdade relasaun entre mane no feto mós hamosu tan violénsia estruturál no violénsia direta 
iha Timor-Leste. Inegualdade entre mane no feto kompleksu tanba sistema indíjena no sistema 
modernu hasoru malu. Foin mak ita respeitu matenek Indíjena Timor-Leste no mós respeitu 
igualdade jéneru mak mane no feto bele partisipa ativu iha prosesu foti desizaun. Husi 
partisipante sira mós identifika katak la’os deit korrupsaun ekonomiku ne’ebe sai hanesan abut 
ida ba inegualdade maibe korupsaun moral mós nu’udar problema bo’ot ida. Partisipante 
hatutan katak edukasaun ne’ebé inklusivu iha ligasaun ba polítika linguajen nasionál, prosesu 
hakbiit kapasidade ne’ebé sustentável no ba prosesu Timoroan sai nain ba dezenvolvimentu. 
Sira esplika katak agora dadaun sistema edukasaun hatutan tan violénsia estruturál no halo 
marjinalizasaun ba feto rural no ema kiak. 
 
Relasaun: Kolonializmu Portugés no okupasaun Indonesia ne’ebé akontese tinan naruk husik 
hela problema sosiál ne’ebé kle’an, komunidade ne’ebé trauma no menus fiar malu. Konflitu 
ne’ebé la resolve, no relasaun fraku ho ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór 
dezenvolvimentu nian sai hanesan kauza ida ba violénsia no mós bareira ida ba 
dezenvolvimentu efetivu. Duplikasaun servisu tanba laiha kooperasaun di’ak no relasaun ne’ebé 
fraku halakon rekursus no kometimentu komunidade dezenvolvimentu nian. Partisipante sira 
hateten katak fiar malu, sai nain no servisu hamutuk mak prinsipiu hirak ne’ebe importante 
tebes. Prosesu harii relasaun no kooperasaun di’ak iha abut kulturál ne’ebe naruk no bele mos fó 
benefísiu no kria ligasaun di’ak ba jerasaun futuru. 
 
Kuandu ko’alia ona kona-ba asuntu kapasidade iha diferensia bo’ot entre perspetiva partisipante 
Timoroan no perspetiva partisipante internasionál sira. Partisipante Timoroan hateten katak sira 
iha rasik kapasidade bo’ot hodi halo mudansa. Ida ne’e diferente tebes husi perspetiva ema 
internasionál sira ne’ebé barak liu negativu no haree katak kapasidade la dun barak. Ema 
Timoroan ida ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu hateten “sira hatún ami nia kapasidade 
lokál, ami nia matenek lokál no ami nia esperiénsia lokál. Sira hamoe ita povu Timor, ita nia 
kultura no ita nia identidade.” 
 
Konsultasaun no planeamentu ne’ebé ikus liu la rezulta iha dezenvolvimentu ruma bele hasai 
komunidade ninia expetativa no bele halo komunidade sira frustradu. Partisipante sira hateten 
katak dezenvolvimentu iha Timor-Leste la produtivu tanba prosesu la apár ho kontextu Timor 
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no la bazeia ba prosesu no oráriu ne’ebé realístiku. Partisipante sira haree katak ida ne’e sai 
hanesan asuntu sistemátiku no katak dezenvolvimentu efetivu tenke bazeia ba fleksibilidade no 
tempu naruk. Partisipante fo sujestaun katak di’ak liu uza pratika lisan ne’ebé bele liga ema 
laran (Timoroan) ba ema li’ur (ema internasionál sira) hodi bele harii relasaun forte, jere 
mudansa no hamenus konflitu entre sistema matenek diferente no pratika kulturál ne’ebé la 
hanesan. 
 
Perspetiva ema internasionál servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu: 
Kultura: Iha jerál partisipante internasionál sira foti asuntu hanesan mos partisipante Timoroan 
sira so sira nia perspetiva mak diferente tebes. Ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór 
dezenvolvimentu hateten katak sira dala-barak la liga ho sistema matenek, kultura no identidade 
Timoroan nian. Partisipante balu hatudu sira nia frustrasaun tamba iha nivel sosiedade no 
identidade oin-oin ne’ebe kompleksu no hateten katak todan ba sira hodi haree no komprende 
didiak kultura Timor nian. Sira rekoñese katak atividade ka programa ne’ebé hatún ka 
representa bosok kultura sai hanesan risku no bele hamosu tan violénsia no katak presiza 
fleksibilidade no tempu naruk hodi bele komprende malu. 
 
Kbiit no Podér: Maske ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu haree 
Timoroan nia kapasidade hanesan menus liu sira hateten katak intervensaun ka programa ne’ebé 
hala’o durante tempu badak la bele hafórsa kapasidade no katak partisipasaun ativu husi 
komunidade no tempu naruk mak fundamental ba mudansa sustentável. Sira rekoñese katak 
sistema dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé kompleksu no prosesu ne’ebé la fleksivel hatún komunidade 
ninia kapasidade atu involve-an iha prosesu dezenvolvimentu. Ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu 
iha setór dezenvolvimentu nian mós hateten katak inegualdade jéneru, korrupsaun no prosesu 
foti desizaun ne’ebé sentralizadu tebes mós impaktu ba prosesu hatutan servicos ba povu, 
haburas violénsia estruturál no limite rezultadu dezenvolvimentu. 
 
Partisipante internasionál barak hateten katak tanba kbiit boot hodi foti desizaun rai iha ema 
élite sira no ema internasionál sira nia liman mak bele haburas liu tan inegualdade no violénsia 
estruturál. Ema internasionál ida ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu esplika tuirmai: “Mai 
hau, relasaun entre ema mak importante liu. Relasaun nia funsaun mak hodi halo mudansa ba 
inegualdade podér ne’ebé agora eziste hela”. Konkordánsia ka akordu ne’ebé livre no bazeia ba 
informasaun sedu (free, prior and informed consent) hanesan dalan ida hodi halo balansu ba 
podér maibé ema internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu identifika bareira 
barak ba implementasaun konseitu ida ne’e.  Ema internasionál dala barak servisu hamutuk ho 
ema élite sira tanba fasil atu komunika no foti desizaun no tanba komunidade dook no iha 
kapasidade ne’ebé la to’o. 
 
Relasaun entre ema: Partisipante internasionál barak hare’e sira nia servisu fatin hanesan fatin 
ne’ebé kompetitivu tebes no fatin ne’ebé la fasilita kooperasaun di’ak no la fasilita sira atu 
atinje alvu dezenvolvimentu sustentável konjuntu. Sira senti relasaun ba malu hanesan relasaun 
kontra malu mak barak. Partisipante internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu 
barak rekoñese katak sira presiza hadia sira nia saúde psikólojiku rasik mak foin bele mai hodi 
servisu iha ambiente kompleksu ne’ebe foin husik konflitu. Sira mos rekoñese katak presiza 
harii fatin seguru no inklusivu hodi komunidade bele partisipa aktivu iha diálogu konjunktu 
hodi muda no hamenus konflitu. 
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Tabela ida ne’e hanesan sumáriu badak ba rekomendasaun sira husi Timoroan no ema 
internasionál ne’ebé servisu iha setór dezenvolvimentu hodi oinsá ita presiza muda 
sistema dezenvolvimentu agora nian 
Ema Timoroan ne’ebé servisu iha Setór 
Dezenvolvimentu 
Ema International ne’ebé servisu iha Setór 
Dezenvolvimentu 
Kultura Kultura 
Rekoñese no fó valór ba sistema matenek 
Indíjena kompleksu  
Komprende dinámika konflitu ne’ebé eziste agora 
dadaun no uza prosesu harii paz Indíjena nian 
Rekonese katak identidade oin-oin eziste 
iha Timor-Leste no katak identidade ne’e 
liga ho area lokal 
Selebra no kria ligasaun ho identidade oin-oin 
Uza no fahe lingua lokal Hasai sistema to’o no la fleksivel 
Rekoñese no fó prioridade ba ligasaun ba 
rai no fatin 
Aprende lingua lokál no fó prioridade ba 
edukasaun inklusivu 
 Respeitu ema nia ligasaun ba rai 
Kbiit no Poder Kbiit no Poder 
Rekoñese katak wainhira laiha balansu 
entre sistema governasaun indíjena no 
sistema governasaun modernu katak iha 
ne’e hamosu violénsia estruturál 
Kapasitasaun institusionál dala barak haburas liu 
tan violénsia estruturál  
Dependensia nu’udar typu violénsia 
estruturál  
Tenke halo balansu ba muda inegualdade kbiit 
ne’ebé agora eziste 
Igualdade nu’udar objetivu ida ne’ebé 
fundamental ba dezenvolvimentu inklusivu 
 
Tenke implementa no legitimisa konkordánsia 
ne’ebé livre no bazeia ba informasaun sedu 
Korrupsaun bele eziste liga ho ekonomia 
no mós liga ba moralidade 
Tenke desentraliza kbiit no podér 
Edukasaun bele suporta prosesu foti 
desizaun inklusivu 
Inegualdade jéneru mós haburas tan tanba 
inegualdade jerál 
 Tenki fasilita oinsá Timoroan sai nain ba 
dezenvolvimentu 
Relasaun Relasaun 
Tenke iha prosesu hasai kapasidade 
ne’ebé sustentável 
Tenke rekoñese no servisu hamutuk ho 
kapasidade lokál 
Tenke hadi’a no kura trauma individual Tenke harii fatin servisu ne’ebé la kompetitivu 
Tenke iha konsultasaun ativu no 
partisipasaun ba ema hotu 
Relasaun di’ak no saudavel individual importante 
tebes 
 
Oráriu no tempu tenke nato’on ba 
komunidade 
Presiza partisipasaun ativu 
Presiza haburas tan ligasaun entre ema 
laran no ema liur hodi harii no sustenta 
ligasaun forte 
Tenke fó kometimentu ba longu prazu hodi bele 
promove no asegura sustentabilidade 
 
Tenke servisu ho kontextu Timor  
 
Konkluzaun no Importánsia husi Peskiza ida ne’e: 
 
Peskiza ida ne’e la hateten katak iha ligasaun entre violénsia hotu-hotu ne’ebé akontese iha 
komunidade Indíjena Timor-Leste nia laran no intervensaun dezenvolvimentu. Maske nune’e 
peskiza ida ne’e hatudu katak iha fallansu bo’ot rua iha sistema dezenvolvimentu ne’ebe agora 
dadaun implementa hela iha Timor-Leste. Fallansu primeiru katak sistema dezenvolvimentu 
agora la fó valór no la hakbiit sistema matenek Indíjena Timor-Leste nian. Fallansu segundu 
katak prosesu dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé agora aplika iha Timor-Leste aumenta violénsia 
estruturál iha Timor. Sistema harii paz indíjena dala barak la hetan uza hodi muda violénsia ida 
ne’e no dala barak kauza abut ba konflitu ne’ebé la hetan rezolusaun prevene komunidade hodi 
atinje ukun rasik an indíjena.  
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Hanesan mos peskizadór Meadows (2008), Rihani (2002) no Ramalingam (2013) hau nia 
peskiza mós hatudu katak sistema dezenvolvimentu ne’ebé implementa agora dadaun falha 
tanba aplika hela modelu mekániku no simples ba mundu ne’ebé kompleksu tebes no la tuir liña 
ida deit. Tuir hau nia haree katak presiza iha mudansa fundamental ba ita nia teoria no pratika 
dezenvolvimentu. Prosesu dezenvolvimentu tenke muda an hodi servisu hamutuk ho sistema 
matenek Indíjena sira hodi buka solusaun integradu no kompleksu ne’ebé bazeia ba kontextu 
ida-idak. Presiza mós katak ita bazeia fali servisu ida ne’e ba kultura, podér no relasaun entre 
ema. Sistema ukun rasik an Indijena tenki bazeia ba prosesu foti desizaun ne’ebé livre no bazeia 
ba informasaun dahuluk (free, prior and informed consent). Hodi la’o ba oin ema indijena rasik 
mak tenki kaer no sai nain ba prosesu dezenvolvimentu hirak ne’e no tenki uza rasik sira nia 
prosesu harii paz Indijena nian hodi transforma konflitu. 
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Appendix F: Text of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(United Nations General Assembly, 2007) 
 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [without reference to a Main Committee 
(A/61/L.67 and Add.1)] 61/295. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Taking note of the recommendation of the Human Rights Council contained in its resolution 1/2 
of 29 June 20065 by which the Council adopted the text of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
 
Recalling its resolution 61/178 of 20 December 2006, by which it decided to defer consideration 
of and action on the Declaration to allow time for further consultations thereon, and also 
decided to conclude its consideration before the end of the sixty-first session of the General 
Assembly, 
 
Adopts the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as contained in the 
annex to the present resolution. 
 
Annex: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and good faith in 
the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by States in accordance with the Charter, 
 
Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right of 
all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as such, 
 
107th plenary meeting 13 September 2007 
 
Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and rich- ness of civilizations and 
cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind, 
 
Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating superiority of 
peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, religious, ethnic or cultural 
differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and socially 
unjust, 
 
Reaffirming that indigenous peoples, in the exercise of their rights, should be free from 
discrimination of any kind, 
 
Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter 
alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus 
preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with 
their own needs and interests, 
 
Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples 
which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, 
spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories 
and resources, 
5 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/61/53), part one, chap. II, 
sect. A. 
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Recognizing also the urgent need to respect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples 
affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements with States, 
 
Welcoming the fact that indigenous peoples are organizing them- selves for political, economic, 
social and cultural enhancement and in order to bring to an end all forms of discrimination and 
oppression wherever they occur, 
 
Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, 
territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures 
and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs, 
 
Recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices 
contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the 
environment, 
 
Emphasizing the contribution of the demilitarization of the lands and territories of indigenous 
peoples to peace, economic and social progress and development, understanding and friendly 
relations among nations and peoples of the world, 
 
Recognizing in particular the right of indigenous families and com- munities to retain shared 
responsibility for the upbringing, training, education and well-being of their children, consistent 
with the rights of the child, 
 
Considering that the rights affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements 
between States and indigenous peoples are, in some situations, matters of international concern, 
interest, responsibility and character, 
 
Considering also that treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements, and the 
relationship they represent, are the basis for a strengthened partnership between indigenous 
peoples and States, 
 
Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights6, as well 
as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action7, affirm the fundamental importance of the 
right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, 
 
Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples their right to 
self-determination, exercised in conformity with international law, 
 
Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this Declaration will 
enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, based 
on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination and good 
faith, 
 
Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply 
to indigenous peoples under inter- national instruments, in particular those related to human 
rights, in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned, 
 
Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and continuing role to play in promoting 
and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, 
 
6 See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex. 
7 A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III 
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Believing that this Declaration is a further important step forward for the recognition, promotion 
and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples and in the development of 
relevant activities of the United Nations system in this field, 
 
Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to 
all human rights recognized in inter- national law, and that indigenous peoples possess 
collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral 
development as peoples, 
 
Recognizing that the situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to region and from 
country to country and that the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken into consideration, 
 
Solemnly proclaims the following United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect: 
 
Article 1 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights8.and international human rights law. 
 
Article 2 
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and 
have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in 
particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity. 
 
Article 3 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
 
Article 4 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or 
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means 
for financing their autonomous functions. 
 
Article 5 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they 
so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. 
 
Article 6 
Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality. 
 
Article 7 
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and 
security of person. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct 
peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including 
forcibly removing children of the group to another group. 
 
Article 8 
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation 
or destruction of their culture. 
8 Resolution 217 A (III) 
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2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: 
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct 
peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; 
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or 
resources; 
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or 
undermining any of their rights; 
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;  (e) Any form of propaganda designed to 
promote or incite 
racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them. 
 
Article 9 
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or 
nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned. No 
discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right. 
 
Article 10 
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation 
shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples 
concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the 
option of return. 
 
Article 11 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and 
customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future 
manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, 
ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature. 
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, 
developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, 
religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in 
violation of their laws, traditions and customs. 
 
Article 12 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and 
religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in 
privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial 
objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human remains. 
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and human 
remains in their possession through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in 
conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
Article 13 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future 
generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and 
literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons. 
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to ensure 
that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and administrative 
proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other appropriate 
means. 
 
Article 14 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and 
institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural 
methods of teaching and learning. 
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms of 
education of the State without discrimination. 
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3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order for 
indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their communities, 
to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own 
language. 
 
Article 15 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, 
histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education and public 
information. 
2. States shall take effective measures, in consultation and cooperation with the indigenous 
peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination and to promote tolerance, 
understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples and all other segments of society. 
 
Article 16 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their own languages and to 
have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without discrimination. 
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect indigenous 
cultural diversity. States, without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of expression, should 
encourage privately owned media to adequately reflect indigenous cultural diversity. 
 
Article 17 
1. Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to enjoy fully all rights established under 
applicable international and domestic labour law. 
2. States shall in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples take specific measures to 
protect indigenous children from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is 
likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s 
health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development, taking into account their 
special vulnerability and the importance of education for their empowerment. 
3. Indigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected to any discriminatory conditions of 
labour and, inter alia, employment or salary. 
 
Article 18 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would 
affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own 
procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision- making 
institutions. 
 
Article 19 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through 
their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent 
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them. 
 
Article 20 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and 
social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence 
and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities. 
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to 
just and fair redress. 
 
Article 21 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their 
economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, 
vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. 
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure 
continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be 
paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons 
with disabilities. 
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Article 22 
1. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, 
youth, children and persons with dis- abilities in the implementation of this Declaration. 
2. States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that indigenous 
women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of violence and 
discrimination. 
 
Article 23 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for 
exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be 
actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic and social 
programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programmes through their 
own institutions. 
 
Article 24 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and to maintain their health 
practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals. 
Indigenous individuals also have the right to access, without any discrimination, to all social 
and health services. 
2. Indigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health. States shall take the necessary steps with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of this right. 
 
Article 25 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, 
waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future 
generations in this regard. 
 
Article 26 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or other- wise used or acquired. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or 
use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. 
Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure 
systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
 
Article 27 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, 
independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous 
peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the 
rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those 
which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have 
the right to participate in this process. 
 
Article 28 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when 
this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources 
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been 
confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent. 
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the 
form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary 
compensation or other appropriate redress. 
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Article 29 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and 
the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. States shall establish and 
implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, 
without discrimination. 
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous 
materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, 
prior and informed consent. 
3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that programmes for 
monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as developed and 
implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented. 
 
Article 30 
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless 
justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the 
indigenous peoples concerned. 
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through 
appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using 
their lands or territories for military activities. 
 
Article 31 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural 
heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the 
manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic 
resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, 
literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have 
the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural 
heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions. 
2. In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective measures to recognize and 
protect the exercise of these rights. 
 
Article 32 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the 
development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. 
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, 
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or 
other resources. 
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and 
appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, 
cultural or spiritual impact. 
 
Article 33 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in 
accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of indigenous 
individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the membership of 
their institutions in accordance with their own procedures. 
 
Article 34 
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures 
and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases 
where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights 
standards. 
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Article 35 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of individuals to their 
communities. 
 
Article 36 
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right to 
maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, 
cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other 
peoples across borders. 
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures 
to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of this right. 
 
Article 37 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, 
agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and 
to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive 
arrangements. 
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of 
indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements. 
 
Article 38 
States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate 
measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration. 
 
Article 39 
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and technical assistance from 
States and through international cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights contained in this 
Declaration. 
 
Article 40 
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through just and fair 
procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, as well as to 
effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective rights. Such a decision 
shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous 
peoples concerned and international human rights. 
 
Article 41 
The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and other intergovernmental 
organizations shall contribute to the full realization of the provisions of this Declaration through 
the mobilization, inter alia, of financial cooperation and technical assistance. Ways and means 
of ensuring participation of indigenous peoples on issues affecting them shall be established. 
 
Article 42 
The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and 
specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for and full 
application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness of this 
Declaration. 
 
Article 43 
The rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and 
well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world. 
 
Article 44 
All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female 
indigenous individuals. 
 
Article 45 
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Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights 
indigenous peoples have now or may acquire in the future. 
 
Article 46 
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the 
United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States. 
2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this 
Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in accordance 
with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory 
and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a 
democratic society. 
3. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with the 
principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good 
governance and good faith. 
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Appendix G: List of some of the development and peacebuilding actors working in 
Timor-Leste. 
 
Sectoral or 
Organisational Groupings 
Key Actors 
East Timorese  
Political leaders Xanana Gusmão, Marí Alkatiri, José Ramos-Horta, Ana 
Pessoa, Rui Maria de Araújo, Emilia Pires, Taur Matan 
Ruak, Rogério Lobato, Manuel Tilman, Ágio Pereira, Ana 
Isabel Soares, Dionísio da Costa Babo Soares, Isabel Amaral 
Guterres, Alfredo Pires, António da Conceição, Armindo 
Maia, Estanislau da Silva, Fernando de Araújo, Alfredo 
Pires, José Luís Guterres 
Political parties Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente 
Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente), Democratic 
Party (Partido Democrático), Social Democratic Party 
(Partido Social Democrata), Timorese Social Democratic 
Association (Associação Social-Democrata Timorense), 
Timorese Democratic Union (União Democrática 
Timorense), Timorese Nationalist Party (Partido 
Nacionalista Timorense), Association of Timorese Heroes 
(Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain), People's Party of Timor 
(Partido do Povo de Timor), Christian Democratic Party 
(Partido Democrata Cristão), Socialist Party of Timor 
(Partido Socialista de Timor), Liberal Party (Partai Liberal), 
Christian Democratic Union of Timor (União Democrata-
Crista de Timor), National Congress for Timorese 
Reconstruction (Conselho Nacional de Reconstrução do 
Timor), Frente-Mudança 
Security-sector PNTL, F-FDTL, Presidential Paramilitary Guard, martial arts 
groups, ex-combatants, family of ex-combatants 
Faith-based Leaders Senior clerics, local clergy, lay people, local faith-based 
development actors 
East Timorese civil society 
and NGOs 
  
East Timor NGO Forum, FOIN SAE, Fongtil, Hukum, Hak 
Asasi, dan Keadilan (The Foundation for Law, Human 
Rights and Justice – HAK), KATILOSA, Kdadalak 
Sulimutuk Institute (KSI) Conflict and Social 
Transformation, LABEH, La’o Hamutuk, Timor Aid, 
Yayasan Hak, SAHE, Yayasan Ema Mata Dalan Ba 
Progressu (ETADEP), HABURAS, Hametin Agrikultura 
Sustentavel Timor-Leste (Sustainable Agriculture Network 
East Timor, Justice System Monitoring Project (JSMP), 
HASATIL, Klibut Alizados Cartilosa Timor-Leste 
(KACTL), Movimentu Nasional Kontra Violencia (National 
Movement Against Violence - MNKV), Belum, Dai Popular, 
Justice System Monitoring Project (JSMP), NGOs Peace and 
Democracy Foundation, Roman Luan, Centro do 
Desimvolvimento do Economica Popular (CDEP), Yayasan 
Halarae, Pronto Atu Serbis (PAS), Fundacao Haburas, 
ETDA East Timor Development Agency, Bia Hula 
(Bubbling Spring), Moris Foun, Halibur Matenek Timor Oan 
ba Progresso (HMTOP), East Timor Agriculture 
Association, Y.O. Desenvolvemento Basico, Y. Timor 
Har’ri, Permaculture Timor, Tane Hamutuk Timor (THT), 
Father Antonio Maia Foundation (FAMF), Commission for 
Justice and Peace – Baucau, 
273 
Gender or Women’s NGO 
organisations 
REDE Feto (Women’s NGO Network), Organização da 
Mulheres Timorenses (OMT) 
Forum Kommunikasi Untuk Perempuan Timor Loro Sae 
(East Timorese Women’s Communication Forum – 
FOKUPERS), Alola Foundation, GERTAK, Asosiasun 
Mane Kontra Violensia (Men as partners in promoting 
gender equality), PRADET, East Timor Women against 
Violence (ETWAVE) Grupo Feto Foinsa’e Timor-Lorosa’e 
(East Timor Young Women’s Group - GFFTL) 
Faith-based organisations  Organisacão da Juventude Catolica de Timor-Leste 
(OJECTIL - East Timor Catholic Youth Organisation), 
Catholic Institute for International Relations, Caritas Dili, 
Naroman Yasona, 
Communications networks 
including newspapers, radio 
and internet resources (i.e. 
blogs) 
Newspapers, Radio Timor Kmanek, Vox Populi, Catholic 
newspapers, Seara, 
Youth organisations Organizacao Popular Juvente (or dos Jovens) Timorense 
(OPJT - Popular Organisation of Timorese Youth), 
RENETIL - Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-
Leste (National Resistance of Timorese Students), Solidarity 
Council, Catholic Boy and Girl Scouts (Escuteiros), Intra-
School Students Association (Organisasi Siswa Intra-
Sekolah, OSOS), Association of Anti-integration Youth and 
Students (Humpunan Pemuda, Pelaja, dan Mahasiswa Anti-
Integrasi, HPPMAI), Organisation of East Timorese 
Students, (Ikatan Mahasiswa Permuda dan Pelajar Timor 
Timur, IMPETTU), Catholic Youth Organisation (OJECTIL) 
Secret Commission of the Timorese Students Resistance 
(Commissao Secrete de Resistencia Nacionaldos Estudantes 
Timorense, CSRNET), and the Clandestine Front of East 
Timorese Students (Frente Estudantil Clandestina de Timor-
Leste, FECLETIL) 
Academic or educational 
institutions 
National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL); training 
institutions 
Diaspora East Timorese communities living or studying overseas 
during Indonesian occupation mostly in Portugal, Guinea-
Bissau, Macao, Mozambique, Indonesia and Australia. 
International  
United Nations Agencies  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), 
UN Volunteer Program (UNV), International Labor 
Organisation (ILO), UN DEF (UNDEF), UN Fund for 
Women (UNIFEM), UNMIT, International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), 
UNESCO, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World 
Health Organisation (WHO), UNOPS, UN Capital 
Development Fund (UNCDF), UN Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO), United Nations Entity for Gender 
Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) 
Multilateral Agencies and 
International Financial 
Institutions 
 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Asian 
Development Bank (ADP), International Financial 
Cooperation (IFC), Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) 
Bilateral Donors  Australia (AusAID, Australian Federal Police, Australian 
Electoral Commission, ACAIR), Portugal, China, European 
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Commission, United Kingdom (DfID), Ireland (Irish Aid), 
United States (USAID), Brazil (Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency - ABC), New Zealand (NZAid), Japan (JICA), 
Germany (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit - GIZ), Malaysia, Danish (Danida) Norway 
(NORAD), Finland, Canada (CIDA), Italy, Cuba, Indonesia, 
Korea (Korea International Cooperation Agency - KOICA), 
Sweden (SIDA), Thailand International Development 
Cooperation Agency (TICA) Spanish Agency for 
International Development Cooperation (AECID), 
Portuguese Institute for Development Support (Instituto 
Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento, IPAD), 
International NGOs  Save the Children, Search for Common Ground, 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), World 
Vision, Water Aid, Interpeace, CARE International, Fred 
Hollows Foundation, Marie Stopes International, Medicos do 
Mundo, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Centre for 
International Conflict Resolution, ICTJ, Trocaire, Oxfam, 
CONCERN, Austcare, Internews Europe, Plan International, 
HIVOS, Amnesty International, National Democratic 
Institute, Solidaritas Jepang (Solidarity Japan), Community 
Aid Abroad (CAA) Grassroots International, Just World 
Partners (UK) and Counterpart (USA) Foundation for the 
People of the South Pacific International, Australian 
Conservation Foundation (ACF), The Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Friendship Cities networks 
International Faith-based 
NGOs  
Caritas, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development Trust, 
Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Mercy Corps, Church World 
Service, Christian Children Funds, Catholic Fund for 
Overseas Development (CAFOD), Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference of Japan, YWCA / YMCA,  
International Think Tanks / 
Analyst Groups 
International Crisis Group (ICG), The Asia Foundation, 
Peace Dividend Trust (PDT), Centre for International 
Conflict Resolution 
Business firms or 
organisations (micro, small, 
medium and large) 
including resource 
extraction companies 
engaged in oil and gas, 
minerals, logging 
Conoco-Phillips, ENI, Santos, INPEX, Tokyo Electric and 
Gas Company, Woodside, Shell, and Osaka Gas, ANZ 
(Australia), Bank Mandiri (Indonesia), Caixa Geral de 
Depositos (Portugal) 
 
International Development 
Consulting firms 
GRM, IDSS, Cardno Emerging Markets 
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